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This is a study about citizen’s entitlements to healthcare, how these have been defined, how and why these 
definitions have shifted over time, and what implications they have for future health provision in countries outside 
of the Global North. It focuses on two countries, Ghana and India, which were a part of the British Empire, and on 
key international organisations, exploring changes that occurred during the colonial and post-colonial period, and 
using these to shed light on shifts in the terms of inclusion that are currently occurring within the rejuvenated drive 
towards Universal Health Coverage (UHC). A driving motivation for this work is the need to make sense of these 
present day changes, particularly those that revolve around the need to include informal workers – workers who 
work in unconventional places of work, either as self-employed operators and/or with blurred employment 
relationships – into health provisions. UHC is a term that arose out of the social democratic era, when health became 
a right of social citizenship. Yet within this model a tension always existed between entitlements to health based on 
status as a citizen, and entitlements based on status as a worker. Due to their unconventional nature, informal 
workers present complex difficulties for the extension of UHC within the social democratic tradition. This thesis aims 
to draw out and explore these difficulties, looking at both the “top-down” politics of health policy making, and the 
“bottom-up” struggles of informal worker organisations as they engage with these policies. In doing so it explores 
the tension between a model of the good society that was developed and worked well in a particular context (post-
World War Two Britain), and the difficulties and questions that arise in the translation of that model to the very 
different contexts of Ghana and India.  
Theoretically, the study draws largely on Marxist theory, in particular using the Gramscian international political 
economy model developed by Robert Cox. It is also inspired by Frederick Cooper’s work Decolonization and African 
Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa (1996), which argues that the roots of modern day social 
policy in Africa lie in the decolonization and post-colonial periods. Methodologically, the nexus of inclusion/exclusion 
is explored in this study using two concepts which have underpinned inclusion into modern forms of health 
provision: that of “the worker” and that of “the citizen.” The inclusion of both the person-as-worker and the person-
as-citizen is not a common feature in the analysis of health policy and provision, but it is the central contention of 
this thesis that keeping the relationship between the two in view over a period of time allows for important insights 
to emerge into past and contemporary health policy which are otherwise lost or made obscure. This includes seeing 
questions of public health in relation to occupational health, a health discipline which has been criticised for its 
narrow, Northern orientation, and often ignored within the health and development literature. Looking at them in 
parallel clearly brings into view questions about the responsibility of capital towards the social good. This relational 
focus is the original contribution to knowledge of this study, and a contribution to the call by Mackintosh and 
Tibandebage (2004) to add analytical depth to the study of health policy and provision in the developing world. This 
method has an additional nuance laid over it, through a gendered and contextualised analysis of the worker. Gender 
analysis here is used as a lens through which to explore the specific context of workers in India and Ghana. Primary 
data was drawn largely from archival sources, as well as key informant interviews and project notes. 
The thesis concludes that it is damaging to the idea of social citizenship to advocate for universal state provision 
without regard for questions about the responsibility of capital, employment dynamics, and the specificity of social 
and economic context. It argues that the international organisations – particularly the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) – have a potentially constructive role to play in 
thinking through forms of social citizenship which do take the above considerations into account. However this is 
circumscribed both by their rootedness in the post-World War Two social democratic model, and by the tensions 
which exist between the two organisations, which embody the tensions between the state-citizen relationship and 
the state-employer-worker relationship within this model. It argues that the relationship between the two 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
After the devastation of two world wars, the Spanish Influenza, and the Great Depression of the 
interwar years, the world’s industrialised countries embarked on the institutionalisation of what has 
come to be known as the welfare state – a state which guaranteed its citizens certain basic services 
such as health care, social security, education, and housing. This was not a sudden development – 
welfare policies had been in place in Germany since Bismarck introduced social insurance in the 
1880s. In Britain, which is the focus of this study because of its colonial history, state-based welfare 
policies and services had been in existence since the turn of the 20th century. It was only after World 
War Two, however, that these policies were systematised and institutionalised in the form of the 
welfare state. The emergence of the welfare state reconfigured the relationship between the state 
and its citizens, from one which was based on political and civil rights to one that included what T.H. 
Marshall (1965) famously called “social citizenship” – a state guarantee of the basics for an individual 
to lead a decent life. Marshall saw this third aspect of citizenship as both a development arising from 
the extension of civil and political rights, as well as a prerequisite for citizens to be enabled to 
participate in those rights. 
 
These social democratic ideas did not stay confined to the industrialised world. The great colonial 
powers of Europe, Britain, and France, influenced by a complex array of factors from economic and 
political considerations to the need to rein in increasingly unstable empire, transported (in a very 
limited fashion) these ideas to their colonies. In the British colonies, health services targeted at 
certain groups of colonial subjects (mainly workers and urban populations) had developed from the 
turn of the 20th century in both Asia and Africa, largely out of a concern to increase the productivity 
of workers and protect the health of Europeans. Between 1930 and 1950, however, there was a 
noticeably more concerted effort to institutionalise these services as the Empire became increasingly 
unstable. Frederick Cooper (1996), in his book Decolonization and African Society: The Labour 
Question in French and British Africa, argues that the emphasis placed on social and labour policies 
during this period by the British colonial establishment was part of its attempt to create stability 
through the development of a respectable working class. What the administration did not expect, 
however, was that African workers would take the new language of social rights and use it to push 
for universal rights – ones that extended beyond the very small working class. This forced a 
contradiction between Britain’s need to profit from colonialism and the need to spend on social 
services for colonial subjects. It was a contradiction which Cooper (1996) argues led ultimately to 




Cooper argues that this process of engagement between colonial administrators, African workers, 
and international organisations like the International Labour Organisation (ILO) was to create a 
particular system of entitlements, one which still influences the trajectory of labour and social 
policies in ex-colonial contexts. Indeed, over the fifty years since the major period of decolonisation 
in the 1960s, the British colonial heritage in terms of the design of welfare apparatus is obvious in 
countries as diverse as India and Tanzania. 
 
Yet the frameworks, ideas, and processes instituted by colonial powers, and engaged with by 
colonial workers, came to take root in a very different context from that in which they originally 
developed. The reality of life in places like India and West Africa did not fit into the institutional 
frameworks which had been developed in a European context. At the same time, however, social 
democracy and ideas of social citizenship inspired liberation movements in colonised countries and 
came to be seen as a model for such countries to aspire. This set up the basic tension with which this 
study is concerned – that between a model of the good society that was developed and worked well 
in a particular context (although is now even coming into question in the present day), and the 
difficulties and questions that arise in the translation of that model to a very different context. Here, 
the concepts of inclusion and exclusion are central because they help answer a basic question of 
political economy: Who benefits from social change and why? Whilst in Britain, the welfare state 
meant that all citizens had access to social services, but in the colonies this access was only extended 
to a limited number – the “terms of inclusion” were bounded (Cooper, 1996). It is these 
contradictions and tensions that have arisen in the struggle for universal inclusion outside of the 
industrialised world, as well as a contextually appropriate inclusion, that sit at the core of this study. 
 
Adopting an historical approach, this study uses the development of health policies and services in 
Britain and two of its old colonies, India and Ghana (Gold Coast), to explore these tensions. It does 
this by looking at how the terms of inclusion into health policies and services have been defined, 
how these definitions have related to the dominant power structures of the time, how and why 
these definitions have shifted over time, and what implications these shifts have for future health 
provision in countries outside of the Global North. In this way it is primarily a study in policy 
discourse, rather than a study of how policy plays out on the ground.  
 
In exploring the nexus of inclusion/exclusion, this study uses two concepts which have underpinned 
inclusion into modern forms of health provision: that of “the worker” and that of “the citizen.” The 
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inclusion of both the “the worker” and “the citizen” as a focus in this analysis is not a common 
feature in the analysis of health policy and provision (historical or otherwise). The academic health 
literature especially that which applies to the developing world, has focused largely on either the 
worker or the citizen. Here, academic scholarship has tended to follow the emphasis of policy itself. 
For example, studies of and references to the health of workers are common within the literature on 
colonial health service provision (Freund, 1981; Crisp, 1984; Dumett, 1993; Hewa, 1995; Behal, 
2006), following the emphasis that colonial governments placed on health services as a way in which 
to ensure the efficiency of labour. Once health care became a right of citizenship after 
independence, a right guaranteed by the state, citizenship became the basis on which to evaluate 
health policy. The place of the worker and of the employment relationship in these discussions has 
been muted, if not totally absent. 
 
What this focus on citizenship alone often obscures, though, is the fact that social provision during 
Marshall’s time was built on specific assumptions about the labour market and employment (Lund, 
2009). The Beveridge Report, commissioned in 1941 by the British government and published in 
1942, laid the basis for Britain’s post-war social security scheme and greatly influenced the nature of 
social provision in Britain’s colonies. Underlying Beveridge’s model was an assumption about the 
labour regime which continues to inform the making of present day social policies, that is the wide 
availability of formal employment. Glennerster and Evans (1994: 58) state: 
At the heart of Beveridge's thinking was a contradictory struggle between his deep desire to 
cover everything and everyone without a means test and his choice of method, contributory 
insurance through employment. He wished to give security to all, but to base this security, 
apart from family allowances on participation in the labour market. 
 
Social security in Britain was accessed through employment, with a much smaller amount set aside 
for providing social assistance to those who, for various reasons, could not find work. Employment 
was central to citizenship. 
 
Admittedly, British health institutions did operate differently. The post-World War Two National 
Health Service, funded through general taxation, was a free service to all regardless of employment 
status. However, even then the provision of universally free health care was only possible because of 
the large tax base on which it was built, which in turn relied on the fact that most men would be 
employed and able to take care of their household. More directly connected to employment was the 
other European model of health care provision – the Bismarckian social insurance model, funded 
through payroll taxes and employer contributions. Both of these European models of health care 
provision have profoundly influenced the development of health policy in the developing world since 
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the period of widespread decolonisation during the 1950s and 1960s, and continue to do so. Yet the 
labour market context into which these models were inserted was a very different one from that in 
which they originated, and here arises the central problem which this thesis seeks to explore. 
 
The employment relationship on which the welfare states of Europe were built was one where 
employer-employee relationships were clearly defined and relatively easy to regulate. In the 
developing world employment has always been structured differently and continues to be so. As the 
early chapters of this thesis will show, what has now come to be called informal employment has in 
fact been the dominant form of employment for large numbers of workers, particularly women 
workers, in the Global South. Informal employment is characterised by low earnings, high levels of 
self-employment, and blurred employment relationships (Chen, 2012a). It is made up of 
“unconventional” employment sectors like self-employed agricultural work, market trading, street 
vending, home based piece rate work, and waste picking. This has important implications for social 
provision and the terms in which people are able to access their social rights. It poses a conceptual 
challenge to the frameworks exported from Europe. Informal workers cannot be taxed in the same 
way that formal workers can be taxed, and it is often difficult to identify employers through whom 
social protections can be acquired by workers. Large numbers of informal workers therefore 
challenge the relationship between citizenship and employment, and it is with this point that those 
who influence the making of policy in developing countries have had to grapple. 
 
Of course for many years economic and social policies in many developing countries chose not to 
deal with this issue at all. The modernist, industrialist outlook of the post-independence period 
produced the predominant view that the informal economy was a temporary phase through which 
developing countries would have to pass on their way to industrialisation and modernised 
economies. It was seen as the “traditional sector” which would, with time, be absorbed by the 
modern one (Bangasser, 2000; Breman, 2003). Those who earned their living in the informal 
economy were largely ignored by politicians and bureaucrats whose ideas were informed by this 
modernist vision. When they were not being ignored, they were actively discriminated against 
(Robertson, 1983). This began to change after the economic crises of the late 1970s. The social, 
political, and economic adjustments that ensued allowed a new understanding of the informal 
economy to emerge, one which increasingly accepted the fact that the informal economy was not a 
transient phenomenon, and, under the influence of globalisation, was in fact increasing in size rather 
than decreasing (Chen, 2012a). This in turn has placed pressure on governments to consider ways in 
which workers in the informal economy can be included in social programmes; the key question is 
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how to adapt policies and institutions to a very different labour regime from that in which such 
policies originally developed.  
 
In terms of health specifically, the result of this re-thinking has led to a number of “institutional 
innovations.” This has been the case both for occupational health – the discipline and practice 
concerned with workplace health and safety – and for the general provision of health services to 
citizens. In Brazil and Thailand there are moves to integrate occupational health services for informal 
workers into basic primary health care, as a way in which to circumvent the more narrow focus of 
labour departments on formal labour and workplace regulation alone (Santana et al., 2011; Alfers 
and Lund, 2012). There have also been attempts to devise ways to include informal workers in social 
health insurance schemes, the Ghana National Health Insurance Scheme being one of the better 
known examples (Alfers, 2013).  There are therefore interesting processes of institutional reform 
taking place in social policy circles around the world, and a policy-oriented academic literature has 
developed around this process (Barten et al., 1996; Loewenson, 1998; Lund and Srinivas, 2000; 
Barrientos and Ware Barrientos, 2002; Alfers, 2013; London, nd).  
 
As with any process of reform there are political and economic interests which underpin certain 
moves that are made and positions that are adopted. Whilst gains may be made for some through 
these reforms, others might lose out. Evaluating who gains what and why is the classic question of 
political economy, one which aims to “make sense” of what happens when such moves are made by 
particular interest groups (Bakker, 2007). Yet much of the current literature on the policy reforms 
that are happening around the informal economy lacks a solid evaluation of the political economy of 
reform. This is particularly so in the health literature, which tends to be dominated by economists 
and medical professionals rather than historians and political scientists.  Moreover, it tends to be 
located firmly in the present, and leaves little space for examination of the historical processes that 
have led up to the present institutional configurations. Yet, as Bakker (2007: 541) has argued, 
adopting an historical approach can deepen our understanding of institutional reform, by making 
“sense of the changing ontology of the global political economy” out of which it has arisen. 
 
This thesis then aims to contribute to the emerging literature on health reform and informal 
employment. It is based on the assumption that in order to properly make sense of the institutional 
reforms that are currently happening, we first have to look at the past. Only in this way is it possible 
to get a fuller picture of what is being gained and by whom, and what is being lost and by whom. 
Furthermore, it takes the position that this understanding must be informed by considering the 
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changing position of the worker in relation to the citizen within health policy. As discussed above, 
the citizen as worker has been integral to the development of social policy in its post-World War 
Two form, and therefore in the spread of such policies to the developing world. The changes that are 
happening now are largely informed, at least implicitly, by the fact that this relationship is being 
reconfigured by global political and economic processes. Understanding the shifts that have 
occurred in the relationship between people’s status as workers and their status as citizens is 
therefore central to understanding the current conjuncture.  
 
Time and Place 
Before moving onto a review of existing literature, it is necessary to clarify the time and place in 
which the thesis is situated. The two issues are linked, and it is perhaps most appropriate to start 
with the geographical places on which the thesis focuses, as this simultaneously provides 
justification for the timeframes that have been chosen. Geographical location operates on a number 
of levels within this work. On one level, the focus is on policy making and institution building 
processes that occur on a level that transcends the national – at first on the dynamics of the British 
Empire, and later on the dynamics of the post-war international institutions, in particular the World 
Health Organisation (WHO), the International Labour Organisation (ILO), and, at a later stage, the 
World Bank. This broad perspective conflicts somewhat with a current consensus that specificity is 
important – that one cannot paint the experiences of the entire Global South in one shade, and that 
politics plays out in very different ways in different contexts, even within the British Empire itself 
(Eckert, 2004). It is certainly difficult to disagree with this argument. Yet, at the same time it became 
clear when searching through colonial documents in particular that there were very obvious patterns 
that emerged across colonies in terms of the framing of health policies and practices – policies 
influenced by Empire-wide processes and ideas. Cooper (1996: xii) was prompted by a similar 
realisation to broaden his study of labour strikes in Mombasa to an Africa-wide (including French 
Africa) study of labour when he “became convinced that Mombasa could not be understood simply 
by studying Mombasa. British rulers could easily have dealt with this city by other means had 
officials not been thinking in terms of the entire empire.” 
 
Likewise within health policy specifically, whilst it is true that in different colonies different 
personalities and attitudes might have led to variation (for example the progressive Governor of the 
Gold Coast between 1919 and 1928, Sir Gordon Guggisberg, ensured that this relatively prosperous 
colony was well resourced in terms of social services), the framing of “the possible” was indeed 
empire wide in scope. This is reflected in the institutional make up of social and labour policies 
across the Commonwealth, which often show a remarkably similar structure, closely linked to their 
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colonial heritage. Ahuja (2007) refers to these state institutions as the institutional “ligaments that 
helped make the Empire a thinkable whole.” These ligaments bring countries which may have little 
in common socially, economically, or culturally, into a relationship with one another. They have also 
inspired interesting trans-territorial comparative studies such as that edited by Hay and Craven 
(2004) which examines the workings of Master and Servant laws from the 1500s when it was first 
implemented in England, to its final form as colonial legislation abolished as late as the 1960s. 
 
This internationalised approach extends into the analysis of the post-colonial period in Chapters Four 
and Five, which concentrate on the international organisations attached to the United Nations – the 
WHO and the ILO. As already mentioned in the literature review, health policy in particular has been 
a highly internationalised field since the post-war period. Amrith (2006), for example, began his 
study of post-colonial health interventions as a study of India specifically, but found that the ideas 
which ultimately informed what happened in India were so closely tied to international processes 
and connections that he was forced to broaden his study to a pan-Asian focus. An interesting point 
here is that these international organisations were themselves influenced by colonial thought. Many 
of the colonial officials involved in the last days of the empire went on to act as consultants for the 
UN organisations, reinforcing, under the guise of development, what colonial administrations had 
started, but also coming into contact with specialists from the USA with different ideas that brought 
to the fore underlying conflicts that are discussed further in Chapter Five. 
 
Yet the fact cannot be escaped that empire wide or international policies had to play themselves out 
in particular national contexts, with all the added complexity that this entails. For this reason, this 
thesis shifts between a focus on broader international concerns, and on the ways in which these play 
out in the arena of national politics in two countries: India and Ghana (formerly the Gold Coast). In 
doing so, it again follows the lead of Cooper (1996: xii), who states that: 
The risk of any study this broad is that the variety of contexts which both shape and were 
shaped by colonial regimes disappears into empty acknowledgements of variation and 
complexity. I have tried to confront this problem by frequent changes of focus moving from 
the Ivory Coast in the days of the forced labour debates on francophone African to Dakar 
when taming urban strikers became the issue, to Mombasa or the Copperbelt to talk about 
stabilisation, to the Gold Coast to look at the relief with which British officials greeted 
Nkrumah’s efforts to discipline the Gold Coast labour movement. 
 
The tension that must be preserved is between painting such broad strokes that variation is 




India and Ghana have been chosen for a number of specific reasons. Firstly, they are of course both 
different and similar to one another, and because of this they are able to both represent the 
divergence of national experience and the similarities. India was the first and largest colony of the 
British Empire, with the establishment of the Raj in 1858. It was also the most industrialised, and 
therefore had the most developed industrial health system of all of Britain’s colonies by the late 
colonial period. It was where the British began their experiments in setting up colonial 
administration, experiments which, as Chapter Two will show, informed the development of state 
institutions in Britain’s African colonies. If the intention is to look at the development of empire-wide 
ideas, then India is a logical starting point. The choice of India as a location also helps to determine 
the start date of the thesis: the first work-related health policies in the British Empire were 
implemented in the 1860s in India, and it is this date that is therefore taken as the starting point. 
Ghana, on the other hand, was and is a much smaller country than India, and it became a British 
colony much later – it was consolidated as a colony only in 1901. Needless to say, was and is very 
different culturally from India. The colonial economy focused largely on gold mining and indigenous 
cocoa production. Although attempts were made to industrialise under Nkrumah, ultimately the 
country has remained locked into an economy based on primary production. 
 
Nevertheless, the two countries have some important things in common. Their state institutional 
frameworks for health provision, particularly workers’ health, are very similar, emphasising the fact 
that the colonial ligaments tied together these very different places. Although Ghana was small and 
relatively non-industrialised, it was the jewel in the West African crown, and its institutional 
infrastructure was relatively advanced by African standards. Furthermore, both countries have, and 
have always had, a large population of workers (particularly women) who operated and continue to 
operate outside of labour legislation – workers who today are called informal workers. In both 
Ghana and India, the figures for informal employment sit between 80 and 90 percent of the working 
population. The point of the thesis is to interrogate how the recognition of this informality has 
impacted on the place of the worker in relation to the citizen within health policy, and it is thus 
important to look at countries with high levels of informality. 
 
There is also a very practical reason for choosing these countries. As mentioned in the literature 
review, histories of public health in the Global South abound during the colonial period, but are 
much sparser when it comes to the post-colonial period. When it comes to occupational health, 
almost nothing has been written in relation to the Global South. There are very real constraints 
which have contributed to this. To write the internationalised history of public health in the post-
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colonial world (as Amrith, 2006 discovered) requires visiting numerous archives – from the World 
Health Organisation in Geneva, to the Rockefeller Foundation in New York, to the Wellcome Trust 
Archive in London. When it comes to occupational health, there is the added problem of a dearth of 
documentary evidence. Occupational health is a neglected topic in the Global South, and the archival 
material reflects this. This thesis has pieced together fragments of the documentation that is 
available from nine different archives located in London, Cambridge, Oxford, Warwick, Geneva, and 
Accra. In this context it has been necessary to focus on what is available, and here both Ghana and 
India reveal themselves as fortunate choices. If India was the original “pathogenic heart of darkness” 
as Amrith (2006) contends, the Gold Coast, once known as “the white man’s graveyard” was equally 
so.  Both countries attracted the attention of the colonial medical services, and fortunately much of 
this documentary heritage survives in the Indian Office Records at the British Library in London, the 
Colonial Office Records at Kew Gardens, and in the documents at the National Archive of Ghana in 
Accra. Where necessary, examples from other countries – particularly those in East and Southern 
Africa – have been drawn on where relevant.   
 
Writing about Health and Labour: Past and Present 
By focusing on the shifting relationship between the worker and the citizen in health policy and 
provision, this thesis sits at an intersection of the existing scholarship on the history of health and 
labour history. The following section provides a review of literature drawn from both of these 
academic disciplines in order to ground the thesis in its intellectual precursors and to point out the 
gaps that it aims to fill. The provision of health services, the policies on which this provision has been 
built, and the politics which has informed and structured such policies, have all been analysed from a 
number of different perspectives. For the purposes of analysis, this review section will divide the 
health literature into three areas: colonial, post-colonial, and present day literature. Labour history is 
a similarly large field to tackle. This review will focus largely on the literature which relates to the 
health of labour, but will also examine some important work on labour and social policy more 
generally.  
 
The Health Literature 
Notable authors who have tackled the subject of health under British colonial administration include 
Maynard Swanson (1977), Shula Marks (1987, 2000), Randall Packard (1989a, 1989b, 1993), Meghan 
Vaughan (1991), Phillip Curtin (1992), and David Arnold (1993). Their work has covered a wide 
variety of health-related topics, ranging from a focus on particular diseases, to analyses of the 
constitution of medical knowledge within a colonial context, to the use of health policies and 
practices to enforce colonial discipline on the subjects of the British Empire. Although these authors 
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cannot be classed within a single theoretical tradition, there is a common thread which runs through 
the body of work: it is the idea that colonial medical knowledge, practices, and policies were 
produced by colonial power, and in turn, reproduced that power amongst colonial societies 
(Vaughan, 1991). The emphasis has therefore been on revealing and unravelling how seemingly 
apolitical scientific and technical institutions were in fact deeply entwined in the power relations of 
the British Empire. 
 
Earlier works, particularly those by Marks, Packard, and De Beer (1984), used an overtly materialist, 
Marxist political economy in their approach, embedding their study of health within the wider 
framework of capitalist social relations. Andersson and Marks (1989) for example famously linked 
disease patterns in South Africa to the introduction of migrant waged mining labour, as did De Beer 
(1984). In a similar fashion, Packard’s (1989) well known work White Plague, Black Labour: 
Tuberculosis and The Political Economy of Health and Diseases in South Africa linked the spread of 
tuberculosis amongst blacks in South Africa to the institution of migrant labour and showed how the 
interaction between competing interests – medical experts, the state, employers, workers, and their 
unions – influenced in very specific ways the development of health policies and practices around 
this disease. This type of analysis was no doubt a reflection of the intellectual context of the time, a 
period which also saw Lesley Doyal’s (1979) seminal work The Political Economy of Health published. 
The wave of post-structuralist theory that overtook the humanities and social sciences during the 
late 1980s has influenced later work on colonial health. Vaughan (1991), Arnold (1993), and some of 
Packard’s (1993) later work have all been influenced in particular by Foucauldian social theory, with 
its emphasis on discourse, “governmental” practices, and the ways in which these are implicated in 
the construction of colonial subjectivity. Vaughan (1991) takes issue with Foucault’s theory of 
governmentality being transferred unquestioningly to the colonial context, but nevertheless adapts 
it to argue that colonial medical practices, and the discourses which arose from them, were able to 
constitute Africans as the objects, rather than the subjects, of colonial rule.  
 
Over the years then a rich literature around colonial health and medicine has been built up. An 
important characteristic of the political economy literature is that colonial subjects as workers are 
very much present. This is not the case for the more recent Foucauldian work. A Foucauldian 
perspective does not in itself necessarily preclude a focus on workers, who were themselves subjects 
of governmental “technologies of rule,” as both Cooper (1996) and Packard (1993) have shown so 
well. Nevertheless, the “cultural turn” in which the Foucauldian work tends to be embedded has 
meant a much greater focus has been placed on issues of race and gender, and the focus perhaps 
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does not fall so naturally on to workers as it does within the Marxist political economy literature. Yet 
it is clear from the earlier political economy literature, as well as lesser known scholarship, such as 
that by Patterson (1981) and Addae (1996), that the worker was very much a central concern of 
colonial health policy. 
 
Citizenship, in the sense of rights being extended to colonial subjects, was not part of British colonial 
rule, as it nominally was under France. Nevertheless according to Cooper (1996), something akin to a 
“limited version of universal citizenship” was envisaged for African subjects during the last years of 
the British Empire. As Chapter Two will show, in terms of health care specifically, the process of 
extending services to colonial subjects occurred much earlier than other aspects of social policy. This 
can be seen as a reversal of T.H Marshall’s view of how citizenship rights progress – starting with 
political and civil rights and ultimately culminating in social rights of citizenship. In the colonies it was 
in fact social provision which preceded political and civil rights (Lund, 2012a). Yet this social 
provision was very limited. Health programmes were aimed at certain groups which were deemed 
important to the productivity of the British Empire: workers, and mothers and their children, who 
were the future workers of the Empire (Allman, 1994; Cooper, 1996; Amrith, 2006). In the colonies, 
as in the metropole, the worker was synonymous with the (proto) citizen. However, the terms of 
inclusion were set so that it was only a limited number of workers, working in very specific 
occupations (largely those who worked for the state or for large colonial enterprises), who qualified 
for these protections. There was an important gendered aspect to this. “Jobs that came under 
formal regulation were coded masculine, while the kinds of things women did were more often 
labelled ‘customary labour’ or the ‘informal economy,’ with all the insecurities and vulnerabilities 
that such a status implied” (Cooper, 1996: 2). 
 
In Decolonization and African Society (1996), Cooper argues that it was these changes that occurred 
during the late colonial and decolonisation period that have had a profound effect on the shape of 
social policy in Africa today. He criticises prominent post-colonial Africanist scholars such as 
Mahmood Mamdani of “leapfrogging” this period in their work on institutionalised colonial legacies, 
which he claims narrows the analysis in important ways. In particular, he argues, it obscures the 
central place of the worker in colonial social policy. The problem with the literature on colonial 
health from the perspective of this thesis is similar to the problem Cooper (1996) has identified for 
social policy more generally. As Anderson (1993) has pointed out, the literature on colonial health 
tends to take its endpoint as the point when colonialism itself ends. There is a lot of attention paid 
to the 1930s and 1940s, when health rose to real prominence in British colonial social policy. Marks 
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(2000), for example, concentrates on the shift to social medicine that occurred during the 1930s and 
1940s in South Africa. Vaughan (1991) focuses largely on the 1920s to the 1940s, although she does 
make reference to the 1950s. Patterson (1981) works up to 1955, Arnold (1993), writing of India 
where health interventions began much earlier than in the African colonies, concentrates on the 
years between 1880 and 1914.   
 
There are some exceptions to this. Warwick Anderson (2006) for example agrees with Cooper that 
the late colonial and decolonisation period is important, and so looks at the way health was used as 
a modernising force in American colonial policy in the Philippines during this time.  Anderson’s focus 
is, however, largely on the way in which race and hygiene became intertwined within this colonial 
project, paying no attention to workers. Packard’s (1989) work is another exception. It traces the 
history of tuberculosis in South Africa from the 19th century to the 1980s, and in so doing avoids the 
leapfrogging about which Cooper (1996) warns. Moreover, it has a very distinct focus on workers, 
and therefore sets a useful precedent for this thesis. There are however still gaps. Firstly, it gives a 
very specific exploration of the path of a particular disease, rather than a more general analysis of 
health policy (although it certainly adds to such an analysis). Secondly, Packard explicitly excludes 
any discussion of occupational health (Packard, 1987). The problem that this sets up will be 
discussed later in this section when it turns to a review of the literature on health and labour history. 
 
Packard aside, the limited timescale of the colonial health literature means that important tensions 
which are central to understanding the shifts within health policy today have been left unexamined. 
The worker might be visible within colonial health policy, but the tensions involved in moving away 
from a system which prioritised the needs of workers (and future workers), to a system which was 
ostensibly based on the idea of universal social citizenship is not seen. As Cooper (1996) argues, the 
conditions of this shift were set up during the late colonial period, but the implications and tensions 
continued to play themselves out well into the post-independence period. Similar tensions were of 
course present in Britain as it moved towards its post-war welfare state. In its former colonies, 
however, the context into which the idea of universal citizenship was inserted were very different. In 
these countries full employment in formal enterprises, which could be regulated and taxed, was a 
dream rather than a reality. This had important implications for health policy. The idea of universally 
free access to health care for all citizens sat in tension with the reality of low tax bases and a 
concomitant reliance on large, formal industries to provide health services for their workers and the 
families of workers. The ideal of free health care for all was met by the reality that workers in formal 




It is perhaps not surprising that the colonial health literature has addressed this tension. By and 
large, colonial health literature focuses on the colonial, not the post-colonial. Whilst history can shed 
light on the present, the intention of much of the colonial literature is not explicitly to do so, but 
rather to understand that period on its own terms. More surprising is that this tension has not been 
picked up in any significant way by the literature on post-colonial health. This literature is far sparser 
and less theoretically and empirically rich than its colonial counterpart. Packard (1997) has 
contributed an important chapter on post-war public health which highlights the fact that public 
health in the post-war era was effectively “internationalised” outside of the industrialised countries. 
The World Health Organisation (WHO) and the other agencies of the UN system became powerful 
forces in terms of setting the terms for national health policies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. 
Packard (1997) argues that this internationalisation was part of the broader post-war development 
project which, at least in part, aimed to increase the consumption of manufactured goods from 
Europe and North America in developing countries. In this way “health interventions were linked 
with social and economic development,” much as they had been during the late colonial period 
(Packard 1997: 103). Indeed, as Packard (1997) goes on to argue, there were many continuities 
between the colonial and post-colonial period in terms of health policies, one being the focus on 
technical solutions to narrowly defined health problems which took little account of local social and 
cultural realities. 
 
This is a theme that is also picked up on by Sunil Amrith (2006) who has perhaps written the most 
comprehensive account of post-colonial health interventions in the Global South to date. Amrith 
(2006) concentrates on the policies and practices of international public health institutions as they 
played out in Asia during the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. He seeks to explore the tensions 
encapsulated by international post-colonial public health, and asks the question: “In what sense was 
international public health post-colonial?” A central tension that he explores is that of the need of 
post-colonial health interventions to distance themselves from their colonial forerunners. This was 
done largely by emphasising the technical nature of the interventions, detached “from matters of 
culture or social transformation,” which he argues, were never fully successful (Amrith, 2006: 17). 
Linked to this were the wider tensions that existed within medical practice at the time between 
social medicine, which “highlighted the importance of social and economic conditions to the practice 
of public health,” and the “magic bullet” approach which focused on technical solutions, abstracted 




Both Packard and Amrith point to the continuities between colonial and post-colonial health policy 
and practice. There is also an acknowledgement of the changing terms of inclusion into health 
policy. As Amrith (2006: 72) puts it: 
Perhaps the most fundamental shift occurring during the war was the emergence of the 
notion that health was a responsibility of government and a right of citizenship. This was 
radically different from earlier approaches to public health in the colonised world, where 
colonial states had never been more than ‘fire fighters,’ preventing epidemics and ensuring 
the productivity of labour. Health, the WHO constitution declared, was a ‘fundamental 
human right. 
 
Both Packard and Amrith go on to discuss the fact that this vision of health as a universal right of 
citizenship was one which ultimately failed to materialise as rapidly and comprehensively as was 
expected. Both link this solidly to the continuities between the colonial and the post-colonial state. 
The extension of health care to all was made much more difficult because it relied on a state 
infrastructure which remained very similar to its colonial predecessor. In the case of India, according 
to Amrith (2006), it was also made more difficult by the continued focus of the Indian government 
on health as linked to productivity. There is an understanding then that despite the rhetoric of 
universal citizenship, workers in formal industries maintained a privileged position. However, once 
this is acknowledged, the place of the worker is more or less abandoned as a topic for discussion. 
Attention turns instead towards the politics of technicist health interventions, the neo-imperialist 
political imperatives guiding health policy, and the limits of post-colonial governmentality (Packard, 
1997; Amrith, 2006). 
 
In the post-war era health was framed as a right of citizenship, and has been analysed on those 
terms ever since. The worker within health policy begins to disappear in the post-colonial literature, 
and has also largely remained absent within the present day literature on the political economy of 
health, which has tended in large part to focus on the privatisation of health care, corporate 
influence on the medical profession, and the influence of global economic actors (such as the food 
industry) on health and health policy (Baum and Sanders, 1995; Baum et al., 2009; McIntyre, 2010, 
2012). Even then, it must be recognised that this type of scholarship, which understands 
fundamentally that health is impacted by wider social, political, and economic factors, is in a 
minority when it comes to the present day literature on health policy. Mackintosh and Tibandebage 
(2004: 144) argue that scholarly writing on health, particularly in developing countries, suffers from 
what they call “thick description, thin explanation syndrome.” Discussions take their starting point as 
the fact that the state has usually failed to deliver on the promise of universal health care, framing 
these as technical failures – failures of system design or management failures – which then leads to 
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proposals for technical solutions of one kind or another, such as improved management and 
reworked systems. As James Ferguson (1990) has argued in relation to World Bank programmes, this 
technical focus ignores the underlying structural factors – both political and economic – which 
enable or constrain the coverage and effectiveness of health systems. In doing so, it depoliticises 
what is in fact deeply political.  
 
Health and Labour History 
The historical literature on the political economy of health discussed above has existed in parallel 
with another health focused literature that has been more closely linked with labour history than 
with public health. This is the history of industrial or occupational health. Occupational health is a 
term which came to prominence in the post-war period, referring to the discipline and practice 
concerned with health and safety in the workplace. However, the discipline itself first emerged 
during the industrial revolutions in Europe and North America, and was initially known as Industrial 
Hygiene. As a subject of historical investigation it has been somewhat neglected. It sits somewhat 
awkwardly between public health and labour and perhaps as a result is often ignored by both 
disciplines (Quinlan, 1997). Nevertheless, there is a small body of notable work on the subject in 
English.1 These include Rosner and Markowitz’s (1991) study of the politics of silicosis (an industrial 
respiratory disease) in early 20th century USA, Levinstein and Tuminaro’s (1997) study of the present 
day political economy of occupational health again in the USA, Long’s (2011) in-depth study of the 
“healthy factory” movement in Britain during the early 20th century, Bartrip’s (1985, 1990, 2002) 
work on the development of state industrial hygiene services in 19th century Britain, Harrison’s 
(1991, 1995) study of the gendered implications of occupational health policy, again in 19th century 
Britain, and collections of smaller studies ranging from the development of workmen’s 
compensation legislation,2 to the evolving relationship between occupational and environmental 
health, to a focus on the politics surrounding particular occupational diseases (Weindling, 1985; 
Sellers and Melling, 2012). 
 
                                                          
1 This review concentrates on the English language literature emanating from the UK and USA. Language 
limitations prevented the author from exploring the European literature on this subject comprehensively, 
although a brief search in French revealed a number of authors who have concentrated on such history. To cite 
some examples: Bouillé, M. 1992. ‘Les congrès d’hygiène des travailleurs au début du siècle 1904-1911.’ Le 
Mouvement Social, 161: 43-65; Moriceau, C. 2009. ‘Les perceptions des risques au travail dans la seconde 
moitié du XIXe siècle: entre connaissance, déni et prevention.’ Revue d’Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine, 56 
(1). 
2 The term “workmen’s compensation” is indicative of the gendered nature of early workplace legislation. In 
both Ghana and India the term remains in place, although in some countries (such as South Africa) it has 
changed to worker’s compensation. 
16 
 
This literature on industrial/occupational health has four particular characteristics that are relevant 
to this thesis. The first of these helps to ground this thesis in existing work. Within the occupational 
health literature the worker is very naturally placed at centre stage, whether or not the discussion is 
focused on the colonial or the modern period. This has the effect of bringing a very particular 
political economy of health into view, one which foregrounds the relationship between state, society 
(in this case workers rather than citizens), and capital. As mentioned earlier, since the post-war 
period when public health became defined as a right of citizenship, the focus has in general been on 
the state-citizen relationship, with much less attention paid to the direct role of capital. 
Occupational health, as it has been framed over the late 19th and 20th centuries, is something that 
has been shared and influenced by the state and capital. Within the British model, occupational 
health services have largely been left up to employers to finance, with the state acting as regulator 
(Sturdy, 2000). The role of capital then is very direct, unlike in public health where the relationship 
between capital and health policy and practice is far less obvious (although this is truer for the 
British health model than the European social insurance model).  As will be seen, this is an important 
point which helps to justify the particular form that this thesis takes – one that looks at occupational 
health in relation to public health, rather than seeing them as two distinct subjects for inquiry. 
 
The second characteristic of the industrial/occupational health literature highlight a gap which this 
thesis will attempt to fill. The focus of the existing literature is very much on the developed, 
industrialised world. This is not surprising; occupational health policy and practice developed most 
extensively in European and North American countries, and the academic work has mirrored that 
fact. However, struggles over occupational health, as well as the development of occupational 
health policies, were not absent in the colonial and post-colonial world. Work on the gold mining 
industry in South Africa has produced some particularly rich accounts; Elaine Katz’s (1994) history of 
the politics of silicosis on the Witwatersrand Reef at the turn of the 20th century is an excellent 
example, as is Jock McCulloch’s (2007) history of asbestos mining in South Africa’s Northern Cape. 
There are also significant discussions of health conditions on colonial mines in Ghana and Nigeria by 
Crisp (1984) and Freund (1981). Furthermore, administrative structures to govern occupational 
health were set up in the late colonial period. These institutions have tended to be severely 
neglected, and in some countries, remain largely unchanged from the original colonial institutions 
(Alfers, 2009). Again, the historical literature has mirrored this neglect; it is difficult to construct 
histories on an absence of activity. The present day literature suffers particularly badly from “thick 
description, thin explanation syndrome” focusing largely on pointing out the neglect of occupational 
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health, suggesting solutions, but rarely looking at the underlying structures that have produced this 
neglect over time. 
 
Third, the work that does exist on the history of occupational health in the developing world 
completely ignores the all-important decolonisation and post-independence period. As Cooper 
(1996) has pointed out, it was during this period that the “terms of inclusion” into social provision in 
ex-colonial countries were set in a way that has had a long lasting influence on the unfolding of 
social policy in many ex-colonial countries. It was during this period that “the worker” as the subject 
of policy began to emerge in a more systematic form. It is also during this time that the most 
comprehensive administrative systems for the regulation and control of working conditions were put 
in place by colonial governments. Yet there is no work within the limited literature on the history of 
occupational health which investigates this period. Following Cooper (1996), a central argument of 
this thesis is that if the neglect of occupational health in developing countries is to be really 
understood, it is necessary to consider the late colonial and immediate post-independence period 
much more closely than has been done so far.   
 
Fourth and finally, the existing literature on industrial/occupational health is heavily biased towards 
male dominated occupations and workplaces. This is not surprising, as it was men who by and large 
occupied formal workplaces. As Cooper (1995: 3) puts it: 
Industrial man, in officials’ eyes, was indeed a male. That most migrant labourers who came 
forth in the early colonial years were male may have had more to do with whom African 
communities felt they could do without for a period of time than European hiring 
preferences. But when European officials sought to build a more stable, more acculturated, 
more experienced labour force, the complexities of African life were of much less concern to 
them than their own gendered imagery. 
 
What Cooper (1996) is referring to here is the fact that “the limited version of universal citizenship” 
– a contradiction in terms, which Cooper argues ultimately forced the decolonisation question – 
which the British colonial regime tried to set up around a stabilised labour force, was one which saw 
workers as male. As numerous authors have pointed out this was a central characteristic of the 
British welfare state itself, based as it was on the idea of a male breadwinner who would be able to 
support the family financially (Nelson, 1990; Orloff, 1993; Sainsbury, 1999). Women were positioned 
as mothers and carers whose place was in the home. It was this gendered imagery which the British 





This had a number of important effects. Firstly, colonial health policy and practice focused almost 
exclusively on women as mothers (Allman, 1994). This remained the case in the post-independence 
period, where reproductive and maternal health became the guiding force behind the movement for 
women’s health led by the international organisations. There is no doubt that the drive for maternal 
and reproductive health, particularly in the period between 1960 and 1975, met an important need 
and did much to improve the position of women in the developing world. However, positioning 
women as reproductive agents alone fails to engage the complexity of women’s lives, particularly 
the fact that women were and are often both mothers and workers (Kelman, 1923; Pinchbeck, 1930; 
Clark, 2010). In Britain the welfare state model of the male breadwinner has been criticised heavily 
for failing to engage with the fact that many working class families were unable to survive on single 
salaries, and that women were very much part of the labour force. In West African countries women 
were excluded from working in the large, formal colonial industries, but as feminist historians such 
as Gracia Clarke (2010) and Claire Robertson (1984; 1988) have shown, they were also important 
economic actors through their activities in petty trade. In India too, whilst taboos existed on upper 
and middle class women’s movements outside of the home, poor and working class women were 
very much involved both in formal plantation and mining work, as well as in small-scale home based 
industrial production and domestic work (Sen, 1999; Roy, 2000; Lahiri-Dutt, 2001). 
  
Theoretical Framework, Research Questions, and Contribution to the Existing Literature 
Having described the health policy literature and the gaps within it, it is now possible to lay out the 
contributions of this thesis. The following section will elaborate on the key research questions which 
have been used to guide the research, linking these to the gaps that have been identified in the 
literature. It will also situate the research questions within a theoretical framework that brings 
together ideas from several sources. The overarching paradigm is a critical one which is based on 
Marxist political economy. Yet, knowing that the intention of this thesis is to look at the politics and 
history of a part of the world that was and is different from the world in which Marx developed his 
theory, it is also necessary to add to this framework from the work of those who have dealt with 
colonial and post-colonial history and theory. In doing so, this dissertation takes its lead from 
Morton (2013: 60) who, citing Edward Said (1983), argues that it is necessary always to develop a 
critical consciousness towards theory, thereby “enabling an awareness of the difference between 
situations and awareness too of the fact that no system or theory exhausts the situation out of 
which it emerges or to which it is transported.” In particular, this thesis uses the work of the 
historian of African colonialism, Frederick Cooper, in order to “stretch” the Marxist theory (Fanon, 





The first aim of this thesis is to provide a comprehensive historical work of political economy which 
addresses the changing place of the worker within health policy and provision outside of the Global 
North, and which intends to shed light on the changes that are occurring within the terms of 
inclusion into health services in the present moment – shifts which have so far been examined 
largely without an historical lens.  On the broadest level the first research question asks: In relation 
to the terms of inclusion into health policies at present, how have we arrived at the place we have 
and why? What light does an understanding of historical processes shed on the current moment? 
This question draws on what has become known as neo-Gramscian critical international political 
economy, after the Italian theorist Antonio Gramsci (Germain and Kenny, 1998; Morton, 2003; Bieler 
and Morton, 2004). Pioneered originally by Robert Cox in relation to international relations theory, 
the neo-Gramscian school of critical international political economy is described by Bieler and 
Morton (2004: 87) as 
…directing attention to questioning the prevailing order of the world. It does not take 
institutions and social power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning 
itself with their origins and whether they might be in the process of changing. Thus it is 
specifically critical in the sense of asking how existing social or world orders have come into 
being, how norms or institutions or practices therefore emerge, and what forces may have 
the emancipatory potential to change or transform the prevailing order. 
 
Antonio Gramsci is well-known for developing the concept of hegemony. A follower of Marx, who 
believed that social change is driven by the conflict between material forces, Gramsci nevertheless 
critiqued Marxist analysis which was simplistically materialist in orientation. He argued that 
economic domination is accompanied by a domination that operates at the level of ideas, cultures, 
beliefs, and subjectivity. This economic domination combined with ideological domination he called 
hegemony – particular economic systems are upheld because people believe that they are built on a 
“common sense” which is socially and culturally constructed (Gramsci, 1971). One of Gramsci’s 
central aims was to question this “common sense” and to reveal the power dynamics that lay 
beneath. 
 
It was Cox who first applied Gramscian ideas to international relations theory in an attempt to 
rejuvenate what was by all accounts becoming a fairly monochromatic field (Cox, 1977; Morton, 
2003). Cox developed a theory of historical change which saw changes in production producing 
transformations in social relations which in turn produce transformations in the structure of power 
relations, embodied in what he called “forms of state” and “world orders” (Bieler and Morton, 
2004). “Forms of state” refers to the particular configurations of state and civil society that emerge 
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under different production relations (the state-civil society complex), and which define the terms of 
inclusion into state policies, and “world orders” which emerge on a global scale. State power and 
state institutions are seen not as essential givens, but rather as the product of social forces and 
processes, which themselves are produced by particular forms of production (Bieler and Morton, 
2004).  
 
This thesis makes use of certain elements of the neo-Gramscian approach which it considers useful 
in understanding the changes in health policy that have occurred since the colonial era. Firstly, as 
mentioned in the review above, there is a gap in the literature on health policy when it comes to 
taking a long view of its development – from colonial, to post-colonial, to the present, particularly in 
countries outside of Europe and North America. This is a gap which this dissertation intends to fill. In 
doing so it draws on Cox and other Gramscian scholars, such as Bakker and Gill (2003), in defining 
the particular key moments of transformation: colonial capitalism, the welfarism (or Fordism) of the 
post-colonial period, and the current era which Bakker and Gill (2003) refer to as the “new 
constitutionalism” where neo-liberalism is the dominant form of production relations. New 
constitutionalism here refers to the ways in which neo-liberal modes of governance are normalised, 
“locking in” governments and future governments into particular policy directions (Bakker and Gill, 
2003: 30). Tracing the changing place of the worker within health policy through these key moments 
will hopefully allow for both an understanding of historical processes, and of ongoing processes in 
which the current “forms of state” have been produced. In this way the thesis elaborates on 
Cooper’s (1996) proposition that an understanding of the decolonisation period is key to 
understanding current institutional forms of social policy in Africa by including another key and more 
recent period that has also had a significant impact. In this way the thesis attempts to avoid the 
leapfrogging that Cooper warns against in relation to historical works that seek to help in 
understanding the present.  
 
Second, Gramscian analysis is essentially materialist in that Gramsci understood class relations as 
central to social transformation. However, as already mentioned, one of Gramsci’s key insights is 
that hegemony cannot be understood in materialist terms alone; it contains an ideological/cultural 
aspect which is equally important to understand. Cox, drawing on this, saw each of his “historical 
structures” (production relations, forms of state, and world orders) as being made up of both 
material and non-material elements such as “ideas … and collective images of the world order” 
(Bieler and Morton, 2004: 87). This has opened up Marxist materialist critical analysis to a 
sometimes uncomfortable and potentially ontologically contradictory relationship with post-
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structural thought (Li, 2007). Yet, the melding of the ideational and the discursive with the material 
has produced some of the more interesting recent work on both the history of health and the history 
of labour in colonial and post-colonial contexts.  Cooper (1996), whose focus is on the way in which 
colonial administrators applied expert discourses on labour and social need to Africans in 
determining “who was to be included and on what terms they were to be included within the 
bounds of social policy,” argues that his work would not have been possible without the years of 
materialist labour analysis which preceded it (Cooper, 1996: 16).    
 
In relation to health policy and practices, this approach is particularly useful. As with other policy, 
professional ‘expert’ bodies (public health professionals, epidemiologists, and medical doctors) have 
played an important role in the development of policies and other state institutions. It is sometimes 
difficult, if not simplistic, to understand the role of such expert groups in purely materialist terms. As 
Latour and Woolgar (1979) have pointed out, understanding the politics of science as purely a result 
of the interplay of class forces leads inevitably to an analysis of corporate influence over scientific 
practice. This is not unimportant. Yet, as they go on to argue, science is itself a culturally embedded 
practice, the politics of which can be read in ways that do not relate to corporate power alone. For 
many scholars who have taken an interest in health, this has been a key point – doctors and other 
health professionals have an expert type of knowledge, which as Foucault long ago argued, is itself 
constitutive of power. This expert knowledge is also itself constituted by and constitutive of 
particular visions of how the world should be, and the way in which it should operate – all of which 
ultimately affect the institutions which develop in relation to such knowledge. Understanding “how 
things got to be the way that they are” therefore entails an understanding not only of the “the 
historical matrices of social, political and economic relations” in which they are situated, but also 
how these are related to the ideational politics of science (Packard, 1993: 13). 
 
Yet, as mentioned in the introduction to this section, Gramsci alone is not enough. His ideas were 
formed in a particular time and place – Italy under a Fascist government in the early years of the 20th 
century. “How things got to be the way that they are” in the Global North cannot be answered in 
exactly the same way as in the Global South, although the two are obviously linked through global 
processes of colonialism and capitalist accumulation and expansion. It calls for the stretching of 
theoretical frameworks and brings up an important tension, which is explored throughout this 
thesis, between universality and difference. Indeed this is a tension which runs through all the 
questions that follow and is explored throughout this thesis: how do we understand the history and 
politics of health provision in a context very different from the one in which it developed, when the 
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state provision of health services is itself a construct of a particular time and place? Furthermore, 
how does this affect the judgements we make on the changes that are currently taking place in 
health policies? Applying the same conceptual categories and frameworks from Europe and its social 
forces limits the analysis, creating the danger of a constant deficit in the post-colonial environment, 
when in fact it is this difference that needs to be grappled with and understood. Avoiding such a trap 
requires an understanding of the different setting – its societal norms, its history, its politics, and the 
specific ways in which these have differed from the metropolitan context. As will become clear 
throughout the following section, it is here that Cooper is of use and can be brought into 
conversation with Gramsci and Marxist political economy in general – challenging the way we think 
about how “forms of state” were created within a colonial context specifically.  
 
Narrowing the focus, the second key research question guiding this thesis is: How has the place of 
the worker changed in relation to the citizen within health policy in countries of the Global South over 
time, and what political and economic processes have underlain this shift? What implications do 
these shifts have for understanding present day policy changes? As already mentioned, this is a 
question which emphasises the relational aspect of the citizen and the worker within health 
provision and its importance as a question emerges from the dialectical method of Marx. The 
method sought to understand the ongoing relationship between economic processes and elements 
as a way in which to think about the unfolding of social and economic life, as opposed to seeking 
causal explanations for their being (Harvey, 2010a). In this way, Harvey (2010: 12) argues, Marx was 
able to see capital not as a thing, “but rather as a process that exists only in motion.” In a less 
abstract sense, the dialectical method allows one to view aspects of social and economic life as 
mutually constituted. Gill Hart (2006: 21) summarises the advantages of such a position: 
Instead of comparing pre-existing objects, events, places or identities, the focus is on how 
they are constituted in relation to one another through power-laden practices in the multiple, 
interconnected arenas of everyday life. Clarifying these connections and mutual processes of 
constitution – as well as slippages, openings and contradictions – helps to generate new 
understandings of the possibilities for social change.  
 
The citizen and the worker may not always have been constituted in relation to one another (the 
original Classical concept of the citizen referring to those who lived within a city), but certainly under 
the British welfarism which was transferred to its colonies and heavily influenced the trajectory of 
post-colonial health policies, they were deeply intertwined. To be a citizen was to be a worker. It is 
also this relationship which, under “the new constitutionalism” of the neo-liberal era has undergone 
important changes. These changes, it will be argued, are able to shed light on the wider implications 




A relational view allows for a focus on the citizen and the worker as “dual aspects of a unity” 
(Harvey, 2010). This in turn allows for an analysis which looks at how the two aspects sit in relation 
to one another, how their relationship changes over time, and an exploration of the tensions and 
contradictions which arise from it. In practical terms such an approach serves to address one of the 
gaps identified in the literature review – the lack of analysis looking at the relationship between 
public and occupational health. As health policy shifted towards a right of citizenship, the worker 
was at least rhetorically confined to occupational health. In order to keep both the worker and 
citizen in view simultaneously then, it is necessary to look both at public health and occupational 
health in relation to one another. As mentioned already, the two are often assumed to be too 
different to discuss within a single piece of work. If they are discussed together, it is usually as 
separate chapters within a general history of health, rather than as relational aspects of a whole 
(Rosen, 1958; Doyal, 1979). Packard (1987) for example states explicitly in his essay on industrial 
health policy in South Africa that he will not talk about occupational health, arguing that it is too 
narrow a field for the analysis he wished to undertake. It is true that occupational health is governed 
by a different set of institutions from public health (tending to be placed under the control of labour 
departments rather than health departments). Moreover, as a scientific discipline it is a very narrow 
field, focused as it is on the work-related diseases and injuries of individual workers.  
 
However, as this thesis aims to show it is not only possible to look at both public health and 
occupational health policies and institutions in relation to one another, it is also necessary to do so if 
the changes that are currently happening in forms of state are to be understood at a fundamental 
level. Occupational health and public health fall along what could be thought of as a continuum of 
responsibility/inclusion that has shifted over the years. On the one end of the continuum is 
employer responsibility (with inclusion based on status as worker) and on the other end is state 
responsibility (with inclusion based on status as citizen). Over the years, public health in the Global 
South has shifted along this scale in complex ways: rhetorically from employer responsibility to state 
responsibility, but the reality being that formal wage employment was still a centrally important way 
to access health services. Occupational health on the other hand has tended to stay firmly placed 
under employer responsibility. With the emergence of the idea of the “informal worker” this has 
begun to change; institutional solutions to the absence of defined employment relationships have 
started to emerge which suggest that occupational health should become the responsibility of the 
state (Loewenson, 1998). This means that the relationship between workers and citizens is beginning 
to shift; the terms of inclusion are beginning to shift. A blurring that is starting to occur between the 
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place of the worker in public health policy, and the place of the citizen in occupational health policy 
– and it is only when both types of health policies and programmes are placed side by side and kept 
in focus together that a clear picture of these shifts begins to emerge. 
 
There are also some broader conceptual issues which emerge from this relational approach to the 
worker and the citizen, to public and occupational health. Firstly, it allows for questions to be asked 
about the apparent separation of the spheres of the social, into which citizenship issues (such as 
public health) tend to be classed, and of the economic into which work, and by association labour-
related policies such as occupational health, are generally classed. Indeed, one of the key aims of 
this dissertation is to highlight that the separation of the economic and the social is itself part of an 
ideological construct that needs to be deconstructed if the current shifts in global capitalism and the 
social policies that arise are to be fully understood. This questioning is opened up by the theoretical 
framework adopted. As Bieler and Morton (2004: 100) argue, when “… the state is treated as an 
aspect of the social relations of production … questions about the apparent separation of politics 
and economics or states and markets within capitalism are promoted.”  
 
Secondly, it brings to the fore questions of universality and difference, and emphasises the need to 
inform the theoretical framework which includes specific perspectives from the Global South. This 
relates in particular to the differences in the “forms of state” which developed in the colonial world 
as opposed to the metropoles, and the enduring legacy that this has had on social policy. It is here 
that Cooper (1996, 2002) makes an invaluable contribution by providing a framework for 
understanding the specific social dynamics which underpinned post-colonial states, and it is worth 
quoting him at some length. In Decolonization and African Society (1996: 5), one of Cooper’s stated 
aims is to explore 
…the power of the idea of “modern” social policy in African states: how new leaders – before 
and after independence and in dialogue with “experts” of the “developed world” – came to 
define social policy around an imported future more than the extension of an observed 
present, around a package of institutions like labour unions, minimum wage regulations, and 
industrial relations machinery rather than around the complex, category-crossing social 
processes that had been going on around them. 
 
There are two related issues that Cooper is concerned with here. The first is to unpack the central 
place that the worker assumed within social policy during the late colonial and post-colonial period 
in African countries. The second is to understand why such a narrow definition of the worker was 
adopted – one which mirrored the definition found in Europe, but when transplanted into the 
African context effectively excluded the vast majority of economically active people – the market 
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traders, the shoe shine boys, the women who turned their homes into small scale production units. 
He argues that this was the result of both economic and political imperatives on the part of the 
British colonial government who attempted to deal with their increasingly rebellious empire by 
trying to create a stabilised and conservative African working class who they hoped would support 
their claim to power, and form the backbone of an orderly transition to independence. Health, social 
security, housing, and labour policies were seen as central to creating this stability. The formal 
worker, working in a formal workplace, living in formalised working-class parts of the city, and 
covered by basic welfare provisions, assumed an important place within it. 
 
Cooper argues too the resulting policies also reflected a failure of imagination on the part of British 
and French colonial officials, a failure to think of alternative institutional structures which might 
more realistically cope with a society organised along very different lines from Europe.3 The tensions 
that emerged out of this – between the rhetoric of universal citizenship inherited from Britain’s 
social democratic welfare state and the reality that it was only the minority of formally employed 
workers who were truly able to access anything like social citizenship – is a central concern of 
Chapter Four. Again, this thesis builds on Cooper’s insights into the present moment, and the 
present is interesting precisely because, with the move towards informal workers’ inclusion into 
social policy, social administrators are now starting to grapple with the failure of imagination that 
Cooper identifies. Yet, as Chapters Five and Six intend to show, this in itself causes a new set of 
tensions to arise, as this process intermingles with the imperatives of the current dominant 
economic model. How does the admission of difference play out when it comes to the terms of 
inclusion and the benefits that can accrue from this? Do the “new” forms of health provision being 
developed around informal workers really give the citizens of the Global South the idealised set of 
social rights that citizens of Europe came to enjoy after World War Two? Does the very acceptance 
of the term “informal worker,” which some would argue is necessary to develop a social policy that 
is realistically suited to the Global South, mean compromising on the quality of universal social 
rights?  
 
These tensions are also examined through the third key question which guides this thesis: What role 
have trade unions and other worker-based organisations played in the development of health policies 
and institutions? In particular, how and why have their activities affected (or not been able to affect) 
                                                          
3 It could be argued that the way in which colonial administrators viewed the African family as the institution 
which would take care of social reproduction without state intervention was a form of alternative thinking, as 
was indirect rule as a whole. However, the failure in reality was one of thinking through how state protections 
might work in a different society. 
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the shifting place of the worker in relation to the citizen within health policy? This question adds an 
important additional dimension to the main theme of the dissertation. The two previous questions 
point more towards a top-down perspective of how policies and institutions are formed. This 
question specifically directs attention to the contribution of workers themselves to the shifting 
terms of inclusion into health provision. In this way it allows the dissertation to weave together both 
forces from above and those from below in its analysis.  
 
Li (2007: 19) points out that Gramsci is centrally concerned “with the ways people become mobilised 
to contest the truths in the names of which they are governed, and to change the conditions under 
which they live.” Yet for Gramsci “the question of how a collective, critical practice emerges could 
not be answered with reference to abstract concepts such as capital and labour. It has to be 
addressed concretely taking into account the multiple positions people occupy, and the diverse 
powers they encounter” (Li, 2007: 22).  However as Drainville (1994) has pointed out, within the 
neo-Gramscian approach to international political economy, particularly that influenced by Cox, the 
challenge to understand forces of resistance to the power of the state and of capital has not been 
taken up as readily as the analysis of state and capitalist power itself. Samson (2010: 406) argues 
that this results in a situation “where there is little sense of how [social relations] can be disrupted 
and transformed other than through interventions at the levels of policy formation.”  
 
This thesis aims to consider resistance and its role within the building of institutions through 
collectively conceived forms of agency. It draws ultimately on the idea that is present, for example in 
the work of E.P. Thompson and Eric Hobsbawm, that organised social groups can make a difference 
in the world through challenging the status quo. In the context of this thesis, Fred Cooper is again 
useful in providing a conceptual foundation for the interactions of power and resistance in the 
colonial and post-colonial context. He argues (1994; 1996; 2000) that there are two sides to 
understanding how and why things have come to be the way that they are in present day Africa. 
Firstly, one has to understand the workings of colonial power itself and the legacy left behind.  It is 
here, Cooper (1996) maintains, that many post-colonial scholars end their analyses. However, as he 
goes on to argue, this is only half the story. Equally crucial is an understanding of the way in which 
“power is engaged, contested, deflected, and appropriated” by those who encounter it (Cooper, 
1994: 1517).  So, for example, when the British colonial government started to introduce its labour-
oriented reforms during the late colonial period, African trade unions and their allies did not resist. 
Instead, they seized the opportunity presented by “engaging substantively with the labour specialists 
of the colonial state, and subtly turning the assertion of authority into a claim to rights” (Cooper, 
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1996: 4). The contradictions this engendered for Britain, as well as the financial implications, left it 
with no choice but to abdicate its position. Cooper (1996) emphasises that, as a result of the 
engagement of Africans with colonial labour regulation, the resulting institutions were European and 
African hybrid institutions rather than institutions which were simply transplanted from one context 
to another.  
 
What Cooper does here is to provide a broader historical sense of how forces from below can play a 
role in the building of institutions, and in doing so he provides an important conceptual base for this 
thesis. Following Cooper, the emphasis in this study is less on why resistance happens (indeed as 
Bakker (2007: 543) argues it is taken as a given “that economic history can be partly understood as 
the interaction between top and bottom of the pyramid, a conflictive relationship between the 
imperatives of capitalism and the necessities of material life.”), but rather on the ways in which this 
resistance happens (for example the engagement that Cooper talks of), the specific strategies that 
are adopted, and how this contributes to the shape of particular institutional forms. Again, though, 
there is an attempt to build on Cooper’s work. Firstly, by looking at moments where the engagement 
of workers with colonial and post-colonial institutions were blocked in some way, and secondly by 
looking at how worker strategies have (or have not) changed over time and what this may imply for 
the future place of the worker and the citizen within health policy and provision. 
 
The fourth and final question is one which adds a further theoretical angle to what has so far been 
developed in this section: How has the gendered definition of the worker and the citizen changed 
over time, and what implications does this have for our understanding of current institutional 
reconfigurations? In asking this question the dissertation seeks to add a gendered dimension to its 
focus on class, in line with Connell’s (1987) contention that constitutive of all world orders is a 
gender order. Gender here is not taken as an essential given, but is rather understood as a set of 
shifting social relations between men and women which both produce and are produced by relations 
of power (Flax, 1987; Albo, 2005; Samson, 2010). This approach, which centres the relationship 
between the male and female spheres, allows the thesis to move back and forth between them, 
rather than focusing on one or the other. 
 
As many scholars have pointed out, both the worker and the citizen have throughout history been 
gendered constructs (Lewis, 1992; Nakano Glenn, 1992; O'Connor, 1993; Mohanty, 1997; Sainsbury, 
1999). The post-World War Two European welfare state model was one based on a male 
breadwinner and a woman who remained in the home to care for the family. Women were 
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positioned as carers who could access their citizenship rights through their husbands. The gaze of 
health workers was firmly placed on women as mothers, and correspondingly men as workers.  
Within and outside of Europe this translated into widespread campaigns focused on reproductive, 
maternal, and child health (Allman, 1994; Amrith, 2006). These campaigns, which were closely linked 
to the primary health care movement, achieved a remarkable amount in terms of improvements to 
women and children’s health (Sender, 1999). They were aided by advances in medical technology 
and the development of antibiotics which greatly improved the efficacy of western medicine. They 
did, however, also tend to box women into their role as carers, failing to account for the reality that 
many women – single women, working-class women, women who needed and/or wanted to earn an 
income – had health needs related to their roles as workers as well. 
 
One of the most important analytical changes in recent decades has been the shift in gendered 
understandings of the worker and the citizen. To a certain extent this has been prompted by the 
entrance of middle class women in the Global North into the labour market en masse (although as 
Chapter Three shows many women in the Global South have always worked). Slowly policies have 
started to adjust to this trend, with “innovations” like flexi-time, job-sharing, day care, and paternity 
leave becoming more common (Williams, 2001). Within occupational health specifically, questions 
have started to be raised about the gendered constitution of the science itself, and how the 
discipline can better contribute to women workers, whose different anatomy and physiologically 
may require different workplace interventions (Messing, 1998). Woman as workers are beginning to 
appear within health policy. Yet there is also a tension here, because as Nancy Fraser (2009) has 
pointed out, the entrance of large numbers of women into the labour market has intersected with 
the informalisation of labour and the downgrading of worker and citizenship rights. Allman et al., 
(2002) argue that women’s positions tend to disrupt established social binaries – their position as 
both workers and carers, as both producers and social reproducers, as workers who work in the 
home, who straddle sometimes contradictory positions. Adding a gendered perspective therefore 
brings an extra element of complexity and depth to the exploration of the tension that is created 
between the recognition of workers’ rights in the informal economy and the desire to maintain the 
citizenship rights that were held up as an ideal during the social democratic/post-independence 
period. The story of the changing place of the worker is also the story of the way in which gender has 
interacted with these changes.  
 
Gender, although a key theme, is not the main structuring social variable of this dissertation. Rather, 
the interest is in both class and gender. In doing so, it takes its lead from O’Connor (1993: 509) who 
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states that, “Welfare State regimes are structured by and in turn structure, both class and gender. 
Consequently, both dimensions must be incorporated into a comprehensive analysis of welfare.” 
Not all scholars writing about social policy from a gendered perspective have agreed with this 
approach, with those such as Lewis (1997) and Sainsbury (1999) assuming an analytical position 
which sees gender as the primary social category, and is blind to issues of class. Primarily, however, 
this is a story of class; it is story of how political and economic forces have formed and re-formed 
over time to produce certain institutional forms which have privileged some groups over others. 
This of course has important gendered implications, but gender here is seen as a social variable 
which interacts with class, rather than existing in isolation from it. The aim then is to keep the view 
on both class and gender, and, in particular, to observe where and how interactions occur. 
Furthermore, it does so in a context of difference – the ways in which class and gender have 
interacted within social policy in Europe are not necessarily the same as the way in which these two 
variables have interacted in countries of the Global South. Here the focus is again on ensuring that 
the conceptual frameworks drawn from feminist thought, as with Marxist thought, are used in a 
contextually appropriate manner.  
 
Methods and Limitations of the Study 
The above theoretical discussion has included some reference to the methods used in this study. It is 
Marxist (social actors), and it is relational, and it looks at gender as a key social variable as well as 
class. Before moving onto a summary of the study and concluding the introduction, it is first 
necessary to elaborate a little further on the methods used, as well as the limitations of these 
methods and how they feed into the limitations of the study as whole.  
 
Primary archival material was sourced from London at the Colonial Office Records at The National 
Archives, the British Library’s India Office Records, the Wellcome Trust Archive, and the London 
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine Archive. The Rhodes House Archive at Oxford and the 
Churchill College Archives in Cambridge also proved to be important sources of primary material. In 
Geneva source material was derived from the archives of the International Labour Organisation, the 
World Health Organisation, and the League of Nations, and in Ghana from The Ghana National 
Archives in Accra. These primary archival sources were supplemented with a small number of 
interviews, particularly in Chapter Six where the author drew heavily on her own experience working 
with informal worker organisations on an Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) project which ran in 
both Ghana and India under the auspices of the global action-policy-advocacy network, Women in 
Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO). The author’s personal notes, as well as 
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official ones, taken at WIEGO workshops, meetings and conferences were another important source 
of primary information. 
 
Despite the large amount of primary material available, it is true that Chapters Two and Three draw 
heavily on a synthesis of secondary sources rather than on these primary sources. There are two 
reasons for this. Firstly, as mentioned earlier, the history of colonial health and labour policies have 
been relatively well explored already. Except for a few small additions, the author has had little 
original contribution to make to an already rich field of study. The original contributions that this 
study makes are to be found primarily in the chapters which cover the post-colonial and present day 
periods. Secondly, and leading on from this, the first two chapters are really intended to provide 
background and historical context to the three subsequent chapters, rather than to make new 
arguments about colonial policies.  
 
The methods used in this study have also meant that this is a story, which, although incorporating a 
recognition of the agency of workers, is still very much a story about the contradictions of policy as it 
is theorised and made in the sphere of discourse and ideas. It is not a classically Gramscian 
ethnographic study of workers or citizens on the ground and how they appropriate, resist, and 
transform the relations of power than exist around them. Chapter Six does of course take a view 
from the ground up, but even then the agency of workers is collectively conceived, and does not 
explore the motivations and subject positions occupied by those who are engaged in the resistance 
to power (Drainville, 1994; Li, 2007; Hart, 2013). Such analyses relate local acts of conflict, 
contradiction, and resistance to wider structural processes, something which is absent in this thesis 
which is focused on broader structural processes and which uses material from which such 
inferences cannot be drawn. As argued earlier, however, this does not mean that it is impossible for 
the study to consider resistance and its role in the building of agencies. It just does so through a 
collectively conceived form of agency, similar to that used by Cooper (1996).  
 
This has also not been a close study – it is one that has spanned wide geographies and time spans, 
the difficulties of which were discussed in the introduction.  This broad perspective has been 
necessary in order to get a sense of shifts that have occurred over a long period of time, in a subject 
area that has been little explored.  It also provides a broad framework into which more detailed 
studies of health policy and provision in the post-colonial developing world may fit. More detailed 
studies could, for example, involve a comparison with French and Belgian colonial traditions in 
Africa. A closer study of the politics of workers’ health in India would also certainly be interesting. 
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This study used documentation derived largely from the India Office records in London, but there 
are likely to be illuminating documents in India itself, particularly at the Tata Steel headquarters in 
Jamshedpur from where much of the post-independence OHS work was driven.  This could also shed 
light on another omission of this study – the relationship between large corporations, nationalism, 
and adherence to and promotion of labour protections. Here the question is why certain 
corporations – such as Tata in India or Anglo Gold Ashanti in the Gold Coast – tended to provide 
relatively good health services to their employees and why some did not, and whether and how this 
tied into imperialist or nationalist projects. 
 
A final omission from this study is a more detailed discussion of small scale agricultural workers and 
indeed “the peasantry” in general. It is true that in Chapter Three there is some discussion of the 
importance of small scale farming in both India and Ghana and how this fed into and was influenced 
by the colonial labour market. Nevertheless, into the post-colonial and present day periods, the 
focus is largely on either the workers in the large colonial industries – plantations, mines, and 
factories, or on those who participated in “informal” economic activities aside from agriculture. 
There is no discussion, for example, of how rural health programmes may have interacted with 
agricultural legislation, and/or how the international organisations tried to grapple with the problem 
of extending occupational health legislation to rural areas. This has largely been done to limit the 
scope of this already large study. 
 
Summary and Structure of the Thesis 
In summary, this thesis is an examination of the shifting place of the worker in relation to the citizen 
within health policy. The four main questions which guide the analysis are as follows: 
1. In relation to the terms of inclusion into health policies at present, how have we arrived at 
the place we have, and why? What light does an understanding of historical processes shed 
on the current moment? 
2. How has the place of the worker changed in relation to the citizen within health policy in 
countries of the Global South over time, and what political and economic processes have 
underlain this shift? What implications do these shifts have for understanding present day 
policy changes? 
3. What role have trade unions and other worker-based organisations played in the 
development of health policies and institutions? In particular, how and why have their 
activities affected (or not been able to affect) the shifting place of the worker in relation to 
the citizen within health policy? 
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4. How has the gendered definition of the worker and the citizen changed over time, and what 
implications does this have for our understanding of current institutional reconfigurations? 
 
In order to answer these questions, the thesis has been divided into five further chapters. Chapters 
Two and Three examine health policy in India and the Gold Coast under British colonial rule and in 
doing so act as a base on which to build the rest of the thesis. Chapter Two looks more broadly at 
the place of the worker in health policy, whilst Chapter Three takes a gendered lens and looks 
specifically at the place of the woman worker. Chapter Four moves into the late colonial (post-World 
War Two) and post-independence period, exploring the tensions between the ideal of universal 
citizenship that post-colonial governments promised their citizens, and the reality of constrained 
resources and health systems that continued to favour formal workers. This chapter also challenges 
Cooper’s theory of worker engagement in relation to occupational health, arguing that there were 
important constraints on how workers could engage with this aspect of labour policy. Chapter Five 
acts as a bridge between the post-colonial period and the present, examining the shifting 
relationship between the worker and the citizen in the health policies of the international 
organisations, the WHO, the ILO, and the World Bank, over a period of fifty years. Chapter Six looks 
to the future by analysing the responses of organisations of informal workers to present day health 
policies, and asking whether these have the potential to catalyse radical socio-economic and policy 




Chapter Two: Specificity and Continuity: Health and Labour in Colonial 
India and the Gold Coast, 1860-1945 
 
Introduction 
One of the crucial periods on which this thesis hinges is the development of the British welfare state 
and its transportation, in a limited form, to the colonial territories. It was during this period that 
what TH Marshall (1965) called “social citizenship” – the idea that citizenship included not only civil 
and political rights, but also rights to health, welfare, and social security – was institutionalised in the 
British state, and began to influence the late colonial policies with which Cooper (1996) is 
concerned. However, as both Gladstone (1999) and Hobsbawm (1987) have noted, whilst “the 
legislation of the 1940s may have constituted a defining moment in welfare collectivism,” it did not 
emerge out of a vacuum. It was the culmination of a long process of social and political reform which 
had its roots in the period 1875-1914 when nationally organised labour unions, democratic 
government, and “modern welfare legislation” began to emerge in Britain (Hobsbawm, 1987: 17). 
Likewise in the colonial territories, the policies of the late colonial period were themselves the 
product of many years of changing economic and political thought about the role of the colonial 
state.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the development of health policies over a period of seventy 
years in Britain and two of its colonies, India and the Gold Coast, tracing the way in which particular 
economic and political configurations impacted on these policies and their terms of inclusion. It 
takes as its starting point 1860 when the first regulations relating to health were instituted in the 
Indian tea plantations. The end point is the end of World War Two, after which the British welfare 
state was established and the drive towards decolonisation began. The post-war conjuncture will 
form the subject of Chapter Four. Following the theme of the thesis, this chapter is particularly 
focused on the place of the worker within health policy and how this changed over time. What is 
important to trace is the gradual movement towards a language of liberal entitlements and where 
the worker was placed in relation to this. In doing so, this chapter lays the conceptual base on which 
the rest of the thesis is built.  
 
The chapter is divided into three sections which look at the development of health policies and 
legislation in Britain, India, and the Gold Coast between 1860 and 1945. Within each of these 
sections critical shifts in the political economy of health and in the ideological reasoning attached to 
these are delineated. In his analysis of colonial health policies in colonial Ceylon, Hewa (1995) 
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defines his periods of analysis in materialist terms, differentiating between the earlier era of 
“plantation capitalism,” characterised by laissez-faire, and the later period of “monopoly capitalism,” 
which emerged at the turn of the 19th century and was characterised by greater state intervention as 
colonial industries developed and European nations increasingly began to compete for greater 
shares of the international markets, and to source raw materials to feed the needs of increasingly 
technologically advanced industry. Indeed, it would be difficult to refute the fact that economic 
reasoning lay behind much of the colonial expansion that occurred during the period of monopoly 
capitalism.  
 
Yet Ashford (1986: 10) argues that purely materialist analyses of the development of social policies 
do not “allow us to pose the most difficult political question of how institutional values were 
adjusted to include the values of social need and social equality.” Indeed, as Ashford (1986: 10) goes 
on to show, a central dilemma in the development of social policies in Britain was the ideological 
question of how to “reconcile the basic tenets of liberalism” (which promoted individual freedom 
and laissez-faire) with the idea that democratic states had obligations to society. A consideration 
which contributed greatly to this dilemma was the need to reconcile liberalism with state 
intervention in order to develop and maintain a labour force to feed growing industries in both 
Britain and abroad (Cooper, 1987; Hobsbawm, 1987). In this way, political ideas and economic 
realities existed in complex relation to one another, and this chapter views them as inextricable 
parts of a whole.  
 
In doing so the chapter engages with the changing nature of the colonial state over this period, 
which is itself the source of considerable debate. Meghan Vaughan (1991), for example, has 
critiqued the use of Foucauldian frameworks to analyse the colonial state. Foucault’s influential work 
Discipline and Punish argued that modern, liberal states develop disciplinary techniques which act on 
the subjectivity of individual citizens in order to maintain social order. Social policies in particular 
were singled out as part of this disciplinary apparatus, and his theories have inspired a large 
literature on the operation of power through social policies in the colonial state. Vaughan (1991), 
however, argues that colonial states were not modern, liberal states and relied on much cruder and 
more violent forms of coercion and repression to manage subject populations. In this context health 
policy and regulation had little to do with liberal modernist forms of social discipline, objectifying 
rather subjectifying Africans. Guha (1997) makes a similar point critiquing the use of the Gramscian 
concept of hegemony to describe the colonial state, arguing instead that the colonial state in India 
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was unable to assert ideological control over the population, and instead was forced to rely on what 
he terms dominance, which was characterised by more overt forms of violence.4 
 
Despite their differing theoretical origins, the above perspectives on the colonial state do share a 
commonality in that they view the state – and its policies and legislation – as predominantly 
oppressive institutions. While there is little doubt that violence and oppression were a part of the 
colonial project, it is important that this is nuanced – particularly when it comes to issues such as 
health. The extension of Western forms of medical practice, and the institutions which supported 
these during the colonial period, were deeply problematic, particularly when they clashed with local 
understandings of health and disease and health practices (Arnold, 1993). As Guha argues, the ways 
in which health policies – particularly at the level of local government – were enacted was imbued 
with violence. Violent forms of discipline, court orders, and intrusions on private households were a 
part of the modus operandi of colonial health provision, particularly in times of epidemic disease. On 
the other hand, the spread of medical innovations, and of Western style health facilities, cannot be 
framed purely in terms of violence and oppression, just as it is simplistic to frame the colonial state 
in such terms alone.  
 
Medical discoveries around diseases such as cholera and malaria, the development of effective 
treatments and prevention strategies, particularly in the period after World War Two when 
advances were made in antibiotic treatment, and the means by which to distribute these to 
increasing numbers of people through clinics and hospitals and medical training facilities led to 
improvements in mortality and morbidity (Dumett, 1993; Sender, 1999; Deaton, 2013). The fact that 
post-colonial states prioritised, at least in theory, the extension of Western style universal health 
coverage after independence indicates something more positive about colonial health provision: 
while it may have been part of what was ultimately experienced as part of an oppressive machinery, 
it was also valued and continues to be valued by the many who argue for its continued extension. 
Here the argument about colonial health services takes a different direction – far from focusing on 
the oppressive nature of the health apparatus of the colonial state, it views the main problem as 
being that the colonial state did not extend this health apparatus widely or comprehensively enough 
(Harrison, 1994). Indeed it was actually relatively few colonial subjects who felt the touch of colonial 
medical and health services. The colonial state was first and foremost one that was based on the 
extraction of economic resources, not one which wanted to expend resources on subject 
                                                          
4 Both Vaughan and Guha refer here to non-settler colonial states. White settlers could not be dealt with in 
such authoritarian ways. 
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populations. As Amrith (2011: 129) points out, despite the rhetoric of the late colonial period, health 
and welfare could never be a top priority of an essentially extractive state, arguing that “what is 
most striking about the medical infrastructure that the Raj bequeathed to independent India is its 
weakness and limited reach.”  
 
Moreover, as Cooper (1996) has argued, the British colonial state, its need for labour, and its rule of 
law provided both a language and political openings which ultimately could and would be used by 
the colonised to expand their claims to social entitlements such as health care. Cooper (1996) shows 
that this process began to speed up after World War One, as colonial states were forced through 
international pressures and their own internal contradictions to grapple with the possibility that 
colonial subjects may also be the rights-bearing individuals of the modern democratic state. 
Consequently, in addition to this top-down approach, this chapter is also interested in exploring 
resistance from below, and how this impacted on the form of colonial health policies. Following 
Cooper (1996) it looks at how different logics of rule opened up or closed down possibilities for 
resistance, and indeed, changed its very nature, from simple acts of desertion to strikes and 
disturbances, and finally to the “engagements” with power that Cooper (1996) talks of, where trade 
unions were able to use the language of liberal entitlements to widen the scope of these 
entitlements until the contradiction became too great from Britain.  
 
Cooper’s arguments here are a critique of two theoretical positions. It is a critique of Foucauldian 
political theory, which has been criticised for emphasising the workings of power at the expense of 
an understanding of resistance to power (Arnold, 1993; Li, 2007). It is also a critique of a certain style 
of post-colonial theory which Cooper (1994) argues emphasises “the binaries of coloniser/colonised, 
Western/non-Western and domination/resistance.” Cooper (1994: 1517) sees these binaries as 
“useful devices for opening up questions of power,” but argues that they “end up constraining the 
search for precise ways in which power is deployed and the ways in which power is engaged, 
contested, deflected, and appropriated.” It is important here to recognise that colonial societies 
were also internally stratified by class, and that these class differences also played an important role 
in determining the form and direction of resistance (Sender and Smith, 1986).  
 
A tension that runs through this chapter is that of continuity and specificity in the politics of the 
institutions which will be discussed. There is a balancing act to perform between the discussion of 
health policy as an empire wide phenomenon, and the specific politics which surrounded the 
development of these institutions in particular countries. What is striking about state institutions in 
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Britain and its colonies is how similar they appeared in their outward form. The regulation of 
occupational health and safety, for example, was governed by Factory Acts and Workmen’s 
Compensation legislation in Britain, Ghana and India, and local government health regulation 
centred on the Medical Officer of Health in all three countries. There was a logic used here that 
stretched from Britain, to its other colonies, often via India where the colonial version of British 
legislation and state apparatuses were experimented with before being sent on to Africa and other 
more minor colonies.  There was a template of sorts, and how and why this template came to spread 
throughout the British Empire is important to understand. Equally important, however, is to 
acknowledge the differences between colonies, as well as between British legislation and that which 
existed in the colonies – to understand the very specific politics that surrounded these institutions in 
particular times and places, as well as to explore the ways in which they were both constituted by 
and constitutive of colonial difference. 
 
The Place of the Worker in Health Policy and Provision in Britain, 1860-1945 
The extension of social policies to Britain’s colonies, including those related to health and welfare, 
has to be understood within the context of the prior developments in the metropole. By 1860 Britain 
was in the midst of what MacDonagh (1958) called the “Nineteenth Century Revolution in 
Government,” where experimentation in the governance and regulation of a newly industrialised 
and democratic society were being carried out. The years between 1789 and 1848 in Europe had 
seen what Hobsbawm (1975) refers to as a “dual revolution” – an economically driven 
transformation of industrialisation and proletarianisation and the politically driven revolution of the 
French. The 1830s and 1840s had seen major social unrest and, although by 1848 the labour 
movement had been decimated by the failed Europe-wide revolutions, by 1860 national labour 
unionism began to emerge.  
 
There is disagreement as to whether forces from below had much influence on these developments. 
Ashford (1986), for example, argues that the development of 19th century social policies was 
primarily led by intellectuals and politicians in a quest to reconcile liberalism and state intervention. 
Yet, as Hobsbawm (1975: 13) points out, without the threat of social unrest, this contradiction may 
never have come to the attention of these intellectuals and politicians: 
Behind the bourgeois political ideologists stood the masses, ready to turn moderate liberal 
revolutions into social ones. Below and around the capitalist entrepreneurs the discontented 
and displaced ‘labouring poor’ stirred and surged.  
 
Ashford (1986: 67) argues that by the turn of the 19th century “Britain was astoundingly unprepared 
for dealing with an industrial labour force,” for two main reasons. Firstly, the strength of liberal 
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ideology – in both social and economic matters – meant that state intervention was a concept not 
easily accepted within the echelons of power, and that the government therefore lacked “a concept 
of state” that could help “leaders and thinkers of the period to assemble their ideas and 
programmes” (Ashford, 1986: 67). Secondly, the state intervention and policy was largely oriented 
towards protecting the interests of the landed gentry, at this time still a powerful political force. Yet 
by the 1860s the sheer social need that industrialisation and urbanisation had created, as well as the 
push from prominent social reformers such as Edwin Chadwick, Robert Morant, and the Earl of 
Shaftesbury, meant that the British government had been forced to develop a new set of 
interventions to meet this demand (Ashford, 1986). The fact that they had “no concept of state” 
meant that these programmes and policies seemed somewhat scattered and ad hoc, developing 
according to specific needs within specific sectors. Nevertheless, by 1880, the Factory Acts which 
governed working hours and conditions in factories (first instituted in 1802) had been through 
several amendments (Henriques, 1979), and urban public health services had become an 
increasingly prominent issue after Chadwick’s publication of The Health of Towns Commission 
Report of 1845, which “drew forcible attention to the connection between disease and bad 
drainage, poor ventilation and inadequate living spaces” (Henriques, 1979: 87).  
 
There are two points worth emphasising here regarding British health policies up to 1880. The first is 
that such policies were closely related to the development of an industrial working class. It was this 
group – divorced from the land, living in cities which could not cope adequately with the influx of 
people, insecurely employed, and prone to disease and injury which could wipe out their ability to 
sell their labour power – who most needed protection by the state. It was also this class, a class that 
was still in the process of formation, but whose labour power fuelled industry, that “the new men of 
the industrial…class” relied on to keep industry running, and whose vote was needed as electoral 
democracy grew to be the organising principle of the state (Henriques, 1979: 113; Hobsbawm, 
1987). The result was that the policies and programmes which were developed during this period 
placed their focus on the working man. For example, the history of public health policy, which is now 
more closely linked to citizenship than to work status, was in fact “intimately tied up with the history 
of working class housing” (Henriques, 1979: 87). For example, one of Chadwick’s famous public 
health reports was called The 1842 Inquiry into the Sanitary Conditions of the Labouring Population 
of Great Britain. Rosen (1958) points out that public health was also closely linked, in its sanitary 
focus, to demands for the improvement of working conditions in the factories, the focus of the 




The second point is that it was only after 1880 that the groundwork was laid for what was to become 
Britain’s welfare state. Between 1860 and 1880, this process was far from complete, and laissez-faire 
as a guiding principle was still strong. The Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834, which had lifted the 
state protections to the poor afforded by the Elizabethan Poor Laws, was actively enforced. The so-
called “New Poor Laws” were based on a mixture of Benthamite utilitarianism, Ricardian wage 
theory, and Malthusian population principles and were essentially designed to make social 
assistance to the poor as unpleasant as possible, so that the rural poor migrating to cities were 
forced to find employment. Poor relief was available only in the infamous workhouses (“outdoor 
relief” being discouraged as providing a disincentive to work) (Ashford, 1986). Master and Servant 
legislation, which had first originated in 1562 in order to deal with the labour shortages created by 
the Black Death, was also in force. Through its provisions, which included until 1875 penal sanctions 
for servants who broke the law, the Master and Servant Act of 1867 attempted to instil labour 
discipline and control inflation by preventing workers from “bidding up wages,” and to “prevent 
trades from leaving towns for the countryside, and forestall or repress widespread and dangerous 
riot and disorder caused by recurrent harvest failure and depression” (Hay, 2004: 64).  
 
The period between 1860 and 1880 then was a period of transition. On the one hand the provision 
of social services was beginning to emerge as a function of government. There was also beginning to 
be a recognition, with Chadwick’s influence, that labour productivity could suffer because of dirt, 
disease, and poor living and working conditions, and that, even worse, this would increase the 
burden on the state’s workhouses as illness resulted in an inability to work (Rosen, 1958: 185). 
Interestingly, Chadwick had sat on the Poor Law Commission of 1832, and did not want to admit that 
disease amongst “able-bodied” adults might be a consequence of poverty (which would “have 
rendered a deterrent Poor Law morally indefensible”). Instead he chose to argue that poverty 
followed from disease, and that it was disease and the environment which produced it that needed 
to be tackled (Henriques, 1979: 87). Yet despite these shifts towards more interventionist forms of 
governance, much of the focus of health and labour policy remained on building up a regular waged 
labour force to feed the growing industrial machine through overtly coercive “incentive” 
mechanisms such as the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 and the Masters and Servants Act, and 
not on the provision of state entitlements to rights bearing individuals. 
 
However, from 1880 onwards state intervention in Britain began to take on a qualitatively different 
form as the challenges to laissez-faire became increasingly strong. There were a number of factors 
which prompted this change. Firstly, the economic depression that occurred between the years of 
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1873 and 1896, as well as rapid industrialisation in the rest of Europe, forced the British government 
to begin rethinking its economic and social policies. The depression transformed European countries 
from an “aggregate of national economies” to “a group of rival economies, in which the gains of one 
seemed to threaten the position of others” (Hobsbawm, 1987: 58). The result was that it was not 
just firms, but nations, which began to compete with one another, ultimately contributing to a 
declaration of war in 1914. By the turn of the 20th century Britain was becoming increasingly 
insecure about its position as global superpower. Apart from the increasing economic competition, 
the Boer War in South Africa had revealed a startlingly incompetent and undernourished military 
and its population was growing at a slower rate than any of the other European states, leaving many 
in Britain “anxious to restructure the national life and overhaul the machinery of government, to fit 
Britain more adequately for the Great Power rivalries of the twentieth century” (Searle, 1971). 
Investments in the nation’s human resources were seen to be a key part of this – attention was 
therefore paid to education and, in particular, health. Healthy, strong, well-educated Britons were to 
be the backbone of a stronger state and economy – an underlying logic of health and welfare 
policies which Pickstone calls “productionism” (Searle, 1971; Pickstone, 2000). 
 
This period was also a turning point for organised labour. The political power of the landed 
aristocracy was waning and the institutions of mass electoral democracy were becoming 
entrenched. In 1874 the first trade unions entered Parliament and by the turn of the century labour 
was an increasingly powerful political force, contributing after World War One to the downfall of the 
Liberal Party and the rise of the Labour Party in British Politics (Dangerfield, 1935 (1961)).5 
Moreover, it was recognised that the skilled regular workman was the backbone of the industrial 
economy, and that policies which aimed to increase productivity needed to focus as well on 
improving the living and working conditions of this “respectable working class” (Hobsbawn, 1987).  
 
After 1880 the laws regulating working conditions in factories and mines were strengthened 
considerably, and the departments administering them bolstered (Bartrip, 2002, Mills, 2008). In 
1898 the Home Office appointed Dr. Thomas Legge as the first Medical Inspector of Factories, 
thereby giving statutory acknowledgement to the fact that workplaces could be a source of disease 
as well as injury (Melling, 2010). However, Britain still had no centralised, state provided universal 
                                                          
5 In his book The Strange Death of Liberal England, Dangerfield argues that four “rebellions” contributed to the 
downfall of the British Liberal Party after World War One, despite their relatively innovative and impressive 
policies. These were: the Tory resistance to the Parliament Act of 1911 (which reduced the powers of the 




health service, although arguments towards this end were already being heard from the Fabian 
Society (Ashford, 1986). Doctors worked privately, except in the poor-house health facilities, which 
were administered by local governments. Local governments also continued to administer urban 
health and sanitation services. This was to change to a limited extent, however, in 1911 with the 
introduction of Lloyd George’s National Insurance (NI) Act, which included both unemployment and 
health insurance provisions (Gladstone, 1999; Sturdy, 2002). 
 
Unemployment was, in fact, one of the major concerns of British politicians and social thinkers 
around the turn of the century. According to Ashford (1986: 196), “In the late 19th century, officials 
and academics had only a dim idea of what unemployment meant.” Unemployment was seen as an 
inevitable fact of life and “for most of the nineteenth century inadequacy of income as such, 
whether caused by low wages, irregular employment, or even by sickness, was not considered a 
legitimate object of state interference, beyond the conditional subsistence granted by poor relief” 
(Harris, 1992: 44). The long depression that lasted for 23 years between 1873 and 1896 had revealed 
that unemployment was not necessarily an inevitability, but something that arose from the 
economic structure of society. The central problem facing the government was how to “revise 
obsolescent liberal policies concerning the poor and less educated” to deal with this reality (Ashford, 
1986: 196). At the time, the answer came in the form of the NI Act, which looked to incorporate the 
mutual insurance schemes of the Friendly Societies into a state-administered scheme which offered 
protections to regular wage-earning men. No doubt influenced by Bismarck’s scheme already in 
operation in Germany, the NI Act was also a convenient way for Lloyd George to ensure the 
continued dominance of private insurers, who were given favoured status as providers, and thereby 
ensuring Tory support (Ashford, 1986; Sturdy, 2002). In terms of health provisions the NI was very 
limited – providing health insurance benefits to working men only, whilst excluding their families. 
 
According to Hobsbawn (1975: 15), the start of World War One in 1914 represented the end of an 
era in Europe – the end of “the world made for and by the bourgeoisie.” After 1914, an 
amalgamation of forces – the entrenchment of mass electoral politics, the rise of working class 
political parties (such as the Labour Party in Britain), Keynesian economic theory, a weakening 
ideological opposition to state intervention, as well as the social consequences of two world wars 
and the Great Depression pushed Britain towards “a comprehensive welfare ideology” in which 
“social expenditure could be seen to change and improve society” instead of merely reacting to 
social crises (Gladstone, 1991: 3).  Productionist ideology was still very much a part of this – the 
wealth and efficiency of the nation relied on state investments in the health and welfare of the 
42 
 
population. However, this was now framed within a conception of social justice – a wider idea that 
health, education, housing, welfare and social security were social rights that citizens could claim 
from the state. Although it was only after World War Two that Britain’s welfare state was 
institutionalised under Clement Atlee’s Labour Government with the publication of Sir William 
Beveridge’s Report (1942) and the passing of the Education Act (1944), the National Health Service 
Act (1946), the National Insurance Act (1946), and the National Assistance Act (1948), the debates 
leading up to this had already taken place in the 1920s and 1930s (Gladstone, 1991). 
  
Within these debates was a central tension that in later years would play itself out across the 
colonies – a tension between inclusion into the new social policy regime based on status as a worker 
(and therefore contributor) versus inclusion based on a more universal conception of social rights.  
Glennester and Evans (1994: 58) have analysed this tension within the work of Beveridge, arguing 
that: 
At the heart of [his] thinking was a contradictory struggle between his deep desire to cover 
everything and everyone without a means test and his choice of method, contributory 
insurance through employment. He wished to give security to all, but to base this security, 
apart from family allowances, on participation in the labour market. 
 
Ultimately, they argue, Beveridge was forced to choose this path because it was a compromise that 
had been agreed upon by employers, workers, and the state, and he would have risked the 
alienation of the trade unions, who were determined to protect the rights of the “respectable 
working classes” if he had not (Glennerster and Evans, 1994). The result was a system based largely 
on social insurance, with contributions to be collected through payroll taxes. One of the great 
exceptions – an exception that will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four – was the annulment 
of the 1911 NI Act and its replacement with the National Health Service (NHS), which converted the 
public health system into a centralised state system that was free to all (Whiteside, 1999).  
 
The Place of the Worker in the Health Policy and Provision in India, 1865-1945 
A complex mix of factors brought the attention of colonial officials to health matters in the colonies, 
and it was a mix that inevitably changed over time. Contributing to the implementation of health 
reforms in colonial societies were a number of factors, including: colonial economics, changing 
ideologies about the role of the state and the rights of the individual, the increasing strength of 
reform movements both religious and secular in Britain and its colonies, the need, particularly as the 
nature of the colonial project shifted, to keep onside ruling elites, as well as the increasing resistance 
and calls by colonial subjects themselves to have the benefits of western scientific advances. In 
implementing these reforms, it was inevitable that colonial officials would look to Britain for models 
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and examples. Once these models had entered the colonial realm, however, they were modified to 
suit the specific political economy, and were adjusted to local social and cultural contexts. This 
meant that the history of health reforms in the colonies, although certainly having a connection to 
the metropole, had their own specific politics. 
 
An important catalyst for the initial introduction of health legislation in the colonies was the end of 
slavery, which was finally abolished in the British Empire in 1843. The Abolitionist Movement in 
England had a number of influences, from the religious (Quakers and Evangelicals featured 
prominently in the movement) to the philosophical as enlightenment ideas regarding individual 
freedom and equality spread through Europe after the French Revolution.  However, as Cooper 
(1987) points out, there were also sound economic reasons for abolishing slavery in the colonies. 
Slavery was not an efficient way to develop and maintain the labour force that became increasingly 
necessary as the nature of colonial capitalism began to shift from what Hobsbawm (1975) calls 
“private enterprise colonialism,” based on trade and which required a minimal local labour force, to 
a colonialism that required large amounts of local labour for plantations and later on factories and 
mines. With slave labour “discipline” was never guaranteed as slaves resisted by exerting their 
“personal autonomy” and deserting frequently. The violence required to maintain the slave labour 
force was also not conducive to the kind of stable society from which a regular labour force could be 
drawn (Cooper, 1987: 16).  
 
The end of private enterprise colonialism in India was signalled by the 1857 Indian Mutiny, which put 
an end to the rule of the East India Company. The administration of India was thereafter transferred 
to the British Crown. This shift created the conditions that would force the state to develop 
legislation and policies to regulate key areas of social and economic life in India. It was now the state 
that was responsible for the governance of a subject population, which included the administration 
of towns, labour, and public health. It was also the state that now had to deal with the fundamental 
problem of “creating the conditions that fostered internalised discipline among…workers” in the 
absence of the compulsions of slavery – something which forced a movement away from the 
previously favoured laissez-faire and towards a more interventionist stance (Cooper, 1987: 13).  
 
Here health legislation was to play an important role as it was discovered how difficult it was to 
produce a consistent and productive workforce when death rates from disease were very high. The 
first British colonial legislation regulating the health of workers was developed in India in 1865 and 
was aimed at the tea plantation zones such as the Assam Valley in north-eastern India, where 
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European planters had been operating since 1833. The provisions of the 1865 regulations stated 
that:  
In the interests of the coolie, Protectors of Labourers and Inspectors of Labourers were 
appointed and these officers and the District Magistrates were empowered to inspect 
gardens…every estate was to maintain a hospital and estates employing over 300 labourers 
were also bound to employ a medical officer approved by the Local Government.6  
 
The legislation had largely come about as a result of problems with labour discipline and the inability 
of European planters to recruit adequate numbers of workers, particularly during the tea boom that 
lasted from 1860-1865. Planters could rely on networks of private labour recruiters known as 
sardars, as well as the introduction of an indentured system of labour and the Indian Penal Code of 
1860 which allowed planters to institute criminal proceedings against workers who deserted their 
employers during their period of indenture (Anderson, 2004; Mohapatra, 2004). These provisions 
were nonetheless still unable to prevent large numbers of workers from deserting. Eventually, a 
series of commissions were established to enquire into the reasons for the continued loss of labour, 
and attention was drawn to the “altogether appalling”7 death rates of the labourers, which, it was 
argued, was a strong contributing factor to high rates of desertion. One official account reported 
that between 1863 and 1866 out of a recruited labour force of 85 000, 35 000 (over 40 percent) had 
either died or deserted (Behal, 2006). Health loomed large within commission reports, and the 
influence of Chadwick’s environmentalist outlook was apparent. A commission which sat in 1868 
blamed the death rate on the “want of proper houses, over-crowding, unhealthy sites, insufficient 
and unsuitable food, impure water and want of proper medical attendance,” arguing in addition that 
the “Protectors of Labour” in the tea areas had “no special sanitary knowledge” and should be 
replaced by Inspectors with appropriate powers of sanitary enforcement.8 
 
A similar problem was faced in later years by the Bengal coal mines, which boomed in the late 19th 
century (Roy, 2000). Labourers in the coal mines were drawn from the surrounding rural areas, and 
were usually from the ‘poorest strata’ of society. Even these workers, however, had their limits in 
terms of how much they were willing to risk the loss of life and limb for wages. In a 1909 report, 
mining officials noted that the high incidence of cholera in the area was “driving labour from the 
mines.”9 Earlier reports had argued that the improvement of public health and sanitation around the 
coal fields was of utmost importance; plague had hit the Jharia coal fields during 1905, as well as two 
                                                          
6 British Library (hereafter BL), IOR/V/26/670/2: Report of the Assam Labour Enquiry Committee, 1906. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 BL, IOR/V/3065, Report of the Chief Inspector of Mines, 1909. 
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serious epidemics of cholera. Workers had returned to their villages, some of which were over 50 
miles away, “and alarming rumours about the unhealthy conditions of the mining districts are 
quickly spread over at least 10 000 square miles of recruit-grounds.”10 Realising the danger this 
posed to the labour supply, government and the mine owners were forced to establish Health 
Boards to oversee sanitary inspections of the mining area and additional staff for the resident 
doctor. 
 
Although these mining health regulations developed at a later stage, and were certainly influenced 
by the increasing attention paid to health and sanitation by the turn of the 20th century, the basic 
issue was similar to the one faced by the plantations in 1865: it was difficult to keep workers in place 
when death and disease had become synonymous with the workplace, despite the availability of 
violent and coercive measures such as penal sanctions. It became increasingly apparent that force 
alone was not enough. Dead workers were not able to produce anything for their employers. 
Workers were also less likely to finish their contracts when working on the plantations or mines 
appeared to amount to an almost certain death sentence. 
 
This fact points to a further important insight – that early workers’ health legislation was profoundly 
influenced by the resistance of the workers to the labour regime. This type of resistance was 
different from Cooper’s idea of an ‘engagement’ with power. The discourse of rights was not yet 
available to the majority of colonial workers, meaning that it was not possible to engage on that 
basis with the colonial state. Even then, as Cooper (1987) has also shown in relation to East African 
plantation labour, workers could vote with their feet, and in doing so forced the colonial state and 
employers to react in certain ways. In India during the period 1860 to 1880, and in later years on the 
mines and mills, the fact that labourers either refused to go to the plantations or deserted in such 
large numbers when they did, was a form of resistance against which the colonial state was forced 
to react with legislative measures, including those which, at least in theory, provided some 
protection to the health of workers.  
 
However, the ability of workers to effect change during this period should not be overestimated. The 
structure of the colonial state in India during this time was one in in which the planters had an 
enormous amount of power, and this would always limit the protections workers would receive. 
Secondly, where health regulations were developed, they were not rigorously applied. As Bartrip 
(2002) has pointed out, this reflected a similar situation in Britain itself where labour protections for 
                                                          
10 BL, IOR/V/3065, Report of the Chief Inspector of Mines, 1906. 
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workers were only rigorously enforced after 1880. Nevertheless, there were differences. For 
example, the penal sanctions in India, which were derived from British law, excluded the employee 
protections afforded to British workers (Anderson, 2004). These penal sanctions were also 
strengthened during the late 1800s, and, despite many abuses of the privilege, private powers of 
arrest were allowed to continue well into the early 20th century, whilst health and welfare 
regulations remained patchy at best (Mohapatra, 2004). Planters were willing to flout regulations, 
knowing that it was unlikely that they would be forced to pay a penalty. As James (1997: 350) puts it: 
In terms of racial arrogance, the tea and indigo planters had shameful reputations; like 
plantation owners and managers in every corner of the world, the Indian planters believed 
that they had the right to do as they pleased with their labour force and exercised it in 
defiance of the letter of the law. 
 
As in Britain itself, a qualitative change in the breadth and intent of health legislation came about 
after 1880. The depression of the late 19th century had also affected Britain’s colonial ambitions, and 
this had an important impact on the development of both health and labour legislation in India. 
Although the connection between the depression and the imperialist expansion that began after 
1880 has been much debated, Hobsbawm (1987) argues that the two were connected, albeit in 
complex ways. Hewa (1995: 12) argues that the period of colonial expansion which occurred after 
1880 represented a change from “plantation capitalism” to “monopoly capitalism,” characterised by 
“the emergence of giant firms with the ability to exercise a great deal of influence on their markets 
and suppliers.”  As Hobsbawm (1987) points out, much of the colonial expansion in this period was 
based on the need to find new markets for European manufacturers in the belief that the “crisis of 
overproduction” which had occasioned the depression could be resolved through what David Harvey 
calls a “spatial fix” (Harvey, 2010b). Whilst India had always been Britain’s prized possession, it now 
began to take on a new importance. Up to 60 percent of British exports were going to India and the 
Far East during this period, with over 40 percent going to India alone (Hobsbawm, 1987). In addition 
to this, colonial territories like India began to be seen as an important source of the raw materials 
needed to feed European industry. 
 
In India this process led to the emergence of a coal industry centred in Bengal. Coal fuelled the 
steam engine which in turn fuelled Europe’s Industrial Revolution. In order to allow for the efficient 
export of coal, the Indian state built railway networks between ports like Calcutta and the interior. In 
turn the railways themselves required coal to operate, further bolstering the industry. Unlike most 
other British territories, however, India had its own capitalist class who were, to a limited extent, 
able to take advantage of the coal boom, so that a significant number of the smaller collieries 
supplying about one-third of total production by 1947 were Indian owned (Roy, 2000). A large scale, 
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Indian-owned textile industry also began to emerge after the first modern textile mill was set up in 
Bombay in 1854. This signalled a drastic change for the organisation of the Indian textile industry, 
which, since the 18th century, had serviced the cloth needs of much of the world. Hitherto the 
industry had been organised around village weavers who sold their product on to merchants who 
then sold the cloth on to foreign trading firms for export (Roy, 2000). The introduction of large scale 
modern textile mills, owned largely by the middle-men merchants, changed this production process, 
creating a market for British mill machinery and bringing textile workers into the now growing cities.  
 
As in Britain, the period of monopoly capitalism was also characterised by greater state intervention, 
as the colonial administration was forced to grapple with the difficulties arising from urbanisation 
and an increasing wage labour force. Health, in particular, began to take on greater importance, 
particularly as the productionist ethos in Britain began to filter down to the colonies. This occurred 
first through the doctors of the increasingly established colonial medical services, which began now 
to take a wider interest in both urban and labour health (the combined Indian Medical Service was 
established in 1897 and a Gold Coast Medical Service during the 1880s), as well as in the African 
colonies through the Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain (1895-1903) whose emphasis on urban 
sanitation was heavily influenced by Chadwick and his successors (Baker and Bayliss, 1987). It was 
during this period as well that scientific advances in understanding diseases such as malaria and 
yellow fever were made, leading to the founding of the discipline of “Tropical Medicine” (a subject 
that will feature more later into this study), the establishment of several influential schools of 
tropical medicine in both Britain (London and Liverpool) and in India (Calcutta).  
 
Although there were similarities between the emphasis on improved health provision in Britain and 
India after 1880, there were also crucial differences – differences which gave rise to the very specific 
tensions and contradictions that characterised colonial India and its approach to health provision. In 
Britain, the greater commitment to state protections had developed through a process in which an 
understanding that individuals had some right to claim entitlements from the state had developed. 
This conception of the state-individual relationship was not present in the colonial context. The 
underlying logic was instead one of paternalism and trusteeship – Britain would look after its 
colonial subjects until they “were ready” to look after themselves (Anderson, 2004). Paternalism and 
trusteeship had the advantage that state intervention in matters of health would be more widely 
spread than the very specific concern in the earlier period with the health of Europeans and of 
isolated rural areas where labour was concentrated. However, this paternalism was always to come 
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into conflict with the fact that an overarching logic of colonialism was one of profit maximisation for 
Britain. Spending on social provisions was not a priority, and this did not change.11    
 
These tensions and contradictions were to play out within the sphere of health, as administrative 
concerns with budgets came increasingly into conflict with the “new men” of the Indian Medical 
Service. A key aspect of the period after 1880 was the innovations of medical science, led by the 
officers of the Indian Medical Service, who hitherto had focused their efforts on the health of the 
British military in India. The years between 1871 and 1921 had heralded in a “woeful crescendo of 
death” in India (Klein cited in Arnold, 1993: 200). The reasons for this have been much debated, with 
some scholars arguing that India had been opened up through greater travel and trade to previously 
unknown pathogens, whilst others have emphasised the fact that the deteriorating social and 
environmental conditions were the greatest contributing factor (Arnold, 1993). Certainly, it was the 
degraded social and environmental conditions which drew the attention of the colonial medical 
officers who were starting to make waves in India around this period.  
 
During this time medical officers such as Ronald Ross (who discovered the relationship between 
malaria and the mosquito while working for the Indian Medical Service), William Simpson (the Chief 
Medical Officer for Calcutta during the 1890s), and Patrick Manson (who had preceded Ross’s 
discovery by establishing the link between filiariasis and mosquito borne parasites) were in the 
process of establishing the discipline of Tropical Medicine (Baker and Bayliss, 1987).  This discipline 
was heavily influenced by Chadwick’s sanitarianism and focused on environmental management as a 
way in which to control disease. Indeed, Simpson’s later lectures at the London School of Hygiene 
and Tropical Medicine were described by one observer as “a maze of drains, ditches, lavatories and 
houses” (Baker and Bayliss, 1987: 457). At the same time, as Arnold (1993) points out, Tropical 
Medicine was not just a transported product – it was a practice of medicine that was both influenced 
and transformed by the specificities of the Indian environment and people.  
 
A number of historians of colonial health have argued that Tropical Medicine was both produced by 
and productive of colonial difference (Arnold, 1993; Anderson, 2006). It emphasised the difference 
between Britain, where diseases of the environment had been conquered through sanitary reform, 
                                                          
11 Sara Berry argues that Britain exercised “hegemony on a shoestring,” particularly in relation to its African 
colonies (less so in India). This meant relying on “indirect rule” through princes and chiefs in rural areas, whilst 
concentrating spending on urban areas and rural zones in which there were high concentrations of labour 




and India whose inferior level of development meant that they had not (Anderson, 2006). It also 
emphasised the intrinsic otherness of India as “a pathogenic of heart of darkness” from whence 
terrifying diseases unknown in Britain emerged (Amrith, 2006). An aspect of Tropical Medicine that 
is often ignored, however, is that it also contained a universalising streak – one which inspired the 
belief among men like Simpson that the answer to the mix of poverty and disease that by the 1890s 
was laying siege to India’s towns, lay in the same approach that had been used in Britain. This was 
essentially Edwin Chadwick’s approach to disease prevention: the upgrading of basic sanitation 
infrastructure, the demolition of slums, and the building of hygienic housing for the working classes.  
The fact that this universalising tendency within Tropical Medicine is not one that is paid much 
attention by historians of colonial health is perhaps a reflection of the general orientation of post-
colonial theory, with its focus on the production of difference. Yet it is when the work of medical 
men such as Simpson is seen in terms of their efforts to transfer a universal standard of sanitation to 
India, whilst at the same time being confronted by the need to keep social spending to a minimum, 
that the contradictions of the late colonial project become obvious. 
 
The rhetoric behind sanitary upgrades in India had been present since the 1880s (a Commission on 
Sanitation sat in Calcutta in 1885 for example), but it was really only after the 1896 plague epidemic 
that efforts were actually made to “turn rhetoric into reality” (Harrison, 1994: 97). During the 1880s, 
in a bid to cut costs, the Government of India had declared that the public health of towns would be 
the responsibility of local councils (partly made up of elected Indian officials) and would have to be 
self-financing (Amrith, 2011). The results did not work in favour of the public’s health – the Calcutta 
Sanitation Commission Report of 1885 noted that: 
Confining ourselves…to the mortality as shown in the returns made since 1867, it would seem 
that there has been no real improvement in the health of the Town. On the contrary, if the 
figures are to be trusted, it would appear that the public health has actually deteriorated 
during the last nine years as compared with the previous five or six years.12 
 
By 1896 this had deteriorated further, the general filth and squalor of the growing industrial towns 
in particular leading to an unprecedented outbreak of plague between the years 1896 and 1904. 
According to Arnold (1993) by 1901 the plague mortality figures exceeded a quarter of a million 
deaths, and by 1904 this had risen to over a million. As Arnold (1993) points out, the plague had 
devastating economic as well as social consequences as workers fled the cities in fear for their lives. 
“At the height of the plague exodus, only a fifth of Bombay’s millhands remained at work. Calcutta 
was to experience a similar, if briefer exodus, in April 1898 when possibly a quarter of the city’s 
residents fled” (Arnold, 1993: 2055). 
                                                          
12 BL, IOR/V/26/840/8: Calcutta Sanitation Commission Report, 1885. 
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The plague forced the government to respond with public health measures. In 1904 the Report of 
the Plague Commission recommended the strengthening of public health works, and the addition of 
health posts under the provincial government Deputy Sanitary Inspectors.13 This meant that public 
health was no longer solely the responsibility of local councils, but would receive support from 
provincial governments as well. One of the key areas of concern after the plague epidemic was the 
upgrading of slum housing. In Bombay the Bombay Housing Trust was established to find solutions 
to the problem of “overcrowding and insanitary housing” (Kidambi, 2001). However, as Kidambi 
(2001) shows, the Housing Trust itself was a victim of the contradiction between improved medical 
knowledge, the need and desire to improve social conditions, and the need to rein in social 
spending, and it ultimately failed to provide much in the way of relief to the urban housing crisis. 
Although the problem was framed as one that sought to resolve the housing crisis of the poor in 
general, in reality it ended up targeting industrial workers. In order to limit the investment of state 
resources, it first looked to mill owners to build low-cost housing for their workers. Eventually in 
1913 the Poorer Classes Amendment Scheme was passed which mandated the trust to spend money 
on the building of houses for the working classes. These houses were then leased to mill owners at a 
rate that would allow the trust to recuperate its expenditure plus four percent interest over a 28 
year period. Even this more limited scheme was unsuccessful, with only one mill actually agreeing to 
participate (Kidambi, 2001). 
 
Tensions and contradictions were also evident in the health legislation that developed around the 
Indian textile industry. The industry had become a key source of revenue for the Indian state, and 
was largely controlled by the indigenous elite on whose support the Raj relied. At the same time, 
however, Britain’s textile industry had competed with India’s for a share of the global market since 
the last two decades of the 18th century. Although Britain had gained the upper hand, the 
mechanisation of the Indian textile industry after 1860 meant that this competition was renewed. 
This meant that trade-offs had to be made between the needs of the British textile Industry and that 
of the Indian textile industry, and between the political needs of the metropole and the political 
needs of the colony.  
 
The development of the Indian Factory Acts were emblematic of these dilemmas. The initial 1881 
Act, recommended by the 1875 Arbuthnot Commission, had focused largely on issues such as age 
restrictions on working children, limits to the working day, protection of machinery, and availability 
                                                          




of drinking water.14 Although the factory reforms in India were also influenced by social reformers 
concerned with the welfare of women and children, the predominant concern was to balance the 
needs of Lancashire with the needs of the Government of India and the Indian elite. On the one 
hand the Lancashire Textiles Lobby was concerned that the increased regulation that they were 
experiencing under the British Factory Acts would mean that the unregulated Indian mills would gain 
the economic advantage.15 On the other hand the Indian mill owners argued that the imposition of 
the Factory Acts was a protectionist move by Britain. The result was a compromise of sorts. As the 
Arbuthnot Commission noted: 
In a point of caution the Commission were unanimous in their opinion that any Imperial Act 
that may be passed should not interfere more than is absolutely necessary with the working 
of factories, for these must be considered as highly important both financially and politically 
and of great benefit to the country as a whole.16  
 
This meant that the Act was minimalist, and arguably had more to do with increasing the costs to 
Indian factory owners by pushing them to make greater investments in the physical safety of 
factories and limiting the use of cheap child labour, than it had to do with a concern for Indian 
workers. Nevertheless, despite these origins, with the passing of time the Act was used by Indian 
labour organisations to extend the depth and breadth of labour protections. This move was 
presaged by Dr. T.M. Nair, Municipal Commissioner of Madras in a dissenting minute of the 1908 
Factory Commission: 
However much, I, as a native of India, may be opposed to the interference of Lancashire in 
questions closely related to the manufacturing interests of India, I cannot but help admit that 
the result of Lancashire’s interference has, on some occasions at least, been of considerable 
benefit…Abuses are abuses whether they are pointed out by friends or foes.17 
 
Sanitary matters were only addressed in a rudimentary form after 1884 when a resolution was 
passed which allowed local government sanitary inspectors to inspect factories. However, it was 
only after the turn of the century that it began to be seen as a central concern, when unhealthy 
living and working conditions began to be linked to the “low efficiency of operatives” in the Indian 
mills.18 
 
                                                          
14 BL, IOR/V/26/670/85, Report on the Commission appointed by the Governor of Bombay in Council to Inquire 
into the Conditions of the Operatives in Bombay Factories and the Necessity or Otherwise of the Passing of the 
Factory Act (Arbuthnot Commission), 1875. 
15 Kydd, J.C. 1920. A History of Factory Legislation in India. Calcutta: Calcutta University Press. 
16 BL, IOR/V/26/670/85, Report on the Commission appointed by the Governor of Bombay in Council to Inquire 
into the Conditions of the Operatives in Bombay Factories and the Necessity or Otherwise of the Passing of the 
Factory Act (Arbuthnot Commission), 1875. 




The tensions inherent in British colonialism would continue to escalate as the 20th century matured. 
As Cooper (1996) has argued, it was ultimately the great contradiction between the need for the 
colonial state to intervene in social and economic life in an increasingly liberal and progressive 
fashion, contrasted against the basic laws of profit that finally bought the Empire to its knees. In 
India, Britain’s oldest colony, the cracks began to show in a serious way after World War One, 
although signs of difficulty had been increasingly obvious since the first partition of Bengal in 1905 
under Lord Curzon, which separated the western Hindu region from the Eastern Muslim region, 
leading to a great deal of unhappiness amongst Hindus. Radical elements within the Indian National 
Congress were stirred, creating a split in 1907 between the moderates and extremists who began to 
call for swaraj (self-rule). In Bengal itself there was an upsurge in worker strikes, as well as the 
growth of terrorist cells known as samiti, which were repressed “ruthlessly” by the military machine, 
but continued to destabilise the area (Wolpert, 1993). In 1906 Curzon was replaced by the Earl of 
Minto, a Liberal appointee, whose general incompetence meant that it was the Secretary of State, 
John Morley, who was largely in left to quell the tide of resentment arising from Bengal (James, 
1997). Morely was a Gladstonian Liberal who believed that stability to India would not be bought by 
military power alone, and that it would be necessary to go further and incorporate the moderate 
Indian elite into government. He steered the Raj towards the Indian Councils Act of 1909, which 
allowed for elected Indian representatives to sit on various legislative bodies (James, 1997). 
 
After World War One, however, the need to placate India became even more pronounced. Britain 
had relied heavily on the help of its major colony during the war, financially and in the use of the 
Indian Army on the battlefields (James, 1997). To entice India into the war effort, promises were 
made that it would be on the path to dominionhood as were Canada and Australia. At the same time 
though, whilst Britain had by now lost any enthusiasm for imperial expansion, Darwin (1980: 657) 
notes that post-war colonial policy “was strangely reluctant to liberate Britain’s dependencies or 
hold out firm promises of independence.” Perhaps this was not so strange – as James (1997: 436) 
argues, Britain still hoped to defend its status as a leading global power, and the loss of India, the 
“keystone of the Empire,” would have signalled the end of these hopes.  
 
In the meantime, the compromise was the implementation of a series of liberal reforms, first in India 
and by the mid to late 1930s in the rest of its colonial territories. Violence and coercion would 
remain a part of the way in which the colonial states operated on the ground, but, in official rhetoric, 
this was now replaced by a liberal regime which acted as a trustee to colonial peoples, safeguarding 
their welfare until they were able to safeguard their own. It was during this period when the 
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institutions and administrative structures, and the ideological rationale for their shape and structure, 
were laid down in such a way that they continue to influence policies in the old British colonies to 
this day. It was also during this period that resistance to British rule began to take on its most 
organised and potent form, first in India and later in Mauritius, the West Indies, and the African 
colonies, drawing on the language of rights and entitlements and ultimately forcing Britain to 
abandon its Empire and direct imperial rule. 
 
In India specifically, a crucial turning point for the Raj was the massacre at Amritsar in 1919, when 
British Army forces opened fire on a crowd of peaceful protestors in the Jallianwalah Bagh garden in 
Amritsar, Punjab. The Indian Munity of 1857 has been described by Hobsbawm (1987) as “the last 
kick” of old India against the new imperial power. Amritsar can be thought of as a similar “last kick” 
of the colonial state which used such overt violence as its primary means of social control. The fact 
that this was considered an international scandal reflected the changing norms of the time. The 
massacre, coupled with the fact that it was becoming increasingly clear that Britain was not making 
good on its promise of dominion status for India, led to an upsurge in Indian nationalism and anti-Raj 
sentiment and through this to the reinvigoration of the Congress party as a “dynamic mass 
movement which embraced the peasantry and the growing class of industrial workers” (James, 
1997: 464). The “midwife” of this process was Mahatma Gandhi, who would lead India in the various 
“Round Table” negotiations on India’s status within the Empire during the 1920s and 1930s (James, 
1997: 464). After Amritsar, the Raj was forced into the enactment of liberal reforms, where it first 
began to experiment with the use of these as a means to buy the favour of the Indian elites whose 
support they relied on and who had been outraged by the actions of the British army (Wolpert, 
1993, James, 1997).  
 
Two main sets of reforms dominated the period prior to India’s independence in 1948. The first was 
the Government of India Act of 1919 (also known as the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms), which set 
up a system of “dyarchy” – a dual system of government, where responsibility was shared between 
the provinces and the central government. Under the 1919 reforms Agriculture, Local Government 
Supervision, Health, and Education became provincial government responsibilities, whereas 
Defence, Foreign Affairs, and Communications remained central responsibilities (although financial 
control ultimately continued to reside in the centre). Provincial councils were to contain a majority 
of elected representatives, and local councils were “Indianized.” Elected representatives were also 
allowed onto the Imperial Legislative Council. The reforms did not do much to pacify Indian 
demands; they were seen as appeasing measures whilst press freedom was clamped down on and 
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the Round Table negotiations failed to result in the promised dominion status for India. Partly in 
response to this dissatisfaction, the 1919 Act was reviewed in 1929 and ultimately replaced by the 
Government of India Act of 1935, which allowed for free elections and which saw in 1936/7 the 
election of the Congress Party to government. Congress, as James (1997: 585) notes, “had now 
become a partner in government.” 
 
The reforms had a significant impact on the administration of health in India. As mentioned above, 
the 1919 Act mandated the transfer of health administration to the provinces. The 1935 Act, whilst 
giving more autonomy to the provinces, did lead to some health functions returning to central 
control (such as medical education). According to Amrith (2011: 131), the 1920s were a period when 
health became “a rallying point” for India’s elite and middle classes, with the “modernising 
nationalists” of the Congress party by the 1930s committing themselves to a “deep intervention by 
state in society.” Here “the health of the population became part of a much broader agenda of the 
transformation from above” (Amrith, 2011: 131). However, according to Harrison (1994), although 
spending on health did increase during the inter-war period, provincial governments continued to 
operate with insufficient budgets and “the commitment of many Indian politicians to sanitary reform 
remained dubious, with a marked preference for expenditure on education” (Harrison, 1994: 436). 
 
Certainly at central level, the issue of public health had not been a priority. During the Legislative 
Debates in 1946, Mr. SHY Oulsnam noted that “…it is many years since any public health matter had 
occupied the time of this House.”19 Partly, he argued, this was because the reforms had designated it 
a provincial matter, but it was also because “in former years the subject itself did not attract the 
same attention as other more attractive matters.”20 Yet he went on to say,  
The idea that grew that the Central Government was hardly concerned with the health of the 
country … I may say, no longer prevails. It is now recognised that the Centre, although it may 
have no legislative powers and it may have no executive power, it cannot be indifferent to 
the state of public health of the country, that it must take an active part in the solution of 
health problems and that it can promote the solution of health problems even within 
constitutional limitations.21 
 
Oulsnam’s comments were made in response to the publication of the Report of the Health Survey 
and Development Committee, led by Sir Joseph Bhore, which in 1944 had been given a mandate to 
carry out an extensive assessment of the state of public health in India and to make 
recommendations on its future. The Bhore Commission Report, as it became known, was strongly 
                                                          





influenced by two of the world’s leading experts on social medicine, John Ryle and Henry Sigerist, 
and ultimately recommended a system of health care very similar to that which became the National 
Health Service in Britain.22 Although the Bhore Report received support from Congress, after 1948 
and its election into power, the party chose instead to implement a health insurance scheme – the 
Employee’s State Insurance Scheme (ESIS). This choice will be analysed further in Chapter Four; the 
purpose of this chapter is to provide the necessary historical background. Amrith (2006) has 
discussed the choice of the ESIS over Bhore’s recommendations, but provides little in the way of 
explanation for this decision, other than that the disruptions of independence and the partition of 
India meant that Congress altered priorities. This may well have contributed to the change of policy, 
but Amrith’s explanation omits another central issue – the very central place that the worker 
occupied in health policy during the late colonial period in India, a period in which social insurance 
was promoted as a solution for both unemployment and the provision of health services.  
  
In 1925 the last of the legislation which mandated penal sanctions against labour was repealed, and 
the Government of India began to introduce systems to deal with a “free” labour market (Anderson, 
2004). As Anderson (2004) points out, in reality the Indian labour force was far from free, as it 
continued to be based on a system which relied on sardars and the holding of wages in arrears for 
labour discipline. Nevertheless, pressures in the international sphere, particularly from the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) which had been formed in 1919, meant that Britain had to 
show a willingness to institute a modern system of labour administration in India. Pressure for this 
was also to come from London, as the Labour Party entered into its coalition government during the 
1920s. Health was central to the ensuing labour reforms. A number of commissions on the welfare 
of labour in industry, plantations, and mines sat during the 1920s, and legislation covering these 
areas was strengthened. The most prominent of these commissions was The Royal Commission on 
Labour in India which concluded an extensive survey of labour with a report published in 1931.23 The 
report spent a great deal of time on health issues, arguing that it was “a matter of cardinal 
importance” in relation to labour.24 The report advocated for a number of measures aimed at 
improving the welfare of Indian workers. One of its more significant recommendations was for the 
implementation of a National Health Insurance Scheme – a contributory scheme for workers to be 
modelled on Britain’s 1911 National Insurance Act.25  
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A particularly striking aspect of the Indian legislative debates during the 1930s and 1940s is how 
much space the subject of insurance took up. In 1923 the Government of India had been forced by 
the ILO to implement a Workmen’s Compensation Act. The Act introduced in India was not 
equivalent to that existing in Britain at the time. For example, there was a schedule of occupations, 
so that only eleven occupations were initially covered (a practice abandoned in 1906 in Britain).26 
The Indian Act placed a very low cap (300 Rupees) on the earnings of eligible workers. British 
legislation had maintained this, but the cap was significantly higher at 420 Pounds.27 The Indian Act 
also upheld the principle of contributory negligence – i.e. that an employer was not liable for 
compensation if it could be proved that injury or illness had been caused by the worker’s own 
negligence. This was still in operation in Britain under the 1925 Workmen’s Compensation Act, but 
by the late 1930s could not be used by employers as a defence.28 
 
In what Rose et al., (2006) describe as a “foundational paper” on the Foucauldian theory of 
governmentality, Defert (1991) has analysed the emergence of Workmen’s Compensation as 
“political technology” in France. He argues that state-based insurance schemes, which in France 
replaced workers’ mutual schemes, were part of the liberal project to constitute the individual as a 
political subject by creating an “immediate face-to-face” relationship between the state and the 
individual. Insurance, he argues, was central to the project of control and surveillance that 
developed within European liberal regimes. The introduction of the Workmen’s Compensation Act in 
India did certainly mark an important change in the relationship of the state to the workers – it was 
representative of a shift to more liberal forms of social control. It related to workers as individuals 
rather than a collective within a factory, mine, or plantation. Yet an analysis such as Defert’s (1991) 
leaves out an important part of the story of this legislation, and it is here that Cooper’s (1996) 
analysis is important. While it was certainly an attempt to reconfigure and reshape the Indian 
worker, and Indian society, into a modern form that the state could understand and deal with, it 
simultaneously gave Indian workers a discourse of entitlements which they used to widen the 
benefits for themselves; it allowed them to engage with power rather than to merely resist it.  
 
                                                          
26 BL, IOR/V/24/64, Workmen’s Compensation Statistics for Years 1926; 1939. The eleven initial occupations 
covered included factory workers, tramway workers, builders, miners, dock labourers, linesmen, sewage 
workers, railway workers, seamen, and members of the fire brigade. Plantation workers were left off the 
original schedule, although included later. 
27 Clow, A.G. 1924. The Indian Workmen’s Compensation Act. Allahabad: The Pioneer Press. 
28 TNA, CO 859/149/2, Comparison between National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act, 1946; Workmen’s 
Compensation Model Ordinance (East and West Africa), and Workmen’s Compensation Act (UK) 1925; 1946. 
57 
 
This engagement with power was nowhere more obvious than with the Workmen’s Compensation 
Act. Defert (1991) implies that the introduction of Workmen’s Compensation legislation in France 
had a detrimental effect on social cohesion within the workers’ movement because of its emphasis 
on the individual rather than the collective in the form of the mutual societies. In India, however, it 
appeared to act as something for workers’ unions to mobilise around and use to strengthen their 
membership. Worker associations had existed in India since the 1880s, but it was not until the early 
1920s that a significant number of workers began to be unionised and to take part in organised 
strike action (Arnold, 1980). Part of the reason for this was that it had become a policy of the 
Government of India to encourage apolitical trade unions to act as a valve for worker grievances and 
to try where possible to avoid violent strike action – much like the original intentions behind the 
formation of the Indian National Congress in earlier years (Morris, 1955; Arnold, 1980). During the 
rapid inflation and decreasing wage rates after World War One this was becoming necessary, and in 
1926 the Indian Trade Unions Act made the encouragement of unionisation official. This was a policy 
that the colonial administration was to enact during the 1940s in the African colonies as a way in 
which to contain the widespread disturbances of the time. 
 
Unionism in India was from the start a fractious affair, with a number of unions arising and 
disappearing in a relatively short period of time. As Arnold (1980) notes, the “law and order” 
approach of the Raj made it difficult for unions to organise effective strike action until the 1940s. Yet 
it is also true that legislation like the Workmen’s Compensation Act gave the trade unions something 
with which to improve conditions for their workers. Although colonial officials complained in 1924 of 
a lacklustre performance by trade unions making use of the Workmen’s Compensation Law,29 by 
1948 it was noted that Indian trade unions were taking “an active” interest in ensuring “proper 
compensation” for injured workers.30 The limitations of the Workmen’s Compensation Act also 
created footholds for Indian labour and its supporters to argue for further gains. Over a twenty year 
period, labour representatives in the Legislative Assembly, such as NM Joshi (a founding member of 
the Bombay Textile Labour Union and general secretary of the All India Trade Union Congress from 
1925-1929 and from 1940-1948), were able to push the boundaries of those limitations further and 
further. They argued for better compensation scales, for all occupational groups to be included 
within the legislation, for the definition of dependents to be widened, to amend the clause on wilful 
negligence, and to increase the wage limitation which cut off workers earning above 300 Rupees.31  
 
                                                          
29 BL, IOR/V/24/64, Workmen’s Compensation Statistics for Years 1924 and 1925. 
30 BL, IOR/V/24/64, The Working of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1923, 1948. 
31 BL, IOR/L/E/9/431, Extracts from Legislative Debates Relating to Workmen’s Compensation. 
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The arguments made on behalf of Indian workers were not always successful, but they did lead to a 
number of changes in the Act.32 Moreover, the existence of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, and 
the amount of time spent debating it, certainly created a space for discussions around social 
insurance that may not have otherwise existed in the legislative chambers. The fact that the Royal 
Commission on Labour had recommended the implementation of a health insurance scheme gave 
further impetus to this discussion, particularly as the Indian members of the legislature continued to 
try to use the gains made against the Workmen’s Compensation Act to push for a more 
comprehensive social insurance scheme. For example, despite the publication of the Bhore Report, 
the jurist and Dalit activist BR Ambedkar announced in 1946 that “we have in contemplation a Bill 
which deals with State Insurance, which will include sickness insurance, workmen’s compensation, 
maternity benefit, more or less on the lines of the social security measures adumbrated in 
England.”33 This Bill had first been mooted in 1942 as a Unified Scheme of Social Security for Factory 
Workers, inspired not only by calls to reform the Workmen’s Compensation Act in India, but also by 
the “general trend of opinion in other countries [which] appears to be in favour of compulsory State 
Insurance,”34 and by the Royal Commission on Labour’s “strong case for health insurance in India.”35 
 
Cooper (1996) argues that British policy makers in the late colonial period lacked imagination in their 
social policies – preferring to remain with a reality that belonged more to Britain that it did to the 
colonies. In doing so they had defined a very limited “realm of the possible” for the extension of 
health and welfare policies – they would revolve around workers, defined in the narrowest possible 
terms. This of course also had an economic rationale – the extension of universal social citizenship to 
colonial subjects was not an economically viable proposition for Britain, already stretched at home 
with increased social spending after the Great Depression. In defining the realm of the possible, 
through the extension of insurance-based mechanisms, the British also defined the trajectory that 
Indian activists and administrators took during the late colonial period. The writings of Professor BP 
Adarkar, who designed the ESIS, reveal very clearly that health policy had become intertwined with 
the idea of a working class, rather than a more general conception of universal citizenship: 
                                                          
32 In 1933 the Act was amended to increase the number of scheduled occupations from 10 to 29, to increase 
the available compensation scales, and to reduce the waiting period for payment.  In 1939 it was again 
amended to include workers who were paid “other than monthly,” and in 1946 the cap on earnings was 
increased to 400 Rupees. 
33 BL, IOR/L/E/9/430: Labour: Workmen’s Compensation (Economic and Overseas Department), Extract from 
Official Report of the Legislative Assembly Debates, 8th February 1946. 
34 BL, IOR/L/E/9/430, Memo from BP Adarkar, Department of Labour, Government of India to All Provincial 
Governments and Chief Commissioners, 30th of June 1945. 
35 BL, Adarkar, B.P. 1945. Report on Health Insurance for Industrial Workers, Labour Department, Government 
of India. 1945.  
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Social security measures are meant for the poverty-stricken masses, just as a country-wide 
health programme is meant for the diseases and unhealthy. The poverty-stricken masses fall 
into two broad groups: the industrial workers and the landless agricultural proletariat. 
Health insurance here is meant for industrial workers, but surely the State is free to devise 
medical assistance, with or without income security, for the agricultural working classes.36 
 
The reasons that Congress chose to remain with this trajectory in the post-colonial period will be 
explored in Chapter Four. As a final point, however, it is also important to note that the timing of 
India’s independence was likely an important factor in their choice of health insurance over universal 
health care funded through general taxation. In 1948, the year of India’s independence, the National 
Health Service had only just become operational and was not yet a tested proposition. This led 
Adarkar to express a cautionary note, saying that he was “quite well aware that Sir William 
Beveridge had proposed in his monumental report a separation of medical treatment from the 
administration of cash benefits,” but that the “conditions in Britain were peculiar,” and that whilst 
India may one day have a scheme such as Britain’s, it was not yet ready for that.37 
 
The Worker in Health Policy and Provision in the Gold Coast, 1920-1945 
Colonial health legislation and policy in the Gold Coast has a shorter history than that of India. Partly 
this was because of the timing of Britain’s colonial expansion. The African colonies were only 
consolidated in the period after the 19th century depression when the “scramble for Africa” began, 
as the European powers looked south for new markets and sources of raw materials. In 1870 Europe 
controlled only 10 percent of the African continent; by 1914 it controlled 90 percent (Hobsbawm, 
1987). In the Gold Coast, British troops fought wars with the Ashanti until their incorporation into 
the colony in 1896, and it was only in 1901 that the Gold Coast, incorporating Ashanti, and the 
Northern Territories emerged as a single entity. However, timing was not the only reason. There was 
also what Anne Phillips (1989) calls the Colonial Office’s “West Africa Policy.” The main objective of 
the policy was to make the West African colonies financially self-sufficient, requiring only 
investments in export facilities and the encouragement of local economic activity which could be 
taxed (Constantine, 1984). In the Gold Coast this policy manifested itself in the encouragement of 
indigenous cocoa farming, with the state reaping the rewards of export in a time of global 
commodity boom. This meant that, at the time, the Gold Coast government had little interest in the 
development and maintenance of an urbanised wage labour force or any of the accompanying 
health and welfare policies. For example, whilst Master and Servants legislation had been introduced 
in the colony in 1874, the reason for its introduction had less to do with the need to mobilise a 





labour force (as in India), and more to do with “eroding slavery” by introducing the idea of a labour 
contract (Rathbone, 2004). 
 
However, by the turn of the 20th century competing ideas were beginning to surface about the role 
of the colonial state in West Africa. In 1895 Joseph Chamberlain was appointed as Colonial 
Secretary. He was an early advocate of a developmental approach to the African colonies, arguing 
that scientific expertise could aid in the development of the colonies in a manner that would 
ultimately benefit British economic interests (Hodge, 2007). Under the influence of Chamberlain’s 
directives, urban public health policies began to be implemented in Accra. In 1889 a Municipalities 
Ordinance was passed which included basic sanitary provisions. However, as in India at the time, the 
emphasis on sanitary upgrades was placed on areas inhabited by Europeans, whilst the responsibility 
for the management of other areas of town was offloaded onto the African residents. Town councils 
were expected to raise their budgets on tax contributions from African residents alone. As a result all 
expenditure on public works and sanitation (except that which maintained the health of European 
officials) was halted (Addae, 1996). Not surprisingly the results of this experiment in “local self-
government” were similar to those in India. A devastating outbreak of plague in 1908 brought 
Professor William Simpson, who had by now left India and was lecturing at the London School of 
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, to Accra to advise on the implementation of sanitary measures 
(Parker, 2000).  
 
Simpson’s arrival in the Gold Coast was emblematic of a trend that would become more noticeable 
as the 20th century wore on and health and welfare policies became a feature of Britain’s colonial 
administration and increased in both size and scope. This was the increasing interconnection 
between colonies. Cross-empire advisory committees were established on topics such as health and 
labour, and later included housing and social security. As Cooper (1996) points out, these advisory 
committees were central to formulating and codifying scientific, health, and welfare policies for the 
Empire as a whole. Here, India often served as a model. Progressive reforms had started earliest in 
India, and model legislation for Africa and the island colonies was often drawn from existing Indian 
legislation rather than from its British counterpart. The justification for this was that British 
legislation was too advanced for colonial societies, but the reality was that the Indian legislation 
offered less substantive protections to workers and was less onerous on employers and the state.  
 
Acting on Simpson’s advice, in 1910 the reform of sanitation began in the Gold Coast, and in 1912 
the Towns Ordinance was passed in Accra which set up a Central Health Board to co-ordinate 
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sanitary activities.38 In 1913 tours of the interior were carried out by sanitary inspectors in order to 
develop similar structures for the large towns of the interior such as Kumasi, the Ashanti capital 
(1996).  Freund (1988: 12) points out that the growing emphasis on harnessing science for 
development also began to intersect with the growing productivist sentiment that was starting to 
spread throughout the empire: “that Africa’s resources could be harnessed only if labour could be 
developed in a more efficient manner.” Impetus was added to this by the growing mining industry in 
Ashanti which began to challenge the laissez-faire approach to labour regulation in the colony. The 
gold mines had boomed between 1900 and 1902 and were struggling to develop an adequate waged 
labour force to serve the industry’s needs (Crisp, 1984).  
 
Nevertheless, it was only during the 1920s that enough factors converged to promote greater state 
intervention in the Gold Coast. A key one was the arrival of Gordon Guggisberg as governor between 
1919 and 1927. Guggisberg was a reformer intent on social development and the bolstering of 
education and health services in the colony. The need for greater state intervention was also driven 
by a labour shortage crisis on the mines. By 1920 even the migrant workers from the endemically 
poor Northern Territories who had made up the bulk of the mining wage labour force were 
becoming less available to the mines, as the cocoa industry boomed and competition for labour 
grew.  As Governor Guggisberg put it, “... the prospective migrant worker had learnt to pick and 
choose, and to know his own value on the labour market” (cited in Crisp, 1984: 50). Although 
between 1906 and 1920 the mines had been engaging in covert forced recruitment (with some 
support from the government) in the Northern Territories (Thomas, 1973), the government was 
becoming increasingly unsupportive of the practice (Crisp, 1984).  
 
The progressive health reforms put in place by Guggisberg, which included the designation of Mining 
Health Areas (discussed further below), the building of several schools of hygiene, and the bolstering 
of urban sanitation work, were taken further during the 1930s, a decade which could perhaps be 
considered the most active period of health reform in the colony. Internally this was given impetus 
by a group of enthusiastic medical officers, but external forces played a role in this as much as 
internal ones. In the early years of the decade waves of “disturbances” and strikes rolled across the 
Empire. In the African colonies workers were becoming increasingly well organised and militant, and 
Indian workers who had spread throughout the Empire began to demand the same rights that their 
counterparts at home were receiving (Crisp, 1984; Phillips, 1989). International pressure on the 
                                                          
38 Although, as Parker (2000) points out, these reforms had less to do with the idea of development or 
productivity than they had to do with the Gold Coast government’s concern with stamping their authority on 
the urban space that was also the domain of the long urbanised Ga people of Accra. 
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Colonial Office was also mounting as the ILO began to take an interest in labour matters in “non-
metropolitan territories.” In 1934 the ILO sent a mission to West Africa to report on labour 
conditions, which had not reflected altogether favourably on the Gold Coast Government.39 Horror 
stories about the conditions on the Gold Coast mines had reached England via reports in the Daily 
Express, and further advocacy around working conditions in the mines had been arranged in London 
by a civil society group called the International African Service Bureau.40  
 
In Britain, the Colonial Office was developing its plans to bring stability to the African colonies – the 
plans which Cooper (1996) has described so well in Decolonization and African Society, which saw 
the development of an orderly, stabilised African working class as central to the stability of the 
Empire as a whole. Yet as Cooper (1996) shows, this project was one that contained the central 
contradiction that had also been seen in India – providing entitlements to one group of subjects 
opened the door for claims to widen and extend those entitlements, ultimately laying bare the 
conflict between doing so and the need to keep spending on the colonies to a minimum whilst 
reaping the maximum profit.  
 
Health played a central role in this agenda, and, as in India, exemplified this central contradiction. 
The first concerted effort in the Gold Coast to extend health services beyond the urban population 
alone and to wage labourers occurred in relation to mine workers, and was linked to the crisis of 
labour supply. Working conditions on the mines were abysmal – underground conditions were 
unsafe and living spaces were cramped and unsanitary. According to Crisp (1984: 49) death rates 
were so high amongst the workers that men considered working on the mines as a death sentence, 
something that was paralleled amongst the coal miners and plantation workers in India. The 
mortality rate per thousand in 1923/4 ranged from 31.34 at Prestea Mine, to 65.73 at Abontiakoon, 
to an astonishing 104.32 at Abosso (Crisp, 1984). To contextualise these figures, it is useful to 
compare to Indian mortality rates. In 1920 the mortality rate on the Assam Plantations was 
estimated at 31.54 per thousand after reaching a high the year before of 83.82 per thousand, 
attributed in large measure to the Spanish flu.41  These figures were considered unacceptably high, 
so the figures from the Gold Coast were particularly shocking, and, as the Indian planters had 
learned in the late 1800s, did little to attract labour to the mines. 
 
                                                          
39 National Archives of Ghana (hereafter NAG), ADM 1/1/448, Report to the Director, ILO if a Mission to the 
British West African Dependencies, 1936. 
40 Rhodes House Archives (hereafter RHA), MSS.Brit.Emp.s.322, Papers of Sir Arthur Creech Jones. 
41 BL, IOR/V/26/670/81.  
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In 1921 the Secretary of State for the Colonies appointed a “Commission of Enquiry into the High 
Death Rate Among Native Labourers,” to be led again by William Simpson.42  Simpson’s report 
ascribed the high death rate on the mines to the “unfit and tuberculous” men sent down from the 
Northern Territories, unsatisfactory housing on the mines, and polluted and insufficient water 
supply. He placed most of the blame, however, on hookworm disease, the presence of which he 
attributed to “constant re-infestation from infected latrines in the mines and villages.”43 The report 
recommended that a Mining Health Areas Ordinance should be enacted “to make regulations for 
securing and improving the health and housing of natives employed in or about Mines or Works.”44  
The Regulations provided for a Government Medical Officer of Health based at Tarkwa whose sole 
duty was to monitor the state of health in the mining areas. The regulations also provided for a 
decent standard of sanitation in the actual mine and the areas in which migrant mine employees are 
housed.  Provision was also made for the compulsory registration of deaths – something which 
Simpson complained was lacking, regular medical examinations, and the provision of adequate 
facilities for medical treatment.  
 
The report established the basis for health policy in relation to mineworkers for the next 20 years, 
and is described by Dumett (1993: 221) as “one of those rare turning points in the history of public 
health administration where a commissioned report actually propelled policy change.” No doubt the 
report was successful because of the changing attitude of the Colonial Office towards its African 
colonies – Simpson’s 1908 report on plague in Accra had led to very limited reforms. By 1925, when 
his second report was released, enough had changed in the Colonial Office’s outlook that his report 
was greeted with much greater enthusiasm. In relation to this thesis, Simpson’s second report is 
important because of its influence on what unfolded in the 1930s, when health became a hotly 
contested subject in the Gold Coast. The report, and the way in which it was contested in the 1930s, 
reveals much about the changing direction of medical practice in the late colonial period. 
Importantly it also gave rise to a tension between the extension of health services to workers and a 
more universal application to the colony as a whole – a tension similar to that experienced in India, 
and one which was to continue to play itself out in the post-colonial period.   
 
                                                          
42 NAG CSO 11/14/245, Summary of Events Leading up to the Declaration of the Mining Health Areas 
Regulations. 
43 NAG ADM 14/1/22; Simpson, WJ. 1925. Preliminary Report on the Investigation Regarding the High Death 




The emphasis that Simpson placed on hookworm disease as the main cause of ill-health amongst 
miners in the Gold Coast is striking in its difference from the sentiments of the Gold Coast doctors at 
the time his report was released, and the opinions of those who came to replace them. For example, 
after the publication of his report in 1929 a Gold Coast Medical Department Report simply noted 
that “larger numbers of individuals harbour the parasite and appear to suffer little.”45 This is a very 
different discourse from that described by Hewa (1995), when the doctors in India and Ceylon first 
“discovered” hookworm and its effects on plantation labourers in the late 19th and early 20th 
century. In 1911 these doctors were reporting that the numbers infected by hookworm had reached 
490 million within the Empire, and that hookworm was in fact responsible for many more deaths 
than it was given credit for, mainly due to the difficulty in detecting the parasite (Hewa, 1995). In 
1908 the British Medical Association had deemed hookworm to be of such importance that it set up 
a conference on the matter, as a well as an advisory committee made up of some of the leading 
minds in parasitology at the time (Hewa, 1995).  
 
This was Tropical Medicine at its zenith, a medical practice which was deeply engaged with the 
tropical environment and the exotic diseases which arose from it – diseases which exemplified the 
“otherness” of colonial geographies and people (Anderson, 2000). Yet, as is argued in the section on 
India, Tropical Medicine also had within it a universalising streak – one which was present even at 
the time of Simpson’s stay in India. By 1930 this universalising element had grown stronger within 
the colonial medical service – one that continued to be based on the environmentalism of Chadwick 
and the school of Tropical Medicine, but which also began to engage with diseases that were seen to 
be less specific to the tropical environment and more universal in nature.  
 
This trend was exemplified by a concern with tuberculosis in the colonial territories – a disease 
which until the 1930s had been seen as a concern solely for industrialised countries (Harrison and 
Worboys, 1997). The Depression in the 1930s, the emergence of unemployment in the colonial 
context, uncontrolled urban growth, deteriorating health conditions in the colonies, and “the loss of 
self-confidence in the civilising mission” which had underpinned Tropical Medicine, led to a 
reframing of disease in the colonial context (Harrison and Worboys, 1997: 109). Tuberculosis came 
to be seen as an endemic disease which had been exacerbated by capitalist development, and which 
the colonial state had a moral duty to address (Harrison and Worboys, 1997). Importantly, the focus 
on tuberculosis bought together medical experts from the colonies and the metropoles, and out of 
this emerged “an international epistemic community of tuberculosis experts who, whatever the 
                                                          
45 TNA, CO 98/53 Gold Coast Medical Department Report, 1929. 
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changes in knowledge and whatever part of the world, operated within a single discourse” (Jones, 
2003:  664). 
 
In the Gold Coast the champion of the fight against tuberculosis was a young medical officer named 
Percy Selwyn-Clarke. Selwyn-Clarke had first entered the Colonial Medical Services in 1919, and was 
posted to the Gold Coast where he remained until 1929. He then transferred to Nigeria, but 
returned to the Gold Coast in 1932 until 1936, when he moved to Malaya. During this time he 
worked his way up from a position as Medical Officer to Deputy Director of Health Services.46 Prior 
to joining the Colonial Medical Service, however, he had spent time working with working class 
patients under Lloyd George’s National Insurance, something which had certainly influenced his 
outlook on the importance of tuberculosis prevention and its link to adequate housing.47 The 
National Health Insurance provided health cover for workers, but not for their wives and children. 
This had led to a moral dilemma for the young Selwyn-Clarke who was forced, when dealing with the 
non-insured members of a workers family, to choose between 
…accepting my visiting fee – which varied from 5s to 7s6d…according to mileage from the 
main surgery – or on the other of waiving the fee, suggesting a suitable home diet of milk, 
broths and fruit juice, and writing out a prescription which might cost the patient as least 
2s6d at the chemist. Without means of my own I could not afford to give free treatment on 
the scale that the situation demanded.48  
 
This eventually became too much for him, and Selwyn-Clarke decided “to do his life’s work in the 
medical field on the basis of a fixed salary, and free my mind forever from any thought of payment 
from a patient.”49   
 
During the time that Selwyn-Clarke worked in the Gold Coast his views on the importance of tackling 
the tuberculosis problem were made clear in numerous reports and memos to his superior officers.50 
Prevention of tuberculosis, he argued, “resolves itself briefly under three heads: 
a) The improvement of housing conditions in the large centres, townships and rural 
areas. A long procedure which will take time. A much better type of house is being 
built on layouts in the large centres, but in most, if not all, overcrowded warrens still 
are in existence. In the rural areas the question is to a great extent one of education 
and example. 
b) The extension of layouts in the township and rural areas. 
                                                          
46 RH, MSS.Brit.Emp.s.470, Papers of Sir Selwyn Selwyn-Clarke, Footsteps: The Memoirs of Sir Selwyn Selwyn-
Clarke. 
47 Ibid. 
48 RH, MSS.Brit.Emp.s.470, Papers of Sir Selwyn Selwyn-Clarke, Footsteps: The Memoirs of Sir Selwyn Selwyn-
Clarke. 
49 Ibid. 
50 NAG, CSO 11/14/237, Howells to Colonial Secretary, June 1936. 
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c) Education in its broadest sense of people of all ages and classes, with particular 
stress on the school child.51 
 
The fact that Selwyn-Clarke’s solutions revolved largely around housing and education bought him 
into direct conflict with the Gold Coast political administration and in doing so showed clearly the 
contradictions of the British late colonial reforms in Africa. Together with his colleagues, Drs. 
Howells and Duff, Selwyn-Clarke began to argue for the removal of the complex, enclavist public 
health regulations, which covered only major towns and the mining health areas, and to replace 
them with a comprehensive public health act which would cover the entire colony, including the 
rural areas. The mining health areas regulations, argued the medical officers, although useful in 
forcing the mining houses to provide accommodation for their workers, were insufficient for dealing 
with the “mushroom villages” full of “insanitary hovels” that continued to spring up on the outskirts, 
and were home to migrants looking for work, large numbers of workers who the mines claimed they 
were not able to house in the mining area, as well as numerous other groups attracted by the 
economic activity in the area.52 Moreover, improved transport and increased migration to the cities 
meant that it was no longer possible or desirable to draw a cordon sanitaire around the towns and 
mines. As Duff argued in a letter to the Colonial Secretary: “The Gold Coast is now so opened up and 
such facilities for transport exist everywhere that the problems of rural sanitation is linked 
inextricably with the problem of the urban areas. For that reason alone the rural problem must be 
faced.”53 
 
Although pressure had been put on the mines to expand the circumference of the mining health 
areas, they had steadfastly refused to do so, and ultimately the government had been left to deal 
with the problem in the face of growing pressure from the workers themselves over housing 
conditions in the rural areas surrounding the mines (Crisp, 1984). Yet the government itself was torn 
between the dictates of the original West Africa policy, and the new interventionism. On the one 
hand, there were doctors like Selwyn-Clarke, Howells and Duff, whose ideas about health provision 
were in many ways universal, and to whom it made little sense to provide health for limited groups 
of people. On the other hand, there were the political officers, whose mandate it was to uphold 
indirect rule, and who reacted violently against the suggestion of a comprehensive public health act. 
As the Chief Commissioner of Ashanti put it: 
                                                          
51 TNA, CO 98/62, Gold Coast Medical and Health Department Report, 1932/33. 
52 NAG, CSO 11/14/183, Howells, WM. 1933. Report on the General Sanitary Condition of the Mines Areas of 
the Gold Coast. 
53 NAG, CSO 21/8/13, Duff to Colonial Secretary, 17/6/1933. 
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It is apparent that [the Deputy Director of Health Services, Dr. Selwyn-Clarke] regards the 
Political Administration as being thoroughly antagonistic to the aims and objects of his 
Department, and this is mistaken. Any points of difference that may arise affect only the 
methods by which results aimed at are to be obtained, and so long as the objective of the 
Health Department is to obtain direct control over all towns and villages in Ashanti these 
differences will continue to exist…as long as their efforts to concentrate on establishing direct 
bureaucratic control in direct opposition to the indirect control through the chiefs which is 
aimed at by the Political Officers such co-operation cannot exist.54 
 
As Cooper (1996) argues, however, ultimately the British late colonial project could never move 
towards a real universalism – the costs of doing so nullified the point of colonial rule, which was to 
increase Britain’s resources. The campaign for the implementation of a universal public health 
ordinance by the Gold Coast doctors did have a lasting effect, however. Despite the political 
opposition to the bill, and its incompatibility with the structure of rule in the Gold Coast, it was kept 
alive as a proposition well into the 1940s because of its appeal to the universalist language that 
Britain was starting to use in relation to health and welfare policies in the African colonies. In 1938, 
for example, Governor Hodson underlined in his speech to the Legislative Council the need for 
improved rural sanitation and publicly declared that the Public Health and Township Bills were now 
under consideration by the Secretary of State,55 although it was only to be implemented after the 
constitutional reforms. 
 
The debate over the public health ordinance was an important one that set the tone for the 
structure of the health services in Ghana, which gained its independence in 1958. Unlike India, 
Ghana, under its charismatic first president Kwame Nkrumah, instituted a universally free health 
service, based on the model of the NHS. This was a direct result of the recommendations of the 1952 
Maude Commission Report on the Health Needs of the Gold Coast, chaired by Sir John Maude, who 
had played an important role in the development of the NHS itself.56 Yet the influence of Selwyn-
Clarke on Nkrumah’s thinking was clear – in 1957 he was invited back by Nkrumah to do an 
inspection tour of the health services in the Gold Coast and to submit his recommendations.57 In his 
report Selwyn-Clarke noted that “the Public Health section of the Ministry of Health in Ghana … is a 
pallid shadow of its former self,” an indication of the problems that were to beset the public health 
services more generally under Nkrumah.58 
                                                          
54 NAG, CSO 11/14/179, Chief Commissioner of Ashanti to Colonial Secretary, 24/9/1932. 
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As the following chapters will show, although Ghana arrived at independence on a different 
trajectory from India in terms of health, similar tensions between the place of the worker and the 
place of the citizen were eventually to emerge, as will be discussed in Chapter Four. Before ending 
this chapter, however, it is important to elaborate further on why Ghana’s outcome was different, 
apart from the institutional legacy left by the doctors of the 1930s and the reformist and universal 
discourses of the Colonial Office after World War Two. Firstly, it is perhaps safe to say that the 
timing of independence played a role. Ghana attained independence a full ten years after India, 
when the NHS in Britain had been in operation for a decade. Unlike India, where the model of health 
care had been influenced strongly by the National Insurance Scheme of 1911, Ghana had an 
established model of universal health care to follow.  
 
Secondly, it may also have to do with the position of workers in relation to the Gold Coast 
legislature. By the 1940s pressures for reform in the colony were growing, the loudest voices coming 
from the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) which had in its a midst a young Kwame Nkrumah, 
who in 1949 would break away to form the Convention People’s Party. Despite the importance of 
labour to the colonial apparatus, prior to World War Two trade unions in the Gold Coast were 
courted less intensively that the coastal bourgeoisie who made up the UGCC and the chiefs who 
were the backbone of the system of indirect rule (Austin, 1964). Partly this was because trade unions 
had not yet developed into a coherent political force. Although the earliest trade unions in the Gold 
Coast dated to the 1920s, it was only from the late 1930s that trade unionism was actively 
encouraged by the colonial government in an attempt to quell rising labour resentment at falling 
employment and wages (Jeffries, 1978; Freund, 1988). A united union of mine workers only emerged 
in 1945, as did a national federation of unions – the Ghana Trades Union Congress (GTUC) (Jeffries, 
1978).  
 
There was also, however, a greater tension between UGCC and the trade unions, particularly the 
strongest union, that of the railway workers, headed by the radical unionist Pobee Biney (Jeffries, 
1978). Biney had little in common with and was openly antagonistic to some of the leading members 
of the UGCC (Jeffries, 1978; Freund, 1988). Constitutional reforms had begun in 1946 under the 
reformer Governor Alan Burns, who forced the Gold Coast Legislative Council to accept an African 
unofficial majority in 1946. These reforms maintained the power of the chiefs, doing so, however, by 
maintaining the electoral colleges as the Joint Provincial Council and the Ashanti Confederacy 
Council – councils of the chiefs (Crook, 1986). It was only after 1948, when riots shook Accra, killing 
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29 people and injuring 200 more, that more far reaching constitutional reforms were enacted under 
the recommendations of the Watson Commission. Yet even then, it was the UGCC (and later 
Nkrumah’s CCP) that dominated the assembly, and it was only after 1954 “that chiefs were ousted 
from the central legislature and a directly elected assembly of 104 members set up” (Crook, 1986: 
25). The opposition of chiefs to labour legislation was made clear in the legislative debates. It was 
the chiefs who controlled the lucrative cocoa industry, and they were not inclined to support 
legislation such as workmen’s compensation, which would require them to provide labour 
protections for their employees.59 While their opposition sometimes met with resistance from the 
UGCC/CPP representatives, there were no voices from the labour movement in the room until well 
into the 1950s.  
 
Partly due to the resistance from the chiefs, which coincided with resistance from the now powerful 
Gold Coast Chamber of Mines, a Workmen’s Compensation Ordinance was only implemented in 
1942 in the Gold Coast, and only after the Secretary of State for the Colonies had “forced it upon” 
the government.60 The model ordinance (developed for East Africa and based on the Indian Act) had 
been developed in 1934. Even once it was in place, the absence of workers in the legislative 
assembly meant that it was more difficult for them to engage with the legislation, to widen the 
benefits and, importantly, to carve out a central position for the worker in social policy. This is very 
different from India where labour leaders like NM Joshi were also political figures. Although, as 
Morriss (1955) has pointed out, the fact that Indian trade unions have generally been led by 
politicians rather than workers has led to innumerable problems – under colonial rule it did at least 
mean that workers’ interests were superficially present in the legislative process. The absence of this 
in the Gold Coast did not mean that workers were not agitating around workmen’s compensation 
and other labour legislation (as Jeff Crisp has shown, they certainly were) – but it did mean that this 
was done mostly outside of the legislature where, until 1954, the government, the chiefs, and the 
mining interests held sway. In the actual making of policy, however, it was harder for those 
sympathetic to workers’ struggles to take forward a specifically worker focused agenda in relation to 
health policy. Discussions around social insurance, for example, only began to be heard in the mid-
1950s. This meant that the contributory model of health provision held less sway over the 
imagination of policy makers, and it meant that, in terms of health policy at least, the worker 
occupied a less central position than it had in India. 
                                                          
59 NAG ADM 1/1/474, Report of a Sub-Committee of the Colonial Labour Committee appointed to revise the 
Model Workmen’s Compensation Ordinance, 1937. 






This chapter has detailed the development of colonial health policy over a period of eighty years in 
the British Empire, focusing on the specific experiences of India and the Gold Coast, and in doing so 
has built the base for the rest of this thesis. In particular its focus has been on the development of 
health policy in relation to workers. This has allowed for a perspective which emphasises the point 
that the development of health policy and services, in both Britain and the colonial context, was 
deeply entwined in one of the central economic contradictions of colonialism: the need to create a 
healthy and productive labour force whilst at the same time maintaining an Empire that was 
profitable for Britain. 
 
This chapter has also emphasised the fact that this process of development should not be seen in 
purely material, economic terms. The development of health policy over this period was also 
influenced by important ideological debates which had their roots in the basic conflict between the 
individualistic, laissez-faire philosophy of liberalism, and the clear need for some form of state 
intervention in the working conditions and lives of workers, which ultimately expressed itself 
through the productionist philosophy of the early 20th century. These ideological debates were also 
related to changing rationalities of rule – a shifting of colonial governmentality, which in turn had an 
important impact on the types of resistance colonial subjects could employ – a resistance, which, 
particularly in later years, was able to shape health policy in significant ways. 
 
Another aspect of the thesis as a whole which this chapter has explored is the tension between 
specificity and continuity in the writing of colonial health history. This has involved holding the 
tension between the similarities in the development of health policy across the British Empire, and 
the specificities of its development in different country contexts. As mentioned in the introduction, it 
cannot be escaped that there are institutional ligaments which held (and in some ways continue to 
hold) the Empire together. This perhaps accounts, at least in part, for the strange sense of 
recognition one sometimes encounters when travelling in countries that – however different in 
other ways – were once a part of the British Empire. The point to be made here is that it is important 
to focus on a specific context – as this chapter has shown there were important differences between 
the Gold Coast and India – but also that these specific developments should be seen in the wider 
context of the Empire of which they were a part.  
 
The detail contained in this chapter is, however, incomplete for the purposes of this thesis. The 
health policies and regulations discussed here, especially those that developed in the later colonial 
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years, in large part developed around an idea of work that was masculine. They focused on 
populations of workers made up predominantly of men, and on occupations that came to be coded 
as male occupations. The fact that compensation legislation was originally termed “workmen’s 
compensation” is indicative of this. Health policies and regulations, being both produced by and 
productive of social relations, were and still are centrally involved in the gendering of work and the 
workplace. Exploring further this gendered aspect will be the subject of the following chapter which 








The previous chapter provided a history of colonial health policies in India and the Gold Coast, 
focusing specifically on the place of the worker. It detailed the changing political economy of colonial 
rule over a period of 70 years, how this impacted on the shape and form of health policies in the 
colonies, and how different modes of governing opened up or closed down possibilities for 
resistance from below. This chapter, which looks at roughly the same time period and follows the 
same line of enquiry, has a similar aim to the previous chapter in that it provides the necessary 
background on which the rest of the thesis is built. However it takes a gendered perspective, looking 
specifically at the place of the woman worker – the woman as economic agent – in relation to the 
citizen within colonial health policies in both the Gold Coast and India. In doing so it introduces the 
gendered lens which runs as a theme through the following chapters and adds further depth and 
complexity to the history related in the previous chapter. Allman et al., (2002: 6) argue that historical 
accounts of women’s lives “complicate the binaries and disrupt the chronologies that have tended to 
frame African colonial history more broadly.” This chapter explores this blurring of boundaries that 
occurs when women are placed at the centre of an historical account.  
 
Sangari and Vaid (1990: 3) state that: 
… historiography may be feminist without being, exclusively, women's history … A feminist 
historiography rethinks historiography as a whole and discards the idea of women as 
something to be framed by a context, in order to be able to think of gender differences as 
both structuring and structured by the wide set of social relations. 
 
Gender here is seen as a social relation – something that is produced through the interactions of 
men and women, rather than about women alone. It is about the way that policies and practices 
interact with society to produce particular power dynamics and social outcomes. Drawing on this, 
this chapter should not be seen as a complete break from the previous chapter, where the focus was 
largely on the production of class and difference within a sphere largely designated as male, but as a 
deepening of the analysis so that an additional component of these power relations comes to the 
fore. Although the focus of this chapter is on women, this focus is used as “an entry point into 






A dominant theme within feminist critiques of social policy and administration has been the 
“public/private divide.” The public/private divide refers to the development within liberal society 
over the course of the 19th century of dichotomous socio-political structure, in which there exists a 
‘public’ sphere where rights and duties, including economic rights, are articulated and lived largely 
by men. The ‘private’ sphere, defined in opposition to it, is the sphere of affect, morality, and 
individual freedom. It is, as a number of feminist scholars have pointed out, also the sphere of 
women and children and the family (Lister, 1997). Women in pre-industrial England often occupied a 
central role in the public sphere of production – in agriculture, but even sometimes in the urban 
trades that existed simultaneously with their domestic roles (Berg cited in Rose, 1988). The Industrial 
Revolution and Victorian morality served to confine women more firmly in the private sphere of the 
home. Whilst her husband earned the family income in the public sphere, she provided the care 
necessary to reproduce the labour force in the private sphere; social policy from the Victorian era 
onwards became increasingly oriented towards supporting this family structure. This restricted 
women’s opportunities in the labour market and left many of them economically vulnerable, 
particularly those who were for whatever reason unmarried (August, 1999). The reasons why this 
division occurred in the way that it did have been much debated and discussed (Hartman, 1976; 
Humphries, 1977). Whilst some feminists have argued that this was the result of capitalist social 
relations, others such as Pateman (1988) have argued that it is the result of the system of patriarchy 
(male dominance) that has existed throughout human history. At present there is a growing 
consensus that the public/private divide, and the resulting economic marginalisation of women, is 
the result of an articulation between capitalism and patriarchy (McDowell, 2008). 
 
Health policies have been deeply implicated in the propagation of the public/private divide, and in 
the economic marginalisation of women workers (Harrison, 1991; 1995). Medical discourses on 
where it is healthy for women to work, and what work it is healthy for women to do have been 
central to the exclusion of women from workplaces all over the world. Within Britain and its Empire, 
these medical discourses contained two major strands. The first related directly to work and 
women’s supposed inability to perform heavy manual labour. This meant that women could either 
be excluded from certain occupations altogether, or would be allocated to lighter (and inevitably less 
well paid) jobs within the workplace. The second was related to productionism, and involved a 
discourse on “proper nurturing motherhood”(Allman, 1994). Within productionism, women’s most 
important role was as carer to the next generation of workers. The concern then turned to the 
reproductive health of women (which was also sometimes used as a justification for the exclusion of 
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women from workplaces), and to the “proper care of children” which centred on women as 
reproductive, rather than economic, agents.  
 
A number of works of feminist historical scholarship, in both the British and colonial contexts, have 
examined the way in which health policies have justified the progressive exclusion of women from 
the world of formal labour and encouraged their position in the private sphere (Harrison, 1991; 
Allman, 1994; Sen, 1999; Lahiri-Dutt, 2001; Mills, 2008). This work has been important in exposing 
the manner in which women’s economic roles were undermined by state policies and will be 
reviewed at some length in this chapter. However, a central argument of this chapter is that this 
story of exclusion cannot be the whole the story when it comes to women, work, and health policies, 
particularly in the colonial context. Here it is important to borrow a concept that has been 
elaborated on most notably by Du Toit (2005). Du Toit (2005) argues that, whilst exclusion may give 
important insights into the dynamics of “power and powerlessness,” the concept of inclusion also 
provides a powerful analytical tool, particularly when it comes to the analysis of policy. Du Toit 
(2005) focuses specifically on what he calls “adverse incorporation,” which refers to the ways in 
which people are included into systems in a manner which serves to disempower them. Rather than 
simply seeing exclusion, argued du Toit (2005), one is able to understand more precisely the multiple 
ways in which disempowerment is produced in the real world.   
 
Allman et al., (2002: 6) state in relation to colonial histories that in the: 
… prevailing binaries – rural/urban, private/public, peasant/proletarian, 
production/reproduction, formal/informal, resistance/collaboration, citizen/subject – either 
women occupy half of the “dichotomy” or their experiences are erased altogether … But 
women’s diverse historical experiences defy such static representations. 
 
Women’s erasure from colonial labour histories is obvious – there have been very few such histories 
written (although there are notable exceptions which will be discussed in this chapter). In part this is 
because of the predominant ideological framework in which labour histories have been written. As 
both Robertson (1988) and Battacharya (2006) have argued, Marxist analysis has assigned great 
significance to the working class (defined as waged workers in formal employment), while assuming 
that self-employed workers such as market traders, hawkers, and workers in home based 
enterprises (many of whom were women) were part of a “lumpenproletariat with no clear 
revolutionary role to play” (Robertson, 1988: 180). There is also the fact that men tended to control 




This trend from within labour history, combined with the focus on exclusion from within the gender 
and health literature, has tended to obscure the ways in which women as workers were 
incorporated into health systems. This was often through the urban health and sanitation systems 
which regulated the homes, market places, and streets where many working class women in Britain, 
as well as large numbers of women from all social groups in India and Ghana. As this chapter will 
show, in the few histories that have been written about women’s economic role during the colonial 
period, the importance of understanding the ways in which women traders and other workers 
interacted with local sanitation systems becomes very clear (Clark, 2010). As many women continue 
to work in a similar manner in countries like India and the present day Ghana, this has important 
implications for analysing the place of the woman as worker in contemporary health policy. 
 
As with the previous chapter and for similar reasons to do with understanding what David Scott 
(1995) calls the “rules of colonial difference” which means understanding policies in their original 
context as well as the colonial context to which they have been transferred, this chapter will begin 
with an overview of the place of women workers in health policy in 19th and early 20th century 
Britain. It will then move onto an analysis of the situation in India and the Gold Cost.  Indian and 
African women were positioned differently within the world of work, and the two will be treated 
differently. In India there was a small, yet significant, population of women workers who worked on 
the plantations and mines, and in the large textile factories. Many more worked in the so-called 
“unorganised industries” – small home based workshops, small scale agriculture, or in small 
industrial concerns. By focusing on the story of the small number of women who worked in formal 
industries, the Indian story presented here bears some resemblance to the British one – it is a story 
of exclusion. That health regulations played a role in the exclusion of women from the workplace in 
India is an important part of this story, despite the arguments made earlier, because it reveals the 
gendered nature of these regulations. The section on the Gold Coast, on the other hand, looks at the 
alternative view – the story of inclusion. Seen together, the two main parts of this chapter are able 
to give a comprehensive picture of women, work, and health during the colonial period, one which 
brings each side of the story into a relational whole, and one which seeks to both build on and 
challenge conventional views on this subject.  
 
Women, Work, and Health in Pre-welfare State Britain 
The Industrial Revolution in Britain had a very specific impact on women’s employment. Prior to the 
late 1700s, when production was based on a domestic system of agriculture and handicraft 
production, women worked mainly in the home as assistants to their husbands and contributed in 
this way to the “family wage” (Pinchbeck, 1930; Hartman, 1976). The separation of the workplace 
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and the home that was such a central feature of the Industrial Revolution changed this structure, 
forcing women who needed to earn a wage out of the home. This challenged the patriarchal system 
under which women had previously operated, giving them greater individual freedom. At the same 
time, however, it also made them more economically vulnerable.  
 
Ivy Pinchbeck was an economic historian who taught social studies and economics at the University 
of London from 1929 to 1961. In her classic work of economic and social history, Women Workers 
and the Industrial Revolution, 1750-1850, she argues that in the long run the Industrial Revolution up 
until 1850 had opened up economic and social opportunities for women, proving to be a liberating 
force (Pinchbeck, 1930). However, this did not mean that certain opportunities had not closed down, 
or that women’s lives were immediately improved. Pinchbeck (1930: 2) notes, for example, that 
under the domestic system women’s labour had been subsidiary to that of their husbands’ but 
resources had belonged to the family as a whole, rather than to the husband alone. However, “as 
soon as women became dependent on their own exertions the hardship of their position was at 
once apparent.” Traditionally women had been excluded from technical training and apprenticeships 
and their wages pegged at a supplementary level. This continued to be the case as women moved 
out of the home and into the modern workplace. Furthermore, as more complex machinery was 
introduced into factories, occupations that had previously been considered women’s work (such as 
spinning cloth), became the province of men who had been trained in the use of machines 
(Pinchbeck, 1930).  
 
The deleterious effects that this had on women’s social and economic position is described 
graphically by Pinchbeck (1930). This was particularly the case for women who, for whatever reason, 
could not supplement their wages with their husband’s wages. Pinchbeck (1930) reports, for 
example, that the death rate of widows increased dramatically during the 18th century and in 
London, where the unemployment amongst women was particularly high, “crime and prostitution, 
and not infrequently starvation and suicide, followed inevitably in the wake” (Pinchbeck, 1930: 5). 
Importantly, many women were also forced into casual employment, domestic work, home based 
outwork paid at low piece rates and street trade (August, 1999), a point which will be discussed in 
more depth later in this chapter. 
 
Nevertheless, there were also counterforces which continued to push women into the new industrial 
workplaces. Pinchbeck (1930) notes that the idea of the father earning the wage for the family, 
whilst women and children remained unemployed at home, did not initially sit well with people who 
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had become accustomed to the family wage system. While this later became the model for the 
growing middle class, it was not something that working class families were able to rely on and 
women from these families often had to earn an income, as did the single women who had children 
to support. There were also other economic reasons for this. During periods where labour was 
scarce or when the introduction of new technology (such as steam) required more hands, employers 
tended to ignore the conventions around women’s employment. For example between 1812 and 
1815 during a boom in the ribbon trade, employers who had previously disallowed women from 
working on the new Dutch Engine Loom (which required a period of apprenticeship) placed large 
numbers of women on apprenticeships which allowed them to work on the looms (Pinchbeck, 1930).  
 
By the time that the nineteenth century revolution in state regulation had begun, there were several 
competing tendencies when it came to the issue of women’s employment. On the one hand there 
were the inherited “traditions” of limiting women’s access to apprenticeships and therefore to 
skilled trades that Pinchbeck (1930) points to as a major reason for women’s subordinate position in 
the labour market. Then there were the employers, many of whom were happy to employ women 
and children because it meant more hands for lower wages. There were male-dominated trade 
unions who protested vociferously against the employment of women in factories as it threatened 
the wage levels of male workers (Rose, 1988). There were also increasingly prominent reformers 
such as Lord Shaftesbury and Lord Ashley who were concerned with the terrible conditions in which 
women and children were employed (Henriques, 1979). Yet until the 1840s the predominance of 
laissez-faire meant that little was done by the state to regulate women’s employment (Pinchbeck, 
1930). The 1833 Factory Act, for example, which was the first to limit employment of children, 
actually improved the chances for women as employers replaced child labour and “the field of 
employment for women was enormously increased” (Pinchbeck, 1930: 184). 
 
The previous chapter has already shown that the strength of laissez-faire began to be challenged 
from the 1840s onwards, and through the course of the 19th century the state became increasingly 
involved in the propagation of so-called “protective legislation” which governed working hours, 
compensation, and conditions of work, including health and safety. The growth of state regulation of 
labour had important implications for women’s employment. The acceleration of the social reforms 
after the 1880s coincided with the increasing prominence of a Victorian moral code, which stressed 
the importance of working class morality in the building of the nation, and placed women at the 
centre of this (Harrison, 1991). In many ways it was during this period that the public/private divide 
was codified as an unspoken moral law in British society. The respectable woman was one who 
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remained largely confined to the domestic sphere. Working women, as Pinchbeck (1930: 196) 
argues, disrupted the boundary and were defined as a social problem who, it was suggested, were 
“causing the complete break up of home life amongst the working classes.”  The new morality was 
complimented and reinforced by an evolving medical opinion which concerned itself particularly 
with the reproductive health of women, who, within the logic of productionism, were the bearers 
and carers of the next generation of the nation’s workers. Within the Victorian imagination, this 
conflicted with the image of the working woman. “The health of the nation was inseparable from the 
morality of the working class,” argues Harrison (1991: 472), and as the 19th century drew to a close, 
medical opinion justified the regulation of hours of women’s work, restricted their work in 
dangerous trades and processes, and concerned itself greatly with the impact of work on 
reproductive health. In some cases these concerns improved the general working conditions in 
factories and mines, in other cases it left conditions unchanged with women, particularly those who 
were married, forced out of better paid but more dangerous employment (Mark-Lawson and Witz, 
1988).  
 
The first instance of workplace health and safety regulation which banned women’s employment in 
a dangerous trade outright occurred in the British coal mining industry, where women worked 
underground in the rural areas of Lancashire, Cheshire, West Riding, South Wales, and in the East of 
Scotland (Pinchbeck, 1930). The 1842 Mines (Regulation) Act barred women and children from 
working in the coal pits for reasons ostensibly to do with protecting their health (Harrison, 1991). 
The traditional hypothesis for the origins of the Act is that it was a consequence of agitation from 
male unionists wishing to exclude women in the context of high competition for jobs. However 
Mark-Lawson and Witz (1988) argue that the reasons were in fact far more complex. For one thing 
the banning of women and children’s labour underground was a way to undermine the system of 
family labour which had up until then operated in the industry. A male worker would be contracted 
by employers, and he in turn would employ his wife and children to assist with the mining. Working 
conditions may have been awful, but the system did ensure a certain amount of autonomy for male 
workers, who could decide on the time and pace of the work. According to Mark-Lawson and Witz 
(1988: 167), the system “clashed at every point with the rationale of new coal companies with their 
focus on work discipline and company paternalism.” Excluding women and children from the system 





At the same time, however, the justifications for the Act were framed by increasing middle-class 
outrage at the conditions of underground work, for which the “delicate constitution” of women and 
children were considered to be unsuited (Mark-Lawson and Witz, 1988; Mills, 2008). Commissioners 
appointed to consider the Act were clearly appalled by the working conditions faced by women, who 
in general worked either as “hurriers” (conveying coal from the workings to the bottom of the shaft) 
or as “coal bearers” (carrying baskets of coal on their backs out of the mine). One Commissioner 
described the women hurriers he encountered as “black, saturated with wet, and more than half 
naked, crawling upon their hands and feet, and dragging their heavy loads behind them.” To him, 
their “appearance [was] indescribably disgusting and unnatural,” and they presented a picture of 
“deadly physical oppression and systematic slavery, of which … none unacquainted with such facts 
would credit the existence in the British dominions” (Pinchbeck, 1930: 249). The effect of women’s 
underground work on their children was also noted, with a Dr. Makellar giving the opinion to the 
Commission that “the effect of exhausting labour of females in coal pits has a marked influence over 
the physical developments of the infants at birth” (Pinchbeck, 1930: 261).  
 
It took longer for the “protective principle” to take hold in the factories. Although the “desirability of 
limiting women’s employment” first appeared in the discussions leading up the 1833 Factory Act and 
women and children’s hours of work were limited by the 1844 Factory Act, it was only in 1875 that 
“the protective principle was firmly established” (Pinchbeck, 1930: 199; Harrison, 1991). Shortly 
after the passing of the 1875 Act, women were excluded from night work, and by the advent of the 
20th century an “expressed public and official desire to restrict the labour of women” in factories was 
discernible (Harrison, 1991: 472). Once again, discourses surrounding women’s health intersected 
with an economic rationale – the Depression of the 1890s and the subsequent problem of 
unemployment that arose meant that restricting women’s employment was also a convenient way 
to ensure that men had greater access to the available employment opportunities. 
 
Through its de facto exclusion of women from the workplace, protective legislation such as the 
Factory and Mines Acts “confirmed the sphere of domestic labour as the primary sphere of labour 
for women,” argues Harrison (1991: 485). The 1911 National Insurance Act, the last major piece of 
social policy legislation that was enacted before the two world wars, continued this trend through its 
insurance policies, which covered only working men. During World War Two women took the place 
of fighting men in traditionally male occupations, but as soon as men returned home the status quo 
was reinstituted. The implementation of the welfare state after World War Two further entrenched 
the gendered division of labour through its male breadwinner family model (Fraser, 1989; Nelson, 
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1990; Lewis, 1992; Orloff, 1993; Sainsbury, 1999), although many women remained in domestic 
service, which was considered a suitable female occupation. The welfare state brought many 
benefits for women of all classes: free health care, education, school meals, and subsidised housing. 
It did not, however, see women as economic agents or as family breadwinners. The world of wage 
employment outside of the home remained largely a male one. 
 
Women, Work, and Health in Colonial India 
In India the gendered politics of workers’ health was in some respects quite similar to that in Britain, 
but in other respects was very different. Here there is a story of exclusion to be told, although it 
differs in certain crucial respects to the British case, and in some industries occurred much later, as 
the confluence of political reforms and economic imperatives made its impact on the Raj. The story 
of Indian women’s exclusion from the workplace through protective labour legislation has been told 
by Sen (1996; 1999), who has focused on the Bengal jute industry, and the tea plantations, as well as 
Lahiri-Dutt (2001) who has analysed this process in relation to India’s coal mines. The following 
section will add to these analyses with a more specific focus on how health regulations played into 
this exclusion.  
 
It should, however, be remembered that women working in the large formal industries were a small 
minority of the women working overall in India. As Janet Kelman noted in 1923: “There are more 
than 319 million people in India. In the year 1921, 102 049 women were working in cotton and jute 
mills and 91 949 in mines. When these figures are considered, it will be realised what a very slight 
impact on the life of the women of India organised industry has made as yet.” Indeed, Roy’s (2000) 
economic history of India argues that most Indian women worked either in small-scale rural 
agriculture, or in the small-scale urban industries located in homes and residential areas which fell 
outside of the Factory Acts. Nevertheless, it is these workers who are the focus of the following 
section.  As argued in the introduction to this chapter, the story of women’s exclusion from the 
formal workplace through health regulation is important to understand, and it is only through the 
story of formal workers that this story can be told.  
 
Bannerjee (1990) argues that colonial rule in India played a central role in the marginalisation of 
women’s economic position. Women in India had traditionally worked in three different types of 
occupations. Firstly they were involved in craft production for sale to markets locally and abroad 
(mainly cloth), either as assistants to their husbands or as self-employed operators. Secondly, they 
worked in caste-specific occupations such as washing clothes, sweeping, and making pottery. 
Thirdly, and most importantly according to Bannerjee (1990), they produced “subsistence crafts” for 
81 
 
the household or for sale to local markets. This included making and selling butter and ghee, 
collecting and processing forest produce, and making and/or preparing various types of food 
products such as puffed rice, vegetable oil, and rock salt, as well as making plates, baskets, mats out 
of natural materials, and religious adornments (Bannerjee, 1990: 284).  
 
The expansion of colonial industry and of transport networks which connected ports to the interior, 
compromised the productivity of women’s occupations. The Indian textile industry of course 
suffered badly from the competition of Manchester and this had implications for women producers 
many of whom had made a cash income from cotton spinning (Bannerjee, 1990). More importantly, 
however, women’s work in the production of basic necessities was threatened by improved 
transport networks and increased competition from goods produced outside of a specific locality 
against which small producers found it hard to compete (Bannerjee, 1990). This was a particularly 
significant blow for women because traditional restrictions on women’s movements outside the 
home meant that many had little option but to engage in home based production (Bannerjee, 1990). 
At the same time policies which upheld familial “claims to women’s labour and sexuality” were 
implemented by the state, including the upholding of male privilege in marriage and inheritance 
laws, as well as regulations which placed strict restrictions on women’s long distance migration to 
plantations and urban areas (Sen, 1996).  
 
As a result of both the increased economic competition faced by women, as well as their limited 
ability to engage in modern industry, the share of women working in agriculture (often unpaid) 
increased noticeably during the late 19th century and continued to do so well into the 20th century 
(Bannerjee, 1990). Yet, as in Britain, the story of women’s employment in large industries was 
slightly more complex. As both Sen (Sen, 1996; 1999) and Lahiri-Dutt (2001) have shown, there were 
times during certain periods of colonial rule when women made up a significant portion of the 
workforce in factories, mines, and plantations. That this was linked to economic factors is beyond 
doubt – when there were shortages of labour, or when certain industries were booming, women 
were employed more readily, and their “delicate constitutions” faded into the background. In the 
factories, these were often women who did not have family ties to keep them in the rural areas, 
single women trying to support themselves, or women who had been cast out from their homes for 
whatever reason (Sen, 1999). On the mines and plantations, systems of family labour meant that 




Particularly striking was women’s involvement in coal mining as both underground and surface 
workers. In Bengal, the centre of the Indian coal mining industry, women were a central part of the 
labour system. In 1901 women made up 47.6 percent of the coal mining labour force. By 1921 – 
after the demand for coal during the World War One had led to a boom in the industry in India – 
women made up just over 61 percent of the labour force (Lahiri-Dutt, 2001). The local labour was, at 
least in the early years of the industry, dominated by very poor adavasi workers, also known as 
“tribals” or “aboriginals” (descendent of the pre-Aryan original inhabitants of the area) (Alexander, 
2007). The mining technology in use was basic, and women occupied a variety of different roles, 
although were perhaps most involved in the movement of coal from the face to the surface61, 
earning them the title of ‘gin-girls,’ after the winding machine (gin) used to lift baskets from the pit 
bottom to the surface (Lahiri-Dutt, 2001).  
 
The first legislation to regulate the Indian coal mines was passed in 1901. Although women’s labour 
in coal mines had long been banned in England itself, the 1901 Indian Mines Act had nothing to say 
in terms of the regulation of women’s work, and sought only to regulate the age of working children 
(who helped their mothers to load and carry coal). While coal mining had been considered too 
dangerous for English women and children since 1842, Indian women, children, and men in mining 
continued to face the most appalling conditions of work. Reports from the Chief Inspector of Mines 
paint a chilling picture of health and safety conditions: 
Strange as it may appear, there are many mine managers who do not know how to ventilate 
a mine … The bad effects of such ventilation are added to by the smoke from the kerosene-oil 
lamps [used to give light] … some of these lamps give off large quantities of smoke and soot. 
The smoke fills the galleries to such an extent that it is impossible to see, and the want of 
sufficient air and the effects of other emanations are sometimes so bad that a light will not 
burn and a man feels that he cannot live long in such a place.62 
 
Another striking excerpt from the Chief Inspector’s reports is one from 1908 which addresses what 
was obviously a fairly common practice of women bringing their babies down into the mine shaft 
with them: 
A baby lost its life underground. The mother had placed it on a ledge 3 feet high while she 
loaded her tub. Suddenly a fall of roof took place in a gallery about 20 feet away and the 
blast blew the child off the ledge and killed it. Taking children and particularly babies into 
mines cannot always be avoided, but it should never be encouraged. It is not a matter of 
surprise that the roof fell as the gallery was 18 feet wide and unsupported by timber.63 
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By 1908 in Britain it would have been unthinkable to take a baby into a coal mine – basic safety 
standards, Victorian morality, and medical opinion had by that time firmly removed women and 
children from dangerous occupations such as underground work. The fact that the Chief Inspector of 
Mines referred quite casually to the occurrence in India as something which could not “always be 
avoided” reveals the very different systems of thought operating in relation to women workers in 
England and India at the time. In India conditions were such that this practice, although not entirely 
acceptable, was nevertheless allowed to happen. This was certainly related to the need for labour at 
the time – particularly in light of the competition the coal mines were facing for labour from the 
South African mines. Women were needed as workers, and this inevitably led to babies and infants 
being on the mine as well. Yet it also says something about the state of the colonial political and 
social project of the time: that the regulation of family life in relation to work that was later 
institutionalised in the welfare states of Europe, had not yet fully taken hold of colonial labour policy 
in India.  
 
This was not true for all economic sectors though, a fact which also reveals the importance of 
economic concerns in guiding the institution of health policies in relation to workers. In the textile 
industries in India, for example, women’s work had been restricted from the first Factory Act of 
1891, and health and welfare reasons had been used as a rationale for this from the outset. The Act 
restricted the hours of work for women and children to eleven hours a day on the same grounds as 
were used to make these restriction is Britain for the same groups. This was a predictable outcome 
as this initial piece of Indian factory legislation was a result of pressures from the Manchester textile 
mills, which by the 1890s were facing strict regulation of women and children’s work hours, and an 
early reformist movement which drew inspiration from the regulation of women and children’s 
labour in Britain.64 This meant that women’s participation in factory employment was always lower 
than that in the mines and plantations; according to Sen (1999) by the early 1920s women made up 
between 15 and 20 percent of the workforce in textile mills, which was about half the proportion of 
women working in the mines and plantations.  
 
Even then, however, these restrictions were contested – largely by Indian factory owners who 
resented the restrictions being placed on them which impeded their ability to compete with the 
Manchester mills. Knowing by this stage that the cooperation of Indian elites was central to the 
sustainability of the Raj, the Government of India was forced to concede in a limited way.  In 1908 
the restriction of women’s hours of work came up for debate again during the sitting of the Factory 
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Labour Commission. Indian manufacturers argued to increase the restriction on women from 11 
hours to 12, and to decrease the time allowed for breaks from 1.5 hours to 0.5 hours.65 Interestingly, 
this argument was also framed in health terms; “the women working in the factories seemed to me 
to be a particularly healthy lot, and quite capable of working the same hours as I have suggested for 
young persons” argued LC Mactaggart, the Chief Commissioner. Indeed, the Factory Commission had 
investigated the health of women factory workers and found it to be “uniformly excellent”66 
(although no data on how this conclusion was arrived at was made available in the Commission’s 
report). Consequently, it was a majority opinion of the Commission that women’s hours be increased 
and their breaks shortened. 
 
This caused some consternation amongst reform minded commissioners, particularly those 
concerned with the health of women workers. Dr. Nair, the Madras Municipal Commissioner, 
protested vigorously against the proposed amendment, claiming that it was “based on a new 
discovery and an old argument.”67 The new discovery, he argued, was that factory women in India 
“are all of good physique.” However, he continued, “the excellent health of women factory 
operatives in India at the present time is the result of the short hours they are now worked.” 
Increasing their hours would most likely see this good health deteriorate. The “old argument” he 
referred to was one which claimed that restrictions on women’s hours gave men an unfair 
advantage in the labour market. This was not relevant in the Indian context, argued Dr. Nair, 
because men and women did very different jobs in the factories and were therefore not competing 
with one another for employment.68  
 
The Commission did however take steps to restrict women’s labour in other ways. The particular 
vulnerability of women working near “openers” (used to clean cotton) in cotton presses was 
described in vivid and horrifying detail by the report.  
All the accidents due to fires occurring at the opener are of practically the same character. 
The men generally escape without injury, other than superficial burns; the women, in most 
cases are killed. The reasons for this are that the instantaneous flash bewilders the women, 
they become panic stricken, and rush into danger while seeking escape. Further, the form of 
garment is such that they attract much more cotton fluff than the men, who usually work 
with no covering but a small loin cloth. This fluff is at once ignited…the feeling that their 
clothing is on fire further bewilders and terrifies the female workers. Lastly, the amount of 
dust and fluff from cotton thrown out from the opener is so great that women are said 
frequently to cover their faces completely with a portion of their garments in order to escape 
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the irritation and annoyance which the fluff and dust cause. It is obvious that in these 
circumstances, they have but little chance of escape should a fire occur.69 
 
As had happened earlier in Britain, this finding did not lead to a recommendation for a general 
improvement in the working environment near the openers, but rather for a full ban against women 
and girls working “in that portion of a cotton-press factory in which an opener is at work.”70 
 
By the 1920s and 1930s, however, a more concerted effort to limit women’s employment in large 
industries became discernible. Again, this was related to economic factors – the Depression of the 
late 1920s meant that unemployment had become a problem, and colonial administrators saw the 
need to create jobs for men first and foremost. Productionism as well was an influence. As the 
previous chapter showed, for male workers, productionism resulted in an increased emphasis on 
health as a means to improve productivity. For women on the other hand it emphasised their 
reproductive roles as mothers to future workers and soldiers, and in India, intersected with a 
growing concern about very high rates of maternal and infant mortality (Sen, 2008). According to 
Sen (2008: 82):   
Factory women were increasingly regarded not as workers with particular problems calling 
for separate remedies, but as special kinds of mothers and wives – ones who also worked. 
Alongside debates about whether they should work or not were questions about the adverse 
impact of work on housewifery, child bearing and rearing. 
 
These concerns belonged not only to colonial administrators, but also to the Indian nationalist 
movement. Janet Kelman writing in 1923 noted that the 1919 Washington International Labour 
Conference had an important influence on nationalist leaders in relation to the regulation of 
women’s work, quickly leading them to realise “the value to the nation of increased health amongst 
its women and children,” prompting them to “demand an extensive programme of change in order 
to secure in rapid ways higher standards of vitality for the nation” (Kelman, 1923: 167). 
 
The inevitable result was the gradual exclusion of women from the formal workplace. It should be 
noted that this did not occur on the plantations where the settlement of entire families continued to 
be encouraged, and where women’s “nimble fingers” were highly valued for the picking of tea leaves 
(Sen, 1996). The steepest declines in women’s employment occurred in the coal industry. From a 
high of 61.1 percent female labour in 1921, numbers of women started to drop steadily – in 1935 
they made up 55.5 percent of the labour force, and by 1951 comprised only 35.4 percent (Lahiri-
                                                          




Dutt, 2001). Simeon (1996) argues that increasing mechanisation was responsible for the decline in 
women’s employment. However, both Lahiri-Dutt (2001) and Alexander (2007) argue that the 
decline was a result of various legislative measures which restricted women’s employment, including 
the 1935 ILO Convention which banned women’s underground work, and the prior Indian Mines Act 
of 1929 which also banned women’s underground work, giving employers a 10 year period in which 
to phase it out. The ban was lifted in 1943 due a boom in the industry during World War Two, but 
imposed again in 1946.71 
 
The 1929 Act was the result of a long legislative process which had begun in 1923 with a lobby 
group, representing the “respectable opinion,” who successfully advocated for a ban to be placed on 
children’s underground work (Alexander, 2007). Women’s work was also a target of this group who 
considered women’s underground work as an outrage against “morality, civilisation and 
womanhood.” Women were not included in the 1923 legislation due to the opposition of employers, 
who still considered the family labour system as working in their interests. However by 1929, this 
moral opposition had gained strength. Increasing competition amongst coal companies, as well as an 
improved labour supply from other parts of India, meant that the old system of family labour (which 
was considered less efficient than modern work discipline) was no longer in favour (Alexander, 
2007). Health concerns were entwined within this moral opposition. In 1927 the Chief Inspector of 
Mines reported that the owners of small collieries were opposed to the proposed ban on women’s 
underground employment, and had “contended that work in coal mines is healthful and easy.” The 
Chief Inspector stated that he was opposed to this view, providing photographic evidence 
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According to the Chief Inspector the women in the photograph on the left hand side of Figure 1 had 
been working in a mine where the humidity was at 97 percent. The photographs on the right hand 
side provide details and evidence of the heavy loads of coal which women carried up long and 
extremely steep paths. The underlying implication of these photographs was that women’s work 
underground was undesirable and the upcoming ban was justified for health reasons. Certainly, the 
health arguments against women’s work were strong. In 1931 The Royal Commission on Labour in 
India, which demonstrated a progressive concern with the economic consequences of women’s 
Figure 1: Photographs of Women Coal Miners inserted into the 1927 Report of the Chief Inspector 
of Mines, Government of India. Reproduced with the permission of the British Library. 
Captions: 
Photograph (left): Women workers leaving a wet coal mine with soaked garments clinging to 
the skin. 
Photograph (top right): A woman emerging from an incline. The thickness of the beam is 4 
feet and 6 inches and the height of the underground roads rarely exceeds this figure. The 
gradient is 1 in 12. The distance over which the coal has to be carried varies from 150 to 250 
feet of underground roadway. The weight of the coal carried in the basket is about 60 lbs. 
Photograph (bottom right): Women workers coming to the surface after emerging from the 
incline shown above. From the incline mouth the coal is carried up a gradient of about 1 in 2, 
for a distance of 50 feet. The women are seen coming up this slope.  
88 
 
exclusion from the mines, was forced to address the health issue head on when countering the 
suggestion that the ban on women’s employment be extended to quarries as well. 
Our view is that the existing regulations involve a great disturbance of the economic position 
of women in the coalfield as is desirable at present, and we are not in favour of their 
extension to quarries on any grounds other than those of health. We think that arguments 
based on health considerations would be met by limitation of the permissible load for women 
… The exact standards are a matter for expert consideration and we would leave them to be 
fixed by the Mining Boards on the advice of their technical and medical experts.73 
 
The report did go on to note, however, that the “family lives” of male workers were likely to improve 
with women excluded from the workplace.74 Presumably this was because women would be able to 
give more attention to living arrangements, food preparation, and childcare.  
 
Whether underground work was objectively more dangerous for women than men is hard to tell. A 
1946 report on working conditions in the industry made an attempt “to investigate whether work 
underground led to greater sickness than on the surface,” but noted that “no conclusive evidence 
could be obtained on this point nor were the doctors in charge of hospitals and dispensaries able to 
say anything definite on the subject.”75 However, fatal accidents were certainly a regular 
occurrence.76 An important consequence of the large numbers of women working in the coal mines 
was that accident records were disaggregated by sex, although this was not always consistent over 
the years. Table 1 below shows the fatal injuries rate for men and women per thousand working 
underground in coal mines falling under the Indian Mines Act. 
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Table 1: Underground fatal injuries per thousand in the Indian coal mines disaggregated by sex77 
Year Men Women 
1908 2.3 1.3 
191078 1.7 0.65 
1926 1.55 0.91 
1927 1.71 0.78 
1928 1.82 1.16 
1930 1.57 0.96 
1931 1.34 1.96 
1933 1.06 1.25 
1934 1.3 1.1 
1935 1.97 2.51 
1936 2.71 10.82 
1937 1.59 2.57 
 
The numbers here present an interesting story, one which on the surface suggests that women may 
well have been more at risk underground. Between 1931 and 1937 the fatal injury rate of women 
exceeds that of men, except in the year 1934. In 1931 the Chief Inspector remarked on the high 
death rate amongst women, which was “double that of the previous year.”79 To analyse the cause, it 
is useful to look more closely at the accident reports. In 1931 the death rate for women was inflated 
by an accident in which “tribute” miners (who were essentially self-employed miners who sold their 
coal on independently) had illegally undercut a side wall, which then collapsed, killing 14 women. In 
1936, where the death rate of women is exceedingly high at 10.82 per thousand, 99 were killed in an 
underground explosion. From the accident report it seems that in the majority of cases, women 
were killed in accidents involving collapsing roofs and side walls.80 
 
The reasons for the higher fatal injury rate amongst women are not clear, and questions about the 
reliability of the methods and reporting must be raised. The incident records show that for each 
accident in which large numbers of women workers died, men died in much greater numbers, 
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although perhaps proportionately less so.81 Nevertheless, the fact is that during the inter-war period 
coal mining became much more dangerous for all underground workers as the production process in 
the Indian coal mines changed considerably in response to increased demand from industry. Deeper 
shafts replaced the previously shallow mines, there was increased mechanisation of the work 
process, and miners were forced to exploit coal seams more intensively, leading to collapses as 
supporting walls were compromised (Alexander, 2007). Once again, though, the answer to this was 
seen to be a ban on women’s employment, rather than a general improvement of working 
conditions. 
 
As in the mining industry, during the 1920s and 1930s women’s access to factory employment was 
also compromised. Amendments to the Factory Act providing for maternity leave and other special 
benefits for women, although progressive in one sense, were not backed up by general legislation 
that protected women’s employment. Knowing that they may have to provide maternity benefits 
meant that employers were often less inclined to employ women workers in the first place (Sen, 
1999; Roy 2000). The Royal Commission ultimately decided not to restrict women’s hours of work as 
it was “firmly in favour of increasing economic opportunities for women.”82 However, it was noted in 
the report that there had been a strong lobby (absent at the time of the 1908 Factory Labour 
Commission) in favour of a reduction in women’s hours of work. What is particularly noteworthy is 
that the justifications for this reduction were framed less in terms of the direct effects of factory 
work on women’s health, as they had been earlier, and instead focused on the fact that “women 
have domestic duties to perform, and that they find the long hours a greater strain.”83  
 
According to Sen (2008) between 1930 and 1940 there was a 2 percent drop in women’s share of 
employment in the Bengal Jute industry, and the reports of the Chief Inspector of Factories show a 3 
percent decrease in women’s employment in industry overall between the years 1928 and 1939.84 
After the passing of Maternity Benefit legislation in Bengal in 1939, women’s share of employment 
in industry “dropped radically” (Sen, 2008). The fall in women’s employment in Indian industry 
between the years of 1928 and 1940 is likely to have several underlying reasons. It was certainly 
impacted by the depression, and the need to find employment for increasing numbers of male 
migrant workers from the rural areas whose cash crop production had been severely affected by the 
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economic downturn.  Nevertheless, as Sen (2008) argues, this intersected with the increasingly 
maternalist view of women’s role in society which was also an important factor. 
 
Within the official historical records, it is difficult to find information on whether and how women 
engaged with the new debates on labour rights which came to exist the mid to late colonial period. 
The Maternity Benefit Act of 1939, for example, provided protections to women, but also played a 
role in their exclusion from the workplace. This was not because the Act was intrinsically 
exclusionary – it became exclusionary because of the context in which it operated, one where forces 
both social and economic converged towards the exclusion of women from the workplace. Sen 
(1999) has discussed the introduction of the Maternity Benefit Act of 1939 in the Bengal jute 
industry, but gives little indication of how women themselves reacted to the legislation which 
simultaneously provided labour protections, and worked to exclude them from the labour market.85 
Women’s organised activism in India started to take shape in the 1940s with the growth of 
communism and the relief work taken on by women during the 1943 Bengal Famine (Devenish, 
2014). However it was only in 1954 that the National Federation of Indian Women (NFIW) was 
established and a national women’s agenda formed through struggles around the Campaign for the 
Hindu Code Bill, which sought to codify and reform Hindu personal and family laws (Devenish, 2014).  
 
Even if it was too early for organised opposition from women during the 1930s, it seems likely that 
there may have been a nascent opposition to restrictions on their employment, or at least an 
attempt by women to use the new regulations to suit their interests. In the earlier period of factory 
legislation women were able to use limits on their hours of work to their advantage, to “come and 
go as they pleased” during the working day,86 allowing them time to care for their children and the 
ability to earn an income. Women also took part in strikes and other labour disturbances, organised 
through trade unions. One account of a khadi87 workers strike in Bihar shows how aggressively 
women could participate in such events: 
In one of the interesting incidents of Khadi workers agitations, women workers collected 
huge amounts of sewage from septic tanks in buckets and not only littered it on the floors of 
the establishments but threw it upon the faces of the policemen who had come to arrest the 
leaders of the striking employees.88 
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The Archive of Indian Labour’s (AIL) oral history project contains a report of interviews conducted 
with Indian trade unionists, including women. A particularly striking theme within the testimonies of 
the women trade unionists is the insistence that they “were prepared to forego their family interests 
in favour of their primary interests in the factory.”89 This in itself may be seen as a form of resistance 
against a dominant idea – perpetuated by male trade unionists no doubt, as well as medical 
professionals and welfare experts –  that women’s proper place was in the home. It should also be 
noted that the emphasis on women’s place in the home coincided with, and through its embodiment 
in official policy, reinforced a separation which had long existed in Indian society, between ghar 
(home) and bahir (outside world), which kept many Indian women confined to the domestic sphere, 
particularly those of a higher social status (Chatterjee, 1990). In this environment, British 
maternalism found fertile ground in which to develop.  
 
In some ways, then, the story of workers’ health legislation and women’s work in India mirrors that 
of Britain – it is a story of women’s progressive exclusion from the public sphere of work. However, 
as mentioned earlier, it is not the full story. In the 19th and early 20th century there were also many 
working class women in Britain who did not work in conventional workplaces. August (1999) has 
detailed the numerous and diverse ways in which poor British women made their living in urban 
areas. Residents in poorer areas often provided goods and services to those in the neighbouring 
richer areas. Markets and streets were home to hawkers and sellers of all sorts of fresh foods and 
household goods. Other women worked in their homes, taking in washing and stitching, and doing 
outsourced piece rate work for textile manufacturers (Pinchbeck, 1930). As August (1999: 15) 
argues, for many poorer women, “the streets, public spaces in their neighbourhoods belonged as 
much to them as their husbands. Poor women asserted their interests aggressively and publicly, 
whether bargaining with street sellers or shopkeepers, arguing with their husbands, or battling the 
police.”   
 
Yet, as August (1999) goes on to point out, these women in Britain were often left out of official 
census collections, their economic contributions largely invisible to national policy makers, and their 
presence as workers in public spaces generally considered a social problem that required a solution. 
Indeed as the 20th century progressed, the Factory Acts came to regulate small home based 
workshops where many women, excluded from employment in larger factories, worked. This, 
combined with more rigorous zoning and town planning regulations meant that by the mid-20th 




century the separation of workplace, home, and public space (and the separation of functions within 
those spaces) was more clearly demarcated. 
 
In India, this demarcation did not progress in the same manner. Roy (2000) argues that the 
development of industry in Britain and India was different in that in Britain large industry developed 
out of small home based industries. In India on the other hand, large scale industry developed in 
parallel with the small home based industries. The Factory Acts in India were never expanded to 
include the home based production units, an important source of employment for women which 
continues to be so to the present day (Bhatt, 2006). The story of these women, so much more 
numerous than those who worked in the larger scale factories and mines, is not one that is often 
told in India’s labour history (Battacharya, 2006). This is not surprising; in Britain they were left out 
of official records and reports, and the colonial commissions were more interested in their roles as 
mothers and upholders of a particular moral order, not as workers. Yet, if one takes a creative 
approach, it is not impossible to find information on these women workers in the public record. 
Specifically, as the following story of women’s work in the Gold Coast shows, the records of local 
government public health and sanitation departments often contain important stories related to 
women’s work outside of formal workplaces – stories that are left out when it is labour records that 
are predominantly consulted.   
 
Women, Work, and Health in the Gold Coast 
The landscape of women’s employment in the Gold Coast (as well as many other African colonies) 
was very different from that of either Britain or India. As in India this had a lot to do with existing 
social structures and how they interacted with the arrival of colonial industries. In the Gold Coast 
women as a rule did not participate in the waged labour force. In the context of Southern Africa, 
Bozzoli (1983) has refuted the argument that the work was considered too arduous for women, 
positing instead that it was women’s relative importance in agricultural production that kept them in 
the rural areas. Cooper (1996) supports this argument for Africa as a whole, although Alexander 
(2007) puts more weight in the somewhat different South African context on the legal restrictions on 
women’s movement. In the Gold Coast, Bozzoli’s (1983) argument certainly carries some truth. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the main focus of the West Africa policy was to encourage the 
development of indigenous cocoa production. Grier (1992: 320) states that “from the very 
beginning, the labour of women and girls was critical to the production of cocoa.” By the time the 
Gold Coast mining boom of the 1890s had started, women’s largely unpaid contribution to family 
production in cash crop agriculture in coffee, cocoa, palm oil, and peanuts was already firmly 
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established, and it is understandable that chiefs, fathers, and colonial administrators would have 
been hesitant to release women for work in the mines (Grier, 1992; Austin, 2005). 
 
Nevertheless there were few explicit regulations banning women from waged employment, and 
there were some exceptions to this rule. For example, archival records do suggest that when labour 
was short on the mines women were employed as surface workers – Major Orde Browne, Labour 
Advisor to the Colonial Office noted in 1944 that this practice was taking place on some of the Gold 
Coast mines. 90 In fact Mining Regulation 15 of 1940 had explicitly allowed for the employment of 
women over 14 years of age in surface works.91 However, as in both Britain and India, the economic 
downturn of the later 1930s, coupled with the new problem (in the Gold Coast at least) of 
unemployed wage workers, meant that this practice became heavily discouraged.  Orde Browne 
argued that the practice should be discouraged “since ample male labour” was available. Arthur 
Casswell Spooner, a Labour Inspector whose personal papers reveal a man with little sympathy for 
the cause of either “natives” or women,92 agreed with this assessment stating that “women would 
be better at home looking after their menfolk.”93  
 
An incident which illustrates how these restrictions played out in reality for women occurred in the 
mining town Tarkwa in 1943. It came to the attention of the colonial officials that a group of 22 
women were employed by the Tarkwa Town Council as sanitary labourers. At least 17 of the women 
were sole breadwinners, either being widowed or unmarried, and were aged between 16 and 45 
years.94 Two of the women had been employed in this capacity for as long as 15 years, and they had 
formed an association known as the Tarkwa Town Council Women Labourers.95 Their positions as 
labourers had been deemed appropriate up until the point when it became necessary to make jobs 
available for male mine workers laid off during the downturn. At this point the Tarkwa Sanitary 
Committee decided to retrench the women. The decision was appealed, the women workers arguing 
that despite “the scanty salary” they received, they had “been executing [their] bounden duties to 
the entire satisfaction of the Local Authorities.”96 They further argued that their sole breadwinner 
status should protect their employment:  
…it is by this work that we poor women both husbandless and fatherless are able to maintain  
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our poor mothers and children. Without which we shall not be able to meet up the demands 
of our children’s schooling which now-a-days entails heavy expenditure.97  
 
The women did not receive a sympathetic response from colonial officials who considered it 
“undesirable for public authorities to employ women as sanitary labourers,” and they were 
retrenched with 2 ½ month’s notice and a gratuity.98 
 
So while there had been (small) gaps that women were able to exploit and gain entrance into the 
world of waged employment, these gaps tended to close more rapidly than they were opened. As in 
Britain and India this trend was reinforced by a medical/welfare discourse which emphasised 
women’s role as mothers above their role as economic agents. Indeed, as Jean Allman (1994: 25) has 
shown, this discourse which aimed at “constructing proper nurturing motherhood … out of biological 
maternity,” although rooted in European middle-class values, was a global one “which impacted 
upon women living in communities as far apart as the working class districts of Liverpool and London 
and the farming villages of West Africa.” From the late 1920s and into the 1930s, “mothercraft,” 
including hygiene and nutrition became a central aspect of health policy in relation to African 
women, just as it had in India. Baby shows, infant health inspections, and child welfare centres were 
all initiatives that emerged in the Gold Coast as a result (Allman, 1994). 
 
According to Allman (1994), the emphasis on women’s role as mothers in the Gold Coast specifically 
(although no doubt this is also true for Britain and India) was an attempt on the part of the colonial 
authorities to assert a particular moral order, one which had become necessary because of a shift in 
gender relations. Economic opportunities for women may have been shutting down in the world of 
formal waged employment, but they were opening up in other areas – particularly that of “middle 
women” in the trade in food, cloth, and other basic goods. According to Robertson (1984) Ga women 
in Accra began to enter into trading in large numbers in the third quarter of the 19th century, and 
particularly after the imposition of formal colonialism in 1874. Prior to this men and women had 
worked in complementary, but segregated occupations (for example, men would catch fish and 
women would process and sell them). Once colonial government and business arrived, many men 
moved into waged employment in government or in the private sector, leaving women to take on a 
greater role in production, transportation, and sale of goods (Robertson, 1984). Here women were 
not confined to the private sphere, but occupied and used public space in a way that often 
frustrated and confounded the British authorities: hawking goods on the roadside, setting up corn 
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mills and cooked food outlets in residential areas, and in general blurring all the boundaries of urban 
space set up by British town planners.  
 
As Robertson (1984) points out, women were enabled to do this by the particular Ga social 
structure, which was segregated along female and male lines, and which gave women a certain 
amount of independence, and some power over their social and economic position – a very different 
context from both Britain and India. Although the female line was politically subordinate to the male 
line in the family hierarchy, economically women could be independent. Powerful older women in 
particular had control over all junior females, which meant that they were able to mobilise labour 
through the system of female apprenticeships. Cultural norms also allowed women to conduct 
economic transactions on their own, and to own property separately from their husbands 
(Roberston, 1984). As the economy of the Gold Coast began to shift in the 19th century, with an 
increase in British produced goods in the colony so that production became less important, women 
were able to use this independence to carve out a specific economic niche for themselves as traders.  
They were so successful in doing so that, by the time the Gold Coast government had begun to 
discuss workmen’s compensation legislation in the late 1930s, some officials were able to argue that 
such protections were in fact not necessary because African women were able to support 
themselves financially in the event of a male breadwinner dying or losing the capacity to work.99 
 
There were then a significant number of women in the Gold Coast operating as economic agents 
during the colonial period. However, they operated outside the world of formal waged employment. 
Since the 1980s there has been a concerted effort from within labour history to write the story of 
African women as economic actors. Notable studies in the West African context have come from 
Robertson (1984), Grier (1992), Mann (1991), and Clark (2010). These have focused primarily on 
women’s labour and accumulation processes, but have also paid attention to the institutional 
context in which women workers operated. Both Robertson (1984) and Clarke (2010) provide a 
number of examples which highlight the relationship between traders and the colonial institutions 
and policies which most affected their working conditions: municipal public health and sanitation 
regulations. 
 
Indeed, it is from the administrative department concerned with municipal sanitation that we see 
one of the only pieces of statistical information available on the risks posed to the health of women 
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traders as a result of their economic activities. In 1924 plague broke out in the Asante capital, 
Kumasi. Percy Selwyn-Clarke, then still a young Medical Officer of Health for Kumasi, wrote a report 
on the outbreak. He concluded that the “conditions under which food was sold in the market and in 
which water for drinking and washing purposes was obtained both constituted contributory causes 
to the outbreak.”100 Perhaps to emphasise his point, Selwyn-Clarke recorded the occupations of the 
deceased. The resulting tabulation indicated that petty traders (considered a woman’s occupation) 
were the worst affected with 43 cases of plague. “Married women” and “labourers” were next on 
the list with 19 and 17 diagnosed cases of plague, respectively.  In conclusion, Selwyn-Clarke stated 
that, while occupation seemed to have little impact on the survival rate of the infected, “petty 
traders and market women stood a greater chance of becoming infected than others.”101 The reason 
for this, he went on to argue, was that they stored edible goods (later to be sold) in their own 
homes. This attracted rats – the source of the fleas which spread the plague. 
 
The development of municipal health systems in the colonies has long been a point of interest for 
historians of health, as well as those interested in local government. Although largely neglected in 
the African colonies until the early 1900s, Joseph Chamberlain’s insistence on the importance of 
sanitation led to major sanitary reforms in the major cities of the Gold Coast – Accra, Cape Coast, 
Kumasi, and Sekondi.  In both India and the Gold Coast the introduction of sanitary regulations was a 
highly charged political affair. In Accra, for example, the provision of sanitation infrastructure often 
required the appropriation of land owned by Ga chiefs and their subjects. In some cases the local 
people were compensated for this, but this was not always the case, and often led to protracted 
wrangling over the control of urban space (Parker, 2000). Moreover, the monitoring of sanitation 
meant intrusions into private dwellings – something which the sanitation court records show was 
not welcomed by the inhabitants of the city.102 
 
These overt political struggles over sanitation have been discussed by a number of historians: 
specifically Arnold (1993) and Harrison (1994) in India, and Patterson (1981) and Addae (1996) in the 
Gold Coast. Sanitation as a political and historical subject has not only been examined from this 
institutional perspective, however. A number of studies have applied a Foucauldian lens to the study 
of sanitation, focusing on the moulding of colonial subjects through the administration and practice 
of hygiene (Anderson, 2006). Perhaps most famous, however, have been the studies which have 
                                                          
100 NAG ADM 14/1/44, Gold Coast Sessional Papers 1925-1926: Report on the Outbreak of Plague in Kumasi, 
Ashanti, Gold Coast Colony by P.S. Selwyn-Clarke. 
101 Ibid. 
102 NAG SCT 17/5/293, Accra Sanitation Court Records. 
98 
 
argued that the provision of such services (or lack thereof) were a means by which to reinforce racial 
and class divisions within colonial society – the so-called cordon sanitaire which marked in urban 
space the difference between black and white, and between the middle and lower classes (Swanson, 
1977, Curtin, 1992). 
 
However, few, if any, of these studies have looked at the relationship between municipal level 
sanitation systems and the economic activities of women workers operating in public spaces. In the 
West African literature, Gracia Clark and Claire Robertson, writing as they do from an Africanist 
feminist perspective, are alone in linking these two subjects, although their focus is not primarily on 
health and sanitation, but on women as economic actors.  The fact that their attention turns to 
sanitation at all is a reflection of the impact of these regulations on the ability of women to work.  
 
Although a Towns, Police, and Public Health Ordinance had been in existence since 1878 in the Gold 
Coast, concerted efforts to regulate sanitation and public health in Accra began only in 1910 after 
several outbreaks of plague had turned the attention of the Colonial Office to the appalling state of 
sanitation in the colony. A particular focus of the new administrative department concerned with 
sanitation was the regulation of food103 – where and how it was produced, where and how it was 
sold. In this respect, sanitary inspectors in the Gold Coast were following a universally accepted 
understanding that food, as a common breeding ground for disease, was in need of careful 
regulation. As it was women who by and large were involved in the production and sale of food in 
Accra, it was their work which fell under scrutiny. 
 
It cannot be disputed that food production is in need of hygiene regulation. However, the framing of 
Accra’s sanitary regulation was problematic when it came to the women workers who produced and 
sold the food. The colonial city administration’s relationship to these workers was an ambiguous 
one. While officials understood and recognised the value and importance of this source of affordable 
food for its urban population, and importantly, for its waged labour force, they also viewed women 
workers both as a threat to the public health, a threat to their control of urban space, and ultimately 
a threat to their vision for the future of African society as a whole. The sanitary regulations which 
were developed reflected strongly these biases. Unlike the regulations relating to the health of the 
mostly male waged labour force, sanitary regulations were little concerned with protecting the 
health of women workers operating in public space. Instead the focus was protecting citizens from 
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the effects of spoiled and unhygienic food. The regulations positioned food producers and sellers as 
producers of disease and treated them punitively rather than supportively. The Accra District Court 
records are filled with the names of women food sellers brought in on charges of sanitary 
offences.104 In fact Robertson (1984) points out that so many women came before the district 
sanitation court that the standard use of “he” within the court transcripts was finally changed to 
“she.” 
 
Perhaps most striking was the way in which women workers were blamed as individuals for the 
spread of preventable diseases, whilst the poor sanitary environment in which they operated was 
often ignored or glossed over. Even with the enhanced focus on sanitation from 1910, the health of 
Accra was generally regarded to be very poor. In one Town Council meeting, Councillor De Graft 
Johnson, an African ‘unofficial’ member of the Council “called attention … to the breeding of flies in 
the quarry near the Adabraka Market and suggested that steps should be taken to fill up the quarry 
with swish105 instead of rubbish in order to protect the foodstuffs sold in the market.”106 The 
response from the Council was that it would be too expensive to fill the quarry with swish, “but that 
if women sellers would protect their foodstuffs as required by the bye-laws, there would be nothing 
to complain of.”107 
 
Sanitary regulations also reflected the need for colonial officials to control and regulate the use of 
urban space. Cooper (1983: 612) has argued that “of all the ways that space can be divided … one of 
the most critical in Africa is the division between legal space and illegal space. This is a distinction 
that reveals the uncertainty of who can define urban society and how.” Sanitary regulation in 
particular was used to define and reinforce the division between legal and illegal space, which had 
important repercussions for traders operating in the public spaces of the city. Street trading was a 
target of Accra’s Medical Officer of Health who argued in 1935 that “from a health point of view,” 
street trading was inadvisable. Not only was food sold on the streets “unhygienic,” but it also 
“harboured rats.”108 This added the weight of medical opinion to an attempt by the Town Council to 
regulate and restrict street trade and to encourage the formation of designated market areas. The 
Town Councils of the Gold Coast had since the 1920s begun to recognise the importance of the 
revenue gathered from municipal markets, and were eager to have traders located in bounded, 
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controlled areas where the collection of various fees, licenses and taxes would be most simple. 
Public health and sanitation provided a means to justify this, and it was the Medical Officer of Health 
for Accra who was finally appointed to lead the first “Committee to Deal with Street Trading in 
Accra” in 1935. The resulting regulations included the following stipulations, all of which were 
framed in terms of ‘protecting the public health’: 
1. No article, which is likely to be used in the state in which it is exposed for sale, shall be sold 
without adequate protection from dust and flies. 
2. No sale shall be allowed within a radius of 50 yards of public latrines or dust bins. 
3. No sale shall be allowed on pavements or streets … during market hours.109 
 
Cooper has noted that the need to control and regulate urban space was linked strongly to the 
British colonial administration’s vision for the African working class. During the course of the 1930s, 
British colonial administrators had come to the realisation that “the way Africans lived and the way 
they worked were part of the same problem” (Cooper, 1996: 117). Discontent in the workplace was 
linked to discontent in the urban areas where the workers lived and raised their families. As a 
consequence, British policy turned not only to dealing with the labour question directly, but focused 
as well on urban infrastructure and planning. The vision of an African working class was matched by 
a vision of the African city as a space ordered along the lines of working class cities in Britain.110   
 
Not part of this vision were the aspects of African urban society which transgressed the social and 
spatial categories imported from Britain. In this respect not only were women working in public 
space an anomaly, but the fact that their work often blurred the boundaries between workplaces 
and living spaces – what Cooper has termed the “spaces of production” and the “spaces of 
reproduction” – was also problematic to the officials concerned.  In Britain these spaces had long 
been separated, particularly after the Factory Acts forced the closure of small home based industry. 
Once again sanitary regulations were used to enforce this distinction. A particular target in the Gold 
Coast was the bakeries located in or near the homes of the bakers who were all women. In 1930, for 
example, the Cape Coast municipality passed a sanitary by-law stating that “no living room, sleeping 
room, or other room can communicate directly with the bake-house”111 In Accra the MoH was 
incensed by the practice of turning “stores into dwelling rooms” at night. After an initial inspection 
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by the health authorities, the MoH called for a thorough re-inspection of all stores in order to put an 
end to the practice. 112 
 
Rather than protecting both the health and economic activities of women workers, then, sanitary 
regulations instead punished them on a regular basis whilst failing to address the generally poor 
state of health and sanitation in the city. Sanitary regulations were also used to control the 
movement of women, and in doing so significantly impacted on their ability to work. However, 
something which requires emphasis in the telling of this story is the fact that, far from accepting 
their fate, women workers in Accra regularly engaged with the municipal authorities around the 
regulation of health and sanitation, as well as safety and security. Indeed as Gracia Clark has argued 
(2010), the commodity associations which are now such a feature of market life in modern Ghana 
were first developed as a way in which to strengthen the bargaining position of women traders in 
relation to the municipal authorities. Clark (2010), in her discussion of women traders in Kumasi, 
notes that the first record of such an engagement was from 1915 when Fante fish sellers met with 
city officials to discuss the sanitation and overcrowding of the main market. This engagement did not 
end well for the fish sellers; instead of rebuilding or expanding the market, city officials chose to re-
site the market outside of town, away from customers, in a reclaimed swamp (Clark, 2010).  
 
Yet other engagements did result in some gains for the market women. As mentioned earlier, the 
colonial government had a somewhat ambiguous relationship with traders, and sellers of food in 
particular. Traders transgressed and blurred all kinds of boundaries that colonial officials wished to 
impose. At the same time they provided an important service which colonial officials knew they 
could not do without, and they contributed significantly to the revenue of the Town Council. This 
ambiguity allowed traders a certain amount of leeway, and at times they were able to gain 
concessions from the local authorities. In 1938, for example, a petition from traders protesting 
against the poor state of the shelters in Selwyn Market resulted in a commitment from the Town 
Council to reconstruct the shelters and plant shade trees within the market so as to provide 
protection from the elements.113 In 1943, again in Selwyn Market, Madam Mary Tetteh had her 
goods stolen and she petitioned the Town Council “asking for compensation and the free use of her 
stall on compassionate grounds.”114 This was allowed – Madam Tetteh was given free rent of her 
stall for three years as a result.  
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Moreover some of the actions taken by local government turned out to be very popular with women 
workers. One such example was that of the “Chop Kiosk.” Having decided in 1942 that open air 
cooking was unhygienic and a public “nuisance,” the Accra Town Council embarked on an 
experiment in providing “suitable” built structures for food sellers to operate out of, naming them 
“Chop Kiosks.”115 Due to tight financial constraints, a very limited number were built by the Council. 
They were so popular by 1945, however, that Councillor Dinah M Quist (the first woman councillor 
on the Accra Town Council), charged with Chop Kiosk allocation, was overwhelmed by the number of 
applicants.116 Councillor Quist was in fact forced to answer charges of corruption placed against her 
by certain people whose applications had been rejected. The result was the formation of a Chop 
Kiosk Committee, which would undertake the work of allocation. The establishment of the Chop 
Kiosk could well be seen as another exercise in defining legal and illegal space – those who operated 
within the bounds of the Kiosk operated legally, those who operated outside operated illegally. 
However, it is also important to acknowledge the popularity of the Kiosks – food sellers wanted 
them because they offered a safe, convenient, and hygienic place to sell food. Moreover, women in 
Accra have continued to use this concept – what are now known as “Chop Bars” are no longer built 
by the municipality, but there is one (and sometimes more) on almost every street corner of any 
reasonably sized town in Ghana.  
 
The point here is not to try and paint colonial local government in a glowing light – in large part, 
colonial sanitary policies and regulations were highly oppressive and discriminatory to women 
traders. The point is to emphasise that, because of the leeway opened to them, traders were able, 
and with limited gains for themselves, to engage with the institutional machinery around them, and 
in so doing “shape their colonial world” (Allman, 1994). They took what they wanted and needed, 
and resisted what they didn’t. There are several examples of market women refusing to use 
designated markets because they were sited in inconvenient locations. In several cases, the Town 
Council was forced to lower the market fees in order to attract sellers to the markets.117  
 
One of the real missed opportunities of the postcolonial period was that women workers, working in 
public spaces, were not given a statutory right to bargain with local government over their 
conditions of work, and that urban health regulations in particular, were not reformed towards 
being more supportive of traders. As Robertson (1984) points out, after 1952, women’s social and 
economic position weakened relative to men’s in the Gold Coast. The means of gaining political 
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power and wealth had become land ownership (dominated by men), and formal education from 
which many women had been excluded. Increasingly Ghanaian men “found women’s economic 
autonomy threatening,” and repressive measures taken against traders – often carried out by 
municipal governments –  has been a feature of life in Ghana since Nkrumah’s rule (Robertson, 
1984). As will be discussed further in Chapter Four, this prejudice was also bolstered by the fact that 
small scale self-employed workers were the ideological antithesis of the modernist industrialisation 
which postcolonial governments in general committed to following. 
 
Finally, does the story of health regulations and women’s work in the Gold Coast have anything to 
say about women’s work and its regulation in India? On the one hand, it is clear that the economic 
structure was different. Cultural norms combined with the wider economy of India meant that 
women were largely confined to the home in urban areas or the home and small farm in rural areas. 
Women in the Gold Coast had much more freedom in the public sphere and their presence as 
workers was more visible, particularly in urban areas. Yet homes, even if they were private, also fell 
under urban sanitary regulation. Women working in the small home-based industries of India would 
certainly have come into contact with these regulations. Indeed the Self-Employed Women’s 
Association (SEWA) in India, which is the largest trade union of self-employed women workers, and 
which will be the subject of Chapter Six, continues to place emphasis on the sanitary upgrading of 
slum areas in order to enable greater productivity amongst its home based workers (Bhatt, 2006). It 
is possible that an examination of municipal sanitary records from India may be able to add to the 
story of health regulation and women’s work in colonial India.  
 
Conclusion 
The arrival of the National Health Service in Britain after World War Two is often seen as a high point 
in the history of health, signalling the moment when health became a right for all. Yet there has 
always been an undercurrent of criticism directed at the fact that, in centralising the health services, 
the link between health services and local government was severed (Doyal, 1979).  The result was 
the marginalisation, within the health services, of the Chadwickian environmentalist approach to 
health, which Percy Selwyn-Clarke, in his later years as head of the Association of Medical Officers of 
Health, decried:   
The National Health Service, in the opinion of many, had been weakened by splitting off 
Housing and Local Government from the Ministry of Health, thus over-emphasising curative 
medicine at the expense of the preventive aspect. The move was said to have been 
engineered by Dr. Hugh Dalton, who seemed to have more influence with Prime Minister 
Attlee than did that splendid firebrand Aneurin Bevan, who had done so much to create the 
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Health Service but resigned over the Labour Party’s decision to charge a fee for 
prescriptions.118 
 
This criticism has become part of the wider debate about the relative merits of basic preventative 
health versus curative care, and has been particularly fierce in relation to the developing world 
where large amounts of money have been spent on building hospitals, whilst basic sanitation and 
primary health care have been relatively underfunded. The lamentation over the separation of local 
government from national health services tends not, however, to acknowledge the fact that there 
may also have been something problematic about the fact the local government was also separated 
from national level labour departments – something which meant that the institutionalisation of 
workers’ rights was fundamentally divorced from the state institutions with which many women 
workers had the closest interactions.  
 
This is perhaps not surprising because this close interaction is only visible when the definition of 
work is expanded to include the often unrecognised sectors of the economy in which women 
proliferated rather than the more traditional formal workplaces on which labour (and health) history 
– with some notable exceptions – have tended to concentrate. As this chapter has argued, when one 
looks at the full range of women’s work during the colonial period and its relationship to health 
regulation, it is necessary to add an extra dimension to the story. As the Indian example shows, 
health regulations, as in Britain, were used to particularly exclude women from the workplace. This 
is certainly an important part of the story to tell. Yet, as the case of the Gold Coast shows it is also 
important to tell the counterpart story – the part which looks at where women were included into 
health regulations and looks critically at the terms on which this inclusion was based. It is this second 
part of the story that has not been emphasised enough in either colonial histories of labour or 
health. In failing to do so, this body of work has reproduced the marginalisation of forms of work 
which differ from those that governed the colonial imagination.  
 
As will be shown in future chapters, this blind spot – of policymakers, academics, and experts – has 
had very real implications for informal workers in relation to health regulations to the present day. 
International and national level health public and occupational health policies which aim to include 
informal women workers such as traders, rag pickers, and home-based workers, are undermined by 
unreformed municipal health policies which play a role in limiting the good health and economic 
potential of these workers. On a broader level though, one which resonates with one of the main 
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themes of this thesis, this chapter has revealed an important aspect of difference. Institutional 
patterns which developed in the metropole were juxtaposed onto a world onto which they did not 
map perfectly. This is not a superficial difference – it reflects a profound mismatch between ideas 
and reality. As Chapter Six will show, this has implications for a more inclusive social democracy – 
one which is able to institutionally recognise different forms of work, but which maintains essential 




Chapter Four: Occupational Health Stillborn: The Late Colonial & Post-
independence Period and the Limits of Engagement, 1945-1970 
 
Introduction 
The immediate post-independence era ushered in a shift in health policy and the terms on which 
former colonial populations were to be included within it. The new international language of 
universal human rights and universal citizenship, permeating from the international organisations 
founded after World War Two and eagerly taken up by post-colonial governments, now framed 
social policy more generally. At least in theory, health was now a service for all, rather than 
something to be extended to special groups in the interests of increased productivity. It was 
prospective citizens who were now the central concern of health policy, not workers, and post-
independence governments, aimed at the provision of a truly universal notion of citizenship, took up 
the call to see health as a “responsibility of government and a right of citizenship,” (Amrith, 2006: 2). 
 
As a consequence of this wider focus, workers’ health issues became a specialised area of health 
policy and administration. Administrative departments concerned with workers’ health increasingly 
fell under labour rather than health ministries within the British colonial institutional mould. In the 
Gold Coast a Factory Inspectorate was established in 1951 to monitor workers’ health.119 In India, 
where workers’ health had always been monitored jointly by the Medical Department and the 
various labour inspectorates, this shift in emphasis manifested with the establishment of the 
Industrial Health Advisory Committee in 1945, set up to advise the Government of India on all 
matters to do with the health of workers. Although the Indian Medical Service was represented on 
the Committee (by the Deputy Director of Social Insurance), the labour department was the 
dominant administrative authority, represented as it was by the Chief Labour Commissioner.120  
 
These administrative shifts reinforced, and in turn were reinforced by, the move within the medical 
profession to build a separate area of specialisation for workers known as Occupational Health (OH). 
By the late 1940s doctors in Britain had for many years been working in the field of industrial health. 
Work on the effects of industrial poisons (such as phosphorus) on humans had commenced in the 
19th century, and dust diseases in miners had also been investigated since the turn of the 20th 
century (Harrison, 1995; Bartrip, 2002; Mills, 2008; Melling, 2010). Industrial health had, however, 
been thought of as having little relevance to the colonies apart from India and some of the settler 
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state such as Australia and South Africa. Even in India, however, little had been done to foster the 
development of the discipline. As the Chairman of the Industrial Health Advisory Committee 
(appointed in 1945 by the Government of India) commented, “The only apology for medical 
inspection and control in respect of factories and mines, if it can be called control at all, is the 
appointment of certifying surgeons of the provincial governments.”121 
 
By the late 1940s and early 1950s, however, the old concept of “industrial health” was being 
overtaken, in the international discourse at least, by the new and more inclusive conception of 
“occupational health.” In 1950 occupational health was defined by the first sitting of the Joint 
International Labour Organisation/World Health Organisation Committee on Occupational Health as: 
…the promotion and maintenance of the highest degree of physical, mental and social well-
being of workers in all occupations; the prevention amongst workers of departures from 
health caused by their working conditions; the protection of workers in their employment 
from risks resulting from factors adverse to health; the placing and maintenance of the 
worker in an occupational environment adapted to his physiological and psychological 
capabilities, and to summarise, the adaptation of work to man and of each man to his job. 
 
This definition represented a landmark in the history of workers’ health – it was an official 
declaration that that the industrial focus of industrial health was to be shifted in favour of the 
understanding that work-related health problems could occur in all spheres of work, rather than just 
in the so-called ‘hazardous trades’ of industry and mining. The implications for the newly 
independent countries was clear: whether or not they were industrialised, occupational health was 
still a relevant domain with which to engage. 
 
For this new vision of occupational health, the immediate post-independence period provided 
potentially endless opportunities for growth and development of the discipline in contexts far 
removed from where it originally developed. Moreover the political and economic context seemed 
to suggest that the discipline might have an important and worthwhile contribution to make to 
developing countries. As the high tide of modernisation theory started to unfold, there was a faith 
that industrialisation was and should be a major part of the development of newly independent 
countries. Occupational health was an approach to health based on scientific and technical principles 
– this was generally favoured by modernisation theorists and post-independence governments – and 
was concerned not only with the health of workers but also with increased productivity, another key 
concern for these new governments. The promise of technological innovation was matched by a 
political environment which, although not always favourable to workers’ organisations, was based 




on the model of late colonial policies in which concerns about urban workers still in reality 
dominated social policy, despite the rhetoric of universal citizenship. No wonder then that in 1961 
Dr. Stuart Hall of the Ross Institute’s East African Branch122 felt confident enough to put in an 
application to the Nuffield Foundation to establish an Occupational Health Unit at Makerere College 
in Uganda.123 Similar excitement was being felt in India, where, on the eve of independence, an 
Industrial Health Research Unit was set up in 1948 under the aegis of the Industrial Health Advisory 
Committee (which still held onto the industrial focus), as well as a Medical Branch of the Factories 
Inspectorate.124 
 
Yet occupational health did not take off in the way that was expected.  Despite periodic (and 
generally brief) flurries of attention in Africa as well as India, occupational health services failed to 
attract much interest from governments, donors, or even worker organisations. The Ross Institute’s 
application to the Nuffield Foundation was turned down;125 in Nigeria the Hot Climate Research 
Institute established by the colonial government at Oshodi, and which had started to offer 
occupational health services, noted in its 1954 annual report that: 
In spite of widespread publicity and personal contacts with various Departments and even 
other West African Governments, there are still no signs that the services of this Unit as an 
adviser on practical points of Industrial Hygiene and Physiology are either appreciated or 
desired.126  
 
An ILO mission to Ghana in 1966 painted a pathetic picture of the state of occupational health 
administration in the country with minimal funding, no equipment and scarce expertise;127 a 1972 
WHO mission described a situation in which little had changed since the ILO report six years 
earlier.128 Even in India, where the health of workers was arguably a more salient concern, 
occupational health specialists were still complaining about the lack of resources given to the 
discipline almost 20 years after the Industrial Advisory Committee had gathered for the first time.129  
 
                                                          
122 The Ross Institute, named after Sir Ronald Ross, was affiliated with the London School of Hygiene and 
Tropical Medicine, and provided hygiene and health advisory services to tropical industries. It operated mainly 
in India and East Africa, but also received subscriptions from large colonial concerns in West Africa as well. 
123 London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine Archives (hereafter LSHTMA), Ross Institute (herafter RI), 
10/04/08. 
124 Gupta, M.N. 1954. ‘Industrial Medicine and Hygiene,’ in Proceedings of the Society for the Study of 
Industrial Medicine (Jamshedpur), Vol 6 (2). 
125 LSHTMA, RI 10/04/08. 
126 International Labour Office Archives (hereafter ILOA), SH 32-2-202, Occupational Safety and Health 
Research Institutions in Nigeria, 1955-1965. 
127 ILOA, TAP 0-196-5 (1), Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance: Ghana OSH, 1966. 
128 World Health Organisation Archives (hereafter WHOA), AFR/SOH/4, Occupational Health in Ghana, Report 
of a Mission, 8th October-30th December 1971. 
129 Bhatia, G.D. 1974. ‘Presidential Address,’ in Indian Journal of Occupational Health (Bombay), Vol 17 (6). 
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This chapter is concerned with understanding why this happened. What can only be considered as 
the “still birth” of occupational health in the post-independence period has left a legacy which 
continues to affect workers in developing countries to this day, including the exclusion of women 
and other workers who were not employees in large formal enterprises, from occupational health. It 
is the contention of this thesis that this current situation is directly linked to institutional processes 
that occurred during the immediate post-independence period, and for this reason it is a period that 
deserves close scrutiny.  
 
Here again there is a need to balance specificity with the general picture. As would be expected, 
India and Ghana after independence continued to be very different societies and economies, with 
very different politics. Nevertheless the ligaments of the British Empire continued to have an 
influence and, when it came to occupational health, there were definite continuities. In both 
countries, occupational health failed to flourish (a condition experienced by many countries outside 
the industrialised world); in both countries there was an institutional legacy inherited from Britain 
which maintained a strong hold over the imagination and politics of scientists, policy makers, and 
citizens. For this reason the chapter, although moving into the period after independence, maintains 
the style of the previous chapters, and continues to look at the institutional template laid out by 
Britain. It uses this template as the basis for a discussion on what was different about the post-
colonial landscape. In both India and Ghana the relationship between trade unions and the state also 
became increasingly fraught after independence (although this was more the case in Ghana than in 
India). The intention of this chapter is not to flatten out the complexities of post-independence life 
in these countries. At the same time this, and the following chapter, seek to explore what happened 
to OHS outside of the industrialised world in fairly broad terms. It therefore looks to emphasise 
similarities rather than differences, although where differences do exist, these are pointed out. 
 
Whilst the chapter is primarily focused on occupational health, it follows the theoretical focus of the 
thesis as a whole by placing occupational health in relation to the wider context of general health 
service provision. In doing so, it highlights the very real tensions that existed during the post-
independence period between inclusion based on status as a worker, and that based on status as a 
citizen of a newly independent country, and also allows the author to map the shifting nature of 
state vis-à-vis employer responsibility for health provision. There is, however, still a need to 
distinguish between health in pure work situations – occupational health – where employer 
responsibility was more easily defined, and provision of general health services where employer 
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responsibility and state responsibility was a highly contested arena. Its core focus is, however, on the 
relationship between the two. 
 
This chapter will argue that a specific confluence of political economy (the interactions of state, 
labour, and capital) and science underlay the marginalisation of occupational health. The following 
sections will attempt to justify this statement through an analysis of the key actors in the political 
economy and the science of occupational health and the role these played in maintaining 
occupational health as both a marginal administrative department within the state, amongst 
workers, and within the medical profession itself.  In doing so the chapter incorporates both a 
materialist analysis and one which considers the question in more discursive terms – trying in this 
way to think further about the ideas and visions which underpinned the science of occupational 
health as well as the way in which this was influenced by the political-economy of the time. 
 
As with previous chapters, this chapter seeks to elaborate on Cooper’s (1996) theory of engagement. 
Here though, the focus is a more critical one than in previous chapters.  If, as Cooper (1996) argues, 
the process of engagement by the labour movement was instrumental in the development of late 
colonial social policy, then the failure of occupational health to evolve during a subsequent period 
may provide insights into the limits of that engagement. This chapter therefore seeks to explore 
situations in which engagement was limited, and to think further about why this may have been the 
case.  
 
Workers, Trade Unions, and Occupational Health  
Vicky Long’s recently published book, The Rise and Fall of the Healthy Factory: The Politics of 
Industrial Health in Britain, 1914-1960 (2011), is the first full-length historical work to explore the 
politics of industrial health in post-Victorian Britain. Long (2011) focuses on the development, and 
later the decline, of the idea of the workplace as a site of health promotion and production amongst 
the workforce. Central to her argument is the idea that trade unions, Britain’s Trades Union 
Congress (TUC) in particular, played a central role in the development of industrial health services in 
the country, by her account a “fraught and contested field” at the time (Long, 2011: 17). In doing so 
she challenges an assertion by Weindling (1985) that British trade unions tended to focus on wages, 
and were not especially interested in engaging with government and employers on the subject of 
workers’ health and safety. To support this argument Long (2011) provides a plethora of information 
on the TUC’s active participation on the various committees and boards which debated the future of 




If the engagement of trade unions had been an important factor in the development of OHS 
institutions in Britain, and if, as Cooper (1996) argues, the engagement of trade unions was 
instrumental in the development of labour institutions more generally in Britain’s African colonies, it 
is the activities of trade unions (and the limitations thereof) which provide a starting point for an 
analysis of why occupational health institutions did not evolve as they could have during the post-
independence period.  In both Ghana and India the post-independence period heralded in a change 
in the relationship between trade unions and the new nationalist governments. Governments now 
found themselves in potentially adversarial relationships with their previously strong allies. Taken 
together with a need for industrial peace, this provoked a tendency towards government control of 
trade unions – something which hindered effective engagement and negotiation on behalf of 
workers.  
 
In Ghana, for example, the post-independence period was a difficult time for trade unions. As 
Damachi (1974: 1) notes, the transition from colonial territories to independent nations precipitated 
“a crisis in government-trade union relations” all over Africa, but most notably in Ghana. It was 
noted in Chapter Two that the relationship between the GTUC and the United Gold Coast 
Convention (UGCC) and later Kwame Nkrumah’s Convention People’s Party (CPP) was a tense one. A 
tenuous alliance between the CPP and the GTUC had developed by 1950 when workers staged 
strikes in sympathy with Nkrumah’s Positive Action Campaign (Jeffries, 1978). However, this alliance 
was always a fragile one, and Ghana’s post-independence politics strained it to breaking point 
(Jeffries, 1975; Jeffries, 1978; Crisp, 1979; Kraus, 1979; Crisp, 1983). Upon assuming power in 1957, 
Nkrumah and his Convention People’s Party (CPP) moved towards what Kraus (1979) has called the 
“corporatist nationalist non-democratic type” of state-trade union relations. Emphasis was placed on 
the importance of industrial peace for development; government and trade unions had to cooperate 
to build the new country (Damachi, 1974).  
 
To encourage this obedience on the part of trade unions, the CPP passed the Industrial Relations Act 
of 1958. The Act gave legal recognition to only one union federation – the Ghana Trades Union 
Congress (GTUC), and forcibly grouped workers in the country into 24 federated unions. In 1959 an 
amendment to the Act was passed which dissolved any existing union other than those scheduled 
under the 1958 Act. This gave the CPP government enormous influence over the labour movement 
(Trachter, 1962). Realising that this did not comply with ILO standards, the then Secretary-General of 
the GTUC, John Tettegah, argued that Ghanaians did not need to “be bothered with Cambridge 
Essays on imaginary ILO standards with undue emphasis on voluntary association” (Damachi, 1974: 
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10). The state also imposed a compulsory mediation-arbitration procedure which essentially made 
strikes illegal (Kraus, 1979). 
 
By the early 1960s, however, even Tettegah had been detained for interrogation in 1962,130 and was 
no longer safe from Nkrumah’s increasingly repressive regime. The Ghanaian economy, dependent 
on cocoa, had suffered during the cocoa price slump of the late 1950s, and the country’s first ten 
year development plan had failed to yield the intended results. Workers became restless with the 
worsening socio-economic conditions, and in 1961 the country’s transport systems came to a 
standstill when the railway and dock workers embarked on a full scale strike which spread from 
Sekondi-Takoradi and Kumasi to the whole country (Damachi, 1974: 49). The economic slump 
powerfully reinforced the state’s need to rein in workers’ demands, and in an attempt to impose 
order on what was becoming an increasingly disordered political and economic situation, Nkrumah  
implemented repressive measures, pushing through a motion that made him president for life. The 
police also had their powers of detention increased to 26 days, and the imprisonment of suspected 
dissidents became common practice. The outspoken Tettegah was removed from the leadership of 
the GTUC and replaced with the “government stooge” Kwaw Ampah, thereby sealing the alliance 
between the GTUC and the CPP government (Damachi, 1974). In 1965, Dr. Nowacki, the Polish 
occupational health expert sent on a two year technical assistance mission to Ghana by the ILO, 
noted that the GTUC had begun to operate as the de facto Labour Department, the department 
itself having been weakened to such an extent that it was now “merely attached as an appendage to 
the more important ministries.”131  
 
Although the GTUC regained a certain amount of independence after Nkrumah’s ousting in 1966, the 
new military regime was hardly sympathetic to labour’s cause. Damachi (1974: 63) notes that 
“labour had no real power to influence economic decision making [during the military regime] ... on 
important boards it usually had only one representative, with at least two from the employer’s 
association, and the rest government.” This provides a possible explanation for the failure of 
occupational health services to develop in Ghana. If the ability of trade unions to engage 
meaningfully with labour policy was a necessary condition for the development and expansion of 
those institutions, one explanation could be that trade unions in Ghana had a limited ability to push 
for this – either because they had been made too weak, or because they had effectively been 
incorporated into the government itself.  
                                                          
130 ILOA, Z 3/196/1, Director General’s Mission to Ghana, November-December 1962: Background Note on 
Ghana. 
131 ILOA, TAP 0-196-5 (1), Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, 1966: Ghana OSH, Notes. 
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A comparable argument could also perhaps be made in the case of India, where the Indian National 
Trades Union Congress (INTUC), although not facing the same restrictions to freedom of association 
as in Ghana, was intertwined with Jawaharlal Nehru’s ruling Congress Party. Writing in 1958, Ralph 
James observed that in certain states INTUC unions were “essentially instruments of their respective 
state governments.” By this time India was experiencing setbacks in its Second Five Year Plan – 
Nehru’s strategy of large scale industrial development was not materialising in the way it had been 
hoped, and, in a bid to maintain industrial peace, the Congress Party utilised “the device of 
monopoly power” in a recognised union (James, 1958). The smaller rival union federations – the 
Hind Mazdoor Sabha (HMS) and the All India Trade Unions Congress (AITUC) – were also described 
by James as “instruments” of the political parties with which they were aligned (James, 1958). 
Moreover, divisions and tensions within and between unions and their federations were high, and 
their commitment to the welfare of rank and file members had been repeatedly called into question 
during the colonial period. In 1945, for example, the Dalit activist and political leader B.R. Ambedkar  
had criticised the unions, calling their policies “really nothing else but a policy of organised loot, the 
first man trying to take whatever he can from the Government of India leaving the rest of the people 
uncared for.”132  There was little indication after independence that this had changed in any 
significant way. 
 
In this context it is difficult to imagine trade unions actively campaigning against the government 
and employers to expand occupational health services. This is particularly so considering the 
government’s clear sensitivity to criticism about workers’ health from outside India, as 
demonstrated by the Government of India’s defensive reaction to an unfavourable ILO report 
published in 1963 on Industrial Physiology in the mining industry. Arguing that the report was likely 
to be misconstrued “to indicate that the job of Indian miners is very hard and they all suffer from 
fatigue during their routine work,” the Government of India wished to make it clear that: 
… the real picture [was] … quite different … There is no gainsaying that the requirements of 
some occupations were such that they showed evidence of producing fatigue when judged by 
one criterion … amongst many others in use, but the miners had complete freedom and 
opportunity to recover fully by resting at an acceptable environmental condition before 
starting a fresh work cycle.133  
 
The Government of India went on to submit an official request for these points to be emphasised 
and “elucidated upon” in the final report. 
 
                                                          
132 BL, IOR/V/9/181, Legislative Debates, 28th February to 13th March 1945. 




Yet this argument, based as it is on the inability of trade unions to distance themselves sufficiently 
from governments, does not fully stand up to scrutiny. The labour movement may have lacked 
independence in both Ghana and India, but it still had a certain amount of leverage, and, while there 
were few advances made in occupational health, there were certainly gains made during the post-
independence period for workers in terms of work related social policy more generally. In Ghana, for 
example, Nkrumah’s regime implemented a national social security scheme (pensions and provident 
fund) for formal workers. Nkrumah officially announced the scheme during his speech at the 
inauguration of the new Trades Union Hall in Accra in 1963, and it was passed into law by parliament 
as the Social Security Act of 1965.134 The colonial Workmen’s Compensation Ordinance of 1942 was 
also upgraded in 1963 to the Workmen’s Compensation Act, which for the first time included a 
schedule of occupational diseases.135 As Damachi (1974) points out, these advances were an attempt 
by Nkrumah to control the labour unrest in the country which was spiralling out of control at the 
time. While he had initially reacted to this unrest with force in 1961 when he ordered police to open 
fire on strikers in Takoradi, his action had alienated many of his allies, and, as his colonial 
forerunners had done before him, he began to see policy change as a more acceptable and 
legitimate means with which to stem the tide of worker resistance.  
 
It should be mentioned that this labour unrest had little to do with the trade union leadership, who 
were situated firmly under the direction of government. Rather it emerged from rank and file 
workers themselves. Nevertheless, this created enough of a disturbance that Nkrumah was forced to 
respond. What is interesting though – and certainly a point for further analysis in this chapter – is 
the fact that Nkrumah chose to focus his attention on social security legislation, doing nothing to 
bolster the institutions governing the workplace, other than to add occupational diseases to the 
Workmen’s Compensation schedule. Before moving onto further discussion about this point, it 
should be noted that a somewhat similar turn of events had also occurred in India, although under 
different circumstances.  
 
In India, the state felt a need to maintain an industrial peace seen as crucial to the nation’s 
development, and this impacted on the shape of health policy (Nanda, 1998). It no doubt gave 
further impetus to the strength of the Employee’s State Insurance Scheme (ESIS), which was aimed 
specifically at a small group of formally employed industrial workers, over the more universal 
recommendations of the Bhore Committee Report. The ESIS, which was passed into law in 1948 but 
                                                          
134 ILOA TAP 0-196-4-1, Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, Ghana Social Security Reports 1963-
1965, Excerpt from Ghana Parliamentary Debates, 16th February 1965. 
135 NAG, Laws of Ghana, vol 7, 2004 edition, Note attached to the Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1987. 
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was only implemented in 1953, was financed through employee, worker, and state government 
contributions. Although the original report emphasised the importance of preventive health work in 
industry,136 occupational health services were excluded from the scheme as they were viewed as 
supplementary to health insurance, rather than as an integral part of it.137 This completely ignored 
the proposals contained in the Bhore Committee Report. The original intention behind the ESIS was 
to slowly expand health insurance provision from a core group of industrial workers to the wider 
population, once India was “ready” for such a move.138 In reality, however, the scheme was from the 
very first beset by administrative and political difficulties as exasperated reports from the ILO’s 
Technical Assistance team reveal.139 In the end it remained a limited one (and still is to this day), 
available only to a select few industrial workers. So while the rhetoric of health in the post-
independence period had certainly emphasised the citizen, in reality the Indian government 
continued the late colonial tradition of extending “universal citizenship” to a limited number of 
formal workers, whose cooperation in developing the nation was felt to be important. 
 
It is important to note here that there were some exceptions to this rule in India. Worker’s Welfare 
Boards had first been set up in 1934 in order to provide social and labour protections to dock 
workers (Agarwala, 2013). The welfare board operated at state level and was funded by an 
additional tax on employers, state and national government and membership fees from workers. In 
1966 the Beedi and Cigar Worker’s Act was passed, which established health and labour protections 
for these home based workers, although its provisions were not enforced until 1974 (Bhatty, 1987). 
In 1976 the welfare board model was used as a basis for the Beedi Workers Welfare Fund and Cess 
Act, which placed a “cess” (additional tax) on beedi sales which contributed to the funding of a 
welfare board to regulate health, welfare and working conditions for Beedi workers.  
 
The point to emphasise here is that workers in both Ghana and India (even some of the more 
vulnerable workers), despite the problematic relationship between trade unions and governments 
and the closing of spaces for engagement, were still able to influence to some degree at least the 
trajectory of health, social security, and labour policies. Both countries had adopted a macro-
economic policy of industrialisation, and organised workers remained a critical force in the post-
                                                          
136 BL, Adarkar, B.P. 1945. Report on Health Insurance for Industrial Workers. Labour Department, Government 
of India. 
137 Das, S.K. 1954. ‘Employee’s State Insurance Scheme and the Future of Occupational Health in India,’ in 
Proceedings of the Society for the Study of Industrial Medicine (Jamshedpur), Vol 6 (2). 
138 BL, Adarkar, B.P. 1945. Report on Health Insurance for Industrial Workers. Labour Department, Government 
of India. 
139 ILOA, TAP 6-33-2-1-0, Technical Assistance Programme, India Social Insurance, Reports from Ian Robertson 
(controversy with M.M. Merani and Katial), 1955. 
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independence period. The state was forced to respond when workers displayed their unhappiness 
with the status quo. What did not seem to be high on the agenda, however, was occupational health 
– not for governments, and not for workers themselves. When occupational health services were 
excluded from the ESIS in India, it was not worker organisations that led the somewhat muted 
protest, it was industrial doctors.140 Reports from the ILO’s Delhi Office, covering the years 1929 to 
1965 show that the majority of official trade union disputes were related to wages and bonuses, or 
personnel issues.141 In Ghana Dr. Nowacki, the Polish occupational health expert from the ILO, stated 
(somewhat despairingly) that if occupational health services were to develop in the country it would 
be necessary for the GTUC to show “much more interest in the occupational safety and health of 
their members.”142 
 
Of course the distance between trade union leadership and rank and file members in both countries 
means that that interests of trade union officials did not always match the needs and concerns of 
their members (Crisp, 1984; Karlekar, 1998). The complexity of the situation in India was revealed in 
an informal interview with Jagdish Patel, the Executive Director of the People’s Training and 
Research Centre (PTRC), an Indian research and advocacy organisation focused on struggles around 
occupational diseases. Patel argued that, while Indian trade unions had done little over the years to 
push the occupational health agenda, certain groups of workers had independently (and with the 
help of allies such as the PTRC) waged successful battles against industry to improve health 
conditions and pay compensation to affected workers.143  
 
The fact that workers may have been fighting health related battles outside of the trade union 
movement during the 1950s and 1960s is certainly an important point to consider. That these are 
unlikely to have been recorded in official documents makes these activities easy to gloss over. Even 
so, this still does not really answer the question of why occupational health failed to take off during 
this post-independence period. If anything, it deepens the mystery surrounding the failure of the 
labour movement to pick up and engage with it (even if isolated groups of workers were managing 
to make gains), or why governments, while implementing labour related social policies, continued to 
ignore occupational health services. The following section attempts to explore these questions 
                                                          
140 The Journal “Proceedings of the Society for the Study of Industrial Medicine (Jamshedpur)” contains several 
examples of such protests from industrial doctors. 
141 ILOA, Reports from the India Delhi Office, 1929-1965. These reports have been digitised in collaboration 
with the University of Goettingen and are available at: http://www.uni-goettingen.de/en/324221.html 
142 ILOA, TAP 0-196-5 (1), Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, 1966: Ghana OSH, Notes. 
143 Interview with Jagdish Patel, 5th April 2013, Delhi, India. 
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further by looking more closely at the state’s role in defining the agenda around occupational health 
in Britain, India, and Ghana during the late colonial and post-independence period. 
 
The State and Occupational Health: Late Colonial and Post-Colonial Welfare Regimes144 
In thinking further about why post-independence governments showed a distinct lack of interest in 
promoting occupational health, it is useful to start with an analysis of the structure of the post-
World War Two welfare regime in Britain because it ushered in far reaching changes in the nature of 
the state and its relationship to its citizens. At the centre of these changes was an understanding 
that the state would provide certain basic welfare guarantees to all citizens – the social citizenship to 
which T.H. Marshall (1965) referred. To the intellectual supporters of the welfare state this was the 
key point to emphasise – if the reduction of social inequality was the aim, then there had to be state 
provision for all rather than limited provision for a few defined groups. Richard Titmuss (1958: 54), 
for example, argued vociferously against additional occupational benefits provided by employers for 
those working in “good jobs,” which he claimed “divided loyalties, nourished privilege, and 
narrowed the social conscience.” Titmuss’s faith lay in the state as provider, and the state alone. 145 
It was this faith in the state, and the importance of citizenship as the basis for entitlements, that 
would have important consequences for the position of occupational health services in Britain. 
 
In 1940 there had been hope that the end of the war would allow for the establishment of a state 
run national industrial health service in Britain, “when the appointment of industrial medical officers 
under the 1940 Factories (Medical and Welfare Services) Order promoted a model of industrial 
medicine characterised by medical supervision of the worker in the workplace” (Long, 2011: 65). By 
the time the National Health Service (NHS) White Paper was released in 1944, however, these hopes 
began to fade (Long, 2011). The White Paper explicitly excluded industrial health services from the 
proposed NHS. According to Long (2011), although Bevan did not necessarily disagree with the 
proposal to include industrial health services, he felt that the NHS Bill could not tackle “everything at 
once.” His position was attacked by both the TUC and the British Medical Association (BMA) who 
continued to lobby for the NHS to recognise workers as citizens with special needs. By 1951, 
                                                          
144 In this chapter, the term “welfare regime” rather “welfare state” is used following Gough and Wood (2004). 
The welfare apparatus adopted in both Ghana and India was too limited in scope to qualify as a welfare state 
even though it espoused an ideal of universal citizenship. The more appropriate term therefore is “welfare 
regime” which acknowledges the presence of social policy, and of certain rights of citizenship, whilst also 
acknowledging the limited scope of these social rights.  
145 An important footnote to this is that Titmuss’s last major work, The Gift Relationship (1970), stressed as 
well the importance of citizens’ voluntary donations to the state and society. He saw these as an absolutely 
vital demonstration of the “contract” between citizens themselves, and between citizens and the state.  
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however, Bevan had become more steadfastly opposed to this idea and a later proposal to establish 
a parallel national industrial health service was also met with opposition. There was a strong feeling 
that the development of a national industrial health service would compete with the NHS for 
resources and manpower. Furthermore, it presented the possibility of increasing the scope of 
occupational benefits, and in doing so undermining citizenship as the basis of the entitlement to 
health care (Long, 2011). Added to this was the Ministry of Labour’s insistence that industrial health 
remain under its stewardship. The result was that industrial health services remained connected to 
the Factories Inspectorate, falling under the Labour Ministry and isolated from mainstream health 
services.  
 
Similar arguments had also been made in relation to workmen’s compensation legislation and social 
security. Titmuss was very against workmen’s compensation because it provided favourable 
treatment to workers over and above citizens, and because of the practical difficulties involved in 
distinguishing between ill-health caused by work and that caused by general living conditions 
(Titmuss et al., 1968). Beveridge too was against the system, his main reasons being the cost of 
litigation, the uncertainty of benefits, and the fact that it did not actually encourage safer practices 
in the workplace (Bartrip, 1985). Nevertheless the opposition of the unions to the dissolution of 
workmen’s compensation led to a compromise position where the legislation was incorporated into 
the national insurance system, so that workers retained preferential treatment under it (Bartrip, 
1985).  
 
Long’s thorough and fascinating account of the “rise and fall” of occupational health services is 
somewhat flawed by her failure to situate these processes adequately within the wider political 
economy of the British welfare state. Although she touches on it, she misses the point that the 
institutional politics gave rise to a certain bureaucratic structure in which industrial health was 
always going to be marginal. Esping-Anderson (1990) has argued that one of the central features of 
the welfare regimes of Europe is the fact that “they systematically kept the bureaucracies and 
administration of social protection and labour market sharply separate.” The origins of this 
administrative separation emerged from classical liberal theory and its assumptions about the 
“equality-efficiency-trade-off,” or the idea that the state’s attempts to maintain equality and/or 
justice within the labour market would inevitably compromise on economic efficiency and 




Even before Esping-Anderson had developed his typologies, however, the socialist critic of the 
welfare state, Claus Offe (1984), expressed the view that this division has the effect of separating 
social life into two separate spheres – what he refers to as “the sphere of work” and “the sphere of 
citizenship.” The sphere of work he associated with the economy, production, and primary income 
distribution; the sphere of citizenship was associated with the state, reproduction, and secondary 
distribution. The welfare state grants and regulates rights of citizenship, Offe (1984) argued, but 
because of its orientation towards the freedom of the labour market, does much less to grant and 
regulate workers’ rights in the sphere of production. In this way the welfare state emphasises 
reproduction over production. Offe (1984) interpreted this as a mechanism of “political-ideological” 
control. By granting citizenship rights in the sphere of reproduction, the state works against the 
expansion of workers’ rights by making “people ignore or forget that needs and contingencies which 
the welfare state responds to are themselves constituted, directly or indirectly, in the sphere of 
work and production.” The social programmes required to address these needs and contingencies 
are then paid for by taxpayers. The point of this, argued Offe (1984), is that the capitalist status quo 
remains unchallenged. Offe’s interpretation of the political economy of the welfare state has been 
heavily criticised. Esping-Anderson (1990) has pointed out that, despite the bureaucratic division of 
social policy and labour market institutions, there are actually many ways in which social policy 
interacts with the labour market. For example, policies around childcare can make a big difference in 
the number of women who enter the labour market. Furthermore, as critics of Offe point out, his 
perspective – which ultimately suggests that “citizenship rights are merely a bourgeois façade 
concealing class-based relations of exploitation which perpetuate capitalism,” (van Niekerk, 1999) – 
does not account for the potential that “citizenship rights have to work in the interests of the 
working class” (Doyal and Gough, 1991). Certainly it would be difficult to argue that the formation of 
the NHS was in any way a negative development for workers in Britain.  
 
Nevertheless Offe’s point about the impact of the separation between social policy and the labour 
regime does provide an important insight into the position of industrial health in Britain at the 
height of the welfare state. Within Offe’s framework, industrial health fell uneasily between the 
spheres of production and reproduction – it was something that was, and still is, intimately linked to 
the production process and the production environment; it is of the sphere of production. 
Preventive measures related to the types of machinery to be used, how they were to be used, and 
allowable limits on the potentially poisonous by-products of industrial processes had an impact on 
not only the processes being used, but also the costs associated with them.  The fact that it was the 
state which monitored and regulated this allowed it a certain degree of control over the sphere of 
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production (which employers have been notoriously sensitive about, as seen in Chapter Two), and 
within the context of the welfare state, created a somewhat anomalous situation. In this context the 
decision of the post-World War Two government to de-emphasise rather than emphasise its direct 
role in regulating the production process by maintaining industrial health as an isolated and fairly 
marginal government department, and concentrating instead on a new health scheme which would 
operate exclusively in the sphere of reproduction, becomes intelligible in political economy terms.  
 
In Britain’s liberal welfare state, industrial health and the physical control of the workplace largely 
became the province of employers. As Sturdy (2000: 224) argues, there had been a move in this 
direction since the end of World War One when governments decided that “in the difficult political 
and economic circumstances they were largely happy to leave such matters in the experienced 
hands of employers themselves.” It is important to note as well that the particular structure of the 
British welfare state was only one aspect which influenced this. Constraints on state spending after 
the war was another. There was also the old principle of “the polluter pays” or the liability of 
employers (rather than the state) to pay for the social problems that they caused directly.  The 
confluence of these factors meant that after World War Two very little was done by the state to 
bolster industrial health services, and Britain failed to sign on to a number of international directives 
concerning occupational health. In 1962 when the European Commission recommended setting up 
occupational health services in all workplaces with more than 200 employees, Britain was one of the 
four out of twelve member states which refused to implement this directive (Schilling, 1998). 
 
This neglect of industrial health was inherited by the welfare regimes of Britain’s ex-colonies. The 
late colonial welfare regimes had followed a similar philosophy – interference in the workplace was 
to be minimised in favour of policies which addressed conditions in the sphere of reproduction.146 As 
Chapter Two has already shown, there was always a tension between the colonial state’s need to 
reap the rewards of British overseas investment, and the need to maintain a particular social order 
which included the regulation of working conditions. In the Gold Coast, this tension was reflected in 
the progressive Governor Gordon Guggisberg’s complicated relationship with the mining sector, 
which tended to waver between acceding to their demands and attempting to place heavy 
restrictions on labour recruitment and workplace practices (Crisp, 1984). Ultimately though, 
interference in workplace matters was kept to a minimum. In a letter home Arthur Spooner, an 
officer in the Gold Coast Labour Department, revealed the power of the mine managers over the 
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mile radius surrounding the mine for which the government would be responsible. 
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institutions of the colonial state: “Mine Managers are very busy and rather touchy individuals so far 
as Government is concerned. If you get up against them you cannot get a damn thing done and they 
are liable to bring pressure to bear and to have individuals removed so I am frankly a little frightened 
of butting in.”147  Here the tension is evident between a theory of state which required the 
regulation of the economy and the reality that, in practice, capital was quite easily able to bypass 
any protective initiatives. 
 
Cooper (1983; 1986) argues that a central feature of the British colonial welfare regimes was the 
attempt that they made to link the spheres of reproduction and production, in the hope that by 
improving living conditions, workers would be less inclined to participate in the strikes and 
disturbances that began to threaten the stability of the British Empire from the 1930s onwards. It 
could, however, be argued that these colonial regimes did not only link together the spheres of 
production and reproduction, but they also actively emphasised reproduction over production, at 
least when it came to protective social regulation. The minutes of the Colonial Labour Advisory 
Committee are filled with discussions relating to housing and social security; relatively scant 
attention is paid to workplace regulation.148  This was reflected in the research carried out by the 
social scientists whose work informed colonial policy. As Cooper (1996) himself points out, despite 
the plethora of social surveys and research carried out amongst urban workers in the late colonial 
and post-colonial period in Africa, very little was done on the actual working environment and the 
work process. 
 
Post-independence governments did little to alter this state of affairs. For both Nkrumah and Nehru 
the drive towards large scale industrialisation was a predominant goal. While methods to improve 
worker productivity were certainly welcomed, state interference in the production process was not a 
priority for these governments in their attempts to attract capital and keep it there. In India 
industrialists were particularly wary of state interference – the British textile industry had waged war 
against its Indian counterpart using the Factory Act as a means to drive up the costs of production, 
leaving a bitter taste in the industry’s mouth when it came to that particular piece of legislation. In 
Ghana, Nkrumah had originally tried to extract concessions from foreign companies operating in the 
country, but this was seemingly limited to the provision of housing and medical facilities for workers. 
Even then his success was limited. When in 1958 his government put pressure on the Ashanti 
Goldfields Corporation to extend their housing provision for workers, the reply from the Chairman, 
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General Sir Edward Spears, was not encouraging. “We must assume the Government will provide its 
citizens with houses as every other Government does. The public entrusts us with money for mining 
and not to enter into large building schemes,” responded Spears.149 Considering these difficulties, 
Nkrumah and his colleagues may well have felt that it would be more trouble than it was worth to 
interfere in the production environment of large international corporations.  
 
The political economy of the post-independence state, its attendant bureaucratic structures, and its 
ideological underpinnings, produced an environment in which occupational health institutions 
remained isolated from other health institutions and therefore marginalised. This particular 
confluence of forces may also provide some insight into the lack of engagement by workers’ 
organisations with occupational health. Engagement, as Cooper (1996) describes it, which is the 
ability of civil society to take advantage of policy gaps and widen them, can only occur after a policy 
space has opened up. While these spaces may initially open up because of pressure from below, the 
precise form of that opening is still determined by those in power. Social policy in the sphere of 
reproduction was a point on which the state was willing to engage, while occupational health in the 
sphere of production much less so. This in turn may well have influenced the strategies of worker 
organisations in terms of which engagements they decided to focus on and which to leave alone. 
 
Employers: “Getting Out From Under” 
There were, however, other important reasons why trade unions and workers found it difficult fully 
to engage with occupational health. Large industries also had a role to play. Here it is necessary to 
acknowledge an important difference between Britain and its colonies. In Britain the Factories 
Inspectorate remained a marginal department, but it was still relatively well resourced, and 
operated within the context of a strong welfare state and social contract which had at least some 
respect for the idea that the needs of capital should not compromise the health of workers. As Long 
(2011) has shown, there was still a state apparatus which workers could leverage, even if the gains 
that resulted were small. This was not the case in the ex-colonies, where the vast majority of 
resources which went into occupational health actually came from employers themselves. 
 
Cooper (1996) has highlighted the inherent contradiction of the liberal reforms of the late colonial 
period; while the Colonial Office wished to create a limited version of universal citizenship, it most 
certainly did not wish to invest the resources necessary for even this limited vision. As a 
                                                          




consequence the Colonial Office tried to shift as much responsibility as it possibly could onto 
employers. This was codified into policy by the Colonial Labour Advisory Committee in 1947 when it 
stated that: 
After full consideration of the various aspects of the problem we recommend that in general 
the provision of social services, such as health and education facilities, and the maintenance 
of standards of housing should be the responsibility of Colonial Governments; but that in the 
early stages of industrial or agricultural development, and pending the establishment of 
permanent centres of population, this responsibility can, in the case of larger concentrations 
of labour, reasonably be laid upon employers.150 
 
While the principle of state provision of social services was upheld, the reality of resource limitations 
was clearly acknowledged. This acknowledgement was not limited to the Colonial Office. In 1952 the 
ILO passed its Convention on Minimum Standards of Social Security (No. 102), which covered nine 
contingencies,151 but asked that new member states (the newly post-colonial states such as India), 
only cover three out of the nine (Rodgers et al., 2009). This was the first acknowledgement by the 
organisation that labour conventions may not apply universally, and that the special circumstances 
of developing countries had to be acknowledged.  
 
As has already been discussed in Chapter Two, the attempt to pressure employers into providing 
such services had mixed results. On the one hand in India some large employers like the Tata Steel 
Corporation, which had already prospered during World War One, invested a great deal in the health 
and welfare of their workers. At Jamshedpur, where Tata Steel was headquartered, the steel works 
provided a number of social and welfare services, including “first class organisations on modern 
hospital lines for giving curative medical aid including antenatal and post-natal clinics for women 
workers.”152 In Ghana, Ashanti Gold had also provided doctors, piped water supplies, a dispensary, 
and a hospital for workers. As Chapter Two pointed out, the motives were more closely related to 
profit than to altruism; many large mines and other colonial industries were located in rural areas 
where the colonial state hardly reached. In order to keep workers fit enough to produce the 
necessary output it was obligatory to provide for health and housing. This was as true outside the 
British Empire as it was inside it. In Liberia, for example, the US based Firestone Tire and Rubber 
Company maintained a fairly sophisticated network of hospitals, clinics, and dispensaries on their 
plantations where approximately 30 000 worked (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2001). In 1950 it employed an 
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expatriate medical staff of 13 in addition to 244 Liberian employees, of whom 89 were nurses, 15 
were laboratory technicians, and 36 were involved in sanitary work.153  This was a ratio of one health 
professional to 200 workers, which, although not ideal, was a better ratio than was found elsewhere 
in the country.  
 
While many of the large international or multinational firms had seemingly accepted their role in the 
provision of basic health services, after independence there was change in the air. In 1950 the WHO 
had announced that health was a right for all and a responsibility of government. The implication of 
this for their responsibility for employee health service provision was not lost on industry, 
particularly as medical technology became more complex and expensive. The ensuing debates and 
deliberations played out particularly clearly at the conference on Industry and Tropical Health. This 
conference had first been organised in 1951 by the Harvard School of Public Health, which, together 
with the Rockefeller Foundation, had interests in both tropical medicine and industrial health, and 
continued on a four yearly basis until 1970. The conference combined insights on industry and 
tropical health from health professionals and representatives from large international firms such 
Anglo-Iranian Oil, Standard Oil, Shell Petroleum, Firestone Rubber and Tire Company, KLM, the 
United States Fruit Company, Iraq Petroleum, and several other still recognisable names.  
 
From the very first a significant contingent of the industrial representatives began to argue for a 
withdrawal from the provision of general health services such as clinics and hospitals. Robert Collier 
Page from the Standard Oil Company led the charge in 1951. He argued that the costs associated 
with such provision had begun to far exceed the benefits to companies: 
In 1940 the total medical expenses for the Latin American affiliates of the Standard Oil 
Company were a little less than 3 million dollars. Now in 1950 the total is over 9 million 
dollars and in spite of curtailment, operating expenditures are still going up…And so we see 
that a practice which was considered expedient in the early days has gone almost beyond 
control. Through commitments of all kind, the Company with which I am associated is 
responsible for, in a medical way, approximately 200 000 people, of whom only 34 000 are 
employed by it and its affiliates. This must mean that much of management’s investment for 
medical services to employees is being misdirected.154 
 
Not only did the costs of health provision mean it was no longer “good business” to provide health 
services, but provision of such services also represented “paternalism to the nth degree,”155 argued 
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Collier Page. The WHO had proclaimed that health services were a responsibility of government, and 
if industry continued to provide in its place, governments would never learn to provide on their own. 
Industry could provide a certain amount of support, providing scholarships for “nationals to study 
medicine abroad” and temporary partnerships to deal with certain pressing problems, but no longer 
should comprehensive health services be seen as the responsibility of industry.156 This was to be a 
consistent theme throughout the twenty years of the conference’s existence. 
 
Not everyone agreed with this. At the 1954 session of the conference, Dr. Luis Dao, a Venezuelan 
working for the SA Petroleum Company in Las Mercedes, Venezuela (a very poor country at the 
time), questioned the position of Collier Page and others:  
I think the oil companies should give medical assistance … in places where no medical 
facilities exist but there is a company doctor. This is different in places where the government 
– the community – has a hospital. The company can differentiate and say, “we don’t accept 
such and such a patient, you have to go to the government hospital.” But in out of the way 
places where they don’t have medical facilities, I think it is good policy – a point of humanity 
– that all should help the poor people.157 
 
When challenged on this opinion Dao responded that he considered it “an ethical obligation of the 
profession to take care of poor people.”158 This rhetoric (one which came more naturally from a 
doctor than a corporate executive) did not sit well with the general direction of the conference and a 
challenge like that was not to be raised again during the conference’s lifespan. Instead, the focus 
turned, in Collier Page’s term, to ways in which to “get out from under.”159 
 
“Getting out from under” essentially meant thinking of ways to free industry from its prior 
commitments to general health service provision – not an easy process where health service 
provision was a result of union bargaining. Yet it was reasoned that as long as the WHO’s drive 
towards state provision of primary health care continued, it would become easier and easier for 
business to withdraw. Within the move to get out from under, occupational health began to assume 
an importance not perhaps seen before. If health service provision was to be renegotiated between 
the state and business, then business would still need to be seen to be viewed as giving some 
concessions. This could involve corporate subsidies to local community health clinics, conceded 
Collier Page, but the responsibility of business should rightly be on “preventive and constructive 
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medicine in contradistinction to curative medicine,” and should involve itself only with workers and 
not their families.160  The provision of occupational health services – with a focus on prevention – 
could be the bargaining chip for industry to use to free itself from the expensive and complex 
provisions of general curative medicine. 
 
Of course this did not mean that large corporations all over the developing world dismantled their 
corporate health services and set up occupational health services in their place. Certainly many, like 
Tata Steel, continued to provide general medical services, as well other welfare services like housing 
and child care facilities – the age of industrial welfare was by no means over.  It did, however, signal 
the beginning of a significant shift in thinking about the responsibility for health service provision – 
who was to be included and on what terms. Where colonial governments had leaned, as far as they 
could, on large industries to provide services, such as housing, pumped water, and health care, for 
their workers and their families, the rhetoric of universal citizenship meant that it was harder for 
post-independence governments to maintain that pressure on industry. 
 
What it also meant was that some of these large industries began to plough more resources into 
occupational health. While this may certainly have had benefits for workers working in those 
industries, the benefits to occupational health as a discipline were more questionable. Occupational 
health was not a science that came cheaply. It required specialist training for doctors and engineers, 
and expensive equipment. For post-independence governments already battling to balance the 
budgets and provide basic social services, occupational health research must have seemed more of a 
luxury than a necessity. When the ILO sent a technical assistance mission to India in 1965 to study 
industrial physiology in the mining industry, the expert arrived to find that no equipment was 
available at the Regional Labour Institute. After much negotiation with various institutions including 
the All India Institute of Hygiene, the Regional Labour Institute, Calcutta, and the University of 
Calcutta, he managed to procure one piece of the necessary equipment and described the results of 
his efforts as “very poor.”161  Dr. Nowacki, working in Ghana, had had a very similar experience, 
arriving to find that not only did he not have a local counterpart with whom to work, but that his 
office was a “higgledy-piggledy” old army barracks “enough to demoralise any expert,” and that he 
had insufficient equipment with which to conduct his research.162  
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For better resourced corporate entities, however, the costs associated with occupational health 
were far less than those of providing curative health facilities for tens of thousands of people. It is 
not surprising then that the professional associations and research institutes which began to emerge 
looked to procure corporate sponsorship for their activities. The Indian Association of Occupational 
Health, the Indian affiliate of the International Commission on Occupational Health (ICOH), began its 
life sponsored by Tata Steel and operated out of its headquarters at Jamshedpur. The doctors who 
presented papers to its journal and who participated in its annual meetings were overwhelmingly 
employees of industrial concerns, rather than representatives from state institutions or 
universities.163 In Ghana, outside of the large mining houses, the only doctor who had training in 
occupational health was Dr. LKA Derban from the University of Ghana’s Medical School, whose 
training had been facilitated by an ILO fellowship in 1965.164   
 
The fate of the Ross Institute’s work in East Africa reveals some of the difficulties this reliance on 
corporate funding could create. The work of the Ross Institute, an offshoot of the London School of 
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM) which had originally been set up to advise colonial 
industries on health matters in the tropics, had always been funded by subscriptions from large 
colonial industries. By the 1960s, however, it was looking to develop in a direction congruent with 
newly independent Africa. The young and enthusiastic doctor in charge, Stuart Hall, proposed to use 
the Institute’s funds to establish an East African occupational health unit which would be situated at 
Makerere University College in Uganda. The response from his superior at the LSHTM, Professor 
George MacDonald, was far from encouraging. MacDonald argued that industries would likely be 
unhappy to see “their contributions go at least in part … to Makerere.”165  If Hall wished to continue 
with his proposal he would have to seek alternative funds. Hall’s attempt to procure funds from the 
Nuffield Foundation, mentioned earlier in this chapter, was an effort at moving away from the 
limitations of corporate funding. After the rejection of his proposal, however, it became clear that 
corporate subscriptions were likely to continue to be the underpinning of any further work, although 
a smaller grant from the Munitalp Foundation did at least allow Hall to take up a lectureship at 
Makerere’s School of Public Health between 1965 and 1967.166  
 
In this way, occupational health became largely the domain of industry and the doctors who worked 
for it – much more so than it ever was in Britain where the state’s resources were relatively better 
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developed and where trade unions had a long history of involvement in campaigns for industrial 
health. This was never going to be a context in which worker’s voices would be prioritised or even 
encouraged, or where it would be easy for worker organisations to engage with the profession and 
those who controlled it. Particularly problematic was the fact that this also excluded the large 
majority of workers in countries like Ghana and India – particularly women workers – who did not 
work for a recognisable employer, or in a formally recognisable place of work. With occupational 
health being the domain of employers, in a context where the state structures were weak, workers 
who worked outside of formal waged employment had no chance of accessing such services.   
 
The exclusion of women workers specifically from occupational health services was of course not 
only a problem in Ghana and India. Chapter Three highlighted the gendered foundations of the 
British welfare state, with women confined (in ideal terms) to the private sphere and men 
dominating the public sphere and the sphere of work. In this context women’s health (which 
continued to follow the productionist emphasis on reproductive health) and occupational health 
occupied very separate places within health disciplines.  
 
Karen Messing (1998), an occupational health scientist from Canada, has detailed the ways in which 
women’s occupational health concerns have been marginalised by state institutions, the corporate 
sector as well as mainstream occupational science in economically developed Anglophone countries. 
If this has been the case in the developed world, it is something that was magnified in countries like 
Ghana and India. As noted in Chapter Three, one of the features of the post-independence global 
health movement, and one which retained a continuity with colonial health, was the emphasis that 
was placed on women’s reproductive health. In doing so health policies tended to position women 
as mothers first and foremost, and as workers second. This was reinforced by the fact that post-
independence governments, with their minds on industrial modernism, actively did not wish to 
consider the occupations in which so many women worked, as occupations. In Ghana, for example, 
Clark (1994) has argued that market women were a threat to the male dominated post-
independence government because of the ways in which their presence as small, private operators 
in the economy challenged the ideology of state socialism. Yet as Messing (1998) argues the 
dominance of the corporate sector in funding occupational health services has also been central to 
the exclusion of (particularly) self-employed women workers.  
 
However, whilst workers outside of the formal sector have little chance of connecting with 
occupational health services, even formal workers were often excluded. The lack of worker 
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representation and input at any of the large meetings on occupational health so far discussed in this 
chapter is quite striking. Only once in twenty years was a worker representative invited to speak at 
the Conference on Industry and Tropical Health. Mr Rudolph Fuapi, the International Representative 
of the International Association of Machinists, started his speech with the following words: “Some 
people might think it unusual, or perhaps even downright inappropriate, to find a trade union 
representative present at a discussion of this highly technical problem.”167 Yet many of the 
discussions at the conference could hardly be considered as highly technical and/or scientific. Whilst 
doctors were certainly well represented, and scientific papers were presented, there were also many 
non-medical representatives from industry and even government who spoke on social issues relating 
to the health of workers. This was certainly not such a technical conference that it should have been 
so unusual for a worker representative to speak at it. 
 
The Proceedings of the Society for the Study of Industrial Medicine in India also reveals a very limited 
engagement with workers during their conferences and gatherings. An unusual 1953 volume did 
however carry two short contributions from workers which presented a fairly damning portrait of 
the collusion between doctors and employers at the expense of workers. Mr Kubul, a foreman at a 
textile mill, complained that: 
The number of factories whose Medical Officers are really conscientious and willing to render 
humanitarian service are few. MO’s are generally appointed on a part time basis. They come 
to the factories, and in the short time they are expected to spend there, their time is spent in 
meeting the Directors, Managers and other officials to enquire after their health, and then at 
the factory dispensaries where they examine a few patients, give a few hurried instructions 
to the compounders and then leave.168 
 
Even today the Indian Association of Occupational Health (IAOH), which emerged out of the Society 
for the Study of Industrial Medicine and is still made up largely of doctors employed by industry 
rather than the state or tertiary educational institutions, faces accusations of being influenced by 
industry. In a letter to the 2008 edition of the International Journal of Occupational and 
Environmental Health, Dr. TK Joshi, a member of the IAOH, accused the association of accepting 
sponsorships from corporate entities associated with the production of substances harmful to 
human health on a quid pro quo basis (Joshi, 2008). This was hotly denied by the IAOH who 
subsequently expelled Dr. Joshi from the association (Shanbag, 2008). It does not, however, seem 
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unimaginable that a professional association which continues to “seek sponsorship” from corporate 
entities may be unduly biased towards their sponsor’s interests. 
 
Industry control over occupational health, the employment of physicians, the sponsorship of 
associations and conferences, and the financial resources to invest in expensive technical work, 
certainly furthers the understanding of why workers in countries such as India and Ghana would find 
it difficult to engage with the profession and turn it to their advantage.  This explanation also sits 
well within a materialist framework – the control of scientific knowledge as a consequence of the 
wider control over the means of production. However, as scholars of colonial health and medicine 
such as Arnold (1993) and Anderson (2000) have shown, the politics of science and medicine is 
intelligible on several different levels. While the struggle for the control over the means of 
production is certainly one important level, there are other ways of understanding these politics 
which incorporate a more ideal level of analysis, and which also have important implications for 
understanding the limits to engagement. The following section delves deeper into the politics of 
medical knowledge and the medical profession itself in order to draw out further complexities in the 
relationship between occupational health and workers in developing countries. 
 
Science and the Limits to Engagement   
Linked very closely to the rise of the welfare state in Britain and the emphasis on citizenship as the 
basis for entitlements was a change in the ideological underpinnings of health provision itself. The 
emphasis that productionist logic had placed on the production of strong, healthy workers had 
shifted, after the World Wars, in favour of what Pickstone (2000) refers to as the “communitarian” 
model of health. In line with the aims of the welfare state, the emphasis was now on the provision of 
health care as a means by which to enhance social inclusion and national solidarity – the “social 
medicine” which Dorothy Porter (1997; 2006) and others have examined in such fine detail. While 
efficiency and productivity were still a concern, they were no longer necessarily considered to fall 
under the health services.  Moreover, the focus on productivity was a limited one which focused on 
certain population groups (workers, mothers, infants), whilst social medicine was a practice of health 
that aimed to be inclusive of all. 
 
This change in ideology was transported to the colonies and reinforced by the various health 
commissions which sat at the time and determined health policy. The Maude Commission Report, 
released in 1952, directed health policy in Ghana for the first ten years of independence (Addae, 
1996). Maude’s recommendations were based on the standard prescriptions of the age of social 
medicine: a focus on primary health care centres accessible by all citizens, both rural and urban. 
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Significantly, and in line with the new focus on citizenship, Maude called for the abolition of the 
Mining Health Areas, against which Percy Selwyn-Clarke had fought so vociferously, calling instead 
for a universal Public Health Ordinance.169 The Mining Health Areas had represented a health policy 
which had focused attention on workers at the expense of the rest of the rural population. In the age 
of social medicine – a practice of medicine based on the principle of universal citizenship – these 
areas were considered exclusionary and untenable.  
 
Yet the battle against the Mining Health Areas was only one front in the larger war that Selwyn-
Clarke and his colleagues fought against the exclusionary orientation of colonial health policy. In 
1936 the Colonial Secretary for Mines undertook a tour of the Gold Coast. In his report, he 
complained that no attention had yet been given by the health department to the occupational 
disease of silicosis, whilst too much had been given to the “general health of miner’s sanitation and 
to tuberculosis.”170  He cautioned about the experience of South Africa, where the government had 
been forced to pay out millions in compensation to silicosis sufferers and underlined the need for a 
silicosis survey in the colony and the deployment of a medical officer with knowledge of the 
disease.171 Despite his reformism in relation to health policy in general, Selwyn-Clarke was deeply 
unhappy with this. His chief interest had been in the upgrading of housing and sanitation as a means 
by which to control the high and rising levels of tuberculosis in the Colony.172  He admitted that 
whilst silicosis may be present amongst miners, tuberculosis was still the main disease to be tackled.  
Silicosis, he and his colleagues Drs. Duff and Howells argued, was only important “insofar as it was 
an aggravating factor in the development of tuberculosis.”173  The doctors in fact refused to refer to 
silicosis independently of tuberculosis, preferring instead to use the term silico-tuberculosis “with an 
emphasis on tuberculosis.” 174 
 
The reason for Selwyn-Clarke and his colleagues’ reluctance to acquiesce to the silicosis survey was 
rooted in the same way of thinking which catalysed his protest against the Mining Health Areas, and 
which had inspired the rejection in Britain of a proposed national industrial health service. It was 
likely also the reason which underlay the Maude Commission Report’s failure to consider the place 
and scope of occupational health within the health services. A focus on industrial diseases removed 
the focus from the health of the general population, away from citizenship as the basis for claims to 
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health. In this way the tension within the welfare state between health provision for workers and 
citizens was reflected in the medical profession itself. As Dorothy Porter (1996: 295) has argued 
social medicine represented “the rising tide of corporate welfarism” – it was medicine for the 
people, for all the people. Industrial health on the other hand represented the health needs of a 
privileged “special population” of workers. 
 
Yet not all proponents of social medicine considered the two to be mutually exclusive. As Amrith 
(2006) points out the members of the Bhore Committee contained some of the leading left wing 
thinkers on social medicine (unusual for such a committee), including John Ryle who was the first 
professor of Social Medicine at Oxford University and Henry Sigerist, a champion of the Russian 
model of socialised medicine. The Bhore Report was exceptionally progressive in taking a holistic 
view of health and Chapter Ten (X) is dedicated to occupational (rather than industrial) health 
services.175  It recommended that an occupational health organisation be set up and  
 
… integrated with the work of the general health services in each local area under the 
national health schemes, including those provided by the general practitioners, the hospitals 
and any specialised units which are available for the treatment of occupational diseases and 
research and teaching in this subject.176   
 
As with the rest of the Bhore Report, these recommendations were never to be implemented. 
Nevertheless, the report does highlight the heterogeneity of positions that existed even within social 
medicine during this period. One reason that occupational health may have featured in the Bhore 
Report, but not in other similar reports of the period (such as the Maude Commission Report in the 
Gold Coast and the Gluckman Commission Report in South Africa), was that Ryle and Sigerist played 
a prominent role on the Bhore Commission.177 Both these men identified themselves as socialists 
and looked to the Russian public health system, in which workers’ health played a prominent part as 
model.  
 
There is, however, an additional factor to consider. Percy Selwyn-Clarke, so vehemently opposed to 
a focus on workers within the public health system, had worked for a long time in the colonies and 
had borne witness to the way which health services had been skewed in favour of workers. Despite 
Ryle and Sigerist’s involvement in the Bhore Committee, they were not doctors operating in the 
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colonial medical services and their experience of colonial health policy was limited. They were 
putting forward an admirable ideal for an integrated health service which catered to the needs of 
citizens both at home and at work, but they had limited knowledge about the context and history of 
the country into which they were trying to insert it. Selwyn-Clarke on the other hand was steeped in 
colonial experience and had battled for years to make the colonial governments realise that it was 
not only workers who had health needs. His antagonism towards occupational medicine is perhaps 
therefore understandable.  
 
It was the vision and rhetoric of men like Selwyn-Clarke that predominated in the era of “health for 
all” after independence, even if the reality of health provision on the ground remained stubbornly 
similar to its colonial predecessor. In this way the structure of the state and the predominant 
ideology of health reinforced one another in a manner that served to marginalise occupational 
health. However, this is not the only politics of science that impacted on the trajectory of the 
discipline. There is something as well about the origins of occupational health as a science, its 
orientation as a high modernist discipline, and the transferral of that to an environment where this 
modernity existed only in limited form. 
 
One gets an odd feeling when looking at the occupational disease schedule attached to the 
Workmen’s Compensation Act in Ghana – that it is meant for another country entirely. In Ghana, 
where the vast majority of workers worked in agriculture, or on the sides of roads and in market 
places, and where workers tended to suffer most acutely from diseases of the environment, the 
schedule maintained a focus on diseases acquired in industrial settings (industrial poisonings 
dominated the schedule), and was derived almost word for word from the ILO’s model occupational 
disease schedule, which had been criticised several years earlier by the Colonial Labour Advisory 
Committee in London as “particularly related to conditions in Europe … taking no account of the 
problems we meet in the colonies.”178   
 
In his history of radiography and silicosis treatment in Britain during the early to mid-20th century in 
Britain, Joseph Melling (2010) argues that historical narratives which place too much emphasis on 
the contribution of worker’s struggles to the development of the science of industrial medicine are 
overly simplistic, and even misleading. “British evidence,” he argues, “suggests rather the 
importance of links forged amongst general practitioners, local tuberculosis officers, expert 
researchers, and campaigning bodies concerned with public as well as occupational health in these 
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decades” (Melling, 2010: 430). So, as with the earlier discussion on the impact of workers’ struggles 
on occupational health institutions more generally, the question of whether workers were really 
able to engage with the science of occupational health even in Britain is raised. Melling (2010) and 
Melling and Sellers (2012) put forward convincing arguments that it was, and still is, the connections 
between scientists in the “invisible colleges” of international expert groupings that are the real 
driving force behind knowledge creation and development within the discipline. 
 
However, even a brief look at the TUC archives reveals a decided interest in using the science of 
occupational health to further workers’ struggles in this area. In 1930 the TUC appointed Sir Thomas 
Legge, the Home Office’s first Medical Inspector of Factories, as Medical Consultant and Advisor. A 
later memorandum on Legge’s “invaluable” contribution to the TUC (written after his death in 1932) 
noted the ways in which his expertise had been used to expand the list of compensable occupational 
diseases scheduled within the Workmen’s Compensation Act; “Dr. Legge was, of course, expert in 
industrial diseases and he knew exactly what was required to get over the objections and criticisms 
of other medical men and the employers.”179  Arguing in favour of the appointment of a new 
Medical Adviser, the memo went on to say that “our agitations backed up by irrefutable facts 
presented in a scientific way has resulted in a very great progress in the last few years and it would 
be a great pity to say the least of it, if that work were to be lost.”180  This suggests that not only was 
the TUC heavily involved in the political machinations surrounding the administration and 
development of occupational services as Long (2011) argues, but they were also deeply concerned 
with the science itself – using professionals to engage with other professionals in the interests of 
developing a science which could be used for the interests of workers. In later years the TUC was 
even to make a financial contribution to the Centennial Institute of Occupational Health at the 
LSHTM which opened in 1968, and which became a driving force in spreading the science of 
occupational health to the developing world (Schilling, 1998). 
 
While the influence of workers’ struggles on the development of occupational health science is 
perhaps therefore still debatable in the British context, it is certainly much less so in its old colonies. 
As with political engagements around workers’ health, the available evidence suggests that workers 
in such places as India and Ghana failed to substantively engage with the science itself – it was an 
area of knowledge driven by experts sitting in Geneva, London, and in various prestigious 
universities in the United States. Ultimately this contributed to a conspicuous collective failure of the 
                                                          





profession to think really creatively about how the discipline could and should develop within 
contexts very different from the ones in which it originally arose.  
 
This was of course partly due to the influence of industry over the profession, as shown in the 
previous section. Industry had no interest in the widening of the field – it was in its own interests to 
keep it as narrow as possible. The intersection between occupational health and tropical disease was 
an area of particular concern because industries were certainly not interested in having to pay 
compensation for diseases like malaria and schistosomiasis – it was much less of a risk in this regard 
to keep tropical medicine a very distinct discipline from occupational health. However, not all those 
who controlled the discipline were linked to corporate interests. As already mentioned in the 
introductory section of this chapter, the ILO and the WHO had by this stage begun to play an 
important role in defining the occupational health research and policy agenda, particularly in 
developing countries. Their entrance into this domain, and the subsequent tensions created by two 
powerful actors operating in the same policy space, will be discussed in more detail in the following 
chapter. For now it is important to note that even where scientists were not directly beholden to 
corporate interests – such as those working in the ILO and WHO – their views on the direction and 
scope of occupational health science in developing countries remained somewhat narrow.    
 
This suggests something internal to the scientific discipline itself was also implicated in the creation 
of a barrier to engagement. This brings to the fore questions about the relationship between power, 
knowledge, and engagement. Cooper (1996) argues that it was the “scientific language of labour” – a 
language that aspired to universalism – that allowed African trade unions to lead the demand for 
universal rights of citizenship in the colonial territories. That it was a universal language, not a 
particularistic language of “the other,” was key to this because it gave workers the language to 
demand for themselves the same rights as those of metropolitan citizens.  Yet it is possible to turn 
this around and argue that this universality also made it more difficult for workers to engage with 
certain elements of this “scientific language of labour,” including occupational health. 
 
In the immediate post-independence period, the exoticism and particularism of colonial medicine 
sat in fine balance with an attempt, particularly by the international organisations, to move towards 
a more universalistic approach to medical practice. Colonial medicine, it has been argued by authors 
such as Vaughan (1991), was both constitutive of and constituted by colonial power. As such it was 
deeply entwined with what Edward Said termed “orientalism”: Europe’s attempt to define itself in 
relation to the other cultures and peoples by setting them up as the “contrasting image, idea, 
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personality” of the European (Said, 1979: 1-2). Colonial medical practice tied colonial subjects to 
otherness – tropical medicine itself was constituted by this exoticism. Diseases of the environment 
which Europe had transcended, such as cholera and malaria, were designated as “tropical diseases” 
still to be overcome in the backward areas of the world. It was a medical practice based on 
difference – different races, different bodies, different environments, different diseases, different 
treatment (Anderson, 2000).  
 
By the 1930s in the Gold Coast, and in other colonies, the particularism of tropical medicine had  
begun to be challenged by doctors like Percy Selwyn-Clarke (as well as those located in the 
metropole such as John Ryle) whose focus was on the more universal ideas which underpinned 
tuberculosis eradication measures. In the post-independence period these more universalistic ideas 
were given greater prominence as a new wave of medical practice was ushered in. Public health, 
now considered a universal human right, was internationalised through agencies such as the WHO. 
This was a medical practice which sought to separate itself from “colonial precedents, assumptions 
and interventions” (Amrith, 2006: 15). It did so by adopting what Amrith (2006) called a “techno-
centric” approach, which in theory allowed it to transcend the colonial need to “intervene deeply in 
matters of ‘culture’ or social transformation” (Amrith, 2006: 17). However, as Amrith (2006) argues, 
this transformation from colonial to post-colonial medicine was an incomplete one. The attempt to 
use technology as a way in which to move away from colonial assumptions was always hindered by 
its inability to break from the “institutional, intellectual and epidemiological legacies of the colonial 
medical past” (Amrith, 2006: 15). 
 
Occupational health was firmly located within this new techno-centric universalistic paradigm and 
unlike the public health discipline was able to firmly draw a line between the colonial and the post-
colonial. Both Anderson (2000) and Arnold (1993) have argued that a defining feature of colonial 
medicine was the connection it had not only to the social, but to the environment of the places in 
which it operated, situated firmly within an understanding of the relationship between “tropical 
vegetation, tropical bodies and tropical mentality” (Anderson,  2000: 238). Occupational health on 
the other hand positioned itself in direct relation not to the tropical environment, but to the modern 
industrial workplace. In 1925 the International Labour Conference (ILC) passed Convention 18 
concerning Workmen’s Compensation for Occupational Diseases. The Convention essentially defined 
occupational diseases as those diseases or “poisonings” produced by the “substances set forth in the 
Schedule appended hereto”: substances such as lead, benzene, mercury, and arsenic.181 This 
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particular definition was to come under challenge in 1936 from the Miner’s International Federation 
who wished to see ankylostomiasis (hookworm) added to the list of occupational diseases.182 During 
the late 1960s and 1970s an increasing awareness of environmental concerns beyond the workplace, 
driven largely by the discoveries around asbestos, would challenge these assumptions further 
(Melling and Sellers, 2012). However at the time of independence, the focus on industrial processes 
as the basis for the definition of occupational disease was to remain dominant for many years to 
come. Occupational diseases were diseases which arose from man-made industrial production 
processes and environments – the processes and environment of modern industrial production, not 
from the natural environment.  
 
Underpinning this drive towards high modernism was the need for what was ultimately a relatively 
new profession to establish its credentials within the medical field. When Sir Thomas Legge, at that 
time the editor in chief of the ILO’s flagship encyclopaedia of industrial hygiene Occupation and 
Health, was asked in 1929 whether or not certain diseases of the natural environment which 
affected working populations could be included within the volume, his answer was an unequivocal 
no.183 He argued that if such diseases were to be included, it would undermine the “sophisticated 
specialty” and unique contribution of the medical discipline of industrial hygiene which they “had all 
worked so hard to establish.”184 It is likely, as Messing (1998) has argued, that this sentiment was 
also behind the clear separation that was drawn between women’s reproductive health and 
occupational health; a division, she argues, which has failed to understand the linkages between 
women’s work and reproductive health.  
 
If occupational health represented a highly modernist view of the relationship between the working 
body and disease, it was also constructed from a universalistic rather than a particularistic approach 
to medicine. It represented and reinforced the universal ideal of “industrial man” and exported it 
throughout the world. Again, the emphasis on “man” here was evident – work that women did, or 
those employed outside of large, industrial workplaces, were excluded. Stuart Hall at the Ross 
Institute, for example, was driven by the idea that “European standards of study and practice in 
occupational health should be introduced in Africa.”185 What created difficulties for Hall, however, 
was the fact that he was trying to do this in a place of what Anderson (2000: 243) calls “liminal 
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modernities.” European style modernity had arrived in the old colonies – the late colonial period had 
ensured that, but it was always limited in scope, and it always had to operate in conversation with 
the very different society and environment into which it had been inserted.  
 
The fact was that most workers in tropical countries suffered more frequently and with greater 
intensity from diseases of the natural environment than they did from diseases related to industrial 
processes. The main health problems for workers in these areas, the Conference on Industry and 
Tropical Health concluded, was “the tropical cocktail,” the term used to refer to “the load of 
schistosomiasis, hookworm infection [ankylostomiasis], ascariasis [roundworm], and malaria.”186 By 
abstracting itself from a consideration of these diseases, occupational health was confronted with 
the problem of remaining relevant in a very different context to that in which it had originally 
developed.   
 
Documents from the WHO in particular reveal an interesting contradiction that emerged as the 
tension between the universal and the particular, the modern and the not quite modern, played 
themselves out. In an attempt to assert itself over the ILO, which remained relatively steadfast in its 
strictly industrial approach to occupational health, the WHO had positioned itself as a champion of 
occupational health in developing countries, arguing that the discipline had to consider the “total 
health” of the worker in such contexts where living and working conditions were difficult to 
separate, and supporting the integration of occupational health into primary health services as a 
“public health speciality” in order to reach workers working outside of large industrial concerns. A 
WHO report from India in 1955 even noted that: 
The health problems of the industrial worker in India are very different from those in 
industrialised states, especially in Europe and Northern America, where occupational health 
has been studied for a long time and considerable experience is available. The difference will 
make it inadvisable and perhaps impossible for occupational health from these countries to 
be copied directly and applied efficiently.187 
 
Even so, the actual research promoted by the WHO into occupational disease and health in 
developing countries remained substantively the same as that which was carried out in Europe.  
 
The big discovery in occupational health during the early 1950s in Britain had been the full 
classification of the disease ‘byssinosis’ – a respiratory disease related to continuous  inhalation of 
dusts during the processing of organic materials such as cotton – by Richard Schilling and his 
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colleagues at the University of Manchester (Schilling, 1998). The excitement over this discovery was 
quickly transferred via the WHO to developing countries, and was to influence the direction of the 
occupational health research it funded for many years to follow. A brief review of various technical 
cooperation documents from the early 1970s reveals a marked tendency towards funding research 
on “respiratory diseases resulting from the inhalation of vegetable dusts.”  While it is very likely that 
respiratory diseases which arose from the processing of raw materials were a cause of occupational 
disease in countries where this industry drove the economy, further research into this area during 
the 1970s was hardly pushing the boundaries of knowledge in a new social and economic context 
where so many workers worked outside of formal industry, or were not working in industry at all. 
Rather it represented the relatively standard replication of work that had first been carried out years 
earlier in Britain.  
 
When Stuart Hall of the Ross Institute put in a funding proposal in 1963 to lead a study on 
“vegetable dust pneumoconiosis in East Africa” he was turned down by the Nuffield Foundation on 
the grounds that the subject “of respiratory diseases in people working in dusty conditions is one 
that has been fully explored.”188  Reportedly, their actual words were “flogged enough already.”189  
In a letter to Hall shortly afterwards, his supervisor at the LSHTM, George MacDonald, stated that 
the Foundation was far more likely to fund an application “that has a local tang to it. That is, if you 
said you were going to study schistosomiasis or some other exotic condition, they would have been 
ready to support it.”190 The charge of exoticism, of “othering,” could quite easily be made against the 
Nuffield Foundation here. Certainly it was not applying universal principles to its understanding of 
workers’ health. At the same time though a certain common sense dictates that in areas where 
workers suffered in far greater numbers from schistosomiasis than they did from respiratory 
diseases related to vegetable dust processing, it was perhaps a better use of resources to focus on 
the former.   
 
The response of the Nuffield Foundation to Hall’s application in 1963 makes it even more striking 
that the WHO was still funding this type of repetitive research well into the 1970s. Part of the reason 
for this was undoubtedly Schilling’s own influence over the particular professional milieu from which 
the occupational health specialists of both the WHO and ILO originated.  After leaving Manchester in 
1956, Schilling had taken up a position as Reader in the newly established Occupational Health Unit 
at the LSHTM. Here he developed a postgraduate teaching programme which attracted students 
                                                          





from around the world – by the time he retired in 1976 almost half of his students “came from other 
countries, and more than half came from developing countries.”191 We were exporting occupational 
health … looking back at my career … this has been one of the things that I look back on with more 
pleasure – that I have friends from all over the world,”192 said Schilling in a recorded interview held 
some years after his retirement.   In exporting occupational health, Schilling was also exporting his 
passion for the study of byssinosis, which he fondly referred to in his memoirs as “the fourth 
Schilling child” (Schilling, 1998).193  
 
However, at the heart of this was the idea that occupational health was a universal modern science 
which could be applied equally in all countries of the world. Consequently, it remained a highly 
specialised area of science. Research on vegetable dust – particularly that from cotton – may have 
had relevance to the relatively small proportion of workers in countries outside of Europe and the 
United States which had developed manufacturing capacity (largely in Asia). To the vast majority of 
workers, however, it held very little real relevance. During the 1950s and 1960s this seemed to 
bother the scientists very little – the focus was on establishing a new specialism which would 
eventually be appreciated by non-metropolitan countries as they moved towards industrial 
development. In later years however, as these countries failed to industrialise, it occasioned a crisis 
of relevance against which occupational health doctors in developing countries continue to battle. 
 
In a brief characterisation of theoretical approaches to social understandings of medicine, Amrith 
(2006) argues that while the historiography of colonial medicine has been highly critical, that of the 
internationalised public health of the post-colonial era has been much less so. While Western 
medicine in the colonial context has been characterised as a constitutive element of colonial power, 
the dominant narrative on international public health has been one of “diffusion,” and the 
progressive defeat of preventable disease (Amrith, 2006: 7).  This chapter has focused not on 
international public health per se, but rather on occupational health where the dynamic was 
somewhat different.  
 
This chapter does however suggest a critique of the approach to understanding colonial and post-
colonial medicine described above – an approach which sees the former as entirely negative, and 
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the latter as a progressive move forward, and which privileges universalism over the particularism in 
a blanket way. Tropical medicine was an integral part of colonial power, that in its particularism it 
‘exotified’ and ‘othered’ colonial populations. For all these faults, however, colonial medicine at 
least engaged with the context in which it was situated – there was no other choice.  Colonial 
medicine was used as a way in which to further a particular vision for colonial society, one which 
instilled certain norms and behaviours in subject populations. In order to do this it had to engage 
with people, and, as David Arnold (1993) has so convincingly shown, those people were able to resist 
and in so doing transform medical practice itself.  As much as colonial medicine attempted to 
constitute colonial society, it was also constituted by it. The champions of tropical medicine were 
men who had spent many years in tropical countries, whose science had inevitably been influenced 
by the context in which they operated. This was never the case with the discipline of occupational 
health. In its inherent modernity and drive towards a universalistic modernism, occupational health 
remained distant and unengaged with the real needs of workers in developing countries.  It was a 
science controlled from Geneva and London by scientists like Richard Schilling who, for all the good 
work they had done in their own countries, had a limited understanding of a world in which work 
and its relationship to human health operated very differently. 
 
Conclusion 
In concluding this chapter, three points should be emphasised. The first is that the answer as to why 
and how occupational health ended up as such a marginal service within post-colonial states is a 
multi-faceted one. A number of factors, including the political economy of the late colonial and post-
independence period, the structure of the British welfare state that was inherited by its colonies, as 
well as the politics of occupational health science and research all contributed to the situation. 
Secondly, this chapter (and Chapter Two) have shown that, whilst workers in both newly 
independent India and Ghana were able engage with policy spaces that opened up for them within 
the provision of health services, there were limits to this engagement. In Offe’s terms, health 
benefits in the sphere of reproduction were more readily granted than those in the sphere of 
production. When it came to occupational health, the political economy and the nature of the 
scientific project, which in itself failed to engage with a new context, were against it. Lastly, an 
important part of this chapter has been the relational approach taken to understanding the place of 
the worker and the citizen in health policy – looking at the way these two visions of health provision 
sat in tension with one another. This relational perspective has also illuminated an important aspect 
of the politics of health – one where the focus on workers and occupational health acted as a lever 
for large international and national corporations to extricate themselves from the commitment to 




In this way, Chapter Four introduces a tension between inclusion into health services based on 
citizenship, and inclusion based on status as a worker. It brings up questions of state responsibility 
versus employer responsibility – the shared responsibility of tax payers versus the responsibility of 
capital for health problems that are either directly or indirectly caused by the processes attendant 
on capitalist development. This is a tension which continues to be explored in Chapters Five and Six. 
Chapter Five moves the thesis from the post-independence period to the present, looking at how 
this tension has played out amongst the international organisations. Chapter Six returns to the 
national level, looking at how these international trends have translated into national level policies 








The previous chapter focused on the position of the worker in health policy during the immediate 
post-independence period. This chapter extends this analysis from the post-independence period to 
the present day. Although there is potential for repetition from the period 1950-1970, this is in fact 
not the case. While continuing to refer to some of the issues discussed in the previous chapter, this 
one focuses mainly on the policies of three of the multilateral international organisations which have 
been concerned with the place of the worker in health policy – the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO), the World Health Organisation (WHO), and in more recent years, the World Bank. 
The chapter also considers the present position of philanthropic foundations, which have come to 
play a significant role in global health through allocations far exceeding those which are available in 
the UN system. 
 
Any study of social policy in the developing world necessitates the inclusion of at least some 
discussion of the influence of such international organisations. As Deacon et al., (1997) have argued, 
the international organisations have always had a much greater influence here than in industrialised 
countries and have been key sites of transmission for ideas about economic and social policy. This 
influence has been extended through direct technical assistance in the setting up of social 
programmes (for example, the ILO assistance with India’s ESIS mentioned in the previous chapter). 
Importantly, it has also been extended through more indirect means – through research, knowledge 
generation, and dissemination, as well as the circulation of senior policy workers, which influence 
the terms on which policies are debated and formulated at national level (Béland and Orenstein, 
2013). This has been particularly true for health policy. Amrith (2006: 19), for example, argues that 
he chose to focus his history of health policy on the Asian region as a whole because “so many 'local' 
sources I examined – books, pamphlets and newspapers in English and in Indian languages ... 
pointed back to the chambers of the UN, the WHO, as the ultimate authority deciding policies 
governing the health of millions.”  
 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to ascertain the impact of the international organisations on the ground. 
Certainly, the mass health campaigns led by the WHO in the 1950s did have a very tangible impact. 
In later years, and particularly in more recent times, these grassroots campaigns have given way to a 
greater focus on influencing policies and ideas. Partly this has been because of financial limitations 
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(especially recently), but as Amrith (2006) points out in relation to the WHO, the mass health 
campaigns of the 1950s had shown how difficult it was for the international organisations to 
influence national politics and local communities. For this reason this chapter is not a study of 
whether and how international organisations had an impact on the ground. Rather, it is a study of 
institutional discourse, albeit a discourse which reacts to real economic shifts. 
 
The chapter spans a considerable length of time. The advantage of taking this approach is that it is 
possible to discern broad trends and changes in thinking which have occurred over this period, and 
allows for direct comparisons to be made between the post-independence era in which social 
democratic thinking tended to dominate the international organisations, the period in which neo-
liberalism gained ascendancy, and the current era which has been labelled as “post-neoliberal” or 
“post-Washington consensus.” Why is this an important comparison to make?  
 
As this chapter will show, there is currently a heated debate over what post-neoliberalism actually 
means for previously marginalised groups. The policies of the post-independence social democratic 
era were concerned with questions of social justice and equity. As the previous chapter showed, in 
the ex-colonial territories the “terms of inclusion” in health policy were reconfigured towards 
universal citizenship. While this ended up being more rhetorical than real, this was a fundamentally 
different stance from the neo-liberal period which followed after the economic collapse of the late 
1970s. The era of small government and the unrestrained movement of capital around the globe 
reconfigured the terms of inclusion again – but this time away from citizenship towards 
consumerism (Pickstone, 2000). Health care became something to be purchased – the introduction 
of user fees in health facilities, promoted heavily by the World Bank, became commonplace across 
the developing world. Those too poor to purchase health care were afforded targeted “safety nets” 
such as indigence exemptions. Now again the terms of inclusion are changing. The need to deal with 
the crises of production and social reproduction wrought by neo-liberal policies in a context of 
increasing poverty and inequality has led to a shift in position towards favouring state regulation in 
some instances. This has allowed for a renewed focus on social policy to emerge (Mkwandawire, 
2004; Lund, 2009), with some arguing that a Polanyian “double-movement” which seeks “to re-
embed the economy in society” has begun (Sandbrook, 2011).  
 
Importantly, this “re-invented” social policy has opened up policy spaces which even in the post-
independence/social democratic era, were closed off. In terms of the position of the worker in 
health policy, for example, there is a growing recognition that workers outside of formal 
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employment are also in need of health protections, and that the existing systems for providing these 
protections, based as they are on the European welfare state models, are inadequate. There has also 
been growing recognition of the role that women play as economic agents, as well as mothers and 
carers, and that their work-related health needs may differ from those of men. At the same time, 
however, there have been words of caution from a number of scholars who argue that while certain 
spaces have opened up, others, equally critical for the realisation of a just society, are closing down 
(Fraser, 2009; Lund, 2009; Bebington and Humphreys Bebington, 2011; Ballard, 2013). Indeed, the 
current conjuncture is one characterised by a tension between the reform of welfare regimes to be 
more inclusive of those previously excluded, and the danger that this reform is shaped in such a way 
that the very real gains of the social democratic period are lost. This chapter attempts to explore this 
tension within the health policies of the international organisations, and, following the main theme 
of the thesis, uses the changing place of the worker in health policy over the three periods in 
question as a point of focus. This historical approach allows for an analysis which is able to evaluate 
the gains and losses of the current moment as compared to previous conjunctures, and in doing so 
adds to the current debate on “post-neoliberalism.” 
 
In doing so this chapter becomes paired with the chapter that follows (Chapter Six). The theoretical 
framework of this thesis is one which sees policy emerging as a result of struggles between and 
within social forces. Yet, following Cooper (1996), it is also one which is centrally concerned with 
where and how workers have been able to engage with policy and to turn it to their advantage (or, 
as in Chapter Four, where and why this kind of engagement was blocked). In taking the thesis into 
the present, this chapter seeks to explore the current hegemonic position on health from a global 
perspective and to compare it to the past to see what has been gained and by whom, and what has 
been lost and by whom. It focuses therefore on the view from the top rather than the bottom, and 
seeks to explore debates that operate at the international level. In Chapter Six the thesis remains in 
the present, but takes a view from the bottom and looks at where and how organisations of informal 
workers are engaging with this hegemony at a national level. In this way Chapter Six grounds the 
debates discussed in this chapter in national experience.  
 
A theme that runs through this chapter is the relationship between certain international 
organisations – particularly the ILO and WHO. As Saunier (2007) has argued, whilst there are a 
number of studies of these organisations, most have focused on single institutions rather than the 
relationship between them. Some important exceptions are those by Litsios (1997), Deacon et al., 
(1997), and Weindling (1995), but on the whole Saunier’s (2007) point remains true. This chapter 
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therefore also contributes to the limited body of work on the relationships between international 
multilateral institutions. A central argument is that the tensions which emerged between the ILO 
and WHO, particularly around occupational health, were not only related to battles for territory, but 
also reflected the tension that existed within the social democratic model between the state-citizen 
relationship and the employer-worker relationship. It argues that the relationship between the two 
organisations has reproduced this tension in a manner which has negative implications in the 
present moment. 
 
It is interesting to note that the tensions between the WHO and ILO seemed to exist mainly within 
the field of occupational health. The available evidence on the relationship between the two 
organisations show that there was very little tension over the question of health insurance systems – 
considered part of ‘labour protections,’ it was unquestioningly accepted by the WHO that in such 
matters the ILO was the lead agency. For this reason, the chapter focuses in large part on the 
tensions between the organisations on questions of occupational health. Yet, following one of the 
overarching themes of this thesis, it focuses on situating occupational health within the wider 
politics of health, highlighting important tensions between international organisations, between the 
different professional groupings within the health profession, and, perhaps, most importantly for 
this thesis, between different viewpoints on how the worker should be positioned within health 
policy more generally, and which can be applied to health policy more widely.  
 
International Health Policy and the Worker during the Social Democratic Era, post-
World War Two 
Chapter Four highlighted the tension within the “terms of inclusion” in the post-World War Two 
period between workers and citizens, with a particular focus on how this tension played out in the 
newly independent countries of Ghana and India. In Britain, it was argued, the terms of inclusion had 
shifted towards citizenship and social provision by the state, with the NHS embodying this move 
within health policy. Whilst health as a right of citizenship had been considered an ideal by many 
developing countries, the reality was that health provision remained tied to employers.  
 
Nevertheless, a point which is not elaborated in Chapter Four is that whilst social citizenship had 
become the defining welfare ideology in Britain, the employment relationship was still an important 
aspect of the British welfare state. As Lund (2009: 2) puts it: 
Beveridge’s model of the welfare state … was built on assumptions about family life and the 
role of employment in meeting families’ needs: that most people would be married, that men 
would be the head of the household, that wages earned would be enough to cover the 




While the NHS was a service which any citizen could access, its very existence relied on the idea that 
there would be enough citizens earning high enough wages and paying enough tax to maintain the 
system. Social citizenship in Britain assumed a labour market where there was full, or close to full, 
employment and it was through employment that the benefits of economic growth would be 
distributed. So even within a system where the “terms of inclusion” were ostensibly based on 
citizenship, there was a need to maintain a focus on production – a situation which meant that social 
and economic policies were in fact highly interdependent even if the design of the administrative 
institutions governing them suggested that they were very separate (Heintz and Razavi, 2012).  
 
The axis of responsibility that ran between the state and citizens for social provision was therefore 
complemented by an axis that ran between employers and workers (Lund, 2009). This second axis 
was downplayed by British social policy experts such as Richard Titmuss, who believed firmly that it 
was the state who should be the dominant provider of social services, arguing that benefits attached 
to the employment relationship served to increase social inequalities (Abel-Smith and Titmuss, 
1987). Even then, however, there was an unspoken assumption that industries would be paying 
enough in taxes and wages to allow for redistribution through the state. The employment axis was of 
course far more visible in developing countries, where state provision of social services was often 
absent, particularly in rural areas, and where large employers in some cases (but certainly not all) 
provided in-house medical services to their employees. 
 
It is important to underscore here that the axes of the welfare state – those of citizen-state and 
employer-work – were essential to the functioning of the social democratic model, but at the same 
time operated in tension with one another even in the industrialised world. This was particularly so 
when it came to the provision of social services. Whilst the tension in countries like Ghana and India 
was one between an ideal and the reality on the ground, in industrialised countries the tension was 
between the different positioning of the employment relationship with respect to social services. 
The battles that raged, for example, between the proponents of Bismarckian models of Social Health 
Insurance (SHI) found in most Western European countries, where contributions to the national 
health scheme were tied to the employment relationship, and the British model of publicly funded 
free health care was a case in point. Although, as mentioned in earlier chapters, the models were 
essentially underpinned by the employment relationship in that they both ultimately relied on the 
contributions of employers and workers, the fact that Britain’s system was funded from general 
taxation did outwardly obscure the importance of the employment relationship to a certain degree. 
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These tensions also existed at the level of the international organisations, and emerged particularly 
prominently in the post-World War Two era within the United Nations (UN) system.  
 
Within this international system, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) was the flagbearer for 
the employment relationship. Born during the period of social and economic turmoil which followed 
World War One, the ILO was originally established to work toward industrial peace in 1919 as an 
office of the League of Nations after the Treaty of Versailles. It was unique within the League, 
however, in that its governance structures gave equal status to representatives from government, 
labour, and employers. This tripartite structure was a consequence of the fact that, while European 
governments, particularly Britain, were interested in an international labour organisation which 
could impose labour standards on all member countries so that they could remain economically 
competitive, trade unions had by this stage also become an increasingly powerful and 
internationalised force who had themselves put forward a proposal for a tripartite international 
labour organisation. Although this tripartite structure did not find favour with all who sat on the 
commission which developed the plans for the ILO (particularly the American delegates), it was 
eventually adopted as “the first pillar of ILO ideology,” which was seen as a victory for the voice of 
organised workers (Alcock, 1971). Equal numbers of representatives from government, labour, and 
employer organisations from each member country would sit on the Governing Body, and would be 
represented at the annual International Labour Conference where various labour standards in the 
form of Labour Conventions would be proposed and adopted. 
 
As an unusual international organisation, the ILO was sometimes accused of “amateurism” by the 
pre-war League of Nations because of its association with trade unions, and struggled to assert itself 
within an organisation that placed emphasis on inter-governmental associations (Saunier, 2007). The 
organisation came under even greater pressure during the period of transition to the UN system in 
the 1940s and 1950s and the emergence of the new “international development agenda.” The USA, 
now one of the dominant players in international politics, and wary of the European social 
democratic model, did not fully trust the ILO and its perceived workerist positions. In a major blow 
to the organisation, the ILO was not invited to the key post-war financial and economic planning 
conference held at Bretton Woods in 1944 (Maul, 2012). 
 
Furthermore, the relevance of the ILO to newly independent countries was questioned. The 
organisation’s tripartism had emerged from a distinctly European model of social organisation and 
although the ILO had dabbled in what it called “the non-metropolitan” territories during the 1930s, 
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its only members from Africa and Asia were India (a “special” member) and South Africa. It had also 
been criticised vociferously by Asian nationalist movements for taking an overly cautious stance 
towards the question of decolonisation, largely because it did not wish to lose favour with Britain 
(Maul, 2012). The 1944 Convention on Social Policy in Dependent Territories (The Declaration of 
Philadelphia), which proposed that colonial powers extend a limited version of social citizenship to 
their dependent states, represented an attempt by the ILO to expand its focus, and was considered a 
triumph when it was adopted at the International Labour Conference. The Declaration garnered 
criticism from the dependent territories themselves, who argued that the ILO was upholding a 
double standard by producing one set of social policy recommendations for industrialised countries, 
and another set for “the rest” (Maul, 2012). Nevertheless, the Declaration was important for the ILO 
because it carved out a clear role for the organisation in the development of international financial 
and economic development policy. Having achieved this success, it was indeed a grave blow for the 
organisation when it was not invited to Bretton Woods.   
 
The ILO was eventually invited into the international fold because of the cooling of relations 
between the Soviets and the USA and Britain. The USSR had attempted to establish the World 
Federation of Trade Unions as a “countervailing force” to what it perceived as the western allied ILO 
(Maul, 2012). This gained the ILO the crucial support of the USA and Britain, and in 1946 it was 
invited to sign an agreement with the United Nations Economic and Social Council to become one of 
the UN’s five specialised agencies, giving it official status as an international body. This agreement 
and the appointment of David Abner Morse, previously U.S. Under-Secretary of Labour, as Director-
General in 1948 changed the position of the ILO considerably. Morse spoke the anti-communist 
language the U.S and Britain were happy to hear and saw the ILO’s programmes as a way to reach 
out to developing countries and steer them away from Soviet influence. This vision for the ILO ran 
parallel to an aggressive and well-funded campaign by US and Western European “liberal” trade 
unions under the banner of the International Confederation of Trade Unions against the 
“communist” trade unions of the USSR and the WFTU (Garcia, 1973; Carew, 1996). It was also Morse 
who saw the real potential to integrate and promote the employment agenda within the wider 
international development agenda. Under Morse the ILO developed its Technical Assistance 
Programme (TAP) which provided assistance and training in developing countries and focused on 
employment priority areas such as manpower development and productivity (Maul, 2012). Yet even 
with Morse’s steadying influence, the ILO still had to prove itself – to newly independent countries 
unsure of the relevance of European labour standards to their context, the USA still wary of 
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workerist politics, and to an international development community still not entirely convinced that 
the ILO belonged. 
 
This basic insecurity is perhaps why the announcement in 1950194 by another specialised agency – 
the WHO, that it was establishing a “Social and Occupational Health Unit” – was met with such 
consternation at the ILO. Before discussing this further, it is first necessary to provide some 
background detail on the health activities of the ILO. While the main purpose of the ILO was, and still 
is, the development of international labour standards, it also has maintained a number of technical 
departments, some pre-dating World War Two, which have not only guided the Technical Assistance 
Projects mentioned above, but have also conducted and compiled research in their respective areas 
in order to support various conventions and recommendations. One of the oldest of these technical 
departments was the Industrial Hygiene Service, established in 1920 to deal with the health of 
workers.195 Prior to World War Two, the service concerned itself with developing health standards 
and maintained an advisory correspondence committee to oversee this process (first set up in 1924).  
This brought together leading minds from Europe and America such as Professor Alice Hamilton 
from Harvard University and Sir Thomas Legge who had retired as a distinguished Medical Inspector 
of Factories in the UK and had gone on to work for the British TUC.  
 
By the end of the war in 1945 the Industrial Hygiene Service listed amongst its achievements the 
White Lead Convention, adopted in 1921, which prohibited the use of white lead in interior painting, 
and excluded women and children from painting with it at all. It contributed to two Conventions 
(1924 and 1935) and a Recommendation on Workmens’ Compensation (the first of which contained 
the first international schedule on compensable industrial diseases), and had organised two major 
international conferences on silicosis (in Johannesburg and Geneva).196 It was also Dr. Luigi Carozzi, 
the Italian who started the service in 1920 and headed it until 1940, who began work on the 
Encyclopedia of Industrial Diseases, the two volumes of which were finished in 1930 and 1934 
respectively. The encyclopedia was aimed at “the enlightenment of the industrial world to 
occupational dangers and hazards, the technical education and training of medical men who have to 
combat occupational diseases, and to spread knowledge about industrial hygiene.”197 
 
                                                          
194 WHOA, Measures for Strengthening Occupational Health Activities, 1953. 
195 ILOA, SH-01-2-3, History of the Industrial Hygiene Section, 1920-1949. 
196 Ibid. 
197 ILOA, HY 104, Relations between Rockefeller Foundation and the ILO, 1923. 
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Weindling (1995) states that under Carozzi’s leadership, the Industrial Hygiene Service of the ILO 
developed a highly scientific and very narrow understanding of workers’ health which centred on the 
direct effects of industrial processes on the individual worker. The ILO had adopted an approach of 
“scientific universalism” in order to justify the various standards they developed. This was a way to 
bypass politics – to put the ILO’s standards beyond question by employers and governments at the 
International Labour Conference. Yet, as Weindling (1995: 140) argues, it was a double edged sword 
because it meant that the understanding of the relationship between work and health was limited to 
“what could be proved in a laboratory.”  
 
This narrow focus was, however, also a consequence of the relationship between the ILO and the 
League of Nations. The ILO’s mandate from the Treaty of Versailles had included the fairly general 
instruction to protect “the worker against sickness, disease and injury arising from his employment” 
(cited in Weindling, 1995: 139). At first the organisation had attempted to interpret this widely.  
Saunier (2007) has written a fascinating history of the ILO’s endeavour to involve itself in the field of 
social housing in the interests of improving the living conditions (and through this the general 
health) of workers during the 1920s. While some inroads were made, ultimately the ILO was forced 
by British employer and government representatives on the ILO Governing Body to abdicate its 
position. They argued that housing was solely a state responsibility and therefore the business of an 
inter-governmental organisation, not a tripartite one. Pressure came also from the League of 
Nations Health Organisation which insisted on its authority on matters related to general public 
health (Weindling, 1995; Saunier, 2007).  
 
As Saunier (2007: 34) argues, “In this sense, the end of the housing activities of the ILO and their 
development at the League were the symbol of the defeat of a coalition of 
socialist/municipal/voluntary associations by a liberal/state/government compact.”  With its wings 
officially clipped by the Governing Body in 1923, the ILO was forced to retreat into a narrow focus on 
industrial health. It was also allowed to continue its programme on the development and 
administration of national health insurance systems because they were considered to be 
“employment related” (Weindling, 1995;  Saunier, 2007).  With the unstable position of the ILO, in 
conjunction with the fact that its drive for a wider mandate on health had been denied, it was 
perhaps not surprising that the ILO would react with alarm when the WHO – an inter-governmental 
organisation – announced that it too would be working on industrial/occupational health. 
Furthermore, the WHO was a new organisation, confident in its role in the new international order. 
It promised to bring health to the citizens of the world; its mission was unquestionably relevant to 
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the wider developmental aims of the post-war period. This put it in a very different position from the 
ILO, whose structures and manner of working were deeply rooted in the European social democratic 
model and whose relevance to development was always questioned.   
 
Officially the potential overlap in functions was resolved through the establishment of an ILO/WHO 
Joint Committee on Occupational Health in 1950, which officially announced that henceforth 
‘industrial health’ was to be known as ‘occupational health,’ thereby widening its scope. However, 
what looked on the surface like a congenial collaborative relationship did not in fact mirror the 
reality of the situation, which was that the ILO was losing ground to the WHO.  
Since the war marked changes have been taking place in Occupational Health, as a result of 
which the influence of the WHO has been steadily growing while that of the ILO has been 
diminishing. The present position is such as to give some cause for concern if the ILO is not to 
lose its former prestige even further, 
 
noted a report commissioned by the ILO in 1953.198 Not only was the WHO encroaching on territory 
that had previously been the sole domain of the ILO, it was doing it in a way that fundamentally 
challenged the ILO’s approach to the subject.   
 
The rather lengthy definition of Occupational Health by the ILO/WHO Joint Commission, presented 
earlier in this thesis, and which is still used today, states that: 
Occupational Health should aim at: a) the promotion and maintenance of the highest degree 
of physical, mental and social well-being of workers in all occupations; b) the prevention 
amongst workers of departures from health caused by their working conditions; c) the 
protection of workers in their employment from risks resulting from factors adverse to 
health; d) the placing and maintenance of the worker in an occupational environment 
adapted to his physiological and psychological equipment and, to summarise: the adaptation 
of work to man and of man to his job.199 
 
As the report commissioned by the ILO noted,200 this definition was in fact a compromise between 
two divergent approaches to OH that were emerging during this period. The first approach, which 
was the one favoured by the WHO, saw OH as “a clinical approach to the total health of the 
worker.”201  From this viewpoint, it was argued that the main causes of illness and disease – and the 
consequent loss of productivity – were in fact non-occupational in nature; it was therefore 
important to see the health of the worker as part of the greater health problem, rather than 
attempting to compartmentalise it. The second approach – “the traditional attitude” – was one 
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which saw it as a “specialised branch of preventive medicine applied to industry.” It was typified by 
the British Factory Inspectorate system, which created a very definite division between workers’ 
health and general health issues.202 The report went on to argue that the WHO’s approach, which 
viewed occupational health as “a small but integral part of the total health programmes,” was 
favoured by the USA, Eastern European countries, and was “growing in popularity” in “many of the 
developing countries,” despite the fact that it was really just “the application of general medicine to 
industrial settings.”203 It was the second specialised approach which was closer to the ILO’s position, 
but even then, the report noted, it was becoming much wider and more complex than the ILO’s 
narrow physiological approach as it began to integrate with environmental medicine through a focus 
on subjects such as aero-space medicine, atmospheric pollution, and agricultural medicine, and 
branch out into the new field of ergonomics.204 
 
The attraction of developing countries to the WHO’s model was particularly worrying in the context 
of the development agenda and the ILO’s struggle to find a place for itself within it. As the report 
made clear, the ILO’s position on OH was not one that bore much relevance to the needs of 
developing countries, and in that case it was no wonder that the WHO’s approach was increasingly 
being seen as a more viable one. In addition, the report argued, the WHO had the advantage of 
being able to use “the emotional appeal of health care to gain the confidence of governments, 
employers and workers.”205 The choice was a stark one for the ILO – “either it must hand over its 
health functions to what many people consider to be the obvious and appropriate UN technical and 
professional agency, or it should develop its existing resources to keep pace with developments in 
the field.”206 By way of conclusion, the report recommended that the ILO attempt to maintain its 
position by forging a strong relationship with the WHO so as to be able to influence the “trajectory 
of WHO policy,” and to turn its [the ILO’s] attention to safety, particularly radiation safety, which 
was an area the WHO would have less competence to tackle.207 
 
These divisions were of course not limited to the ILO and WHO. There were fierce battles raging at 
the time between the professional groupings concerned with OHS, and not only between the 
“traditional” practice of OHS and the clinical approach discussed above, but also between those 
concerned with the engineering aspects (industrial hygienists) and those concerned with the medical 









aspects. In 1951, for example, M. Robert, head of the ILO’s Safety Division (then separate from the 
Industrial Hygiene Division), forwarded an article to his Director-General by Allen D. Brandt, head of 
the American Industrial Hygiene Association, who argued that the medical aspect of OHS was on its 
way out, being replaced with a focus on engineering.208 To support his argument he cited figures to 
show that the number of industrial physicians employed by the US Department of Labour had 
shrunk considerably, with the number of engineers increasing exponentially. This shift  was 
corroborated in a correspondence between David Morse and his old colleague in the US Department 
of Labour, Clara Beyer (then Associate Director in the Bureau of Labour Standards), who wrote to 
advise Morse on ways in which to counter the WHO’s encroachment onto ILO territory:  
It seems to be that if the ILO is to hold its own with the WHO in the industrial health field, it 
must have particular competence in the engineering aspects of controlling industrial health 
hazards. You can always draw on the research of medical men in the purely medical aspects 
of the problem, but the job that the ILO and the labour ministries throughout the world must 
do – and must do well – is to apply the medical research to the industrial scene in such a way 
as to prevent the incidence of disease. This is primarily the job of engineers of one sort or 
another. 90 percent of the work of industrial hygiene units in this country is handled by 
engineers.209 
 
Of course what was not being accounted for by Brandt, but was brought up by Beyer as a worrying 
trend, was the fact that an increasing amount of the resources for OHS within the USA were being 
diverted from the US Labour Department towards the public health services. This trend culminated 
in 1970 with the creation of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) which 
was located under the Centre for Disease Control as part of the health apparatus, and was later to 
become one of the WHO’s OH Collaborating Centres.210  
 
The advice to Morse from both the international ILO report and from Beyer corroborated the 
findings of an earlier commission of enquiry held in 1950 into the ILO’s work in the field of safety and 
health. The commission, known as the Buckland Committee, was chaired by the Under Secretary of 
the Safety, Health, and Welfare Division of the British Ministry of Labour. In its report it made two 
key recommendations. The first was that the programme should be “practical and must apply 
directly to the needs of Member states,” (which suited Morse’s drive towards Technical Assistance 
Programmes), and secondly that the safety and health divisions should be amalgamated into one 
department.211 Again, it emphasised the competence of the ILO in the field of engineering and 
industrial hygiene. 
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Consequently, under Morse the safety and health divisions were merged and given the name of 
Occupational Safety and Health (OSH). The positioning of ‘safety’ before ‘health’ was an indication of 
the relative priority afforded to safety as opposed to health within the new division – a move which 
has certainly had lasting effects, with the ILO’s current OSH programme known now as SafeWork. 
However, even after this move, the new division continued to face challenges to its authority in the 
international sphere. There were clearly internal tensions between the doctors of the health division 
and the engineers of the safety division as they struggled to define their territory in relation to one 
another. Initially it had been decided that the doctors would deal with medical problems and the 
engineers with technical ones. This division was not, however, clear cut, and Robert wrote to the 
Deputy Director-General complaining that a “friction had developed … [which was] preventing the 
ILO from playing its full part in a field in which it has been active since 30 years ago.”212 Moreover, 
despite a formal agreement with the WHO on methods for information sharing and collaboration, 
the ILO was clearly feeling increasingly left out of the fold – particularly in Europe where the WHO’s 
OH programme was most developed. By 1958 ILO officials were complaining that the WHO was not 
sharing information adequately and had, on several occasions, launched OH programmes of “direct 
and even primary interest to the ILO … without any prior consultation.”213 
 
Nevertheless, despite what could be described as early teething problems, an uneasy and fragile 
truce appears to have developed between the two organisations during the 1960s. By this time the 
ILO had become more confident in its international role. In 1960 it had encountered criticism from 
African delegates at the ILO Regional Meeting held in Lagos, who expressed doubts about whether 
such a fundamentally “Eurocentric” organisation could ever really be of use to them (Maul, 2012). In 
response the ILO launched the World Employment Programme (WEP) and put an enormous amount 
of energy into raising “awareness within the developing countries of the necessity of focused 
planning and active policies to create productive employment” (Maul, 2012: 250). Although the WEP 
was certainly the flagship programme of the ILO during the 1960s, technical assistance programmes, 
which included OSH, were not neglected, and still accounted for a significant proportion of the 
budget. The ILO, according to Maul (2012) was rapidly becoming a provider of services to poorer 
countries, and employment had secured its place within the development agenda. 
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By 1969 it was in fact the WHO which had now become worried about its position in the field of 
international workers’ health. Although the ILO had moved towards placing greater emphasis on 
industrial hygiene in its OSH programme, it had maintained a contingent of doctors, meaning that 
the “medical aspect” had not been left entirely to the WHO. By now the OSH Division was again 
headed by a medical doctor, an Italian named Parmeggiani. The result was a shift in focus back to 
health214, which clearly threatened the WHO’s position.  In a letter to his Director, the head of the 
WHO’s OH Division, Dr. Dukes-Dobos, wrote that the WHO were now falling significantly behind the 
ILO in terms of workers’ health activities, noting as well that the ILO were “trying” to become 
involved in issues that strictly speaking should be seen as part of the WHO’s competence such as 
ambient air pollution and medical education.215  
 
This expansionism was happening, argued Dukes-Dobos, because within the ILO’s programme of 
work, OSH had a much higher priority than did the OH Division within the WHO and therefore 
commanded significantly more resources. Indeed a review of the respective budgets of the ILO and 
WHO reveals that, while the ILO maintained a consistent budget for OSH of approximately 3 percent 
of the total budget for ‘Major Programmes’ during the years 1963, 1964, and 1968 216 and additional 
support from the UNDP,217 the WHO’s regional offices in Africa (AFRO) and South Asia (SEARO)(from 
which technical activities were carried out) maintained an OH budget of 0 and 0-1.6 percent of the 
combined Technical and Regular budget respectively over a similar time period.218 Indeed, it was 
only the European Office (EURO) which appeared to have any significant budget at all for OH 
activities,219 and a memo from the Deputy Director of the WHO to the Regional Offices noted that 
“an increasing number of countries are directing their requests to the ILO,” and that WHO 
representatives should “try to encourage member states to direct their requests for assistance to 
the WHO.”220 
 
In order to counteract the ILO’s expansion into its territory, Dukes-Dobos argued that the WHO 
would have to expend more resources and give greater administrative priority to its OH programme. 
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If this were done, “it should be very easy to at least match Dr. Parmeggiani’s efforts.”221 There had 
been suggestions to sit down with the ILO and work out clearly demarcated areas of competence 
between the two organisations, but Dukes-Dobos stated that he was categorically opposed to this 
solution because it would “sooner or later inevitably and officially place the WHO in a very junior 
role.”222 Instead, he suggested that the WHO continue to work with those countries which looked 
“more closely to the WHO for leadership.”223 Overlap could not really be avoided when the two 
organisations were working in the same area, and, although the official line would always be one of 
cooperation between UN agencies, the WHO should in fact view the ILO’s activities as “healthy and 
stimulating competition.”224  
 
The overt tension between the ILO and WHO revealed by the above correspondence foreshadowed, 
and was probably even further catalysed, by an incident in East Africa during 1966 and 1967 which 
had been particularly galling to the WHO.225 During 1966, the Ugandan Health Ministry had been in 
negotiations with the WHO Regional Office for Africa (AFRO) to fund a consultancy to assess the 
feasibility of establishing an East African Occupational Health Institute, which would most likely act 
as a WHO Collaborating Centre in the region. Unbeknownst to AFRO, this request had also been 
transmitted to the UNDP via the Ugandan Ministry of Planning, and the UNDP had passed the 
request on to the ILO rather than the WHO. The AFRO office was “then mystified” to receive 
notification from the UNDP that a consultant had been proposed and that the ILO had made 
budgetary provision in their 1967 budget for this position, effectively transforming it from a WHO 
project into an ILO one.226 Clearly upset by the “Gilbertian situation”227 which had arisen, the WHO 
internal correspondence reveals a suspicion that the ILO had conducted this takeover with “devious 
procedures” intended to undermine the WHO.228 Officially, however, these suspicions were never 
mentioned; the need for the UN family to put forward a united and harmonious front to 
governments had to trump the antagonism between the two organisations.229 The WHO did, 
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however, make its displeasure known internally and Dr. Ezzat, the consultant initially appointed by 
the ILO, was later designated as a joint ILO/WHO consultant, although ultimately it remained an ILO-
led project.230 
 
It was this need to present a unified face to the world that led to a framing of the problems between 
the ILO and the WHO as a matter of poor co-ordination and communication. The memorandum 
written up by the WHO after the East African incident argued that the problem essentially lay with 
the fact that two channels of communication had been used in an uncoordinated manner by two 
different government departments.231 An earlier WHO memorandum had already mentioned that 
the development of an improved system of coordination and communication at local, national 
(particularly between health and labour ministries), and international levels (between the ILO and 
WHO) was necessary if OH was to make advances.232 In later years “improved cooperation” became 
almost a mantra as more and more meetings were held in order to align the WHO and ILO in 
attempt to avoid replication and overlap of activities.233  
 
It would be hard to deny that there was a problem of coordination and communication between the 
two agencies. However, the framing of the problem as one rooted solely in a failure of systems 
represents what Tanya Murray Li (2007) has called “rendering technical,” a concept which draws on 
James Ferguson’s (1990) work on the depoliticisation of international development practice.  
Rendering technical happens when social problems that are embedded within a confluence of 
political and economic forces are redefined as technical problems which can be solved by a logical 
set of interventions which do not necessarily address the more complex underlying political 
economy of the problem (Li, 2007). In the process, argues Li (2007), subjects which are deeply 
political in nature are “rendered non-political.” It was true that coordination and communication 
between the ILO and WHO was not particularly good. Yet to place the emphasis on coordination 
systems as the root of the problem was to see the solution as relatively straightforward and 
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technical – “improving coordination and communication.” What this did not solve, however, was the 
underlying cause of tension between the two organisations, which, aside from egotistical battles 
over territory, was (and still is) rooted in different conceptions of the relationship between workers 
and health policy. 
 
The conceptual differences between the ILO and WHO were similar, although not identical, to the 
tensions discussed in the previous chapter around the NHS and the Industrial Health Service in 
Britain – between work-based social provision and state-based social provision. As mentioned 
earlier, the ILO was an organisation based on the social democratic model which saw the 
employment relationship as central to both economic and social policy. Its central concern with 
labour standards meant that its approach to social policy was determined by the labour agenda. The 
citizen as worker was the core subject of its social policy work, and the tripartite consultative model 
was indispensable to social progress. For the WHO, on the other hand, which was a purely inter-
governmental organisation, the worker was seen not as central to health policy, but as a small 
“special group” amongst the wider citizenry, as “primarily a member of the community.” 234  So 
unlike the ILO, the WHO saw the citizen first, and the worker second – their concern was the worker 
as citizen. The important relationship then was that between citizen and state, rather than that 
between employer and worker. 
 
It was not that the WHO was not based on the social democratic model – the idea that health was a 
right for all was indisputably underpinned by social democratic values. Indeed, the ILO and WHO 
together represented the two axes of the social democratic model. As the last chapter showed, 
these axes could operate both in concert and in tension with one another. Unfortunately, within the 
realm of occupational health, the relationship between the two organisations reflected the tension 
rather than complementarity. Consequently, rather than being seen as two aspects of a whole, the 
axes of the social democratic model were positioned in opposition to one another. This had negative 
effects on both sides; the WHO took an approach to workers’ health which was top-down and did 
little to actually include workers, and it remained a fairly marginalised department within the 
organisation. Within the ILO the health of workers retained its narrow, individualised approach, 
remaining segregated from wider issues to do with public health because these were seen as areas 
of competence for the WHO.  However, perhaps the most serious effects of this separation are only 
now really being felt, as the following section will show. 
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Health and the Worker under Neo-liberalism 
The global context in which the ILO and WHO operated changed radically after the late 1970s. 
Economic crises and the “failure” of modernist development in many countries led to a questioning 
of this development paradigm. By the 1980s neo-liberalism had emerged as an alternative economic 
model, particularly in Britain and the USA, and increasingly it began to be seen as a solution to the 
economic crises in the developing world. Peck et al. (2009) have noted that the term “neo-
liberalism” is a contested one – on the one hand there are those of a structuralist bent (Hardt and 
Negri, 2000; Harvey, 2010b) who have viewed it as a hegemonic form of economic and social 
organisation with a systemic logic; on the other hand there are those who adopt a more post-
modern approach have refused to use such “big-N” formulations,  instead focusing on a more 
“refined” vision of neoliberalism as represented by “local trajectories, contingent forms and hybrid 
assemblages” (Peck et al., 2008: 96-7). However, on a broad level there were certain characteristics 
of neo-liberalism which represented a break with the previous social democratic model. Its 
philosophical underpinnings came from two sources – liberal individualism rather than 
communalism, and neo-classical economics as opposed to the Keynesian variety. The policies 
associated with neo-liberalism were a well-known array of economic and social reforms which 
included a much reduced role for the state in managing economic and social development, an 
emphasis on individual self-reliance and on markets as the driver of economic development – 
defined as economic growth which would ultimately ‘trickle down’ to the poor without the 
intervention of government, but with the privatisation of state services, the removal of regulations 
on global flows of capital, and the integration of the global economy.  
 
For the purposes of this chapter, perhaps the most important of these breaks from the past was that 
which occurred between economic and social policy. The assumptions underpinning neo-classical 
economics included the idea that social problems could be solved as long as the market was left to 
deal with them without the interference of government. In terms of employment, it was argued that 
“wage rigidity” created by policies and institutions (such as collective bargaining agreements) led to 
a labour surplus and an increase in unemployment. In order to solve this, it was necessary to 
promote “wage flexibility” by removing the institutions and policies which created the problem in 
the first place. Left to the market alone, which would determine the wage to allow for market 
clearing, the problem would resolve itself (Heintz, 2013). Social protections attached to employment 
were also seen as inducing rigidities and market distortions in the labour market. Macroeconomic 
policy now turned away from employment creation and instead focused on reducing public debt and 
inflation (Heintz and Razavi, 2012). The implications of these ideas for the terms of inclusion into 
social policy were dramatic. The axis of responsibility between employer and worker fell away. The 
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axis between the citizen and state remained, but only in a limited form. They were displaced by a 
market logic which was based inclusion on the ability to pay – the age of the citizen had been 
superseded by the age of the consumer. Health, as Pickstone (2000) has pointed out, became 
something that was traded on the open market – not as a right of citizenship, but as something that 
could and should be purchased. Within this ideology, the “rights of citizenship” were no longer 
universal and applied only to the poor who were unable to pay for services. Social policy was 
transformed into a marginal domain which focused on “indigence policies” and “safety nets” for the 
poor.  
 
It should be noted that these changes applied to the developing world in a far more apparent 
manner than developed countries. Particularly in Europe, social democratic policies remained in 
place. Yet the power of social democracy to influence international health policy was waning. One of 
the most dramatic changes that occurred in international health policy was the entrance of the 
World Bank as a major force from the early 1980s onwards. Prior to 1980 the World Bank had not 
seen a role for itself in global health, viewing health as something that would improve with 
economic development. This began to change under the stewardship of Robert McNamara (1968-
1981) (Garrett, 2007). By the late 1980s World Bank economists were starting to argue, in a manner 
reminiscent of productionism (but with a market based twist), that improvements in health were 
essential to economic development (Garrett, 2007). In 1993 this stance became official with the 
publication of the World Development Report: Investing in Health. By the 1990s, the World Bank had 
become an acknowledged, though controversial, leader in global health issues and health sector 
development (Koivusalo and Ollila, 1997). The Bank along with its partner organisation, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), were at the forefront of promoting neo-liberal health policy 
reform globally. Countries indebted to the IMF were forced to undergo a process of structural 
adjustment, which meant cuts in state spending on health care, the introduction of user fees in 
public health facilities, and the promotion of privatised health services.  
 
The World Bank is not a monolithic entity, and has had progressive elements and dissenting voices 
working within it at times. Yet the general direction of its health work has been to promote private 
sector involvement in health, cut back on state health services, and to centre the “poor citizen” as 
the subject of social policy whilst actively discouraging any discussion of the place of employers in 
the provision of health services. Forcing employers to provide work related health benefits was 
considered a hindrance to economic growth because it increased the costs associated with 
employing workers and hindered the move towards a “flexible” labour force which could be hired 
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and fired with ease. Even the provision of occupational health services – which as the previous 
chapter has shown, allowed big businesses to justify their exit from the wider provision of health 
services – now began to be questioned. Labour standards were not a priority in world where the 
unrestricted and unregulated movement of capital across the globe were key drivers of economic 
policy.  
 
However, it is important to note that the process by which the neo-liberal ethic entered the 
international development scene was complex and contested. If neo-liberalism is understood as 
creating uneven development, it should also be understood as itself developing unevenly (Peck et 
al., 2009). The world did not wake up one day to find that development policy had been radically 
altered. It was a slow process that at times co-existed with a more social democratic approach – one 
which was simultaneously (and even paradoxically) beginning to open up to progressive alternative 
models of social provision besides the male industrial breadwinner.  
 
For the ILO and WHO the 1970s had been both a challenging and exciting period, and again 
represented a period of transition. Within the ILO, the World Employment Programme (WEP) was in 
full swing and in 1972 a “comprehensive employment mission” had been sent to Kenya. It was in the 
report of this mission that the term “informal sector” (coined two years earlier by the economic 
anthropologist Keith Hart in Ghana) was officially recognised. It referred to the large number of 
particularly urban workers working in atypical forms of employment in atypical workplaces – market 
women, street vendors, people working in their own homes – workers who, in general, were not 
covered by state labour regulation and had not necessarily been recognised as workers previously. 
An important departure in this report was the idea that the informal sector, with its energy and 
resourcefulness, could be seen as an engine of job growth, rather than as a transitory phase on the 
way towards modernist development (as it had been seen by mainstream economists until that 
point).  
 
Events during the 1970s meant that the integration of this changing conception of the “worker” into 
the ILO’s structures was delayed by some years. Firstly, the World Employment Conference in 1976 
endorsed a “Basic Needs” approach to development. Basic Needs was a reaction to the failure of 
modernist development, aimed at addressing absolute poverty. Although the ILO maintained an 
employment focus within Basic Needs by arguing that jobs were fundamental to poverty reduction, 
the focus of the approach was largely rural which meant that the urban informal sector was not 
necessarily a priority (Bangasser, 2000). Secondly, in a dispute over the USSR’s membership, the USA 
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had walked out of the ILO in 1977, taking with it a significant share of the budget (Bangasser, 2000). 
This meant that the scope for spending increases in new areas of work was severely circumscribed.  
 
In 1979, the UN organised a multi-agency meeting in order to “co-ordinate a programme of action … 
for the improvement of the working environment.”235 The agencies invited included the ILO, the 
WHO, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), the World Bank, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),  the International 
Mechanisms Coordinating Committee (IMCC), and each of the UN Regional Economic Councils. 
During the meeting the subject of the ILO and WHO’s jurisdiction over occupational health again 
arose, with the argument made that the two agencies needed to coordinate themselves better. 
What is particularly noteworthy from the documented discussion is the comparative list of activities 
in the area from the ILO and WHO. It is quite clear that by this stage the WHO had started to make 
strides into looking at how OH could be made to serve what they termed “underserved workers,” 
“vulnerable workers,” and those working in “small industries in developing countries.”236 The ILO 
listed as its activities:  
1. International labour standards adopted by the ILC, model codes, codes of practice, and 
guides;  
2. Tripartite meetings;  
3. Research and dissemination;  
4. Coordination meetings of experts, regional conferences and technical cooperation 
activities.237  
Nowhere was there an indication that it had done anything to integrate the “informal sector” into its 
activities. 
 
In 1982 the ILO began, to a limited extent, to engage with the informal sector, making it one of the 
five “global themes” of the Medium Term Plan (1982-1987), and the International Programme for 
the Improvement of Working Conditions and Environment (PIACT, under which OSH now fell) 
contained several activities which included informal sector workers (Bangasser, 2000). Despite this, 
                                                          
235 WHOA 6-1-1, Occupational Safety and Occupational Health: Questions arising therefrom, “Towards a co-
ordinated programme of action of the UN for the improvement of the working environment.” Working 





the ILO had started late with the inclusion of informal workers. It was only in the 1988 ILO Plan of 
Work, for example, that a project was first proposed which would “prepare a study on the provision 
of OH services at the national level for small enterprises, agricultural workers and the informal 
sector.”238 Robert Cox (1977: 390) has argued that the ILO was the manifestation of a particular 
model of production relations – one which engaged unionised workers, employers, and the state in a 
tug of war which ultimately benefited those three groups and left the remaining unprotected 
workers “as a human buffer softening the blow of an economic downturn.” For the ILO to begin 
engaging with unprotected workers was to threaten that consensus, and as Bangasser (2000) argues, 
there was no natural champion for the informal sector within the tripartite alliance. 
 
The WHO, on the other hand, had no such problem and seized the opportunity to promote their 
vision of workers’ health.  In the late 1970s the WHO were embarking on their Health for All 
campaigns, in which primary health care featured as the core organising principle. Here the 
organisation was learning from China and its “revolutionary” innovations to the health system. 
Agricultural workers were being trained to provide sanitation services, health education, 
immunizations, first aid, and a certain level of primary care (WHO, 2008). These barefoot doctors 
“challenged the health manpower models of the developed world,” and inspired the WHO towards a 
model of health systems development which became known as the primary health care (PHC) 
movement (WHO, 2008: 2). Within the PHC model there was also a place for the worker – 
particularly the “poor, vulnerable and underserved workers” who had until now been excluded from 
labour protections. While the WHO had for a long time argued that workers’ health should be 
integrated into national health services, it now adjusted this to argue that workers’ health should be 
integrated into primary health care, and in 1976 launched its Plan of Action on Workers’ health.  
The situation is that much more serious in developing countries with few health services of 
any kind, where it becomes essential to ensure the development of community-based 
primary care capable of dealing with occupational health hazards for the underserviced 
working populations,239 240  
 
stated the WHO’s Director-General at the 33rd World Health Assembly held in 1980. 
 
In 1978 the historic Declaration of Alma Ata on Primary Health Care had seemingly placed the WHO 
in what seemed like a secure position from which to lead health systems development in the 
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developing world. It had certainly inspired a clearer mission and greater confidence within the OH 
Unit, which was at this time headed by the Egyptian Mustafa El-Batawi (who had incidentally started 
out his international career as a regional advisor for the ILO). In 1979 the World Health Assembly 
had urged that “special attention be given to working people, by the development of occupational 
health care, as a contribution to the attainment of health for all by the year 2000.”241 Resources to 
back up this commitment were also forthcoming – particularly from the USA’s National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), which was a WHO Collaborating Centre on Occupational 
Health. In 1981 an agreement was signed between the WHO and NIOSH for approximately $200 000 
per year over a four year period. The NIOSH money was to be used for scientific studies of exposure 
limits, but also for promoting the WHO model of occupational health around the world.242 
 
Indeed, the WHO’s OH programme now moved from something which only the European Regional 
Office (EURO) had really taken on, to one which was included in the programme of work of the other 
regional bodies. The African Regional Office (AFRO) and the South and East Asian Regional Office 
(SEARO) were singled out in particular for occupational health systems development, with the goal 
of integrating occupational health services into primary health care in at least seven countries in 
each of the regions.243 The Pan-American Health Organisation (PAHO), the WHO’s regional office in 
the Americas, also began a large drive towards the primary health care model of workers’ health, 
with a substantial portion of the NIOSH budget moving towards supporting work in the Latin 
American region during the mid-1980s.244  
 
Importantly, the perspective of the WHO doctors and scientists was beginning to change. It began to 
be recognised that the science of OH might actually need to change if it was to be relevant in the 
developing world. The research programme moved towards studies which concentrated on the 
interactions between the “general diseases” occurring in poorly served areas and “occupational 
diseases.”245 There was also a drive to develop “appropriate occupational health technologies” 
which would be relatively cheap to use, such as “simplified methods for air analysis in the work 
environment.”246 Finally, in a departure from its previous methods of working, the WHO also began 
to engage with trade unions, with El Batawi writing a series of letters to international trade union 
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federations in 1987 in an attempt to “build up a working relationship.”247 Interestingly, the trade 
unions themselves did not seem to have the same reservations as the ILO about working with the 
WHO, with positive replies coming back from major unions like the International Union of Food and 
Allied Workers, Public Services International, and the International Federation of Building and 
Woodworkers.248 
 
It should be noted, however, that while informal or ‘underserved’ workers were starting to gain 
recognition within occupational health circles around 1980, these workers still appeared, on the 
whole, to be male. A 1977 report on the health of workers in the African region talked about the 
need to reach out to agricultural workers and those working in small industries, but did not really 
engage with the deeper implications of this for the ways in which OHS was conceived and 
regulated.249 It showed no understanding of the situation women market traders in Ghana or home 
based workers in India faced – the women whose working lives were described in Chapter Three and 
who will again be a central concern in Chapter Six.  
 
Little had improved for such women in the era after independence. In Ghana, market women 
continued to be subject to harsh municipal regulations and were the victims of smear campaigns led 
by successive governments to blame them for inflation (Robertson, 1983). In India, whilst middle 
class women were beginning to make headway into professions such as medicine and teaching, 
formal job opportunities for poorer women remained scarce. By 1985 women’s formal employment 
in the textile industry had declined to below 4 percent over a 50 year period (down from a high of 
approximately 25 percent in the 1890s) (Bhatt, 2006). In the absence of a formal economy to absorb 
their labour, women – as Ela Bhatt, the founder of the Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA), 
discovered in 1968 when two of Ahmedabad’s major textile factories closed – were turning to small 
scale informal economic activities (Bhatt, 2006).  
 
However, when women workers did finally become a subject of interest in 1985 when the WHO 
established an expert committee on the occupational health needs of women workers,250 it was not 
the women working in home based factories in India or in the markets of West Africa who were a 
major concern. The discussion focused on “the common problems of working women,” such as the 
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double burden of childcare and economic activity, and the effect of workplaces on reproductive 
health. It also mentioned the need in developing countries to reach the many women working in 
agriculture and in “cottage industries.”251 However, it did not in any serious way think about the 
challenges that informal work posed to the conceptual models on which the discipline and practice 
of OHS was built. 
 
A notable omission from the discussion was the need to think carefully about the local level of 
governance in relation to health and sanitation. In a recent double volume, Mitlin and Satterthwaite 
(2013) and Satterthwaite and Mitlin (2013) argue that international organisations’ neglect of this 
level of governance in favour of the national level has been detrimental to urban dwellers in the 
Global South. A similar point can be made about the neglect of local government as an institution 
which, in many ways, is a regulator of labour and working conditions. As Chapter Three showed, it 
was this level of government which had a great impact on both the health and productivity of 
working women in both Ghana and India who worked either in public spaces such as streets and 
markets, or in their own homes. The problem was, of course, that these local level institutions were 
not set up to recognise people operating as economic agents in public spaces as workers, instead 
treating them as a threat from which the public needed to be protected. The WHO’s consideration of 
OHS and working women did not extend to these considerations. 
 
The ILO’s reaction to the WHO’s increasing activity in the field of workers’ health was again far from 
positive. In 1976, the WHO Director General had reported to the Executive Board on the Human 
Environment and Health that the relationship between the WHO and ILO had improved, as 
“evidenced by several joint country projects and joint meetings on Occupational Health 
problems.”252 In reality, however, the tension continued to simmer. When the ILO saw an advance 
copy of the WHO Director-General’s Progress report on the Workers’ Health Programme that was to 
be delivered at the 33rd World Health Assembly, they protested vociferously.  They were particularly 
concerned that the WHO was positioning itself as the defender of workers’ health for the 
“underserved populations,” which the progress report suggested could only be resolved by the 
WHO. “WHO has no monopoly on the extension of protection to neglected categories of workers,” 
argued an ILO official.253 Moreover, 
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… the time has come…to solicit from the [ILO] Board a clear position that reaffirms on the 
one hand, that the problems concerning safety and hygiene at work and the health of 
workers – as workers – are the main competence of the ILO and that while the ILO is willing 
to participate in any joint programming exercise in this area…it will be a condition that it has 
main competence in the matter and it is recognised unequivocally that the conclusions 
adopted at these joint programming meetings should be submitted to the Board of the ILO, 
specifically to the representatives of employers and workers who are the main groups 
concerned with this matter.254 
 
Perhaps not yet aware of the threat on the horizon, the arms of the social democratic model 
continued the fight for position. Yet by the late 1980s much of this was to become irrelevant. The 
ideals of the WHO, as put forward at Alma Ata, were defeated by the increasingly powerful 
philosophy of the World Bank. The PHC movement became increasingly marginal in the face of the 
widespread adoption of the World Bank model. As the World Bank continued to gain in power and 
influence, the WHO was forced to retreat into a subsidiary role as a cooperative partner (Koivusalo 
and Ollila, 1997).  The defeat of the principles of Alma Ata was also a defeat for the WHO’s vision for 
basic occupational health services, which it had tied to PHC. This was compounded by the Reagan 
Administration’s cut in the NIOSH budget, which meant that it in turn had to radically reduce its 
financial contributions to the WHO.255 Certain branches of the WHO continued to work towards the 
model of Occupational Health for All (particularly PAHO and EURO), but the vision of the widespread 
integration of OH into primary health care services for Africa and Asia remained only a vision. 
 
The ILO remained a lone voice representing workers’ issues in the international development 
sphere. Yet even then, it was watered down. The plan to integrate productivity into national 
economic development plans represented by the WEP was no longer in vogue as countries accepted 
the IMF and World Bank’s structural adjustment programmes, and turned their economic plans 
towards a focus on economic growth and little else. Rather than trying to define the development 
agenda, the ILO now had to adopt a more reactive stance. It turned, for example, towards measures 
to assist those employees (particularly public sector workers) who were the “collateral damage” of 
structural adjustment.256 Notably, even with the WHO’s weakness and the rise in informal workers’ 
numbers that accompanied structural adjustment, the ILO was still having difficulty in adjusting the 
focus of its workers’ health programme to meet the needs of the informal sector. The 1992 OSH 
Programme of Work mentioned nothing about the informal sector specifically, choosing instead a 
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programme which focused on nuclear safety, chemical hazards, the electronics industry, and work 
related diseases for workers using “new technologies” such as “visual display units.”257 
 
Health and the Worker under Post-neoliberalism 
During the late 1990s and early 2000s the neo-liberal consensus was rocked by a series of economic 
crises in the developing world: the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the 1998 Brazilian and Russian 
financial crises, and the Argentinian “Great Depression” which lasted from 1998 to 2002. In 2008 the 
USA and Europe were also badly affected by a global financial crisis which led to widespread 
questioning of the neo-liberal economic model and re-opened the debate on the merits of state 
involvement in society and the economy.  These debates have led to new terms being used to 
describe the current conjuncture – terms such as “post-neoliberalism,” and the “post-Washington 
consensus” (Ballard, 2013). Within the World Bank, social policy started to take on a more central 
role, as the consensus shifted back towards (a limited version of) the productionist ethos “seeing 
social spending not just as a cost, but also as an investment in human capital” (Lund, 2009: 8). 
Within this context, health policy was also re-invigorated, research proving conclusively that user 
fees and privatisation had increased health inequalities rather than reducing them (Global Health 
Watch, 2012) . 
 
This “post-neoliberal” moment is a complex one, however. On the one hand it has seen the return to 
the development agenda of some progressive trends which started in the late 1970s and 80s. 
Participatory approaches to policy development and development interventions have come to be 
seen as important. (Eyben, 2009). The worker has also made a return to the development agenda, 
albeit now in the form of “the informal worker.” The “jobless growth,” increasing flexibilisation of 
labour, and inadequate social security that were features of neo-liberalism have led to increases in 
the size of the informal economy, with ILO and World Bank studies showing that most jobs created 
in the last 10-15 years have been informal (Meagher, 2013). The latest regional estimates on the size 
of the global informal economy from the ILO and Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and 
Organizing (WIEGO) show informal employment making up 82 percent of employment in South Asia, 
66 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa (with a large differences between West Africa and Southern Africa 
which tend to have higher formal employment), 65 percent in East and South-East Asia, and 51 
percent in Latin America (Vanek et al., 2014). This process of informalisation and casualisation of 
labour has not only affected developing countries, however. “Non-standard” forms of employment 
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have also increased in the developed world, with 2008 OECD data reflecting an increase in own-
account, temporary, and part-time employment in those countries (Vanek et al., 2014). 
 
In response to this, the World Bank begun to engage with informal workers; its 2005 World 
Development Report made, according to Lund (2009), a “genuine effort” to see the informal sector 
as both permanent and normal. In 2012, the Bank went even further to a focus on jobs and 
employment as the theme of the WDR, with important sections dedicated to the informal economy. 
There has been an important gendered aspect to this. What was originally known in development 
circles as “women’s empowerment” has been rejuvenated and transformed into what is now known 
as “women’s economic empowerment” (Kabeer, 2012). The greater emphasis on the economic 
aspect of empowerment, has formed a bridge between gender concerns and development 
economics. Partly this has been influenced by the recognition that informal work (which absorbs 
large numbers of women), is both a source of livelihoods and asset accumulation (Kabeer, 2012). In 
this way, policy spaces have opened up for women, informal workers, and women as workers in 
ways never previously seen.  
 
Yet, despite these positive moves, many remain suspicious. Peck et al., (2009: 103), for example, 
argue that neo-liberalism is a “flexibly mutating regime of market rule,” which adapts after each 
crisis in ways that allows it to both pacify its critics and continue with its policies of market led 
growth. Room might be made for progressive ideas, and even a limited type of redistributive politics, 
but they will be adapted in such a way that neo-liberalism’s underlying principles are not challenged, 
meaning that egalitarian principles will remain limited in scope. Nancy Fraser (2009) has made this 
argument in relation to feminism. She argues that under neo-liberal capitalism, the two arms of the 
feminist movement – that which sought recognition for women, and that which sought economic 
redistribution for women – have become separated. Whilst the recognition element has been 
relatively successful, with the importance of gender equality now widely recognised, this has not 
been matched with a simultaneous transfer of resources. Therefore while women are now entering 
the labour market in greater numbers, the fact remains that the jobs which await them are generally 
low-paid and menial. Women and men may now have more equal opportunities in some 
workplaces, but more people will be working in bad jobs earning low wages. 
 
How can one judge whether the same thing is happening within health policy and provision? One 
way would be to compare current configurations of power with those of the social democratic 
period. If the social democratic era was one in which redistributive politics took precedence (even if 
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it was a limited idea of equality), then a comparison between the movements and shifts of post-
neoliberalism and the ideas underpinning social democracy should give some indication of whether 
redistribution is really at the heart of the project, or whether these moves are just a thin disguise for 
continued market dominance. Key to making this judgement are Lund’s (2009) “axes” of the welfare 
state – the lines of responsibility that run between citizen and state, and between employers and 
workers. How those two axes interact with one another is central to understanding whether a 
Polanyian movement to “re-embed the economy in society” is taking place, or whether there is a 
different dynamic at work, and if there is, what potential that dynamic has for redistributive politics. 
The following section provides three short summaries of the movements taking place in global 
health policy involving three main global actors who are now concerned with the informal worker, 
and then analyses these movements using the framework described above. 
 
The World Bank 
The World Bank has remained an important player in global health, and has moved away from a 
direct focus on user fees and “cost recovery” as the main drivers of its health policy. The main thrust 
of the health policy work of the Bank now centres on the Bismarckian model of health provision – 
Social Health Insurance (SHI).258 The fact that SHI schemes operated through the employment 
relationship has made this the natural territory of the ILO, which has been concerned with the 
development and promotion of SHI schemes globally for many years (for example it acted as an 
advisor on the ESIS in India). Yet now it is the World Bank which is one of the more powerful 
promoters of this model, and it is important to consider why this should be so. 
 
The reasons are clearly laid out in the influential World Bank Institute document Social Health 
Insurance for Developing Nations, authored by Hsiao and Shaw (2007). The four reasons given in 
support of SHI are: 
i. In developing countries, tax revenues may be limited. SHI targets public funds to 
subsidise premiums for the poor rather than financing and providing universal health 
care for all; 
ii. SHI frees up public funds so that they can be targeted to public health goods and 
services; 
iii. SHI shifts public subsidies from the supply side to the demand side to improve the 
efficiency and quality of health care. This separates the responsibilities for collecting and 
                                                          




managing SHI financing from the responsibilities for providing health care to patients, 
whereby services are contracted from providers that are separate entities. Providers are 
required to be accountable to patients for the quality of services; 
iv. SHI uses the capacity of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and private providers 
to improve access by the insured to health care by means of contracting.259 
 
From above it is clear that a shift in World Bank thinking is perhaps less significant than one would 
suppose. Clearly it conceives of a role for the state in providing health services, which is an 
important change. At the same time, the focus on “targeting” rather than publicly funded universal 
health care is still very much a part of the earlier language of safety nets for the poor. Importantly, it 
also clearly articulates a role for the private sector in health service provision, and, it should be 
noted, does nothing to repudiate the need for user fees. In fact, the report argues that user fees at 
health facilities must be in place so that people are motivated to join the health insurance 
scheme,260 which is a circular argument. 
 
Perhaps most interesting, though, is the fact that this move towards SHI has meant that the bank has 
had to engage with “the worker,” and more particularly “the informal worker.” SHI programmes 
have generally worked well in European countries because of the high levels of formal employment, 
which ensure that deductions can be made from both workers and employers. In countries such as 
Ghana and India and many others where informal employment makes up about 90 percent of total 
employment, there is a problem not only of enforcement, but also of determining who will pay the 
contribution. The drive to seek a solution to this dilemma has led to a plethora of studies which 
attempt to resolve the question of “extending health coverage to the informal workers.” It is 
certainly not beyond the realm of possibility to think that this has been influenced by the orientation 
of the World Bank. 
 
The answer from the Bank appears to be to support national SHI programmes which enforce payroll 
taxes amongst formal workers, but to combine this with a voluntary scheme which allows informal 
workers to pay in at a rate subsidised by the state. The Ghana National Health Insurance Scheme, 
which has received World Bank support, operates in this manner. The Bank has, however, been 
roundly criticised for promoting such schemes. In a recent Joint NGO Briefing Paper,261 led by Oxfam, 
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it was argued that voluntary health insurance schemes do not work for the unemployed or those 
working in the informal sector. SHI requires strong state capacity to work well for these groups, and 
this capacity is often missing in developing countries, argues the briefing paper. Interestingly, a 
report from inside the Bank itself agrees with this assessment, revealing that alternative currents are 
present within the institution. In a World Bank Policy Research Paper, for example, Acharya et al., 
(2013) state that their systematic review of the evidence on the impact of health insurance schemes 
on the informal sector shows that there is “no strong evidence of an impact on [health service] 
utilisation, protection from financial risk, and health status.”262 
 
The criticisms have certainly been justified in the case of Ghana where administrative chaos and an 
inability to reach poor households has dogged the scheme. Yet there is another problematic aspect 
of such schemes in terms of the way in which they incorporate informal workers. The assumption is 
that all informal workers are purely independent, self-employed operators. This means that 
contributions must come from the workers themselves, to be topped up with a subsidy from the 
state. Whilst in Africa many informal workers are indeed self-employed operators, there are also 
informal workers who are not, particularly in Asia. Jan Breman (2003: 27) has argued that to see the 
“informal sector as an infinite reservoir of one man businesses run by what in essence are petit-
bourgeois entrepreneurs who create their own means of production and who use the resulting 
revenue to lead a modest but not poor existence” creates an “extremely distorted view of reality.” 
Breman (2003) argues that significant numbers of informal workers are in fact labourers who are 
employed by either formal or informal firms. Moreover, he argues, “so-called self-employment is 
often thinly disguised work performed for others”(Breman, 2003: 27).  
 
In many Asian countries, ‘self-employed’ home based workers are often in reality sub-contracted 
piece rate workers working at the bottom end of large and lucrative international value chains. The 
problem with the World Bank model of health insurance is that this aspect of informal employment 
is not considered. In particular no attempt is made to engage with the responsibility of capital for 
the health of the workers whose employment relationship is so disguised, and no attempt is made to 
think of innovative ways in which capital might contribute more widely to a health scheme for 
informal workers, whose very informalisation has been promoted by the same economic policies 
                                                          
Works? Joint NGO Briefing Paper, available at: https://oxfam.qc.ca/sites/oxfam.qc.ca/files/2008-05-
07_health_insurance.pdf 
262 Acharya, A, Vellakal, S, Taylor, F, Masset, E, Satija, A, Burke, M and Ebrahim, S. 2013. ‘The Impact of Health 
Insurance Schemes for the Informal Sector in Low and Middle Income Countries: A Systematic Review. World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 6324. Washington DC: The World Bank. 
174 
 
which have benefitted capital around the globe. The idea that capital should be made to bear some 
responsibility for those workers who have been pushed out of the formal labour market does not 
come into consideration, despite the existence of suggestions about alternative forms of taxation 
such as “Tobin taxes”263 and calls for taxation on production (Kanbur, 2010). The citizen-state axis is 
emphasised, while the employer-worker axis remains non-existent. Therefore, while the World Bank 
talks about informal workers, in reality it seems to be using a new name to talk about the same poor 
citizens it was ‘targeting’ with ‘indigence exemptions’ during the user fee era. 
 
“Post-neoliberalism” and the World Health Organisation and International Labour 
Organisation 
The World Health Organisation has struggled to regain its prior status in the world of global health. 
The World Bank remains strong as do other organisations such as UNAIDS, and The Global Fund to 
fight AIDS, TB, and Malaria which draw government resources away from the WHO (Garrett, 2007). 
Its most recent attempt to reassert its position as the global health policy leaders has taken the form 
of the campaign for Universal Health Coverage (UHC), which is the structuring theme of the 
organisation’s 12th Plan of Work. UHC has been seen as an attempt to revitalise the PHC movement 
in new packaging. The focus on improvements to primary health care is strong. However, in attempt 
to create wider consensus around UHC, the WHO has declared that there are “different pathways to 
UHC.” It states in the 2010 World Health Report that health funds  
… can come from a variety of sources – income and wage based taxes, broader-based value-
added taxes or excise taxes on tobacco and alcohol, and/or insurance premiums. The source 
matters less than the policies developed to administer prepayment systems.264  
 
A flexible approach to health systems financing may have its advantages. One disadvantage is that 
the UHC model seems to be increasingly interpreted as Universal Health Insurance Coverage by 
many developing countries (Lund, 2012b), meaning that UHC seems to have become not so much a 
challenge to the World Bank model, but more as a way for it to garner greater acceptance.265 
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Nevertheless, within the WHO itself, the focus on UHC appears to have led to something of a 
rejuvenation of its model for workers’ health. In 2007, the WHO launched its Global Plan of Action 
on Workers’ health, 2007-2014 at the 60th World Health Assembly, and recommitted itself “to work 
towards full coverage of all workers, particularly those in the informal sector, agriculture, small 
enterprises, and migrants.”266 Through the Joint ILO/WHO Committee on Occupational Health it has 
also completed the plans started under Dr. El Batawi to develop a model for what is now called 
‘Basic Occupational Health Services’ (BOHS),267 which involves simplified techniques to monitor and 
protect workers’ health more easily by integrating into primary health care services. The WHO has 
also released a booklet titled Gender, Work, and Health which seeks to address the particular health 
needs of female workers.268 It seems again to be increasingly accepted that in developing countries 
the integration of occupational health into primary health care is the way forward. At a side meeting 
of the World Health Assembly in 2013, it was reported that a number of countries, including Brazil, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Colombia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, and Tanzania, have begun to 
move towards implementing this model.269 The influential High Level Expert Group (HLEG) report on 
Universal Health Coverage for India has also recommended that occupational health be integrated 
into primary health services, just as the Bhore Report had done 60 years earlier.270 
 
The ILO has had a more difficult time in asserting its occupational health agenda within the new 
world of work. On the progressive side its “Decent Work” strategy, which was adopted after the 
election of Juan Somavia as Director-General in 1999, has led to a greater focus on “people on the 
periphery of formal systems of employment (Vosko, 2002). In line with this, the ILC has passed two 
conventions protecting the labour rights for groups of informal workers, largely made up of women: 
the Home Work Convention (C177, passed in 1996), and the Domestic Workers Convention (C189, 
passed in 2012). In both of these Conventions, the workers’ right to a safe and healthy work 
environment is explicitly stated. Moreover, several of the programmes run under Decent Work have 
made important inroads into engaging local government institutions as key sites of workplace 
regulation. The Decent Work Pilot Programme, which ran in eight countries including Ghana, from 
2000-2005 worked primarily with local governments as opposed to national level labour 
institutions.271 Just prior to this, the OSH division had run a project in Tanzania to improve working 
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conditions in the urban informal sector, which explicitly engaged both primary health care and 
municipal institutions.272 In 2012 the ILO collaborated with the United Cities and Local Governments 
(UCLG) to run a peer learning programme on “hygiene, health, and markets” in Maputo, which 
aimed to exchange lessons on improving working conditions in urban markets.273 
 
In seeing local government as an important aspect of labour regulation, the ILO has certainly made 
more progress than the WHO, which continues to see environmental health and sanitation from a 
national perspective exclusively. The absence of any discussion on municipal regulation is notable in 
the WHO’s Gender, Work and Health booklet which discusses the exclusion of informal workers and 
women workers from the formal discipline and regulation of OHS. It concludes, however, with 
unimaginative recommendations to extend labour laws to previously excluded groups, and 
encourages employers to make more effort educating their employees about health and safety in 
the workplace. Firstly, this assumes a traditional employer-employee relationship exists in the first 
place. Secondly, it fails to address the contradiction which often exists between labour laws (which 
operate at national level) and municipal level regulations which often do much to undermine the 
working conditions of workers working in urban public spaces (as discussed in Chapter Three).  
 
Despite these progressive aspects of the ILO’s work, there is also a deep tension within the 
organisation which limits how far it can stretch its progressive programmes. In examining whether 
Cox’s (1977) arguments still hold in relation to the ILO, Vosko (2002) argues that, despite some 
progress “at the margins,” the ILO continues to operate largely within its hegemonic tripartite 
model. This gives rise to a fundamental contradiction: while the ILO continues to claim protection for 
the ever decreasing number of formal workers in the world, it fails to provide any real challenge to 
the basic model of neo-liberal capitalism, which allows less and less workers to enjoy these 
protections. Indeed, its very essence as an organisation built on a model of tripartite consensus 
building, means that it cannot break from its hegemonic mould. 
 
This contradiction is of course also tied up with the relationship between the ILO and the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO), and the debate on inserting so-called “social clauses” into trade 
agreements, which has emerged because of the difficulty of regulating increasingly transnational 
flows of global capital at a national level. The debate hinges on the regulation of labour standards 
through the WTO’s multilateral trade agreements in order to halt the global “race to the bottom,” 
                                                          
272 Forastieri, V.1999. Improvement of working conditions and environment in the informal sector through 
safety and health measures. Working Paper OH/9907/08. ILO: Geneva. 
273 UCLG. 2012. Peer Learning in Maputo City, Mozambique on “health, hygiene and markets.” 
177 
 
where investors move to countries with the least restrictive labour laws. It has been a fraught and 
complex one which has been fought across the traditional political dividing lines of the left and the 
right (De Wet, 1995). On the one hand governments of developing countries (led by countries like 
India) have argued against such clauses as representing a “thinly veiled” form of protectionism from 
developed countries. Developing country trade unions have been divided on the issue, whilst 
developed countries and the trade unions from developed countries have generally supported the 
inclusion of such clauses. Employers have generally been against the insertion of social clauses into 
multilateral trade agreements (International Organisation of Employers, 2006). 
 
According to de Wet (1995), the ILO was unwilling to take a firm stance on the issue of social clauses 
as they go against the organisation’s commitment to voluntary compliance and the use of political 
persuasion (as opposed to enforcement through trade sanctions), as well as the fact that its member 
states have been deeply divided on the issue and unable to reach consensus. It did, however, 
eventually respond in 1998 with the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and 
its Follow Up, an attempt to compel all member states to adopt four basic labour standards: 
freedom of association, elimination of forced labour, elimination of child labour, and elimination of 
discrimination in respect of employment.  
 
The problem is, as Vosko (2002) had pointed out, the 1998 Declaration is aimed at states, not 
industries or capital. Whilst employers are represented at the ILO, there are entire industries whose 
production chains span the globe and do not belong to any of the more traditional “employer 
associations” affiliated with the ILO. It is the regulation of these globalised entities which is perhaps 
most urgent, but as Vosko (2002: 30) again argues, the ILO’s Declaration of 1998 
…targets nation states for adherence to core labour standards yet fails to enable states to 
challenge global capital collectively. In this way it does not address the issue at the heart of 
the labour standards - international trade debate - the erosion of basic labour rights and the 
weak enforcement of labour standards, leading to a race to the bottom in wages and 
working conditions, propelled by the practices of global capital. 
 
However, even those employers who do participate at the ILO are able to influence the terms of the 
debate to such a small extent that little progress can be made. For example, the employer 
representatives walked out of the ILC debate on the Home Work Convention (Vosko, 2002), which 
meant that while states and workers might work towards improving working conditions for home-
based workers, it would always be difficult to use the C177 to hold capital to any kind of 
commitment. Also, Occupational Safety and Health is not one of the core labour standards.The ILO 
classification of occupational diseases has also suffered from a similar problem. While the WHO is 
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able to endorse a list of occupational diseases which takes into account the changing world of work 
and includes a number of diseases of the environment (such as malaria and schistosomiasis), 
protozoal and viral infections, as well as mental health issues,274 the ILO’s list is far narrower and to a 
large extent has retained its emphasis on diseases caused by industrial poisons and processes, with 
only nine diseases out of a total of 106 on the list classified under “biological agents and infectious 
or parasitic diseases.”275 The most recent additions to the ILO lists were made during two tripartite 
expert meetings in 2005 and 2009. The minutes of the meetings suggest that employer 
representatives attempted to keep the list as narrow as possible by emphasising “science over 
politics” and the need to show absolute direct causality between work and disease.276 While worker 
organisations sometimes disputed these attempts, their interests also did not necessarily 
correspond to those of the workers outside of formal employment, so that alternative voices were 
muted.277  
 
This “hegemonic tripartism” has certainly limited the ILO’s ability to think creatively about how 
capital could be held responsible for the health and safety of workers outside of traditional formal 
employment relationships. Outside of the more creative Decent Work Programme, the ILO’s work on 
OSH in developing countries has focused largely on creating labour standards and strengthening 
labour inspectorates278 – which have in reality very little hope of ever reaching the vast majority of 
workers in developing countries. Its flagship programmes for informal workers are Work 
Improvement for Safe Home (WISH), Work Improvement in Small Enterprises (WISE), and Work 
Improvement in Neighbourhood Development (WIND), which involve a series of steps to allow 
informal businesses to implement very basic safety and health measures, but is essentially aimed at 
encouraging informal businesses to regulate their own OSH (Lund and Marriott, 2011). In shifting the 
burden of responsibility onto informal operators themselves, it would seem that the ILO contradicts 
its own Convention on Occupational Safety and Health (C155) which states that “the financing of 
services for protection and promotion of workers’ health needs to be organized and financed in a 
way that workers do not have to pay for prevention and treatment of occupational diseases and 
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injuries.”279 What this suggests, of course, is that within the WISH, WIND, and WISE models the ILO 
has assumed that the informal economy consists of “one man [sic] businesses run by what in 
essence are petit-bourgeois entrepreneurs,” essentially making the same assumptions that the 
World Bank has made in its SHI model. 
 
A similar problem is evident in the ILO’s approach to health provision more generally. As shown 
earlier in this chapter, the ILO has been at the forefront of promoting schemes of employer-based 
health provision, such as the ESIS in India.  Its latest attempt to assert its leadership in the field of 
social security is the Global Social Floor (GSF), which was passed as an autonomous recommendation 
at the 101st Session of the ILC in 2012. The GSF is aimed at providing a minimum standard of 
protection to vulnerable people throughout their lifecycles through cash transfers and affordable 
health services. It explicitly includes informal workers along with the unemployed, children, the 
elderly, and the disabled, describing them as “vulnerable people”. Yet, as Lund (2009) has pointed 
out, the emphasis within the GSF is on protection provided by the state (it explicitly endorses the 
WHO’s UHC model), with little space for any discussion of how capital could and should be held to 
some account for the declining labour standards and levels of formal employment which have 
exacerbated the vulnerable situation of the informally employed. Whilst ultimately guided by worthy 
aims, Lund (2009: 10) argues that the GSF “dilutes the focus on the working poor,” seeing informal 
workers less as economic agents operating in largely unfavourable economic conditions, and rather 
as “just another” type of vulnerable citizen requiring state assistance. 
 
Philanthropic Foundations 
Philanthropic foundations have for a long time been a feature of the global health scene. According 
to Dowie (2001), amongst American philanthropic foundations, health has traditionally been the 
second most funded area of interest after education. The Rockefeller Foundation, in particular, has 
played a prominent role since 1913 when it started its first campaign against hookworm disease 
(1913-1918), later moving on to other areas of global health (Hewa, 1995, Amrith, 2006, Kavadi, 
2007). Currently, however, the role of these institutions has increased significantly. Between 1995 
and 2005 charitable giving by US based philanthropic foundations tripled, with a third of all funds 
going to global health (Garrett, 2007). It is difficult to pinpoint precisely why there has been such a 
surge in philanthropic activity for health, although the World Bank’s 1993 report on health has been 
cited as an influence by the person heading the foundation which has surpassed all previous giving – 
Bill Gates (Cohen, 2006; McCoy et al., 2009). There is also the fact that staggering amounts of wealth 
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have become concentrated in the hands of a few. Garrett (2007) reports that in the first six years of 
its existence the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) gave away $6.6 billion in support of 
global health initiatives, significantly dwarfing the money spent by UN agencies. 
 
In general, the foundations have been criticised for taking a technocentric approach to health and 
focusing on specific diseases at the expense of working to strengthen health care systems as a 
whole. Dowie (2001), for example, shows that public health has received the lowest priority within 
philanthropic spending on health. The Gates Foundation in particular has spent large amounts of 
money funding “vertical” programmes on HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis. Yet these 
programmes often create imbalances in health systems which ultimately serve to undermine the 
provision of basic primary health care, so that patients are able to receive care for specific diseases, 
but are unable to access basic services like maternal care or blood pressure checks (Cohen, 2006).  
 
For the purposes of this chapter, however, the concern is whether foundations in their current form 
and with their increasing and more overt global influence have worked to undermine or reinforce 
the social democratic model of health provision and, in particular, what stance they have taken 
towards the place of the worker within health provision. In terms of global health, there has been 
less work done on health systems as a whole by foundations like BMGF,280 which prefers to spend its 
money on technical work like vaccine development, although they have promoted what Moran 
(2007) calls a “social entrepreneurship style” – promoting partnerships between public health 
systems and private enterprises focused on producing low cost products for the health system. As 
Moran (2007) points out, although the social entrepreneurship model has been introduced by the 
newer foundations like BMGF, the public private partnership approach has, since the 1990s, been 
supported by older foundations like Rockefeller who shifted during that period towards a focus on 
“market based solutions,” prompted no doubt by the prevailing neo-liberal economic climate. On 
the whole, however, US philanthropic foundations have been supportive of increased private sector 
involvement in health care, and in the United States itself they have been a central force in closing 
down discussions around the provision of state based health care (Dowie, 2001). 
 
Further, the above suggests that foundations, at least in the recent past, have done little to support 
the social democratic model of health provision, with a greater focus instead on the citizen as 
consumer. Yet more recently the Rockefeller Foundation has started to take an interest in informal 
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workers.  This interest is likely to have been spurred by a number of factors. An important one, 
however, has been the Foundation’s focus on health financing reform, which has taken it into the 
field of health insurance, and through this to the same question posed by the World Bank: how can 
health insurance coverage be provided for informal workers? As part of its work in this area, 
Rockefeller has funded together with the World Bank, the German Development Agency (GIZ), the 
WHO and the BMGF, the Joint Learning Network (JLN), a network of member states currently 
implementing health financing reforms. Although the JLN does include within its membership 
countries like Thailand and Brazil – which both have free public health systems funded through 
general taxation – a review of reforms currently supported by the foundation reveal that, much like 
the World Bank, it is in large part supporting the development of health insurance schemes.281 
Indeed one does not have to look far beyond the JLN’s mission statement to see that health 
insurance is at the core of its work: “The Joint Learning Network’s members are low and middle-
income countries that are implementing health financing reforms, sometimes called national health 
insurance.”282 
 
It is important to note though that there is some confusion in terminology – the use of the term 
“health insurance” by US influenced institutions does not always denote what would be considered 
a health insurance scheme in Britain. For example, the Indonesian Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional 
(JKN), which the JLN refers to as a health insurance scheme, is one that is single-payer and funded 
through general taxation. Yet the majority of the schemes supported by the JLN, including those in 
Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, India, and the Phillipines are health insurance schemes that both open up the 
scope for private sector involvement in health provision and, importantly, require informal workers 
to pay in to the scheme. In all of these schemes, what has already been said about the World Bank’s 
approach to health provision is true: the citizen-state axis is emphasised, while the employer-worker 
axis remains non-existent. While the Rockefeller Foundation talks about informal workers, in reality 
it seems to be using a new name to talk about poor citizens. 
                                                          
281 JLN member countries include Ghana (the NHIS), Nigeria’s National Health Insurance System, the Kenyan 
National Hospital Insurance Fund, Mali (with its system of small community based health insurance schemes 
known as mutuelles), the Phillipines (PhilHealth, an insurance scheme), India (Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana 
– a publicly funded insurance scheme using private health insurance providers for those below the poverty line 
and certain groups of informal workers for tertiary level care) and Indonesia (Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional, 





Regaining the Citizen, Losing the Worker? 
The above discussion has brought to the fore some important tensions of the current period. It is 
difficult to argue against the WHO’s UHC model, into which an inclusive model of workers’ health is 
inserted. Not only does this attempt to break the stranglehold of large industry on the OHS 
profession, but it also makes more sense in a world where the boundaries between spaces – home 
space, work place, public space – are becoming increasingly blurred. It is similarly difficult to argue 
against the ILO’s GSF, which perhaps does hold some hope for informal workers who are genuinely 
self-employed. It is easier to find fault with the World Bank’s SHI model, which increasingly looks like 
a thinly disguised attempt to put a new spin on an old idea. At the same time though there is an 
important convergence between the Bank’s approach and that of the ILO and WHO: the citizen-state 
relationship has been re-asserted, but the second axis of the social democratic model – the 
employer-worker axis – remains absent (in the case of the WHO and World Bank) or has been 
significantly weakened (in the case of the ILO). Even with the en vogue “informal worker” the 
emphasis is less on the citizen as worker as it is on the worker as citizen. 
 
James Ferguson (2007) has added his voice to the burgeoning literature on how the post-neoliberal 
order should be categorised and understood. In his analysis of the campaign for the Basic Income 
Grant (BIG) in South Africa, which would provide a basic income guarantee from the state for all 
citizens, Ferguson argues that the progressive left has begun to appropriate “neo-liberal 
technologies of rule” and adapt them to fit their own ends. Whilst there are those who argue for the 
BIG on the leftist premise that it allows people a degree of independence from the dictates of the 
labour market (decommodification), the campaign has simultaneously used neo-liberal arguments 
about the potential for increased self-reliance and the need to support entrepreneurship. According 
to Ferguson this demonstrates almost guerrilla-like tactics by the left to cloak their policies in neo-
liberal rhetoric.  
 
This is certainly a worthwhile point to make; Ferguson (2007) is trying to chart a positive path for 
leftist politics in troubled times. It is, however, also important to be suspicious of such moves. Is this 
the left appropriating the language and tools of the right, or is it the right appropriating the language 
and tools of the left? The BIG, as Lund (2009) points out, is another piece of social policy which, 
while having laudable aims, fails to take account of the historical importance of employer-based 
social provision in South Africa. In emphasising the citizen-state axis, it fails to engage with the 
employer-worker axis, it places more and more responsibility for social provision on the state, and it 
says nothing about how and where capital is to contribute. It is exactly this that can be observed 
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with respect to health policy and workers. In occupational health it is the WHO’s citizenship model 
which has become increasingly dominant, while the ILO struggles to resolve the contradiction 
between its desire to address the issue of informal workers, with its tripartite model which gives it 
little room to challenge the dominant economic model or to think seriously about new ways to 
challenge capital. Where the ILO has been able to reach beyond its boundaries, it has been able to 
do so only with a very diluted definition of worker, focusing largely on the citizen-state relationship. 
Whilst the World Bank talks of informal workers, they really mean poor citizens and their model is 
entirely based on state provision in collaboration with the private sector.  
 
The lessons of history are clear: in 1950, when the WHO announced that health was a right of 
citizenship, an unanticipated consequence was that large industries would use this to “get out from 
under” their commitments to general health care provision, using OHS as a justification. Now under 
the WHO’s guidance, OHS is increasingly being accepted as a responsibility of state health systems. 
This is a double edged sword: on the one hand the WHO’s model has the potential to be more 
equitable – on the other hand it frees capital from all responsibility for the health of workers, and it 
compromises one of the founding principles of labour regulation – that industry has the 
responsibility to ensure that people do not damage their health in the interests of profit (or if they 
do, that they are compensated for this). Moreover, in the many developing countries which have 
historically relied on employment-related health provision to supplement those services provided by 
the state, a move towards state provision alone may put undue pressure on state resources (Lund, 
2009). This seems particularly unfair considering that the global capitalist economy is founded on 
the fact that some countries will remain poor and weak, with GDPs far smaller than the profits of 
many large multinational corporations. Again, the problem here, as Vosko (2003: 30) has pointed 




There are two points which should be highlighted in this conclusion. The first relates to an argument 
made by James Ferguson (2012) in an essay on the future of social assistance which continues the 
work he has done on the BIG in South Africa. Ferguson (2012: 511) argues that “historicizing” new 
forms of social assistance (such as the BIG) is important because it: 
 
…helps us to see this circumstance as something other than simply decay and degeneration. 
The idea that Africans leaving agricultural village life for the city would be incorporated into 
a stable, Fordist industrial working class, where unemployment and destitution would be 
atypical conditions, stabilised through insurance mechanisms, is increasingly implausible. But 
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if we make ourselves aware that what is being lost is not any possibility of a decent future, 
but instead just one very particular formulation of what such a decent future might look like, 
then we can perhaps learn to free ourselves from a politics of nostalgia, and see new sorts of 
futures, and new sorts of politics, that only a properly historicised sense of the future might 
be able to detect.  
 
Certainly, Ferguson is making another important point here. As this thesis has often pointed out, the 
social democratic model that developed after World War Two was a European model based on 
European realities and a labour market which looked vastly different from those that existed in both 
African and Asian countries. Though, at the same time there is a danger in making this argument; it 
may feed, however unwittingly and unwillingly, into an economic model which is deeply unfair and 
which will never really allow for the realisation of a “decent future.” The social democratic model 
held capital responsible for the welfare of workers. Corporations had to contribute directly to social 
welfare, either through Worker’s Compensation or through OHS (at the very least) and/or the 
provision of general health services. This is something that is conspicuously absent from the new 
“post-neoliberal” discourse on social welfare, which appears to be placing more and more 
responsibility on citizens to pay, through taxes, to repair the health damage caused by the pursuit of 
profit. In a world where many capitalists are richer than some countries, it is unlikely that state 
assistance alone can create a “decent future” for the majority of the world’s citizens.  
 
The second point has to do with the institutional dynamics between the WHO and the ILO, and the 
way in which this has played into the neo-liberal project. There is a distinct similarity here with the 
arguments made by Fraser (2009) with regard to feminism. According to Fraser the two “arms” of 
second wave feminism have become disjointed, so that while cultural critique of feminism has 
gained ground, the critique of capitalism has not. While there is now a “recognition of women’s 
rights,” this has not been accompanied by economic redistribution.  A similar problem has been 
encountered by the two arms of the social democratic model – particularly with respect to 
occupational health. While the WHO and the ILO continue outwardly to talk the language of 
collaboration and cooperation, it is quite obvious that a deep tension still exists between the ILO’s 
OSH and the WHO’s workers’ health models. What this has meant in reality is that the WHO’s model, 
which has the potential to be a more equitable model, has become disjointed from any real 
consideration of employer responsibility. Genuine engagement between the ILO and WHO on this 
matter may have resulted in some creative thinking about how the financing of the WHO workers’ 
health model might include extra contributions from large industries as part of a wider system of 
redistribution aimed at informal workers. Yet such conversations seem impossible whilst the 






Chapter 6: Into the Future: Informal Workers and the Struggle for 
Health 
 
This thesis has traced the shifting place of the worker in health policy over a period of 120 years in 
the policies of the British colonial governments in India and Ghana, the post-independence 
governments of those same two countries, and in the policies of the ILO and WHO to the present 
day.  In both countries worker-based entitlements to health care were emphasised as part of the 
late colonial project to establish a stabilised working class. This was, however, a deeply gendered 
idea of the worker, based on the male breadwinner model of the British welfare state. Women’s 
entitlements to health care stemmed more from their role as mothers than as workers – a situation 
which failed to acknowledge their important role as economic agents outside of the large colonial 
industries. Post-independence governments, following international trends, shifted the discourse 
around entitlements to one based on citizenship, with “workers’ health” transforming into the 
specialised discipline of occupational health. Yet workplace health care provision continued to be 
linked to large industries, and in the face of government failure to truly extend universal health care, 
continued to be an important source of health services to formal workers and their families. The 
previous chapter focused on the WHO and ILO, looking at the conflicts and shifts that have occurred 
within occupational health policy over a period of fifty years, concentrating particularly on the 
moves to incorporate workers outside of formal employment, as well as women workers, into 
occupational health services. The chapter argued that, whilst these moves have certainly opened up 
spaces for informal workers to make claims on the state, the fact that the focus has been on the 
state alone, whilst capital has increasingly been delinked from responsibility for health provision, 
means that actual gains for these workers are in practice limited.  
 
In this penultimate chapter, the analysis from the previous chapter is extended by focusing on the 
activities of organisations of informal workers’ and their engagements with the national and 
international policy spaces that have opened up in recent years. Previous chapters have explored the 
policy process “from above.” This chapter adds an important element to these previous chapters by 
looking at how the process plays out “from below.” In focusing on organisations of informal workers, 
the chapter once again brings gender, as well as class, to the fore. As Chapter Three showed, the 
informal economy is a space where women, particularly poorer women, are situated within the 
labour market in far greater numbers than they are in formal employment. For example, in Ghana, 
88 percent of women’s non-agricultural employment is informal (Budlender, 2011). In India, this 
figure stands at 85 percent (ILO/WIEGO, 2012). Figures for agricultural employment are less easily 
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available, but it is likely that levels of formal employment in agriculture in both of these countries is 
low. Nevertheless, informal employment is not, of course, limited to women. There are many men 
who are also informally employed. Yet, it is women who are more likely to be concentrated at the 
lower end of the socio-economic scale, and to work in the most poorly paid (or unpaid) occupations 
(Chen, 2012a). In Chapters Two and Four the focus was largely on how formal workers and male-
dominated trade unions have engaged (or not engaged) with health policy and services. In order to 
maintain a gendered perspective, and now that policy spaces have opened up for informal workers, 
it is important as well to look at how organisations of informal workers, particularly those made up 
of poorer women, are engaging with health policy.  
 
There are some omissions in this chapter of which the author is aware. The first relates to the issue 
of class. The theoretical framework laid out in the Introduction stated that this is a study which looks 
at how gender interacts with class, but prioritising class as the analytic variable. In this chapter, 
however, there are class issues which are not discussed. These are the class divisions that exist 
within the worker organisations that are explored in this chapter, all of whom struggle with the 
divisions between leadership and rank and file members, and also with the fact that some of their 
workers members are also themselves employers. These are complex social issues which can only be 
explored fully through ethnographic methods, and not the more distant analysis used in this study. It 
is, however, important to flag the issue. The second relates to the large agricultural sectors in both 
India and Ghana, which are not explored in this chapter. As noted in the introduction, this study 
does have an urban bias, this chapter particularly so. Partly this is because of the need to limit the 
field of study. However, it is also a result of the fact that the author’s own experiences have been 
with organisations that are largely urban based.  
 
The main focus will be on the world’s largest organisation of informal workers: the Self Employed 
Women’s Association (SEWA) based in Ahmedabad in Gujarat State, which has almost two million 
members, all of whom are poor, women workers. SEWA was formed in 1971 and has over the years 
developed a large and impressive range of health interventions. To provide additional insights, the 
activities of two smaller organisations will be discussed.  Kagad Kach Patra Kashtakari Panchayat 
(KKPKP) is a newer and smaller organisation of around eight thousand informal waste recyclers 
(known as waste pickers) based in Pune in Maharashtra State, India. Waste pickers are some of the 
poorest and most marginalised informal workers in India, and experience some of the most serious 
occupational health hazards amongst such workers. KKPKP’s membership is mainly made up of 
women, although not exclusively so. In Ghana, the actions of an alliance of four market and street 
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trader associations, formerly known as the StreetNet Ghana Alliance (now known as the Informal 
Vendors and Hawkers Association of Ghana), will be discussed. These organisations have been 
chosen not only because of the countries in which they are based, but because they have actively 
sought to engage with health policy in different ways. All three of them have also participated 
actively in a health research and action project run by the global research-advocacy-policy network 
Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing between 2009 and 2013.283 This 
chapter is a reflection on both the achievements and the tensions that have arisen through the 
project.  
 
In asking questions about the processes in which these “new” worker organisations are involved, this 
final chapter brings the thesis full circle – from one moment of possibility to another. Based on Fred 
Cooper’s (1996) arguments on the spaces that opened up during the decolonisation period, Chapter 
Two described the openings that occurred for workers in health policy during that period, arguing, in 
line with Cooper’s more general argument, that Asian and African worker organisations were 
engaged in a process of co-production – that the policies which resulted were products of both 
openings from above and engagements from below. This chapter looks at the possibilities that are 
emerging for the workers previously excluded from that earlier process of policy development – 
asking questions about the processes with which they are currently engaged. This moment is one 
that has the potential to reconsider so many orthodoxies of the past – the concept of work, the 
worker, and the institutional designs which govern these areas of life. Yet at the same time it exists 
in a very different context from that of the decolonisation period. There is no colonial oppressor to 
mobilise against, no external occupying force to overthrow, no contradiction of the colonial 
enterprise to prise open and unleash. The role of the developmental state – so crucial to the earlier 
“welfare pacts” – has also been pared back, something that De Swaan (1988) has argued makes a 
repeat of this earlier time unlikely. It is the capitalist system in its current neo-liberal (or post neo-
liberal) form that informal workers are engaged with, and engaging with this orthodoxy to the 
benefit of poorer workers is arguably a far more politically complex task than the struggle against 
colonialism ever was.  
 
Of course, informal worker organisations are not alone in their engagements with the dominant 
social and economic system. Formal trade unions continue to play an important role. Yet neoliberal 
economic policies and the attendant casualisation and informalisation of the global labour force 
                                                          
283 It should be noted from the start that this author has worked on WIEGO’s health project as a project 
manager and researcher since 2009. 
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means that their strength has been weakened considerably (Gallin, 2001; Tendler, 2004). These 
processes have perhaps hit trade unions in developing countries the hardest. With a limited base of 
formal workers and the power of neo-liberal economic policy, public sector retrenchments and 
informalisation have left these unions with a declining membership and resources, and limited 
ability to influence economic policy (Schillinger, 2005; Ahn, 2010; Beckman and Sachikonye, 2010). 
As Tendler (2004) points out, they have also tended to be demonised by development policymakers 
as inefficient obstacles to economic growth. Yet even in the Global North, trade union density has 
declined considerably in some places. In Japan and the USA trade union membership has halved over 
the last forty years, and in Britain trade union membership is down by 27 percent (Gallin, 2001).  
 
The central position of trade union militancy has also been altered by the growth of what is known 
as “social movement” activism. Social movements have sprung up around the globe partially in 
response to the diminishing and inadequate power of trade union-based agitations to counter the 
increasingly flexible and mobile flows of transnational capital and the social fallout that has resulted. 
Della Porta and Diani (2006) define social movements as being concerned with social justice (often 
with an environmental angle) and view them as marking a definitive break with what they term 
“workerist” modes of resistance. According to these authors,  
The principal innovations of the new movements … are a critical ideology in relation to 
modernism and progress, decentralised and participatory organisational structures, defence 
of interpersonal solidarity against the bureaucracies, and the reclamation of autonomous 
spaces, rather than material advantages (Della Porta and Diani, 2006: 9).   
 
This definition, argue Della Porta and Diani (2006: 9), has the advantage of placing “actors at the 
centre of the stage, and [capturing] the innovative characteristics of movements which no longer 
define themselves principally in relation to the system of production.” 
 
The organisations of informal workers which are discussed in this chapter straddle a divide between 
the traditional workerist model of activism and the new social movement activism. On the one hand, 
they adopt the pragmatic tactics and strategic positions which are in keeping with social movement 
activism. On the other hand, they have identified strongly with the trade union model – in India, due 
to a loophole in the trade union legislation, both SEWA and KKPKP have been able to register as 
unions of self-employed workers. More importantly, their activism focuses very directly on a critique 
of the system of production. This orientation, it will be argued during this chapter, offers a powerful 
(and unique) challenge to the dominant models of the current era. Indeed the suggestion that social 
movements in the present era “no longer define themselves principally in relation to the system of 
production,” and that class struggle may be considered somewhat passé, is concerning. As the 
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previous chapter showed, and as Nancy Fraser has articulated so clearly in her critique of second 
wave feminism (Fraser, 2009), the erosion of the relationship between social justice concerns and 
questions of economic justice does little to reinforce, and may ultimately undermine, the gains of 
social justice movements. Della Porta and Diani (2006) do go on to say that “the rise” of 
“movements of the poor,” which make the notion of class central and whose goals involve the 
improvement of the material conditions of life for their members, has challenged the idea that the 
new social movements operate solely in the sphere of “post-materialism.” Yet even then, many 
movements of the poor make their claims on very different grounds from informal workers. For 
example, in terms of health-related claims specifically, most social movements base their claims to 
health and health services on the basis of citizenship or human rights. The informal worker 
organisations discussed in this chapter make these claims based on their status as workers. In terms 
of the aims of this thesis, this is particularly interesting for two reasons. Firstly, it allows these 
organisations the space to unite issues of social and economic justice (which in itself is a critique of 
the current neo-liberal system); and second, it plays on the tension that has been discussed 
throughout this thesis between status as citizen and status as worker.  
 
Yet even so, questions do remain about the direction of resistance taken by organisations of 
informal workers and whether they are likely to have the transformative impact on society that 
trade unions have had in the past. Unions have been significant political actors in both national and 
international politics. They have been at the heart of the Labour Party in Britain, been strong 
supporters of the Democratic Party in the USA, and have had representation and voice equal to that 
of governments and employers at the ILO. The aim of this chapter is to interrogate what impact 
these new worker organisations are making in a changed world, one where this union power has 
diminished. It will look critically at how these organisations are engaging around health services in 
India and Ghana, how they are taking advantage of policy spaces that are opening up, if and how 
they are managing to widen those spaces and if so in what direction, and what implications their 
strategies and tactics have more generally for a just distribution of health services. These questions 
also feed into a major thread running through the literature on resistance movements more 
generally.  In essence these debates revolve around questions of purpose and process. What should 
constitute a desirable end-goal for the actions of resistance? What should be counted as progress 
towards that vision?  
 
Such questions are hotly contested among those coming from different theoretical and ideological 
positions. Some scholars adopt a rigid Marxism which sees the downfall of capitalism as the proper 
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end goal of resistance activities (Smith, 2011). Therefore, on this extreme are those who Tanya 
Murray Li (2007: 278) refers to as “vanguards” who argue that groups who exist on the margins of 
society should  
…not strive for inclusion in markets, or seek a closer relation with ruling regimes, or their 
share of the material benefits of development, which structurally speaking are impossible for 
them obtain. They should lead the way in autonomous, authentic, post-development thinking 
that is anti-capitalist, anti-state and grounded in local traditions and cultural diversity. 
 
The vision here is for an alternative to statist capitalist development which ultimately, it is hoped, 
will challenge the capitalist system. In this view, any kind of negotiation or accommodation within 
the system is seen as collaboration with it – acquiescence to a wider social structure which will keep 
marginalised people marginal. It might yield some benefits in the short term, but in the long run it 
cannot fundamentally benefit those who are seeking to improve their situation. For example, 
Foweraker (2001, cited in Bebbington, 2007) argues, in relation to political engagements between 
the Chilean and Brazilian states and social movements in those countries, that negotiation ultimately 
led to a “taming of social movements,” whose demands for radical social justice were met with 
“hand-outs and programmes to help the poor cope with crisis” that the movements in question 
accepted in lieu of a fundamental re-ordering of the economic system (810).  
 
On the other end of the spectrum there are a number of positions. They range from a neoliberal 
approach which would see reform as proceeding in a direction that is even more favourable to 
business interests, to a social democratic incremental approach to reform which sees social progress 
occurring in planned stages. In the less directly policy-oriented academic literature there is also the 
“everyday resistance” approach – a term first used by James Scott (1985) in his book Weapons of the 
Weak. Scott (1985), whose empirical work was conducted amongst peasant populations in Malaysia, 
argues against an approach which frames “peasant resistance” in revolutionary terms. Peasant 
revolutions, he argues, have time and time again replaced one coercive regime with another – 
“much at odds with the goals for which peasants had imagined they were fighting” (Scott, 1985: 29). 
For Scott, framing research in this way misses the importance of different forms of resistance which 
are perhaps more likely to create beneficial change for marginalised people. His research in Malaysia 
concentrated on everyday forms of peasant resistance against “those who seek to extract labour, 
food, taxes, rents and interest from them” (Scott, 1985: 29). These forms of struggle, he argues, are 
often not collective or even conscious decisions to rebel – resistance emerges from the “foot 
dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage…” 
that “relatively powerless” people use in their interactions with the state (Scott, 1985: 29). Although 
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this form of resistance does not result in spectacles, it is often very effective, Scott argues, and can 
bring state programmes shuddering to a halt as people refuse to comply with them. 
 
In a somewhat related vein, James Holston (2008) uses the term “insurgent citizenship” to describe 
the ways in which poor urban dwellers in the Global South gained citizenship. Holston (2008), who 
conducted his field work in Brazil, argues that these citizens gain their rights not primarily through 
labour struggles, but rather through their engagement with the spaces and institutions of cities. By 
occupying and transforming the peripheral spaces of the city, and demanding basic services in those 
spaces (insurgent citizenship), the urban poor have been able to challenge the dominant form of 
“entrenched” and inegalitarian citizenship and make real gains for themselves. This approach, which 
again views resistance in very different terms from the vanguardist framework, has also been 
highlighted by scholars like Asef Bayat (2009) who has spoken of the “quiet encroachment of the 
ordinary” to describe the way in which the poor and marginalised are able to force their imprint 
onto mainstream politics. The direct goal is not to destabilise the capitalist system; instead the goal 
may be to secure a livelihood, or to gain access to basic services. The cumulative effects of such 
actions, however, are to radically transform the landscape and our conceptions of the normal. These 
approaches tend to be more positive about the actions and potential of social movements than 
more hard line Marxist approaches which tend to emphasise the structural limitations to resistance. 
Holston (2008) in particular also emphasises the entangled nature of state and society. By 
challenging the classic binary divide between state and society he is able to see what may be termed 
“accommodation with the system” as an unavoidable part of the political process. 
 
Returning back to the national level, this chapter will begin with an overview of developments in 
social and economic policy in both India and Ghana, including a description of the current labour 
market picture in each country. It will then move on to an analysis of the health-related activities of 
the three informal worker organisations before moving on to a concluding section in which three 
main points will be emphasised. The first point is that it is more important to understand what social 
movements are actually doing on the ground – to analyse these with multiple theoretical tools – 
than it is to jump to concrete conclusions about their relative merits and demerits based on rigid 
theoretical frameworks. As Scott (1985: 40) argues, “Much of the debate on these issues has taken 
place as if the choice of interpretation were more a matter of the ideological preference of the 
analyst than of actual research.” Adopting a rigid vanguardist position which would see the downfall 
of capitalism as the end goal of resistance and judging organisations on their compliance or non-
compliance with the system, may obscure the fact that there is much more going on.  Specifically, 
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that an organisation might be revolutionary in an entirely different sense, whether that be by giving 
its members a sense of self-worth and empowerment in the most genuine sense of the word, or by 
the small but crucially important gains that are made in living standards through accommodations 
that are made with the current political and economic system.  
 
At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that improvements in the living standards of most 
of the world’s poor workers are limited by the structural constraints of the capitalist system and thus 
will be continually contested. Adopting a rigid vanguardism may obscure some of the gains of 
organisations, but completely discarding a critique of capitalism and the way in which it works to 
keep living standards low is equally problematic. Without taking away from the real potential of 
organisations to make a significant contribution, it is also necessary to ask questions about what 
they are doing at a fundamental level in relation to the economic system – this cannot and should 
not be ignored. A hybrid approach tempers optimism with realism. It allows for an appreciation of 
important gains that are made, yet at the same time keeps the limits in view.  
 
This leads to the second point, which is that organisations of informal workers do indeed hold a 
powerful key to unlocking primary elements of the current capitalist system. Underlying their 
activism is the basic argument for the recognition of a “reserve army” – the term used by Marx to 
refer to the oversupply of labour which could keep wage rates down – as productive workers with 
the full rights and responsibilities that this entails. Their contributions to the economy should be 
recognised, and they should receive the protections and services they require to lead a good and 
productive life. For this to actually happen would require a radical transformation in the dominant 
political and economic system. Yet, as the previous chapter showed, the forces pushing in the 
opposite direction are powerful, and whether informal worker organisations will be indeed be able 
to use that key to good effect remains to be seen. At present the material gains are still small ones. 
Nevertheless, as Gramsci reminds us, politics cannot be read off economics alone (Hart, 2013). 
Where these organisations – particularly the Indian organisations – have been most powerful is in 
their ideological challenge to otherwise accepted orthodoxies around work and the institutions that 
govern it. With time this challenge may begin to bear material fruits.  
 
The third and final point is that the systemic tensions, contradictions, and dialectics that have been 
drawn out throughout this thesis are reflected as well in the internal constitution of informal worker 
organisations. These organisations do not operate independently of the system in which they 
operate, nor of the history of worker politics in which their activism is deeply embedded. Their 
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philosophies, strategies, and tactics are both produced by, and reproduce, the tensions that exist 
between universalism and particularism, and between “the terms of inclusion” – inclusion based on 
citizenship, and inclusion based on status as worker.  
 
India and Ghana in the 21st century 
Both India and Ghana have undergone major political and economic changes since the post-
independence period. Although their economies are very different, both countries have experienced 
periods of economic crisis and stagnation. They have also, since the 1980s in Ghana and the 1990s in 
India, adopted a neo-liberal model of development. There are differences and similarities in how this 
has played out. India has boomed since the opening up of its economy, and it is now an undisputed 
global economic power. The majority of its people (69 percent), however, remain in the rural 
areas.284 Ghana’s economic development has been a more halting success, although the recent 
discovery of oil off the coast has begun to stimulate rapid economic growth. Ghana has also become 
a predominantly urban country, with 51 percent of the population living in cities.285 In both 
countries, however, rapid economic growth has led to growing inequality, and the structure of the 
labour market has continued to be dominated by informal employment. In both countries the 
informal workforce comprises over 90 percent of total employment, which has important 
implications for both the regulation of labour and social policy. Global forces interacted with 
national politics, and these national contexts in which the informal economy continues to 
predominate is examined in the next part of this chapter.  
 
During the 1970s and 80s the Indian economy stagnated, culminating in 1989/1991 with a major 
fiscal crisis. The crisis provided the necessary impetus for Manmohan Singh’s Congress-led 
government to introduce wide reaching reforms, abandoning the planned development approach of 
Nehru and embracing the global, liberalised marketplace by removing license regimes, lowering the 
barriers for the entry of foreign capital and goods, and privatising state-owned sectors such as 
information technology, telecommunications, banking, and insurance. Economic growth has been 
impressive, with booms in the IT and telecoms sectors in particular (Bardhan, 1998). Growth rates 
averaged at around 5 percent during the 1990s, increasing to 7 percent during the first decade of the 
21st century (Chen and Raveendren, 2011). Previously thought of as a land of extreme poverty and 
hardship, India has become an undisputed global economic power. 
 
                                                          
284 Index Mundi (2011 figures), available at: http://www.indexmundi.com/india/urbanization.html 
285 Index Mundi (2011 figures), available at: http://www.indexmundi.com/ghana/urbanization.html 
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Partha Chatterjee (2008) argues that the economic reforms have profoundly altered the Indian 
political landscape. A newly confident and globally connected “corporate capitalist class” has risen 
over and above the traditionally powerful “landed elites.” The middle classes, the bastion of the 
“bureaucratic-managerial class” who devise and lead the interventions of the state, have 
increasingly begun to see the state itself as irretrievably corrupt and inefficient and have transferred 
their allegiance to the professional and efficient corporate capitalist class. This, in conjunction with 
the dictates of the free market, has led to a much greater acceptance of the private sector in matters 
previously thought of as state responsibilities. The state and the private sector, Chatterjee (2008) 
argues, have thereby become increasingly entangled with one another. This promotes the 
prioritisation of “the country’s trading and investment regimes … over its ‘social investment’ regime” 
(Corbridge and Harriss, 2000: 146). India’s once powerful trade union federations have suffered 
under this regime, losing much of their political leverage and being forced into a constant defensive 
position which has done little to advance the position of Indian workers (Roychowdhury, 2003). This 
has extended even to those with affiliations to the major political parties, such as the Indian National 
Trade Union Congress (INTUC), traditionally affiliated with the Congress Party. Ahn (2010: 27) argues 
that trade unions have lost so much ground in the Lok Sabha (India’s highest decision making body) 
that they have effectively “turned into a peripheral support group for political parties.” 
 
One of the areas where evidence of India’s change in policy is most striking is in employment. In a 
detailed paper on employment trends, Chen and Raveendren (2011: 1) argue that the high levels of 
output growth have not been matched by a growth in employment, and that job seekers are not 
being “…absorbed into modern formal wage employment,” but rather into informal employment. 
Higher employment rates were in fact achieved during the late 1980s when economic growth was 
lower, but government spending had a greater focus on poverty reduction and social spending at 
this time (Corbridge and Harriss 2000; Chen and Raveendren 2011). The lack of job creation has been 
most marked in the period of 2005-2010, when employment growth dropped to 0.2 percent per 
annum from the 2.85 percent recorded in the previous five year period, and labour participation 
rates for both men and women aged fifteen years and older declined. This drop has affected women 
the most, with a 10 percent drop in women’s labour force participation (Chen and Raveendren, 
2011). Regular wage labour has declined, casual wage employment is also waning, and there has 
been a significant increase in self-employment, particularly amongst women, in both rural and urban 
areas (Chen, 2012b). Recent labour force statistics on urban employment reveal a small salaried 
workforce (20 percent), an informal waged workforce (40 percent), and a large informal self-
employed workforce (40 percent), meaning that informal employment, which is largely unprotected 
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and has a higher chance of lower returns, now accounts for at least 80 percent of urban employment 
(Chen and Raveendren, 2011: 1). When rural employment is included, levels of informality rise above 
90 percent, with 77 percent of these workers receiving less than US $0.50 in wages per day 
(Sengupta 2007, cited in Whitehead 2013). 
 
For India’s poorest workers, the liberalisation of the economy has opened up some opportunities, 
but has closed many others down. On the one hand, new markets have opened up globally for small 
home based producers. On the other hand, small home based producers, lacking any kind of 
protection or encouragement from the state, are easily brushed aside by competition from large 
producers (Bhatt 2012). Chen (2012b) paints a detailed picture of the opportunities opening and 
closing for informal workers in India. The boom in infrastructure development has provided 
opportunities for agricultural workers – new dams and canals are allowing a growth in paddy 
cultivation. At the same time, increased mechanisation has meant fewer jobs in wheat harvesting. 
The pro-business environment has also meant that employers are more easily able to avoid labour 
regulations without sanction. Construction labourers, for example, are only protected by legislation 
if they work for the same employer for 90 days a year. Employers therefore make a concerted effort 
not to hire for 90 days or more, and are able to do so with impunity. Street vendors are facing 
increasing competition from well-stocked, air-conditioned supermarkets, and are being excluded 
from the public (and productive) spaces of the city through urban planning initiatives which “aspire 
to World Class City status” (Chen, 2012b: 279). Moreover, as long as the growth in formal wage 
employment remains stagnant, Chen (2012b) argues that the number of entrants into the informal 
economy is likely to rise, putting livelihoods under even greater stress. 
 
Although the political reconfigurations attendant on the neo-liberal reforms may be specific to India, 
the entanglement of state and capital is not. David Harvey (2010b) argues that it is a central and 
global characteristic of the neo-liberal era; the consequence being that the benefits of growth are 
not evenly distributed as the state increasingly favours “the ruling class.” In Ghana it can be argued 
that this is equally true, although with little actual economic growth occurring until very recently, 
political reconfigurations may be harder to discern. The overthrow of Nkrumah in 1966 ushered in a 
period of political and economic turbulence in Ghana, with alternating periods of military and civilian 
rule and civil disturbance that left the economy vulnerable to the 1979 oil shock. The economic 
collapse of the country in 1979 led to the overthrow of the Supreme Military Council of General 
Acheampong by Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings. A brief period of democratic government ensued 




In 1983, Rawlings and his Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) embarked on a major 
overhaul of the economy, known as the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP). The ERP was based 
heavily on neo-liberal economic principles – price controls were removed, state owned enterprises 
and basic services were privatised, and public sector employment was cut dramatically (Gyimah-
Boadi and Jeffries, 2000). The brief spurt of economic growth which followed the reforms made 
Ghana a poster child for the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) led by the IMF and the World 
Bank; although, Kraus (1991) argues that the growth pattern was misleading in that it compared 
Ghana’s performance between 1984 and 1989 with the years between 1979 and 1983 when the 
economy was in complete collapse, with Ghana’s cocoa exports falling from 33 percent of the world 
market to only 12 percent (Manuh, 1994). When economic indicators for 1984-1989 are compared 
to 1970 indicators, it shows the cocoa and timber output remained low, and consumption per capita, 
real minimum wages, and levels of basic social services remained lower than in 1970 (Kraus, 1991: 
24). Moreover, employment in the manufacturing sector fell below 50 percent of its 1970 share of 
total employment (Manuh, 1994). 
 
Although not comparing well to the economic indicators from 1970, since 1984 the Ghanaian 
economy has recovered to some degree from the collapse of 1979. Agricultural, timber, and mining 
output has improved, and in more recent years the economy has begun to grow rapidly (at around 7 
percent in 2013). This growth has been driven not only by improved output in agriculture 
(particularly cocoa), but also by the pro-business orientation leading to increased foreign direct 
investment adopted by the successive Ghanaian governments elected since Rawlings returned the 
country to democratic rule in 1994, and since the discovery of oil in Ghana’s territorial waters off the 
coast of Takoradi (Manuh, 1994, Booth et al., 2005). This economic growth, and a sustained period 
of relative political stability, have seen Ghana move from Low Income to Low Middle Income status 
according to the World Bank’s ranking system.  
 
As Kanbur (2013) points out, however, this newfound wealth has not translated into benefits for all 
the country’s citizens equally. Although income poverty has been reduced, income inequality is on 
the rise. Since 2000 public and private sector formal employment has recovered from its low levels 
during the 1980s, with the public sector wage bill as a percentage of total government spending 
increasing from 20 percent to 30 percent between 2001 and 2006 (STAR-Ghana, 2011). However, as 
Anyemedu (2000) points out, the quality of these jobs is questionable, with the daily minimum wage 
in 2000 sitting at half of its real value in 1991. Moreover, there continues to be a shortage of formal 
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jobs and the informal economy has continued to dominate employment in Ghana. Heintz’s 
calculations in 2005 (based on the Ghana Living Standards Survey of 2000/1) showed that formal 
employment stood at only 9 percent of the total employment, meaning that just over 90 percent of 
Ghana’s workers worked informally and therefore had a higher chance of earning low returns 
(Heintz, 2005). An analysis of the most recent round of the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS 5 
2005/6) showed that 15 percent of Ghanaian workers were in formal non-agricultural employment, 
which suggests that formal employment may have risen (in 2000/1, formal employment in 
agriculture was negligible) (Budlender, 2011). Again, though, the quality of this formal employment 
is questionable, as Anyemedu (2000) points out.  
 
In this context, the Ghana Trades Union Congress (GTUC) has struggled to assert itself. In 1979 the 
organisation made the decision to withdraw from party politics. Its prior “cosy” relationship with 
Acheampong’s Supreme Military Council regime had led to deep splits in the organisation and had 
demoralised the labour movement (Akwetey and Dorkenoo, 2010). The decision to remain politically 
independent returned credibility to the GTUC, but it has faced significant challenges nonetheless. 
The public sector retrenchments that occurred early on under the ERP significantly impacted the 
membership of the organisation, and membership numbers are yet to recover (Anyemedu, 2000). 
Wage restraint in order to attract foreign direct investment has been a core tenet of the ERP and 
subsequent economic policies of the Ghanaian government. This has created “an alliance between 
government and private business in opposition to demands for wage increases from formal 
organised labour” (Anyemedu, 2000: 11). According to Kraus (1991), the government has regularly 
attempted to obstruct collective bargaining agreements by requiring the Prices and Incomes Board 
to approve the agreements, and allowing the Board to alter agreements at their discretion. It has in 
fact become so difficult for the GTUC to have an influence on core worker issues like wages that it 
has increasingly begun to play a role as a critical voice from civil society on more general issues of 
social justice – although it attempts to influence economic and social policy where possible with the 
presence of various tripartite and policy making bodies (Akwetey and Dorkenoo, 2010).  
 
For informal workers, Ghana’s recent history has also not been easy. Like his predecessors, 
Rawlings’s vision for Ghana was not one which was particularly amenable to the needs of informal 
workers. As with Nkrumah, groups of informal workers were specifically blamed for the economic 
problems facing the country. Shortly after he took power in 1979, Rawlings launched an attack on 
the market women of Accra’s Makola Market, claiming that they were “hoarders” who were driving 
up the price of food. He continued this targeting of market women into the 1980s. As Claire 
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Robertson (1983) has argued, the market women, whose real crime was to play the most visible role 
in drawing attention to the recurring shortages of goods and foodstuffs, bore the brunt of the public 
displeasure which rightly should have been targeted at the less visible sources of inflation, decline in 
the terms of trade, and general corruption that characterised the Ghanaian economy at that time. 
Since Ghana’s return to democracy in 1993, there has been less obvious discrimination against 
informal workers, although it is questionable as to whether much genuine effort has gone into 
promoting their inclusion into the economy on more favourable terms. The World Bank has 
remained one of Ghana’s largest sources of international aid (Harrigan and Younger, 2000), and this 
has certainly played a role in the continued neo-liberal slant of economic policy, with many negative 
effects on informal workers. These include increased competition for livelihoods (Overå, 2007), and 
the (poorly regulated) privatisation of basic urban services which negatively affect the physical 
condition of many informal workplaces and increase the costs of operating micro and small 
businesses in public spaces (Alfers and Abban, 2011). The oil finds have opened up opportunities for 
some workers in Takoradi, but many more are struggling to cope with rising food prices, rising house 
rentals, and battles over productive urban space, including plans to demolish the central Takoradi 
market and replace it with a high rise mall to cater to the needs of middle class oil workers (Overå, 
2011). 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, ‘post-neoliberalism’ has brought about a softening of the neo-
liberal stance towards social policy. In both India and Ghana this has had an impact on national social 
policy, and in both cases there has been an attempt to extend social protections to the large 
informal workforce. In terms of health policy specifically, both countries have recently implemented 
large “flagship’ health programmes. In India, where the public health system is famously neglected, 
the state introduced in 2008 a large central government funded health insurance scheme known as 
the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY), which aims to provide health protection to poor citizens 
and certain specified groups of informal workers. In Ghana, Rawlings’s neo-liberal reforms brought 
about a disastrous user fee policy for public health care facilities which saw health utilisation drop to 
a record low. In 2003 the country introduced its National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), which is 
meant to provide coverage for both formal and informal workers – the first time in the country’s 
history that informal workers have been included in a national social protection scheme.  
 
In Ghana the reform of the health system was driven by a number of factors both national and 
international. The deep unpopularity of the health care user fee system introduced under the ERP 
led to a political party (the National Democratic Congress) promising the implementation of a 
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national health insurance scheme as part of its policy platform during the 2000 national elections 
(Alfers, 2013). The failings of the free universal health service set up under Nkrumah has meant that 
the platform of this type of health scheme has been seen as politically unfeasible, and the choice of 
health insurance more attractive.286 It is certainly the case that the World Bank has played an 
important role in facilitating the design and implementation of the scheme, and Ghana has been an 
active member of the Joint Learning Network which is also partly supported by the Rockefeller and 
Gates Foundations (Apoya and Marriott, 2011; Alfers 2013).  
 
International influences have also been present in India, where the Labour Ministry was the driving 
force behind the implementation of the RSBY (Jain, 2013). The country is, for example, also a part of 
the Joint Learning Network. The structure of the scheme has also been a result of driving national 
concerns – in particular the government’s need to be seen to be seen to be addressing some of the 
obvious social inequalities wrought by economic growth. De Haan (2013) argues that India has taken 
a “welfarist” approach to its social policy, as opposed to the “productivist” stance taken by the Asia’s 
other great economic power, China. Despite the fact that the background to the RSBY was the 
SEWA-driven, 12 year initiative to pass the Unorganised Sector Bill, India, according to de Haan 
(2013), has not seen social spending as inextricably linked with the economy and its productivity and 
therefore as a productive investment in its population, but rather as a means to ameliorate the 
conditions of the poor. It is not social democratic principles which underpin these policies, but rather 
the neo-liberal idea of safety nets for the poor.  
 
Both the RSBY and the NHIS will be discussed in further detail in this chapter, but it is worth noting 
here that both are considered flagship health programmes, yet are actually health insurance 
schemes to mitigate against catastrophic health expenditures for the poor. They do little to address 
the dire need for primary health care and basic essential services such as clean water and sanitation 
– things seen as highly important by the British productivist welfare regimes. Even though they claim 
to include workers, this is done in the same manner in which the World Bank has sought to include 
workers within its policy frameworks and recommendations – seeing them not as economic agents, 
but as an especially vulnerable group of poor citizens who cannot be reached through traditional 
social health insurance techniques.  
 
                                                          
286 Interview with Dr. Clement Adamba, Institute for Social, Statistical and Economic Research (ISSER), 
University of Ghana, 22nd March 2012.  
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It is this national context in which informal worker organisations are currently operating. The themes 
brought out in the previous chapter present themselves again. On the one hand possibilities have 
opened up for such organisations; there are greater economic opportunities, and national social 
policies have started to grapple with the complex task of extending social protection to informal 
workers. On the other hand, the economic context means that there is greater opportunity for the 
already large and powerful to grab an even greater share of the profits. Social policy remains 
delinked from economic policy – the protections extended to informal workers do not necessarily 
see them as potentially productive economic agents, but rather as just another group of poor 
citizens requiring welfare. The challenge for informal worker organisations has been to try and re-
forge that link in an image which suits the reality of work outside of the industrialised world. 
 
The Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) 
It was not this period, but rather an earlier time of economic instability which gave rise to the first 
and largest of India’s informal worker trade unions, the Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA). 
SEWA began its life in 1972 as a branch of the Textile Labour Association (TLA, known in India as the 
Majoor Mahajan Sangh, set up in Ahmedabad, Gujarat (“the Manchester of India”) by Mahatma 
Gandhi and Anasuyaben Sarabhai in 1920). It was started by Ela Bhatt, then a lawyer working for the 
organisation during the period after 1968 when the large Ahmedabad textile mills came under threat 
from smaller operations, and some 17 000 male workers were laid off (Shani, 2007). Bhatt noticed 
that while the men continued to look for formal employment, it was women who managed to keep 
the family going through largely invisible and unrecognised forms of labour, such as rag picking, or 
sewing done in the home. She began to organise these women under the auspices of the TLA, but 
lacked support, and finally encountered outright hostility from the organisation, which Bhatt (2006: 
14) says had “very little room for new ideas and a dwindling ability to face new challenges.” Realising 
that “women workers would always be of marginal importance to the TLA – their numbers had 
declined to four per cent in fifty years,” Bhatt set up SEWA as an independent organisation. Its roots 
remained Gandhian; the organisation is committed to the Mahatma’s ideals of peaceful mediation 
and negotiation, decentralised, local production units, and “the forging of dignity through work” 
(Bhatt and Jhabvala, 2012). 
 
SEWA’s orientation as a Gandhian workers’ organisation places it in an interesting position in regard 
to debates about the present day Indian left. SEWA arose alongside a number of social movements 
in India between the years 1972 and 1975. These movements focused largely on environmental 
issues, human rights, gender and caste-based issues, and, during the 1980s, started to rise to 
prominence as the “new” face of the Indian left (Omvedt, 1994). The “traditional left” in India – 
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embodied in the two Communist parties – has condemned these movements. Guha has argued that 
such organisations, focused as they are on gender, caste, or ethnicity, can never have the mass 
appeal of “class-based movements,” and Alam argues that they represent the decline of truly 
democratic forces (cited in Omvedt, 1994).  
 
The Gandhian organisations in particular have come in for criticism. Gandhi’s philosophy of swaraj 
(freedom) meant freedom not only from colonial rule, but also an individual freedom which he 
conceptualised as self-rule: “At the individual level swaraj is vitally connected with the capacity for 
dispassionate self-assessment, ceaseless self-purification and growing swadeshi or self-reliance.”287 
Unlike social democrats and socialists, Gandhi did not see the state as a source of liberation, but 
rather as a negative force and a constraint on individual swaraj, and Gandhian organisations have 
adopted this suspicious view. Whitehead (2003: 293), for example, citing Bakshi (1996) and Sangvai 
(2003), characterises Gandhian organisations as upholding the belief “that both urban and rural 
communities should be largely self-reliant for their basic needs, with limited dependence on 
expanded markets, and that decision-making should also be decentralised to the village level.” 
Whitehead (2003) goes on to argue that this orientation fails to engage with the reality of present 
day India, where the market and state play a much more important role in economies that were 
formerly subsistence based. 
 
Yet SEWA does not fall so easily into these categorisations. Although its work focuses on gender and 
caste issues, it is first and foremost a worker’s organisation and as such, work is the issue which sits 
as its core. It is a member of the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC),288 and in 2010 had 
a representative elected to the vice-presidency. With a current membership of approximately 1.9 
million workers,289 it was considered large enough to have been given official trade union 
consultative status by the Government of India in 2002 alongside eleven other trade union 
federations, despite the hostility of the formal trade unions (Ahn, 2010). Moreover, although SEWA 
has refused to merge with other large union federations, it does collaborate with them where 
possible. For example, the 2014 announcement by India’s new Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 
government that it planned to use Rajasthan as an experiment in cutting back on labour laws was 
                                                          
287 Gandhi, M.K. Young India, June 28, 1928. 
288 ITUC was formed in 2006 as a merger between the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
(ICFTU) and the World Confederation of Labour (WCL). See Chapter Five. 
289 Data courtesy of SEWA Union, September 2014. Approximately 1 million of SEWA’s members are in its 
home state of Gujarat. The organisation also has a significant presence in Madhya Pradesh (600 000 
members), Uttar Pradesh (127 000 members), Bihar (82 000 members), Delhi (40 000 members), and 
Rajasthan (37 000). In the Communist run states of West Bengal and Kerala, its numbers are lower; 7000 and 
10 000 members respectively. 
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met with a joint declaration from the eleven trade union federations with consultative status 
(including SEWA) stating their opposition to this move (Menon, 9 July 2014). Moreover, SEWA’s 
orientation towards the state and market is different from the one described by Whitehead. It is 
true that there is a distrust for the centralised state and market economy – in their booklet The Idea 
of Work Ela Bhatt and Renana Jhabvala (the current SEWA president) argue strongly for the 
decentralisation of production into localised production units, thereby giving workers greater control 
over both production and surplus while boosting industry in previously neglected areas (Bhatt and 
Jhabvala 2012). However, they are at pains to point out that this “by no means suggests that local 
communities should de-link from the larger society. On the contrary, local markets need to be better 
linked with larger markets while the flow of goods, services and knowledge needs to be 
strengthened” (Bhatt and Jhabvala, 2012). Their argument is for inclusion, not exclusion, but 
inclusion on terms that will benefit poor workers.  
 
However, although SEWA is arguably different, it also has similarities to the social movements which 
have made Indian Marxists so uncomfortable. Omvedt (1994) argues that social movements pose a 
challenge to traditional Marxist theories of capitalism. SEWA, being an organisation that focuses on 
the reserve army rather than the working class, certainly does pose such a challenge. The fact that 
SEWA organises poor, self-employed informal workers means that it cannot operate in the same 
manner as a traditional trade union. The fight for labour rights is still of course a central aspect of 
SEWA’s work. It has argued vociferously for a reconceptualisation of the idea of work and the worker 
so that labour rights and social protections may be extended to self-employed informal workers 
(Bhatt and Jhabvala, 2012). It has thought through what this would mean in terms of institutional 
innovations from the state, and, where possible, it has taken on middle-men and owners of capital in 
the interests of the workers at the bottom of production chains (Bhatt, 2006). At the same time, 
realising that for poor workers the first priority is an income, it has also become involved in 
‘developmental work,’ setting up a cooperative bank for the poor and illiterate, as well as production 
cooperatives, which, Bhatt (2006) says, would never have been allowed under the auspices of the 
TLA. 
 
Furthermore, the organisation remains strictly non-partisan politically – a decision made by its 
leaders when it was established in 1972. This makes it one of the very few major trade unions in 
India not to involve itself in party politics (Ahn, 2010). Independence from party politics amongst 
trade unions is not unique to SEWA – the GTUC for example also remains independent from party 
politics. This is different from the corporatist arrangements of welfare state Britain, where trade 
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unions traditionally affiliate themselves with the Labour Party in a bid to create a workers’ state 
(although this changed under Blair’s New Labour). Yet it is one grounded in the realities of present 
day politics in India and Ghana. In India the politically partisan unions have been driven apart by 
factionalism, something which has contributed to their weakened state (Ahn, 2010). In Ghana too, 
political affiliation has negatively affected the GTUC. SEWA’s independence meanwhile has meant 
that it has been able to work with a range of actors to improve the well-being of its members. Much 
like the GTUC, SEWA engages with the state. It is represented on the National Planning Commission 
and through this has become relatively influential on various policy making bodies. It sits on the 
advisory board of the National Rural Health Mission, launched by Manmohan Singh in 2005, as a 
means to improve health indicators in poorly served rural areas. More recently it has also been 
heavily involved in the National Urban Health Mission, launched in 2013 to target the urban poor. 
Through these initiatives it has also partnered with the state to improve the delivery of health 
services through its own network of community health workers. Depending on one’s position, this 
way of working may represent a threat to social democracy (the end of the ideal of the worker’s 
state), or it might signal a move towards a pragmatic politics which truly has the potential to extend 
social and labour protections to those previously excluded, or it may be both. 
 
More problematic for SEWA’s potential allies on the left, however, is its reluctance to state an open 
political position on certain key issues. For example, according to the International Coordinator of 
StreetNet International, a federation of street vendor organisations from over forty countries to 
which SEWA belongs, SEWA has not been forgiven by the Indian left wing for failing to make an open 
statement about the communal violence which wracked Gujarat in 2002. The violence was widely 
believed to have been (at least partly) encouraged by Narendra Modi’s BJP government and its 
Hindu nationalist stance which at the time of the violence was the state government of Gujarat.290 As 
the only organisation trusted on both sides, SEWA played a central role in the resolution of the crisis 
and the support of those affected. Many on the left felt that they were ideally placed to make an 
important statement critical of Modi, but the organisation chose to remain silent and remain 
politically neutral, despite a smear campaign led by the BJP against it.291  Its reluctance to overtly 
endorse socialism has also led to problems in developing and sustaining alliances. This was a 
contributing factor to SEWA’s leaving the New Trade Union Initiative (NTUI), an organisation it 
founded as a way to bring together unions working in the informal economy.292 In a less overt way, 
several of these tensions play themselves out in SEWA’s health work. 
                                                          





SEWA’s Health Work 
Health policies and services have long been a concern of SEWA. Their concerns around health care 
stem largely from their members’ status as workers and income earners. The pernicious effects of 
the relationship between unprotected labour, poverty, and illness are described by Ela Bhatt (2006: 
24): 
An asset that the poor are left with are their own bodies. As long as they have physical 
strength, they can dig, carry, haul, and cut to earn some money. Such manual labour requires 
a strong and healthy body, but their bodies are often weak and overtaxed from overwork, 
inadequate food and poor nutrition. On days that they are able to work, they earn; in times 
of illness, they still work but their productivity declines, and consequently they earn a lot less 
money. So during illness – precisely the time when they need good nutrition the most – the 
family half starves. 
 
SEWA’s activism around the provision of health care – whether general health services, reproductive 
health services, or occupational health services – has therefore been centred on the worker. Their 
underlying argument is that India’s poor workers, making up such a large percentage of the 
population, are productive economic agents who provide essential services to the Indian economy. If 
their health is not cared for they cannot be productive, and the economy and society ultimately 
suffers. This language is a productivist one, very different from the language of the “poor citizen” 
who cannot work and must be cared for by the state on an altruistic basis – the language which 
governs neo-liberal safety nets. It is an argument that says that poor people work hard, that they 
contribute in many ways to the social and economic life of the nation, and for that reason are 
deserving of the rights of citizenship. Here SEWA is employing a discourse which draws on that of 
the social democratic era. Citizenship for SEWA is rooted in work, just as it was in post-World War 
Two Britain. The difference is that the definition of a worker is a much broader one, encompassing 
home based workers, street vendors, and waste pickers, whose economic contribution, in a country 
where these sectors employ a substantial number of people, should be recognised. 
 
Importantly, SEWA’s emphasis on access to health care as a worker’s right is also very different from 
another discourse which frames much of the global activism in the health field – that of human 
rights.  Human rights have a different basis than citizenship rights. Rights are held on the basis of 
existence as a human being, rather than being attached to a particular relationship with the nation 
state. Although the discourse of health as a human right has been in existence since the formation of 
the UN system in the late 1940s and has underpinned the work of international organisations such 
as the WHO, it is only in more recent times that it has begun to supersede citizenship as a basis for 
claims making. This is because the declining power of states in relation to global economic 
processes, as well as the “failure” of a number of states in the developing world, has led to greater 
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emphasis being placed on the provision of services as a matter of human rights, meaning that 
international agencies have a role to play. Since the 1990s there has in addition been an attempt to 
argue that workers’ rights should also be seen as a subset of human rights, an argument which has 
come most forcefully from the anti-sweatshop movement looking for ways to make transnational 
capital more accountable to workers through codes of corporate conduct and international labour 
standards monitoring systems (see for example Seidman, 2007). 
 
Yet, according to McIntyre (2008) human rights are a “problematic basis for worker rights.” This is 
because “they deal with what the individual is entitled to rather than what is in the interest of 
community, solidarity or civic virtue” (McIntyre, 2008: 56). Indeed as the political philosopher Onora 
O’Neill (2005) has pointed out, the discourse of human rights is an entirely individualistic one, which 
fits well within an otherwise problematic neo-liberal framework. What this means, argues McIntyre 
(2008: 55), is that those worker rights which fit into this individualised framework (e.g. the health of 
the individual worker or freedom from forced labour) are emphasised at the cost of rights which do 
not fit into this framework (e.g. freedom of association or collective bargaining) and which may be 
“more potent tools in developing a humane and equitable globalization.” For example, in a study of 
the private regulation of labour standards in the global clothing industry, Bulut and Lane (2013) 
found that multinationals were willing to push bans on child labour and improvements in health and 
safety amongst their suppliers, but unwilling to enter into the realm of unionisation and 
improvements in general living standards. 
 
SEWA has not taken this individualised approach to workers’ health, which essentially views workers 
as separate from the social and economic context in which they live. The organisation’s health work 
is considered one complementary aspect of the wider SEWA project to uplift the general living 
standards of the poor through organising workers, wage and welfare negotiations, slum upgrades, 
and many other activities. The organisation began its health work in the late 1970s with health 
education campaigns. This later developed into the formation of health cooperatives, of which there 
are now about sixty (Jain, 2013). Each of the cooperatives runs a primary health care centre, staffed 
by health assistants known as aagewans, as well as a basic dispensary which provides low cost drugs 
to workers. The aagewans conduct mobile health camps at various intervals during the year which 
include health education and information, as well as basic diagnostic tests (Bhatt 2006, Jain 2013). 
Since 1992 SEWA has also run a well-known worker-based health insurance scheme, known as 
VimoSEWA, which is aimed at protecting members against catastrophic health expenditures arising 
from hospitalisation. In the face of a very poorly resourced and managed public health care system, 
207 
 
SEWA has negotiated deals with a range of hospitals (mainly charitable, but also private and public) 
to provide quality health care for its members through the VimoSEWA scheme (Jain, 2013). 
 
The approach that SEWA has taken to health provision does reveal the tendency towards Gandhian 
self-help that Whitehead (2013) criticises. As a consequence, the organisation’s health scheme has 
come under criticism from some on the left, not least from other organisations of informal workers 
in India, who argue that this orientation does little to push forward the social democratic ideal of 
universally accessible state provided health care. If anything, by providing their own health care 
system to members, they claim that SEWA allows the Indian government to escape from the 
responsibility it has to its citizens.   
 
Once again, however, it is difficult to exclusively categorise SEWA in this way. Its approach to health 
provision in fact reveals a dialectic between self-help and reliance on the external world. The 
organisation provides its own health system to its members. This is done in the name of pragmatism 
– workers cannot be productive without access to health care and, at present, the Indian state does 
not provide either the quantity or the quality of services that are required. This has not, however, 
precluded the organisation from engaging with an impressive range of actors in an attempt to 
institutionalise adequate health provision for poor workers within the state. As noted earlier, SEWA 
favours engagements that are based on negotiation rather than outright demands and hostility. 
Their engagements include representation on international, national, and local commissions, ranging 
from the WHO’s Commission on the Social Determinants of Health, the Planning Commission of 
India’s High Level Expert Group – which in its 2012 influential report recommended that India move 
towards universal state provision of primary health care and advocated for increased health 
spending by the state (India’s current health spending stands at a very low 1.2 percent of GDP),293 
the National Health Mission, and local level representation on village sanitation committees. SEWA 
has also partnered with the state on several occasions to expand provision of health services. It has 
worked in collaboration with the Ahmedabad Municipality to provide tuberculosis health education 
and referrals. At one stage SEWA was also given seed money by the municipality to scale up the 
operations of its low cost dispensaries so that more poor people could take advantage of the service 
at one of the large municipal hospitals. “The politics of curative medicine” eventually caught up with 
the hospital scheme though, and the arrangement came to an end in 1999 because of opposition 
                                                          




from pharmacies and doctors unsupportive of generic medicine (although SEWA continues to run its 
own low cost pharmacies) (Bhatt, 2006: 133).  
 
Basic preventive health measures such as sanitation have also been a concern for the organisation – 
many of its members work from their own homes and improvements to their homes done through 
SEWA’s slum upgrading programme, is also a part of SEWA’s health work. Again, it is interesting to 
note the reasoning behind SEWA’s involvement in slum upgrading, which a number of other social 
movements (most notably Slum Dwellers International) are also involved in. SDI uses citizenship as a 
basis for claims making: “We are Citizens, Not Squatters” is a key advocacy slogan.294 The difference 
between SDI and SEWA is that underpinning SEWA’s argument for citizenship is again the notion 
that the poor are also economic agents. This is absent in the SDI rhetoric. For SEWA slum upgrades 
are necessary because workers need clean, healthy houses to live in because it makes them more 
productive.295 Here again, social arguments are linked with economic arguments – social justice and 
economic justice are part of the same package. It is a social democratic argument, albeit with a 
Gandhian twist. 
 
SEWA’s engagements have not been limited to state and/or inter-governmental organisations. Since 
its inception, OHS work has been considered an important complementary aspect to the general 
health work. The current focus within its OHS programme is the development of ergonomically 
designed work tools for informal workers, which can both protect the health of workers and improve 
their productivity.296 The link to productivity is important here, because without it informal workers, 
whose first priority is always income, are unlikely to change their work practices. Getting involved in 
this work led SEWA to create partnerships with scientific institutions and design institutes concerned 
with improving the workplace, engaging with their foundational practices and ideas, and 
encouraging them to shift their gaze from formal to informal work, and from top-down scientific 
practices to participatory ones which centre the worker’s needs and experiences. There has been 
some success in this battle over ideas and principles: the National Institute for Occupational Health 
(NIOH), the lead OHS research body in India, was “not always interested in collaborating,”297 but 
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through SEWA’s consistent engagement has started shifting its research towards informal 
workers.298 
 
In terms of work tool design, SEWA has engaged with two institutes of design in India which have 
been co-opted into lengthy participatory design processes, with workers testing the implements at 
several stages and sending feedback for improvements.299 One of the more successful designs has 
been a frame for embroidery workers developed to allow for improved posture. A follow up study 
reported that “Embroidery workers find the new prototypes less tedious to work with since it’s only 
a single piece and easier to set up for each piece. Back pain has reduced considerably and more time 
is saved per piece and their income has doubled from work.”300 Some of the tools that have been 
developed have been adopted by the Gujarat Workers’ Welfare Board and will be sold to workers at 
a heavily subsidised rate.301 This has been successful in the case of one of the tools developed – 
specifically, a table designed for kite makers. 
 
“Ideas can take on a life of their own,” argues Amrith (2011: 127), and are an important part of 
challenging any status quo. In line with their wider challenge to the hegemonic understanding of 
“the worker” and “the workplace,” SEWA’s tool designs, whilst ostensibly improving the working 
conditions and productivity of informal workers, are also about reforming scientific ideas and 
practices which fail to ‘see’ poor people as workers. Ela Bhatt (2006: 279) elaborates on these 
ideological battles in the following way: 
When asked what the most difficult part of SEWA’s journey has been, I can answer without 
hesitation: removing conceptual blocks. Some of our biggest battles have been over 
contesting set ideas and attitudes of officials, bureaucrats, experts and academics…The 
Registrar of Trade Unions would not consider us ‘workers;’ hence we could not register as a 
‘trade union.’ The hard working chindi workers [weavers who use leftover cotton strips], 
embroiderers, cart pullers, rag pickers and forest produce gatherers can contribute to the 
nation’s gross domestic product, but heaven forbid that they be acknowledged as workers. 
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Through the tool design process, SEWA has been challenging dominant ideas about what a worker is, 
and questioning the idea often implicit in the scientific field of OHS that the poor cannot benefit 
from the expertise of scientists concerned with the workplace. They are also demonstrating by 
example that the standard top down scientific approaches which have thoroughly characterised the 
discipline of OHS until very recently cannot work for the majority for the world’s workers. In doing so 
SEWA are forcing the scientific discipline to engage with workers – something that Chapter Four 
showed was conspicuously absent from the earlier attempts to extend the OHS discipline into the 
developing world. There is also something interesting in the fact that the modernist science of OHS 
is being forced to grapple with the “liminal modernities” that continue to exist in places like India. 
The occupations in which many of SEWA’s members are involved are not modern. They are 
traditional ones, such as producing bidis,302 incense sticks, cloth, and embroidery, or are agricultural 
and non-industrial. The fact that modernist sciences are beginning to engage with non-modern 
occupations implies that, through the process of tool development, a hybridisation of the modern 
and the non-modern is taking place. In doing so, modernity’s terms are being debated and 
redefined. Indeed for SEWA part of their conceptual challenge is to fight the idea that the modern 
and the non-modern should remain separate. They are of the mind that with thought and an 
openness with government, traditional forms of employment can (and should) play a role in the 
bright new India. 
 
The struggle to change fundamental concepts and ideas is an area where SEWA had made some 
important gains. Yet the fight for recognition is related to but not the same as the fight for 
redistribution. Material economic realities are another front in SEWA’s battle, and it is by examining 
the organisation’s work in the context of these realities that questions begin to arise about the real 
impact that SEWA can make on the economic system. Once again, OHS legislation provides an 
important clue to uncovering these structural limitations in SEWA’s work.  
 
As mentioned earlier, SEWA is represented on the Planning Commission of India’s High Level Expert 
Group (HLEG), which recommended in its report that the Indian Government increase expenditure 
on health care and reinvigorate the country’s decrepit primary health care system. SEWA’s presence 
on the HLEG resulted in the recommendation that Occupational Health Services be integrated into 
the primary health care system under the wider banner of the Social Determinants of Health.303 Yet 
SEWA has not always been convinced by this move. In 2011 the National Planning Commission of 
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India released its Report of the Working Group on Occupational Safety and Health for the 12th Five 
Year Plan.304 SEWA was represented on this working group, which recommended that existing OHS 
legislation and systems in India – which largely fall under the Labour Ministry – be overhauled and 
upgraded. This commission did not endorse the integration of OHS into primary health care, instead 
recommending that OHS training for informal workers be integrated into the mandate of existing 
OHS institutions such as the Factories Inspectorate and the Ministry of Agriculture’s extension 
programmes. It went further to recommend that OHS services be integrated into India’s (then) 
proposed comprehensive social security scheme for informal workers. Workers would have to have 
a medical check-up every second year by doctors trained in occupational health. As an incentive to 
comply with this, workers who presented themselves for the check-up would not have to pay their 
annual social security contributions. Health information on workers would then be sent to a central 
database so that a better record of worker’s diseases and injuries could be maintained.305  
 
It is not entirely surprising that this report differs from the HLEG’s report in its bias towards a labour 
oriented approach to extending OHS to informal workers. Apart from the SEWA representative, the 
Working Group was composed largely of officials from the Departments of Labour, Mining, and 
Factories and included only one health representative – the health adviser to the Planning 
Commission.306 The report also came out before there were any serious attempts to address the 
primary health care system in India, which as it exists at present would not have the capacity – 
either in terms of finances or human resources – to support additional occupational health services. 
The HLEG on the other hand was composed entirely of health professionals and it itself was the first 
step in a move to reinvigorate the findings of the Bhore Commission Report. Even so, the two 
reports do reflect a basic ambivalence in SEWA’s position on the matter of where occupational 
health should sit within the state institutional structure.  
 
SEWA has always fought under the banner of “the informal is normal,” arguing that informal 
workers, who make up the vast majority of workers in India, should be afforded the same 
protections, rights, and responsibilities of formal workers. In this way of thinking, if formal workers 
are afforded workplace protections under the Labour Ministry, then informal workers should have 
the same protections, which includes forcing the owners of capital to contribute to improved 
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working conditions. Furthermore, SEWA foregrounds workers’ rights for the working poor – 
citizenship for them is not delinked from status as worker. At a micro scale, SEWA has fought hard 
for this philosophy. Ela Bhatt (2006) has detailed the many struggles that the organisation has fought 
at the sectoral level in order to hold owners of capital accountable for wage increases and improved 
working conditions for piece rate workers. Carré (2012) details the battle SEWA’s bidi rollers have 
fought against large company owners, who have tried to obscure their employment relationship 
through a chain of contractors and sub-contractors. After a long period of negotiation, the bidi 
rollers won a concession to create a tripartite health and welfare “provident fund” financed by a ten 
percent additional payment from the bidi companies. 
 
Systematising these small victories at the scale of national legislation and policies has turned out to 
be difficult, however. In May 2011, SEWA officials who attended an international workshop on OHS 
– hosted by Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO) – were clearly still 
somewhat ambivalent about whether OHS should be a labour function or a health function.307 By 
June 2012, their position had moved towards an integration of OHS into primary health care. This 
shift may have occurred for a number of reasons. One of them is certainly pragmatism. In a personal 
communication with a SEWA official, this author was told that, whilst the Indian government was 
increasingly willing to engage on issues of state provided social protection, it was much less willing 
to enter into negotiations around worker or workplace rights.308 Indeed, the HLEG report itself is a 
symbol of the new willingness of the Indian government to think further about the state provision of 
health care, and SEWA has unabashedly used this opening to push its agenda.  
 
As discussed earlier, SEWA does in general tend to adopt a pragmatic stance on issues of policy – if 
advantages for their members can be gained from a particular channel, they will use it. This has 
sometimes meant steering a careful path between the left and the right sides of the political 
spectrum. In one of its slum upgrading programmes, for example, which entailed joint contributions 
from the Ahmedabad Municipality and SEWA members, SEWA faced opposition from the left who 
argued that the slum upgrading should be the entire responsibility of the municipality, and those on 
the right who argued that the state should play no role in housing provision at all. The pressure was 
such that it almost derailed the entire programme (Bhatt, 2012). A question remains though as to 
whether this pragmatic approach may sometimes draw too much attention away from challenging 
the underlying economic structures which continue to keep informal workers poor and marginal.  
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At the WIEGO OHS meeting, which was attended by SEWA and other WIEGO affiliates and partners, 
the Director of WIEGO’s Social Protection Programme, expressed her concerns around the 
integration of OHS into primary health care: 
What worries me about this [move to integrate OHS into primary health care] is that … we’re 
losing the connection between the informal worker and formal organised labour. This is a 
completely unresolved and critically important question as part of an overall global political 
project. The question is, how do we strengthen the new movement of informal workers? Are 
we losing the edge that we have, by not insisting on OHS as a specifically worker’s right? 309 
 
Encapsulated within this question are a number of finer interrelated threads which are worth 
drawing out. “The edge” that Lund refers to here is the very particular critique that SEWA has of an 
economic system – a worker-based critique which inserts the economic into the social and vice 
versa. It is a critique which draws on social democratic, productivist principles to argue that “the 
poor” are economic agents whose needs can only be addressed by changes in both economic and 
social policy. It is a critique, which in Nancy Fraser’s formulation, seeks both recognition and 
redistribution for the poor. Although redistributive arguments are not unique to movements of 
informal workers, the focus on employment provides the most direct challenge to a fundamental 
feature of neo-liberalism which assigns poverty to the realm of the “social,” and draws attention 
away from the basic economic nature of the problem. Integrating OHS into primary health care may 
be a practical institutional innovation which benefits informal workers. It can also be a way of 
blunting the edge that informal workers have, downplaying the economic argument and treating 
informal workers as “just another” category of poor citizen. 
  
In a wider sense this issue refers back to the question raised in the previous chapter: How are the 
working and living conditions of informal workers ever to improve in a sustained manner whilst they 
operate within a capitalist system where the odds are stacked against them? The state, although 
critically important, can only do so much in the face of powerful transnational capital – indeed as 
Chatterjee (2004) argues, the two are increasingly entwined in a way that is beneficial to capitalist 
interests. Good, low-cost primary health care systems, with an integrated workers’ health 
component, can certainly provide an important service to informal workers. Yet if these do not 
operate within a wider economic system which allows marginalised workers greater access to the 
benefits of growth, which centres employment and places the onus on powerful economic interests 
                                                          




to contribute to social protection and improved living and working conditions, their impact will 
always be circumscribed.  
 
Implicit in these questions is a tension that underlies SEWA’s work. It is a tension which centres on 
the idea of different grades of citizenship (Meagher, 2013). On the one hand, SEWA argues that its 
members are workers who should be afforded the same rights as formal workers. The terms of 
inclusion should be the same. As Lund suggests, this is a powerful argument which links informal and 
formal workers together. If all of those on the margins – the reserve army – were to be incorporated 
into the economic system it would be unable to remain as it is. This ideal sits in tension with reality. 
The fact is that the current economic system is not reformed, and the informal economy is growing, 
not shrinking. Furthermore, the traditional institutional mechanisms for the regulation of labour are 
not always appropriate for informal workers. OHS services integrated into primary health care, 
combined with municipal policies which promote basic services such as sanitation and waste 
management in poor areas, are realistically far more likely to benefit informal workers than 
improved labour inspections. One is then forced to ask whether providing one set of institutional 
mechanisms for one group, and a different set for another group, is differentiating the forms of 
citizenship that these groups can access. This question is particularly relevant when considering how 
new institutional arrangements reconfigure the relationship between workers and those who profit 
from their work. In shifting their attention away from OHS as a workers right under a ministry which 
has the ability, at least in theory, to secure compliance from employers and/or owners of capital, is 
SEWA settling for a downgraded version of citizenship for informal workers?  
 
This question can be answered in many different ways, and may depend on the theoretical position 
adopted by the interpreter. Those coming from a formal trade union background might well argue 
that SEWA’s pragmatism is problematic. Others might argue that the European welfare pact was 
never realistically extendable to the whole world, except in enclave and white settler nations with 
close ties to the old colonial power. It was in fact the rest of the world’s exclusion that made those 
pacts possible (Cox, 1977; Harvey, 2010b). From a pragmatic point of view, then, new ways have to 
be sought for workers to make gains in any manner possible. Moreover, it may be the case that at 
present the incorporation of OHS into primary health care has little emphasis on employer 
contributions, but once the institutional infrastructure is set up it may well be possible for SEWA to 
lobby towards this (although the experience of China, which had corporates in the textile industry 
move to Bangladesh once the government began insisting on tripartite contributions for health 
insurance would perhaps suggest otherwise). Another point of view might emphasise SEWA’s impact 
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on changing ideas about work and workers. In fact ideas may mould material realities, and although 
the point has probably not yet arrived for this to happen, it may with time.  Still others will point to 
the very real and very important gains that SEWA has made for its membership, not only in material 
terms, but in terms of bolstering their sense of identity as workers and as contributors to society, 
and in doing so providing them with a sense of dignity otherwise difficult to achieve (Kabeer et al., 
2013). 
 
It is of course also possible to take a heterodox approach. In the face of SEWA’s success stories, 
which incorporate challenges to the system on multiple levels, including securing sectoral tripartite 
agreements which do connect sub-contracted workers to the owners of capital, which continues to 
help almost two million women to secure better working conditions and a sense of dignity as 
workers, which has profoundly challenged national and international institutions, as well as scientific 
disciplines to think differently about workers, it can be difficult to criticise this organisation. Indeed, 
very little of the literature on SEWA contains any criticism at all. However, rather than taking an 
entirely celebratory view, it is important to keep the limits of the organisation’s work in view.  
 
The Kagad Kach Patra Kashtakari Panchayat (Trade Union of Waste Pickers) 
Kagad Kach Patra Kashtakari Panchayat (KKPKP) is a trade union of waste pickers located in Pune in 
Maharashtra state. Waste pickers (also known as rag pickers in India) are some of the poorest 
informal workers, who, in sorting through waste in bins and landfills, perform some of the dirtiest 
and most unhygienic work. In Pune, most are women from Dalit (untouchable) castes, a significant 
proportion of whom are widowed or deserted and provide at least half of their household’s income 
with their average daily earnings of $1.25 (Narayan and Chikarmane, 2013). KKPKP is a much 
younger and smaller organisation than SEWA. It was first registered as a trade union in 1993, and 
has approximately 8000 members. Although it has in common with SEWA a focus on peaceful 
protest and negotiation, it is not Gandhian. It is much more closely aligned to the principles of Paolo 
Freire, the Brazilian educator and theorist of critical pedagogy, and in its health work in particular 
has focused largely on gaining benefits for its members from the state. A particularly interesting 
aspect of KKPKP’s work is that its activism has often been aimed at the local level of government, 
rather than at national government labour institutions.  
 
As with SEWA, KKPKP’s battles are fought both at the ideological and material levels. The 
organisation first registered as a trade union as a way in which to reframe the activity of waste 
picking from something that was seen in the public imagination as a nuisance or desperate last 
resort of the very poor (scavenging), to something that is seen as an occupation and as work that 
216 
 
contributes to the local economy (Narayan and Chikarmane, 2013). Where they have been 
particularly astute is in their linkage of waste picking to the environmental movement, arguing that 
waste picking is essentially a form of recycling. Waste pickers sort through waste to collect scrap 
(mainly cardboard, paper, plastic, glass, and metal) which they can then sell on to recycling plants. 
This reduces the amount of overall waste that goes to landfill sites. Their activities, argue KKPKP, are 
both “economically productive and environmentally beneficial” (Narayan and Chikarmane, 2013: 
209).  
 
The link to environmental sustainability has served the organisation well. In 2000 India passed new 
municipal solid waste regulations, which required the segregation of waste, waste processing rather 
than dumping, and door-to-door collection. KKPKP took this opportunity to argue that waste pickers 
– as already existing waste sorters and processors who provide cost-effective and environmentally 
sustainable forms of waste management – should be integrated into the new municipal waste 
management systems, in particular into door-to-door collection. In order to take advantage of the 
new regulations, KKPKP formed the first cooperative of waste pickers in India, known as the Solid 
Waste Collection and Handling (SWaCH) cooperative.310 SWaCH, which started off as a pilot project 
in collaboration with the SNDT Women’s University in 2005/6, now provides door-to-door waste 
collection services for 125 000 households in Pune, and provides employment to 1500 waste 
pickers.311 
 
SWaCH uses several different arrangements for collecting payment. In some areas the cooperative is 
contracted directly by the municipality, so that it receives a monthly fee which is then distributed 
amongst the cooperative members. In other areas SWaCH is contracted to body corporates and/or 
private citizens who pay a fee to the cooperative. Each waste picker is then able to supplement the 
earnings from the cooperative with earnings made from the sale of recyclables which they sort from 
the collected waste. Earnings are higher here as well because the workers have first access to the 
waste, rather than receiving it second or third hand when a lot of recyclable material has already 
been removed. This arrangement has significantly increased the income of the waste pickers 
involved. It has also improved their working conditions. Waste pickers traditionally operate in 
extremely unhealthy conditions – they pick through a mixture of rotting organic and inorganic waste 
in dustbins and landfills often without any protective gear. They are at risk for bacterial infections, 
toxic substances emanating from waste products, and the bites of rats and dogs which wander 





through the trash. Door-to-door collection allows SWaCH members to collect waste at regular 
intervals before it has a chance to putrefy, and to sort their waste in more hygienic conditions. The 
cooperative encourages citizens to separate their organic and inorganic waste so that the workers 
can more easily sort through the dry waste. In this way, SWaCH integrates healthier working 
conditions into its wider project to improve the livelihoods of waste pickers. 
 
Unlike SEWA, KKPKP does not approach health provision through self-reliance. In part this is because 
it is a much smaller organisation and does not have the capacity to mount its own health services. A 
more salient reason is that KKPKP’s orients its health work around deriving state provided health 
services for its members, and in this they have done some particularly innovative work. This has 
sometimes bought the organisation into conflict with SEWA, whose self-help approach has clearly 
rankled, despite SEWA’s engagements with state health policy.312 In 2002 the organisation fought 
for, and won, a municipally-funded health insurance scheme for its members. An ILO research study 
commissioned in 2000 showed that waste pickers in Pune, by sorting and removing recyclables from 
the waste stream, saved the PMC $330 000 in transportation costs, whilst each waste picker 
contributed $5 of unpaid labour to the municipality per month (Narayan and Chikarmane, 2013: 
209). KKPKP went on to show that whilst the municipality was making these savings, workers 
themselves were having to bear the health costs of this unhealthy work. This information was used 
to advocate successfully for a municipally-funded health insurance scheme for the workers.  
 
The Jan Arogya Programme (JAP), as the health insurance scheme is known, uses the services of a 
private insurance company, The New India Assurance Company. This has developed a scheme 
specifically for the waste pickers. The premiums are paid by the PMC and cover workers (but not 
their families) for health costs up to a sum of Rs 5000 (just over $80) per annum. Workers can access 
treatment at public or private health facilities. KKPKP plays the role of intermediary between the 
workers, the insurance scheme, the municipality, and health service providers.313 In a recent analysis 
of their health data, KKPKP found that since the introduction of the scheme there has been a “new 
trend in health care amongst waste pickers. They no longer neglect their ailments or hesitate to get 
themselves treated for illness.”314 The popularity of the scheme has also risen – in 2003 there were 
3707 members insured under the policy; in 2013 that number had risen to 6673.315 Yet there are 
some obvious problems with the JAP. According to KKPKP’s analysis, the average hospitalisation bills 
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for its members amounted to Rs 11 880 ($192), which means that workers are still having to make a 
significant financial contribution to their health care over and above the JAP’s benefits.316 Larger 
hospital bills are a consequence of the fact that although private health facilities are “prohibitively 
expensive,” workers prefer them because of the awful state of many public facilities. This, argues 
KKPKP, “is a telling indictment of private hospitals and the commercialisation of health care as well 
as of government hospitals which are no longer attractive to patients.”317 Another problem with the 
scheme is that it does not include family members. If the children of waste pickers fall ill and they 
have to take time off from work, the JAP does not provide any form of financial relief.  
 
The JAP suffers from the same problems as Lloyd George’s workers’ health insurance scheme in 
Britain which drove Percy Selwyn-Clarke into the Colonial Medical Service (see Chapters Four and 
Five), and it reflects a tension which exists in the present-day activism of informal worker 
organisations. KKPKP won the JAP on the basis of their members’ status as workers. It was this 
powerful argument, centred on the economic contribution of waste pickers, which gained them their 
victory. Yet this argument has also limited the concessions that they have gained – it is a scheme for 
those who contribute alone. KKPKP are aware of this contradiction. In its analysis of 10 years of the 
JAP scheme, their official conclusion is “that publicly funded private health insurance schemes can at 
best be an interim measure and can never substitute for universal public funded primary, secondary, 
and tertiary care to all citizens.”318 In India at least, there is now a movement towards this through 
the work of the HLEG. There is also a state with enough resources to provide it. The reality in many 
other poorer countries of the Global South is that work-based entitlements to health care are likely 
to have to be an important contributor to overall health provision for the foreseeable future. 
 
This fact brings into focus (again) the problem of obtaining work-based entitlements to health care 
for informal workers who have no recognisable employer, and who cannot be linked into a value 
chain in any direct manner. KKPKP has addressed this very creatively by establishing a line of 
responsibility between the municipality and the waste pickers as a “proxy employment” relationship. 
The municipality is, however, a public institution. The question remains as to how to draw capital 
into such arrangements. This is something that KKPKP has tried to address in a creative manner 
through one of its OHS campaigns. Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) is a concept which has 
emerged out of the environmental movement and was codified into law for the first time in India 
through new plastic regulations introduced in 2010. EPR places the onus for recycling or responsibly 






disposing of a manufactured product at the end of its life onto the manufacturer of the product. It is 
an attempt to force manufacturers to take on responsibility for the environmental impact of their 
products. SWaCH have started to use the EPR concept as a way in which to benefit workers as well. 
EPR is a controversial topic in the broader global waste picking community because it can be used to 
limit access to waste. In Uruguay for example, a municipal authority adjacent to the capital city of 
Montevideo has developed a scheme jointly funded by the Chamber of Commerce which channels 
dry waste materials from companies to a sorting shed where waste pickers are paid a wage to sort 
through and recycle waste.319 Although this is clearly a beneficial relationship for the waste pickers 
involved, the scheme benefits only about 20 workers, with many more now excluded from the waste 
stream and their means of making a living. 
 
SWaCH has tried to reinterpret EPR as a beneficial concept for waste pickers in terms of improving 
their occupational health conditions. One of the biggest (and most unpleasant) health hazards faced 
by waste pickers are the large numbers of used sanitary pads and baby diapers with which they 
come into direct contact while sorting through waste.320 Often these are uncovered and workers 
have no gloves. SWaCH, on the basis of EPR regulations, argues that the manufacturers of sanitary 
pads and diapers should take some responsibility for how their products are disposed of. In one 
campaign, the organisation’s members dumped bags of used nappies at the gates of one of the 
manufacturers. In a less confrontational manner, SWaCH has now also started trying to negotiate 
with manufacturers to insert sanitary disposal bags into packets of sanitary pads and diapers. They 
themselves have developed environmentally friendly “ST-Dispo Bag,” made by retired waste pickers, 
which they hope the manufacturers will adopt. So far there has been some success with the 
campaign – a positive meeting between SWaCH, Maharashtra State officials, and representatives 
from a large manufacturer took place in 2013. The campaign has however stalled because of a lack 
of engagement by the provincial government and the manufacturers.321 
 
In wider terms, SWaCH’s campaign is not only interesting because of its creativity and the obvious 
ways in which it will benefit waste pickers, but also because it is an attempt to think about capital’s 
responsibility for workers’ health. It does this not through the state itself (although through the 
passing of the Plastic Rules the state has created an enabling environment for the campaign), but by 
making a more direct approach to capital. The campaign manages draws a direct line of 
responsibility between self-employed informal workers and large formal capital, something which 
                                                          
319 Personal observations, WIEGO staff field trip, Uruguay, 24th October 2013. 
320 WIEGO OHS Newsletter, October 2012. Available at: http://wiego.org/ohs/ohs-newsletter-october-2012. 
321 Personal communication with Poornima Chikarmane, KKPKP, 23rd November 2013.  
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the much more established fair and ethical trade movement has struggled to do. Whether the 
campaign succeeds or not is still in question. Yet its very existence as a concept is an important 
challenge to a status quo where the line of responsibility between capital and workers is becoming 
increasingly blurred.  
 
The Ghana Trades Union Congress, the StreetNet Ghana Alliance, and the Ghana 
National Health Insurance Scheme 
In Ghana the organisation of informal workers has operated differently from that in India. As 
discussed in Chapter Three, urban market trader associations dominated by women were developed 
during the colonial period largely based around commodity groupings (Clark, 2010). This structure 
was encouraged by the colonial authorities because it made the management of markets easier to 
deal with, and the structure has remained in place to the present day. Within a given market there 
are several commodity associations operating. Each commodity association is governed by an 
executive as well as a commodity “queen.” The commodity queens also sit on a market executive, 
out of which is nominated an Ohemaa (Queen Mother, who is queen of the market). The queens are 
not elected democratically – they assume their position because of their existing connections and 
resources, so the market queen is likely to be one of the most well connected and wealthy traders 
within the market. This has obvious advantages and disadvantages. The queen’s political 
connections can ensure that resources flow towards the market (Prag, 2010). It also means that 
power is highly concentrated in a few individuals, who are not always necessarily concerned with the 
greater good,322 and that the fortunes of particular associations and markets depend on the 
government of the day. These commodity associations are also not worker associations in the same 
way that SEWA and KKPKP are worker associations. Their focus is largely on controlling trade within 
each market – determining who is and who is not allowed to trade – and on welfare activities. 
Queens often become queens because they have the resources to contribute to funeral and 
wedding costs of the association members. Some of the associations also have an entrepreneurial 
focus, although these are often business associations more likely to be run by men.  
 
                                                          
322 A very clear example of this is the story of a blocked drain in Makola Market in Central Accra. The drain is 
horribly clogged and filled with stagnant water and debris which causes a terrible smell in the textile section of 
the market, as well as flooding during the rainy season. The drain is clogged because a powerful, well-
connected queen has given permission for a market stall to be built over the drain. The Accra Metro’s 
Environmental Heath Officers, although acknowledging the health hazard, were unwilling to challenge the 
queen because of her powerful political connections (Alfers and Abban, 2010: Focus Group Research Reports 
for WIEGO Occupational Health and Safety Project, Accra). 
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Aside from the commodity associations, there are many other types of associations operating in 
almost every sector of the economy. These associations vary in their strength and purpose, and are 
often locally based. There are associations for Kayayei (a word derived from the Hausa word “Kaya” 
– to carry – and the Ga word “Yei” meaning women or girls) who are the women and girls who travel 
down from the poor northern regions of Ghana to work as headload porters for market women and 
their customers. The poverty of the members, and their need for protection in an environment 
where they have few connections, means that these associations are often oriented towards welfare 
concerns.323 There are also associations of street vendors and hawkers. These workers operate on 
the fringes of markets, or in informal market areas, or on the side of roads, selling their wares as 
they weave between traffic. They tend to be poorer than market traders who are better established 
and can afford to rent market stalls, but are more likely to be better off than the Kayayei. It is these 
traders who often bear the brunt of urban legislation which does not recognise their right to operate 
as workers in public spaces. As a result they have a greater awareness of themselves as an 
organisation engaged in a struggle with the state; they have a welfare function certainly, but are also 
constantly battling evictions and confiscation of their goods which gives them more of a ‘’workerist’’ 
orientation (Alfers, 2009). It is was street trader organisations which StreetNet International first 
approached in 2003 in an attempt to develop a national association of street trader organisations. 
 
Launched in 2002, StreetNet International now has over 40 affiliated organisations of street vendors, 
market traders, and hawkers drawn mainly from Latin America, Asia, and Africa.324 SEWA and the 
National Alliance of Street Vendors in India (NASVI) are members of the organisation. The 
international conventions and meetings held by StreetNet International have allowed organisations 
from countries like Ghana to interact with SEWA members on a regular basis. In conversations with 
leaders of the Ghanaian affiliate – the StreetNet Ghana Alliance (SGA)325 – a very clear admiration for 
SEWA’s work was displayed.326  
 
It is, however, questionable as to whether SEWA’s model can ever work outside of India, where the 
Gandhian “glue” that holds SEWA together is absent (Devenish and Skinner, 2004). Self-employed 
informal workers are difficult to organise for a number of reasons. Competition for space and market 
                                                          
323 Initial Research Report on status of Kayayei in Accra by Dorcas Ansah, WIEGO Accra City Coordinator, 
August 2011. 
324 www.streetnet.org.za 
325 SGA changed its name to the International Vendors and Hawkers Association of Ghana (IVHAG) in 2013. 
When this research was conducted the organisation still operated under the name of SGA, and it is this name 
that will be used. 
326 Interview with Juliana Brown Afari, International Coordinator, StreetNet Ghana Alliance, 10th March 2009. 
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share leads to divisions, as does the relative isolation of homebased workers (Sanyal, 1991). In 
Ghana specifically the system of queens and commodity associations keep traders divided between 
insiders and outsiders – often the most visible division is between those in the markets and those 
operating outside of the markets. As mentioned earlier there are also collusive relationships 
between queens and local authorities, which may provide some benefits, but do not necessarily lay 
the foundation for an independent, democratic organisation of traders. Kate Meagher’s (2010) work 
on men in informal manufacturing clusters in Nigeria showed that these tensions and divisions can 
be exacerbated under conditions of economic stress. The influx of new operators places strain on 
existing organisational structures, poorer operators are less likely to be able to afford membership 
levies and fees, and leaders are more likely to enter into “cliental and collusive ties with officials and 
more powerful organisations” (Meagher, 2010: 57).  
 
These tensions exist within the SGA, which is at present an alliance of five trader organisations 
including both market traders and street vendors. The organisation was originally set up to provide a 
challenge to the system of market queens, and in doing so to create a more unified alliance of 
informal workers who could launch effective protest and negotiation actions. It has not been wholly 
successful in achieving these aims; the organisation has remained under the control of a single group 
of relatively powerful (and politically partisan) market traders whose political strategies have not 
always been in the interests of the organisation as a whole.  Yet woven into the organisation’s fabric 
are important threads. The idea of an alliance which crosses commodity associations and locations is 
an important one, which cannot be dismissed if an effective movement of informal workers is to 
emerge in Ghana. The SGA’s street vendor affiliates in particular are themselves well-functioning 
democratic organisations, who have long been engaged in local actions to protect members from 
local government initiated eviction actions, and who have begun pushing the organisation as a 
whole to reform towards a more democratic model. Through its international networks, the SGA has 
also managed to access support from organisations such as WIEGO, and, together with worker 
associations from other sectors of the informal economy, has pursued some interesting strategies, 
particularly in their health activism. These strategies have not necessarily created large-scale change 
in the way SEWA’s work has done, but they give some indication of potential pathways for worker 
activism in the future, and also highlight pitfalls which such groups may encounter.  
 
One way that StreetNet International as a whole has approached informal worker activism has been 
by linking formal trade unions with informal worker organisations. This has been a conscious 
strategy to strengthen the worker focus of informal worker organisations, and to strengthen the 
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workers’ movement as a whole by attempting to unite the working class with the reserve army 
against global capital. Dan Gallin, former Secretary General of the International Union of Food, 
Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco, and Allied Workers (IUF), has been one of the 
major supporters of this linkage from the side of formal labour. In a 2001 paper he argued that 
organising workers in the informal economy needed to become a priority for the formal labour 
movement for several reasons: that the informal economy, contrary to Arthur Lewis’s dual sector 
economic model which assumed that surplus labour would ultimately be absorbed by the industrial 
sector as development progressed, is not likely to be absorbed into the formal economy and that it 
is in fact growing whilst the formal economy is shrinking; that the growth in the informal economy 
and shrinking of the formal are linked trends; and lastly that consequently “the stabilisation of the 
formal sector organisations and building trade union strength internationally depend on the 
organisation of the informal sector” (Gallin, 2001: 531). 
 
In Ghana a relatively long-lasting and strong relationship has developed between informal workers 
and the formal worker movement in the form of the rejuvenated GTUC. SEWA’s experience over the 
years has been that informal workers are not automatically accepted by formal trade unions, which 
often view informal workers as a threat to their hard won labour rights, and that the ILO would 
rather see them placed in the employers’ camp as self-employed “entrepreneurs” (Bonner and 
Spooner, 2011). This has not been the attitude of the GTUC, which has instead seen the opportunity 
that informal workers represent. It became the first union federation in the world to formally accept 
membership from informal worker associations. The SGA is an affiliate of the GTUC, as are several 
other informal worker organisations ranging from taxi drivers and musicians to hairdressers and 
chop bar operators (owners of informal restaurants serving local food). The author’s numerous 
conversations with informal worker organisations in Ghana revealed a very strong appreciation for 
this affiliation; GTUC membership bestows a formality and a dignity to informal worker organisations 
– they are workers who belong to a fully recognised formal worker’s organisation. In theory, 
membership also means that they are represented on all the national commissions on which the 
GTUC sits.  
 
In many ways this moves makes sense from the GTUC’s perspective. Numbers have been in decline 
since the slashing of public sector jobs under the Rawlings regime, and there is negligible (if any) 
growth in formal private sector jobs. Organising the informal sector is one way to keep numbers up. 
However, this is only one aspect of the GTUC’s willingness to work with informal workers. Kofi 
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Asamoah, the current Secretary-General, stated that “all workers are workers,”327 a statement that 
encapsulates the political idea that worker solidarity across the formal/informal divide is necessary 
to challenge the current status quo, as Gallin (2001) points out. If all workers were indeed extended 
meaningful rights, a capitalist system which requires an expendable and “flexible” labour force 
would be unable to continue to operate as it currently does. Yet, as mentioned earlier in the 
discussion of SEWA’s work, there is a tension here between the ideal of universal workers’ rights, 
and the specificity of informal workers’ needs. Bridging this tension is not simple as the story of the 
GTUC, the SGA, and Ghana’s National Health Insurance Scheme shows.  
 
The NHIS is a “hybrid scheme” which is underpinned by the principles of social health insurance 
(funded through employer and employee contributions deducted from the payroll) and voluntary 
community-based health insurance (Alfers 2013). This model was specifically adopted so as to 
include informal workers whose contributions could not be obtained through payroll taxes. The 
scheme is intended then to be a universal one. It has been designed to introduce cross-subsidisation 
between formal workers and informal workers. The National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF), which 
re-insures and subsidises the “satellite” community based schemes, is funded in part through a 2.5 
percent deduction on the contributions of formal workers and their employers to the SSNIT 
retirement scheme (this makes up 22.1 percent of the Fund’s resources). The NHIF is also funded 
through a 2.5 percent VAT levy placed on all but essential goods (which makes up 72.2 percent of 
the Fund’s resources), in order that informal workers also contribute to the fund (Alfers, 2013).  
 
The NHIS is problematic for a number of reasons. Apoya and Marriott (2011) have argued that it is a 
deeply unfair scheme which essentially sees poorer people subsidise health care for those better off 
than themselves. All people in Ghana pay the VAT levy which contributes most significantly to the 
NHIF, but only those who can pay the annual premiums (which range from $10 to $32) can actually 
access the services. The scheme is also delinked from health provision itself, so that the bolstering of 
the primary health care system has not been a feature of this flagship health programme. Under-
resourced public health facilities have struggled to keep up with the increased demand placed on 
them. There is a well-founded suspicion that the NHIS is in fact more about the public subsidisation 
of private health care than it is about extending truly universal health care to the citizens of Ghana 
(Alfers, 2013). However, for the purposes of this chapter, what is of particular interest is the way in 
which the NHIS has reinforced divisions between formal and informal workers rather than creating a 
bridge between them. 
                                                          




The scheme is governed by a National Health Insurance Committee (NHIC), which represents the 
interests of government, labour, and employers. However, only one position is reserved for a labour 
representative, and since the inception of the scheme that has been filled by the Secretary-General 
of the GTUC. In his capacity as labour representative the Secretary-General is meant to represent 
both formal and informal workers. However, the problem is that formal and informal workers have 
been placed in very different positions, even oppositional positions, to one another by the design of 
the scheme. For formal workers, there are two main issues of concern. First, they are losing a part of 
their pension savings to the scheme; second, they may lose their work based private insurance 
benefits if employers decide to transfer to the NHIS. These are not the problems informal workers 
themselves face. Their issues revolve around not being able to afford the costs of the scheme 
premiums, not having the time to deal with the scheme’s cumbersome and inefficient registration 
procedures which have completely ignored the fact that most of Ghana’s poor are also workers who 
lose income when waiting in long queues, and not having enough information about what the 
scheme is actually about (Alfers, 2013). Moreover, (in theory at least) informal workers stand to gain 
from the losses that formal workers incur on their pensions. 
 
The question then arises as to how one individual is to represent effectively two very different sets 
of interests. Some of the issues could of course be dealt with simultaneously – arguing that scheme 
registrations for informal workers should be located in their places of work does not preclude one 
from arguing against the loss of work-related benefits for formal workers. On the issue of cross-
subsidisation, however, there is a direct conflict of interest, and the unsurprising result has been that 
the GTUC has chosen to focus on the interests of its original constituency. In a conversation with a 
World Bank consultant, who sat on the planning commission and the NHIC, it was alleged that the 
GTUC had in fact done little to represent the interests of informal workers on the commission. In his 
view the GTUC had focused instead on challenging the cross-subsidisation from the SSNIT, ultimately 
gaining the concession that, in return for the SSNIT deductions, formal workers would be able to 
register with the scheme at no further cost.328 There was no voice on the NHIC to challenge the fact 
that whilst poorer informal workers are contributing to the NHIF through VAT, they still have to pay 
an additional premium.  
 
This has disappointed the informal workers who are affiliated with the GTUC and who see 
themselves as GTUC members. Focus group discussions on the NHIS with the leadership of the SGA 
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revealed that the leaders felt that their interests had not been represented on the NHIC.329 There 
were also other areas where support from the GTUC might have been helpful, but was lacking. The 
GTUC’s OHS programme, for example, focuses almost entirely on formal workplaces and has done 
little to engage with local government and the institutions which govern the workplaces of many 
informal workers.330 Partly this is a result of organisational structures; the GTUC’s OHS desk falls 
under the organising division, alongside the women’s desk and the informal economy desk. This 
sectioning off of women’s interests and informal worker interests has organisational implications. It 
could be argued that these specific desks are necessary in order for these groups to get adequate 
representation and attention. However, it also means that these interests are not mainstreamed 
throughout the organisation – organising informal workers becomes a side-line business, whilst the 
“real work” remains focused on the small formal sector. 
 
The informal worker organisations affiliated to the GTUC are aware of their marginal position within 
the organisation, and have started to fight for better representation. For example, in 2012 they 
insisted on their own representation at a GTUC national panel on the rising costs of basic services. 
Through a WIEGO Law Project, the GTUC has also become more interested in engaging with local 
government institutions in order to challenge unfair city bylaws which discriminate against informal 
workers. Yet the basic contradictions of trying to organise across the formal/informal divide remain. 
Andrae and Beckman (2010) argue that these contradictions, which stem from the fact that formal 
and informal workers (particularly those who are self-employed) occupy very different positions 
within the economy and are surrounded by very different institutional structures, mean that the 
primary business of trade unions should in fact remain with formal workers and the fight against 
labour flexibilisation, informalisation, and the downgrading of social policy. They argue that this does 
not necessarily mean that formal and informal workers should not collaborate on issues that affect 
them both, but ultimately informal workers need to develop their own forms of organisation and 
advocacy which better suit their position and needs.   
 
From a purely pragmatic point of view, Andrae and Beckman (2010) have a good point. The NHIC is a 
good example of where formal workers could not adequately represent the interests of informal 
workers. The council should have another labour position to be filled by an informal worker 
representative. On the other hand, though, this has implications for a stronger workers’ movement 
overall. It goes against the idea of a universalised workers’ movement, which compromises “the 
                                                          
329 Alfers, L. 2009. Field notes for a WIEGO study of the Ghana NHIS and barriers to access for informal 
workers. 
330 GTUC Handbook on Occupational Health and Safety. 
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edge” that the movement of informal workers has. This is recognised by informal workers 
themselves. Despite feeling let down by the GTUC, the SGA has remained firmly committed to its 
membership of the organisation.  
 
Two different worker movements – one made up of traditional formal worker unions and one made 
up of informal worker organisations – opens up the idea of difference. This is not in and of itself 
necessarily a bad thing. The problem comes in when, in an attempt to cope with the very different 
institutional realities of informal work and with the different position informal workers occupy in the 
economy, governments start to downgrade workers’ citizenship overall. The Ghana NHIS is an 
attempt to extend a form of social health insurance to informal workers. Formal workers have a 
scheme which is funded by joint contributions with employers. Informal workers, who are generally 
poorer, have a scheme to which they contribute via VAT, but which many are unable to gain access 
to because of the additional contributions required. At the same time processes of informalisation 
and dispossession continue, so that more and more workers are forced to rely on such downgraded 
schemes – schemes which additionally do little to bring any further contributions from capital, and 
which rely on already weak state structures. This again is the same problem SEWA faces with its 
push to integrate OHS into primary health care in India. Different institutional structures are 
necessary, but institutional reconfigurations also reconfigure the relationship between workers and 
capital. The challenge for informal worker organisations in particular is in ensuring that this 
reconfiguration is not to the detriment of workers in the long run. This does require an alliance with 
the formal trade union movement, who sit at the forefront of this type of activism.  As the example 
of the NHIS shows, however, this can be very difficult terrain to negotiate. 
 
Conclusion: Informal workers: What is being Gained? What is being Lost? 
This chapter has shown that gains have certainly been made by organisations of informal workers, 
led particularly by the work of SEWA. These organisations are working actively (and sometimes 
successfully) at international, national, and local levels to bring ideas about work, workers, and the 
meaning of workers’ health to a more inclusive understanding. Importantly, these gains have been 
both enabled and constrained by specific national and local level economic, health, and labour 
policies. This means that whilst it is certainly worthwhile to look at the more generalised 
international context in which these organisations operate, it is also necessary to understand the 
specific national and local context. From this perspective it becomes clear that the gains that are 




KKPKP’s JAP health insurance scheme was negotiated for a specific group of workers. The scheme 
remains strong and there is no present danger from the PMC. At the same time it is not a scheme 
covered by legislation or supported by policy. It is the product of negotiation. It is not inconceivable 
that the PMC might one day change its mind and decide that it no longer wishes to support the 
waste pickers. For example, in the neighbouring municipality of Primpri Chinchiwad, where SWaCH 
had begun to operate, a change in policy by the municipal corporation to allow in privatised waste 
management companies has led to a collapse in the negotiated settlement between the PCMC and 
SWaCH. Similar stories of SEWA’s victories and losses are recounted by Ela Bhatt (2006). Long 
processes of negotiation are easily derailed by corporate pressure on politicians and by changes in 
state policy – such as happened with the agreement to provide low cost drug dispensaries at 
municipal hospitals in Ahmedabad.  
 
At the same time, it is possible to argue that some of the work done particularly by SEWA is 
managing to transcend the limits of these negotiated agreements. The fact that SEWA sits on the 
HLEG, which is currently at the forefront of efforts to transform the Indian health system into one 
which allows universal access to quality health care, is one such example. Here SEWA is contributing 
towards the development of policy that is universal in scope. The health system envisaged by the 
HLEG report goes far beyond the targeted approach of the RSBY, which covers the Below Poverty 
Line (BPL) population and certain specified groups of informal workers. Through its HLEG work it is 
possible to argue that SEWA is involved in the building of a new, more inclusive welfare compact 
than that which has existed at any time in India. Through its work at international level, for example 
on the WHO’s Global Commission on the Social Determinants of Health, and the work it is doing to 
challenge scientific workplace disciplines, it is even possible to argue that it is contributing to a new 
inclusive international welfare compact. 
 
Even then, though, important questions remain. If informal worker organisations are really to be at 
the forefront of forging a new welfare pact, they do require the political power to be able to 
determine the terms of engagement. This is difficult terrain to negotiate, particularly because, 
despite the fact that the formal economy is so small, political power is becoming increasingly 
entangled with the power of large multinational corporations who more and more set the stage for 
capitalism globally and nationally. It has been said that even SEWA, with all of its influence in India, is 
consulted by the Indian government not because of its political weight, but because of its technical 
ability to extend social programmes to the poor on the ground.331 There is a worry that this may in 
                                                          
331 Interview with the International Coordinator of StreetNet International, 24th September 2014. 
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turn affect SEWA’s mission – that it encourages it to become a technical organisation rather than 
one with an important economic and political vision.332 Whilst a certain amount of political power 
can be leveraged through formal trade unions, as the example from Ghana shows, this is again 
difficult terrain to negotiate, and formal trade unions themselves are less politically powerful than 
they once were. There are also questions about SEWA’s replicability in the rest of the world – 
whether a global movement of SEWA-type organisations is actually possible, creating strength in 
numbers on an unprecedented scale, or whether the particular context of India allows for 
organisations which cannot exist in other countries. 
 
Moreover, as Breman (2003) has pointed out, it is difficult to think about a new welfare compact 
under current economic conditions, where the state has been cut back so dramatically and is 
intertwined with capital in such a way that workers’ rights are not a priority. Relatively small 
organisations cannot take the place of the state. Without a strong state to regulate legal controls 
and monitor enforcement, it is difficult to think of how a truly universal health system could work. 
SEWA is managing to make inroads into the provision of state benefits at scale, but as it itself admits, 
it is less able to make large-scale gains against the economic processes which continue to promote 
informalisation and threaten the incomes of workers who make their living at the margins. Its 
recommendation to integrate OHS into primary care is partly about pragmatism, but it is also partly 
a result of the fact that SEWA does not have a strong purchase on the Labour Ministry. This begs the 
question posed by Lund: what “edge” does a worker’s organisation have if it cannot fight specifically 
for workers’ rights as workers, as economic agents, as people connected with the economic 
processes which surround them?333 Further complexity is added to this question when considering 
the underlying tension that exists in informal worker organisations themselves between the 
particular and the universal – between addressing their members’ particular needs as they exist at 
present, which may require a compromise of sorts, and the longer term project of economic 
redistribution. 
 
Nevertheless, there are of course many innovative ways in which organisations like SEWA, KKPKP, 
and the SGA continue to fight successfully for wider social and economic justice, even though their 
victories may be small and contingent. KKPKP’s use of EPR is one example, as are SEWA’s myriad of 
sector-specific agreements which compel sub-contractors to increase piece rates and contribute to 
health and welfare funds for workers.  Then there are the very real gains that so many women 
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workers make as individuals through their membership of these organisations; the self-esteem, as 
well as the sense of worth and purpose that both SEWA and KKPKP foster amongst those who have 
led the most difficult lives is inspiring. These cannot be simply written off because of the constraints 
of structural conditions. Moreover, if history tells us anything, it is that society does not move in a 
straight line. A time may again arrive when structural conditions are more favourable to the 
interests of workers. The movement of informal workers is still young; SEWA has only been in 
existence for 43 years. It took many more years than this for the formal trade union movement to 




Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
 
Introduction 
At its core, this study has been an attempt to explore what is revealed – what tensions emerge, what 
new questions arise – when the worker is seen in relation to the citizen in discussions of health 
provision.  In this way it is primarily a study in policy discourse rather than a history of policy as it 
plays out on the ground. It raises important questions about contemporary policy and about the 
political and economic paradigms on which health policy has been built. It also challenges the 
practice of analysing health policy from the perspective of the citizen-state relationship, arguing, 
following Lund (2009), that the employer-worker relationship is an important additional analytical 
component. This relational focus on the worker and the citizen is the original contribution to 
knowledge of this study, and a contribution to the call by Mackintosh and Tibandebage (2004) to add 
“methodological thickness” to the study of health policy and practice in the developing world. 
Particularly in the developing countries, ideas about social justice and human rights abound – yet as 
O’Neill (2005) argues, little attention is paid to the source of these rights and to questions about the 
responsibility for provision. It leads to arguments such as those by James Ferguson (2012), whose 
attempt to “historicize social assistance” in relation to informal workers is deeply flawed by his focus 
on social assistance as entirely an issue of citizenship, thereby missing the importance of work-
related social provision, particularly in countries of the Global South where universal state provision 
was always an incomplete project.   
 
In line with the above point, this study has been framed around four key questions: i) In relation to 
the terms of inclusion into health policies at present, how have we arrived at the place we have and 
why? What light does an understanding of historical processes shed on the current moment? ii) 
More specifically, how has the place of the worker changed in relation to the citizen within health 
policy in countries of the Global South over time, and what political and economic processes have 
underlain this shift? What implications do these shifts have for understanding present day policy 
changes? iii) What role have trade unions and other worker-based organisations played in the 
development of health policies and institutions? In particular, how and why have their activities 
affected (or not been able to affect) the shifting place of the worker in relation to the citizen within 
health policy? iv) How has the gendered definition of the worker and the citizen changed over time, 




In order to answer these questions, the study has adopted an historical approach informed broadly 
by Marxist theory, and has explored a number of themes related to its main thesis, drawing largely 
on the specific country experiences of two ex-British colonies: India and Ghana, and the policies of 
key health related international organisations. Chapters Two and Three laid the foundations for the 
thesis as a whole by looking at the place of the worker, from a gendered perspective, in colonial 
health policies in the British Empire, with a specific focus on India and the Gold Coast. Chapter Four 
moved to the decolonisation and early independence period in both of these countries, and 
explored the central question of why occupational health signally failed to thrive in an environment 
that was potentially conducive to it, arguing that a lack of engagement of both workers to the 
discipline, and of the discipline to the realities of the world outside Europe and North America, was a 
central aspect of this. The chapter also focused on the political economy of the relationship between 
occupational and public/clinical health provision by large employers in developing countries. Chapter 
Five moved the study from the post-independence period to the present, focusing specifically on 
how the axes of the social democratic model (the state-citizen axis and the employer-worker axis) 
had been interpreted by three key international organisations – specifically the ILO, the WHO, and 
the World Bank – in relation to health policy. Chapter Six looked at how organisations of informal 
workers, largely dominated by women workers, are attempting to engage with the politics of health, 
and asked questions about the implications of their actions for wider health justice.  
 
In this concluding chapter, an attempt is made to draw these threads together, to assess what has 
been learned, and to reflect on the debates that have arisen. Using health policy as a lens, and by 
keeping a gendered, and contextualised worker in view, the thesis has developed a critique of the 
concept of social citizenship and, in particular, the way in which social citizenship has come to be 
interpreted at present. This not a critique of social citizenship like that which has accompanied neo-
liberalism – it is not concerned with the ways in which state “interference” causes market 
distortions. Neither is it a critique from the radical left, such as that from Carl Offe (1984) who 
argued that social citizenship was merely a means to pacify the masses. Neither is it a purely feminist 
critique which focuses on women’s exclusion from economic rights (Orloff, 1993). Rather, it is a 
critique that is grounded in the realities of the Global South, specifically those countries which were 
colonised by Britain.  
 
It is important to emphasise here that the point of this critique is not to conclude with a 
demonisation of the concept of universal social rights. The idea that the state should be a guarantor 
of a basic standard of living for its citizens is a foundation stone of social justice, and has been of 
233 
 
benefit to many, even when only partially realised. Rather, it is a critique that is ultimately 
supportive of the values underlying social citizenship, but argues that, in order for those values to be 
realised in a more inclusive manner, there is a need for greater cognisance of context, gender, and 
historical realities in the making of policy. Looking at citizenship rights in relation to workers’ rights 
over time has allowed the author to look critically at the meaning and value of the concept of 
universal citizenship in a context different from that in which it developed, and to grapple with the 
tension between reality and ideas about “how reality should be.” This has moved the thesis away 
from either an optimistic but reductionist story about the progressive march forward of universal 
citizenship, or its corollary, a pessimistic analysis of the failure of citizenship in the developing world 
– exactly the “methodological thinness” against which Mackintosh and Tibandebage (2004) argue. 
Importantly, too, if there is to be a coherent challenge posed to neo-liberalism, then this re-thinking 
of social citizenship needs to be accompanied by an approach which is able to combine flexibility and 
pragmatism, while at the same time not ignoring key social democratic principles.  
 
The Critique of Social Citizenship 
It is the central contention of this thesis that keeping the relationship between the worker and the 
citizen in view over a period of time allows for important insights to emerge into past and 
contemporary health policy which are otherwise lost or made obscure. In practical terms this has 
meant looking at the economic – both economic policy and the person as economic agent, i.e. the 
worker – and the social in terms of both policy and relationships, as well as looking at occupational 
health in relation to public health throughout the thesis. This method, however, has an additional 
nuance laid over it, through a gendered and contextualised analysis of the worker. Gender analysis 
here was used as a tool with which to unlock a deeper understanding of the context of workers in 
India and Ghana. In both of these countries there is, and always has been, large scale informal 
employment. Yet, as Claire Robertson (1988) has pointed out, labour history has tended to neglect 
this fact, focusing on the more widely documented stories of employment in large colonial 
enterprises.   
 
A gendered analysis does not focus on women alone. Rather it seeks to expose the relationship 
between men and women, a relationship that is infused with power and that is both productive of 
and produced through social institutions such as the labour market and social and labour policy. In 
this thesis, this was used as a theoretical grounding which allowed the study to move beyond 
“exclusion,” and to look as well at inclusion. Cooper (1996), for example, admits that the industrial 
worker, in the eyes of African colonial administrators, was a male worker. Women were largely 
excluded from the frameworks describing this world, positioning them in the ideal world of post-war 
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welfarism as home makers and mothers. Yet, he does not go further than this to look at what 
happened to women as a result of this exclusion. The ideal was always just that – an ideal. Reality 
was very different – women worked, but they worked in very different ways, ways which challenged 
the categories drawn up by British administrators. This thesis has attempted to go further than 
Cooper, looking not only at the male dominated world of formal employment, but also at the world 
of informal work, which has always made up a disproportionately large percentage of women’s 
employment in both India and Ghana. By moving back and forth between the two worlds of work – 
the “male” and “female,” the thesis has aimed to get a deeper analysis of context. It has also used 
this approach to unlock and draw out the tension between “reality” and “ideas about how things 
should be” – a tension which is threaded through the critique of social citizenship below. 
 
The critique of social citizenship in this study emerges out of two key insights, which together form 
the basis of the critique. First, Chapter Four emphasised a tension within post-colonial health policy 
in India and Ghana, between the rhetoric of universal health provision and the reality that access to 
quality health services often remained tied to employment. The fact that this tension did not play 
out in exactly the same way in both countries, despite the common colonial heritage, is a testament 
to the very different economic, political, and social histories of these two countries. India’s longer 
history as a British colony, its specific political configurations, and the timing of its independence 
meant that health provision was more firmly tied to employment through its Employee State 
Insurance Scheme (ESIS) than is the case in Ghana, where the relative exclusion of labour from 
political decision making, and the recommendations of the Maude Commission, meant that the 
country implemented a free universal health scheme funded through general taxation after 
independence. Nevertheless, workers in Ghana did have privileges that other citizens did not, 
especially in underserved rural areas where large concentrations of labour existed, such as in the 
mining areas where large corporations like Ashanti Gold provided medical services for workers and 
their families. Workers were also able to access social security and Workmen’s Compensation which 
non-working citizens could not.  
 
The visible contribution to welfare, made through work related provisions in newly independent 
countries like India and Ghana interacted in a complex way with the predominant thinking on 
welfare provision at the time. On the one hand, the welfare states of post-war Europe had been built 
on what Lund (2009) describes as a double axis, with a line of responsibility running between the 
state and the citizen, and another running between the employer and the worker. Whilst the state 
often took on the responsibility of administering health services, this would not have been possible 
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without the contribution of capital to a broader welfare pact. In the Bismarckian models of health 
provision, the state, employers, and workers contributed directly to a social health insurance fund. 
In the British model of health provision, the NHS was a state service, free to all, and funded through 
general taxation. Although employment was a less visible part of the NHS model, it was nevertheless 
important – the NHS could never have been funded without the assumption of full employment, and 
the level of tax income that this would generate. In this way, the “social” (health) and the 
“economic” (employment) were intertwined.  
 
However, when it came to health policy in the developing world, this interdependence of health 
policy and employment concerns tended to be downplayed. In the post-colonial period, health as a 
universal right of citizenship came to be something that existed in and of itself, without real 
consideration of how that right was to realistically materialise. National policymakers on the ground 
perhaps had a more realistic understanding of the question of how to fund free universal health care 
with a small tax base and a limited budget, but international policymakers and experts, no doubt 
buoyed by the optimism and idealism of the time, seemed to pay these concrete questions less 
attention. The WHO, in particular, was an important force in pushing health as a universal right of 
citizenship into the domain of development. The fact that it was engaged in a turf war with the ILO 
as well, meant that it remained largely divorced from questions of employment, and the importance 
of work related health provision in contexts where the state’s ability to provide was limited.  
 
The failure of the WHO to engage fully with these difficult questions has led to some undoubtedly 
unintended consequences. The drive towards universal health care, whilst certainly having laudable 
aims, also provided an opportunity for large corporations operating in developing countries to “get 
out from under” their commitments to providing curative health services for workers and their 
families. The reports of the Conference on Industry and Tropical Health showed how firms like 
Standard Oil, the United Fruit Company, Firestone Rubber and Tyre Company, and others viewed 
their responsibilities in light of the WHO’s assertion that health was a right of citizenship.334 Here the 
relational analysis of public and occupational health was particularly important, as it was clear how 
occupational health had been turned into a potential bargaining chip by corporate executives, used 
as a justification for their shift away from providing curative health services. Participants at the 
Conference argued that the rightful duty of industry was to prevent ill-health amongst individual 
workers in the workplace, and not to provide expensive treatment centres for workers and their 
families. The latter was the duty of the state, as the WHO had made clear. The same logic was used 
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by General Sir Edward Spears, the Chairman of Ashanti Goldfields, when pressed by Nkrumah’s 
government to provide housing for the mining group’s workers. His reply that the Ghanaian 
government should provide housing for its citizens, “like any other government,” was a direct 
reference to social citizenship and state responsibility. 
 
These insights formed one aspect of the basis of the critique of social citizenship contained in this 
thesis. The second aspect emerged from the gendered, contextualised analysis of health and 
employment. The welfare state of Britain (and the social democratic model in general) was not only 
something which was developed in the specific context of post-war Europe, but at its foundation 
also contained definite assumptions about the social and economic roles of men and women. The 
transportation of social democratic principles and welfarist measures to India and Ghana during the 
decolonisation and post-independence period transported a set of assumptions about citizenship, as 
well as set of assumptions about gender which informed the shape of health policy and provision. 
These two sets of assumptions did not operate in isolation from one another. As Chapters Two and 
Three showed, the ideal worker was largely seen to be male (except in times of labour shortage), 
and, particularly as the colonial administrations began to implement liberal, welfarist reforms, 
women were largely positioned as mothers and carers, whilst their needs as workers were relatively 
ignored. Health programmes and policies played an important role in this by specifically excluding 
women from occupations considered unsafe or unhealthy, such as occurred in India’s coal mining 
sector when women were banned from underground work. Concerns about reproductive health 
were often intertwined with these arguments, drawing on a productionist logic which privileged 
workers and future workers. Citizenship was for workers, and work was defined by gender. Gender 
therefore has to be an important consideration when questions of inclusion and extending health 
provisions to those previously excluded are evaluated.  
 
Again the tension between ideas and reality is present here. Post-war welfarist health policies may 
have positioned women as mothers and carers relegated to the private sphere more often than they 
recognised them as workers, but the reality of women’s lives, particularly poor women, was always 
very different from that ideal. Ivy Pinchbeck’s (1930) work showed that this was as much the case for 
Britain’s working class women as it was for women in the colonies.  As Chapter Three pointed out, 
many women took part in economic activities during and directly after the colonial period –  both 
because it was necessary for the survival of the family to do so in changing times, and sometimes, 
particularly in the case of Ghana, because it gave them a social status they otherwise would not have 
had. These women included the petty traders of Accra and Kumasi, so vividly described by Claire 
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Robertson (1988) and Gracia Clarke (1994), the miners, factory workers, plantation workers 
described variously by Bannerjee (1990), Lahiri-Dutt (2001) and Sen (1996; 1999; 2008).  Further, as 
time went on and Indian women were increasingly excluded from these workplaces, the employees 
in small home based production units in India were described variously by Bhatt (2013) and Roy 
(2000).  
 
The fact that so many women continued to work, despite their formal exclusion from the labour 
market, led to a closer examination of their situation. The analysis in Chapter Three moved in this 
way from an analysis which looked only at how health policies were implicated in the exclusion of 
women from formal workplaces (such as that described above for the case of India), to one which 
also looked at where women continued to work and how health policies related to them in that 
space.  The Gold Coast here was used as an example. Unlike in India, women in the Gold Coast have 
never worked in any significant numbers in large colonial industries. They did, however, dominate 
urban petty trade. Working as these women did in urban public spaces, it was not labour health 
regulations which interacted with them in their roles as workers, but rather municipal health and 
sanitation regulations. Indeed, some of the only documentary evidence on the occupational health 
problems of market traders comes from Percy Selwyn-Clarke’s municipal health and sanitation 
report on plague in Kumasi, where market women died in disproportionate numbers because of the 
food they stored in their homes which attracted plague-ridden rats.335 Looking at points of inclusion 
then, the chapter points to a very different part of the state health apparatus than a perspective 
which focuses on exclusion alone. 
 
The key point to be drawn from the above is one about categories. Social categories can emerge out 
of material reality, but they are also the product of ideals about what a society should look like. As 
Cooper (1996) argues, European colonial administrators, and their successors in the newly 
independent countries, drew on a particular template of how the world was to be organised when 
they designed social and labour policies in the post-war period. The world that was imagined by 
colonial administrators was much like the world from which they came. In this world, men worked in 
places like factories, offices, and shops, and women remained at home to care for the family. The 
social and labour institutions they put in place matched that imagined reality – not the complexity of 
work and social life on the ground. Working women in India and the Gold Coast crossed these 
categories doubly. Firstly, they were not only mothers and carers, but also economic agents. 
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Secondly, the places in which they operated as economic agents – streets, homes, marketplaces, and 
the homes of colonialists – defied the spatial and institutional categories laid down by labour, 
municipal, and social policies. Consequently they were either ignored by national governments and 
international organisations, or, because they were an inconvenient reminder of an ideal that 
remained unattained, they were actively persecuted.  
 
In Chapters Five and Six these insights from the past were used to help to make sense of the present, 
and in doing so put forward a critique of social citizenship. This was done though a critical 
examination of the changing ideas about work and health that are part of what some have called the 
“post-neoliberal” era. These changes centre around “informal workers” – the previously ignored 
petty traders and home based workers. A question that is being asked by the ILO, the WHO, the 
Rockefeller Foundation, the World Bank, and others, is how to extend health protections, including 
OHS, to workers who work in unconventional workplaces and do not have clear employer-employee 
relationships.  After a period of high neo-liberalism, where in many countries the only basis for 
entitlements to health care came from the ability to pay, the citizen and the worker are back on the 
global health agenda.  
 
The reasons for this shift in thinking are diverse. The shift in global development discourse towards 
neo-liberalism after the 1978/9 oil crisis put an end to the era of import substitution based 
industrialisation and the promotion of social democratic style social policies in developing countries. 
Ironically, at a time when the idea of social citizenship began to come under pressure in the 
development discourse, progressive ideas about gender and work were starting to flourish. In 1970 
the economic anthropologist Keith Hart had coined the phrase “informal sector” whilst working in 
Ghana to refer to the petty traders and others who worked in unconventional forms of employment. 
The phrase was taken on in the ILO’s World Employment Programme Mission to Kenya in 1972. By 
1982 the “informal sector” was making an appearance in the ILO programme budget, and the WHO 
began to think about how to extend OHS to these “underserved workers.” There was a growing 
acceptance, particularly as globalisation proceeded and the informal economy started to grow 
rather than shrink, that governments and international organisations should think about informal 
workers. Around the same time, and particularly as the decade turned to the 1990s, questions were 
being raised about the economic contribution of women to society, and the concept of “women’s 
economic empowerment” became an important development policy issue (Razavi, 2011). Both of 
these shifts in thinking have also contributed to the current movements in health policy which seek 




Some of the most prominent suggestions have come from the World Bank, which has strongly 
promoted the idea of extending social health insurance to informal workers, with the state 
subsidising the costs.336 Other areas in which the informal worker has gained prominence is with 
regard to OHS and, particularly, the WHO’s call for the integration of OHS into primary health care 
services. What is noticeable here, when the historical importance of the employment relationship is 
kept in mind, is how responsibility has shifted onto the state and away from capital. As Chapter Five 
argued, this is occurring in a context where state power, compared to the social democratic period, 
is weakening, where the power of global capital is strengthening, and where states are being asked 
to take on more and more responsibility for the provision of social services whilst at the same time 
having less and less ability to derive contributions towards these services from capital.  Here the 
argument was that the current models of health provision erode the concept of employer 
contributions towards social welfare in favour of greater state-based provision.  
 
This shift is particularly noticeable in the case of OHS. The original principle behind industrial or 
occupational health was that of “the polluter pays” – that capital had a responsibility to protect 
those whose health may suffer in the interests of profit by paying, over and above their general 
taxes, for preventive and protective measures in the workplace and by offering compensation to 
those who lost their health. Shifting OHS into primary health care undermines that principle – it 
means that citizens now have to foot the protective bill for those who make the profits. It is in fact 
reminiscent of the ways in which capital attempted to “get out from under” its commitments to 
general health service provision in the post-independence period.  As Chapter Five argued, in this 
way new health policy configurations can be thought of less as “post-neoliberal” and more as a 
continuation of neo-liberalism, albeit in a gentler form. Here it is possible to discern the workings of 
Bakker and Gill’s (2003: 30) concept of the “new constitutionalism,” which refers to the ways in 
which neo-liberalism has reconstructed “the political and legal terms through which governance and 
accountability operate,” so that new reforms are structured in such a way that fundamental neo-
liberal principles remain unchallenged. 
 
However, the problem is that these shifts tend to go unchallenged because of the way in which they 
are able to fit into the vision of both the left and the right. The argument for the integration of OHS 
into primary health care is not coming from World Bank economists. It is coming from public health 
                                                          




professionals and health justice advocates (Barten et al., 1996, Loewenson, 1998). Here there is an 
uncomfortable cleaving of left social justice positions, which have historically failed to give adequate 
consideration to employment concerns within health policy and provision, particularly in relation to 
developing countries, with a “post-neoliberalism” that looks to emphasise state responsibility over 
employer responsibility, even for services traditionally regarded as employer based. By not seeing 
the employment relationship as a concern within health service provision, those who analyse health 
policy from a left social justice position also do not see the shifting of responsibility away from 
capital and towards the state. It is only when the worker is kept in view that this problem emerges 
clearly, thereby demonstrating the value of this approach to the analysis of contemporary health 
policy.  
 
Yet, and here is where the contextually grounded gendered analysis made in this thesis is important, 
this is not the whole story. As much as these reforms might be a manifestation of the new 
constitutionalism, they also come out of a strong critique of the social democratic model. This 
critique comes not only from the gendered analysis of welfare states and social policy, but also from 
a contextualised understanding of the labour market situation in countries outside of the Global 
North where, particularly for women, informal employment is high. This critique, which has come 
from academics as well as also from organisations of informal workers themselves, emphasises the 
need to re-think fundamental social-democratic notions of work, the worker, and the workplace, as 
well as the institutional configurations which have developed around them. This in itself though is 
contested terrain. On the one hand, the idea that informal workers are workers like any other 
workers has the potential to challenge neo-liberal ideas about the labour market. On the other hand, 
it is also a position which sits in tension with the left, social-democratic perspective that emanates 
from certain trade unions, which have tended to take the position that the only thing wrong with the 
social democratic welfare model was that it did not spread extensively enough. This of course 
ignores the fact that, as Cox (1977) argues, the post-war national and international welfare pacts 
were made possible through the exclusion of large numbers of workers outside the Global North. 
 
In reality this debate plays out in complex ways when it comes to the political economy of health. 
Again, a good example here is the movement of OHS into primary health care. On the one hand this 
is a pragmatic response to a world of work where employment relationships are blurred, and the 
workplace crosses over into living spaces and public spaces. In this way the reform makes a lot of 
sense. It bypasses the need for an employer-employee relationship and a defined workplace – the 
foundations on which the labour regime is built, including health regulation. On the other hand, it 
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creates a difference between informal workers and formal workers – one that is not necessarily in 
the best interests of informal workers in the long run, and which erodes the “polluter pays” 
principle. Like the social health insurance model promoted by the World Bank, it has the potential to 
delink capital from any responsibility to contribute to the social good. This ignores the fact that the 
very reason that there are so many workers without health protections in the first place is the 
mobility of unrestricted capital and the attendant informalisation of labour. 
 
The period of social democracy that emerged after World War Two inspired social and economic 
policies in developing countries which brought tangible benefits to the citizens of those countries. 
Health, education, and welfare indicators in many African countries, for example, improved at a rate 
much faster than previously seen in European countries undergoing social and economic transitions 
(Sender, 1999). Indeed, from the perspective of social justice, it is difficult to argue against the idea 
of state provided health care and education for all, good working conditions, and fair pay. 
Nevertheless, a contextualised, gendered analysis of social democratic ideals – and in particular 
those that underpin the provision of health services – brings up some hard questions. Is it actually 
possible to organise capitalism all over the world in this way, or is what Meagher (2013) calls the 
“downgrading of citizenship” the only realistic way that everyone can take a fair share of the global 
economy? If it is possible, how would one think about a social democracy that incorporates different 
contexts, but avoids a descent into relativism?  
 
Reflections on the Future of Social Citizenship 
It is of course difficult to provide hard and fast answers to the questions posed above. It has been 
the aim of this thesis to draw out these questions rather than answer them. Nevertheless, it is 
possible, drawing on the arguments made throughout this thesis, to add some substantive 
comments to the debate.  
 
Firstly, whilst it is agreed that the involvement of the state in the provision of health services is the 
only way to reach “universal health coverage,” it is damaging to the idea of social citizenship to 
advocate for universal provision without regard for social and economic context. An insistence that 
health care should be universally provided freely by the state is not unproblematic. In a country like 
India, where the state does have the resources to invest more heavily in health care, these 
arguments do need to made, even if the state looks unwilling to make these investments. In Ghana, 
which is smaller and poorer, it is also possible to argue this, particularly since the discovery of oil. It 
also has to be recognised, however, that the prevailing international policy environment, as well as 
internal national politics, mean that there is a long road ahead in terms of actually seeing this 
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happen. In the many smaller, poorer developing countries, it is much more difficult to see how this 
could feasibly work. Here there really is a need for pragmatism, particularly the kind of pragmatism 
that emerges directly from the needs of poor people.  
 
SEWA’s VimoSEWA scheme and its Lok Swasthya Cooperative, with their emphasis on self-reliance 
and the use of private insurance, is very far from the ideal. As discussed in Chapter Six, it has been 
criticised by those who see it as detracting from the push for universal health care in India. In 
practical terms however, it has provided much needed health services to over 120 000 poor working 
women during a time when the Indian government has all but ignored ignored health provision. 
Dismissing pragmatic choices such as this by informal workers as “the downgrading of citizenship” is 
not particularly helpful. As this thesis has attempted to show, this type of social citizenship has never 
really existed outside of the Global North. Purely ideological arguments about what the role of the 
state should be, in a context where the state can never or will not be that, turns the idea of social 
citizenship into something unrealistic and impractical. It hinders the search for meaningful 
alternatives which perhaps compromise on some of those ideals, but which ultimately have a 
realistic chance of reaching those who have been previously excluded.  
 
On the other hand, as argued in Chapter Six, it is important not to slide into relativism, and an 
uncritical acceptance of the pragmatic over the idealistic. Questions should be asked of pragmatic 
solutions and the structural factors which determine what is pragmatic and what is not. There must 
also be a line against which the politics of pragmatism can be judged – about what is and is not just. 
Keeping the changing place of the worker in relation to the citizen in view has helped to define that 
line in this thesis. It has demonstrated how the large and powerful have continued to undercut their 
contributions to social welfare, and it has looked at how this trend has interacted with the 
pragmatism of informal worker organisations, as well as those advocates of social justice whose 
(a)historicism neglects the important place of the worker in social democratic state configurations.  
 
What this means is that there is a two-fronted battle to be waged by those interested in seeing the 
emergence of a more inclusive understanding of social citizenship. The first of these fronts is a 
challenge to the left – to the advocates of universal citizenship and social justice, so that there is 
greater acknowledgement of the fact that work related social protections have been, and still have 
to be, an important contributor to national social protection, including health protection. Here 
workers’ rights and economic justice have to be seen as indivisible from social justice and citizens’ 
rights. The drive towards universal health coverage does not rule out, for example, pressure on large 
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corporations to provide health services to workers which can help to ease the burden on the state. 
An example of this from South Africa is the HIV and AIDS programme run by Anglo Gold, which has 
provided vital additional health services to mine workers. The alternative is, as Nancy Fraser (2009) 
points out, that social justice and economic justice become divided from one another, so that the 
social is privileged above the economic, and more responsibility is placed on the state, whilst capital 
remains free of obligation to contribute to the social good. 
 
The second front is a challenge to the idea that work and employment should operate in the same 
way around the world. Employment has always been structured differently in India and Ghana, 
particularly for women, and likely always will. This difference being accepted does not automatically 
signify a downgrading of worker or citizenship rights. There are ways, as organisations like SEWA and 
KKPKP have shown, that working conditions can be improved, and social and labour protections can 
be provided to informal workers working in unconventional places of work. This brings up the third 
point, which is that this acceptance comes with a necessary rethinking of institutional forms 
inherited in the late colonial period. The importance of the local state, for example, in the regulation 
of workplace health and safety and the implications that this has for the structure of labour 
regulations is something that needs to be thought through seriously. The other challenge is to the 
right and is perhaps both easier and more difficult than the challenge to the left. It is easier because 
the target is more obvious – the continued informalisation of labour, and the downgrading of work 
related protections to suit the interests of capital. This is difficult because the power of global capital 
is strong. 
 
The question then is who are and who should be the central actors in these struggles, and what 
possibilities are there for change. Whatever else, the present moment has opened up some 
possibilities for informal workers and questions of health reform. The danger, as this thesis has 
shown, is that those possibilities are being shaped in a way that does little to ultimately further the 
ends of social or economic justice. The way in which the new constitutionalism is able to adapt to its 
challenges without altering its core, means that, unlike colonialism, it is a very difficult hegemony to 
crack. Nevertheless, the fact that possibilities have opened up can also be interpreted optimistically 
as a sign of change, brought on, as Bakker and Gill (2003: 30) argue, by the “emerging contradiction 
between the global accumulation of capital and the provisioning of stable conditions for social 
reproduction.” Moreover, the shape of these openings has also been influenced by hard won 




Perhaps then the battle for now should be thought of as one which seeks to alter the shape of policy 
openings, to contest them where necessary, and to widen them where possible.  As much as 
contestations on the ground are important in this regard, there is a central role for ideas here. In this 
regard the international organisations have a potentially important part to play. As both Deacon et 
al. (1997) and Béland and Orenstein (2013) have argued, and as Cooper (1996) showed in 
Decolonization and African Society, the international organisations have acted and continue to act as 
platforms for developing and transmitting ideas.  In this way they have the potential to act as a 
space where the limits of the possible can be contested and reformulated. Of course, there are 
questions about the actual impact of the international organisations on the ground – about what 
difference the WHO and the ILO have actually made to national level policy. The ILO might have a 
Homeworkers Convention, but few states have actually ratified it. There is also the fact that 
international agencies find it difficult to provide the contextualised solutions which states and/or 
regional bodies can provide. Nevertheless, there is also ample evidence that these internationalised 
ideas can have an impact. The language of UHC, for example, which has been spearheaded by the 
WHO, is woven into the Ghanaian NHIS, and it is present as well in India’s RSBY.  
 
An important point to consider is the relative strength of the international agencies of the UN 
system, the organisations that were borne out of the social democratic, internationalist post-war 
spirit versus the World Bank and the large, philanthropic foundations like the BMGF and the 
Rockefeller Foundation. The UN organisations – in this case the ILO and the WHO – have struggled to 
define the international agenda in the neo-liberal world order and indeed have tended to confine 
any defiance to neo-liberalism to rhetoric rather than practical action. Certainly, part of the reason 
for this is that they have been undermined by a lack of resources in comparison to philanthropic 
organisations, as national budgets have tightened and donor spending has decreased (Garrett, 
2007). There has, however, also been a failure by these organisations to assert an agenda that 
provides an alternative to the World Bank model. The WHO’s UHC agenda, although reminiscent of 
Alma Ata, is a very watered down version of the earlier Alma Ata model. Its attempt at providing a 
flexible model is on the one hand an important concession to differing country contexts. On the 
other hand, it fails to draw solid boundaries around what can be considered a UHC scheme. This 
means that a scheme such as India’s RSBY, where the state pays private insurance providers to 
insure those below the poverty line for in-patient care at tertiary hospitals, can be considered part of 
the “move towards UHC” in the same breath as Brazil’s free primary health care system, funded 
through general taxation. Yet these are two very different schemes, with very different implications 
for health equity. 
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The ILO as well could be working more forcefully and creatively to think about a labour agenda for 
the 21st century. Its Decent Work programme has certainly put forward some fresh ideas – 
specifically the way in which it has experimented with the integration of labour regulation and 
municipal governance. However, it continues to have difficulty with integrating the concept of 
informal work into its tripartite structure. The difficulties in which the ILO finds itself in this regard 
are exemplified in the 2014/2015 ILC Discussion on “formalising the informal,” which a cynic might 
argue is a delaying tactic so that the organisation does not have to deal with the integration of 
informal workers, something which will fundamentally change the nature of the ILO.  
 
It also continues to push some problematic ideas about health, which have not substantively 
changed for many years. It has failed, for example, to grapple with the WHO model of integrating 
OHS into primary health care, instead trying to ignore it and carve out its own territory in 
ergonomics. Here there could have been interesting joint work to look at how capital might 
contribute to the system in order to bolster the primary health care system into which OHS could be 
integrated. For example, the ILO could support the idea of a Tobin tax or taxes on production, as 
suggested in Chapter Five. Even with ergonomics, there has been little in the way of combined 
action or thinking about how one would institutionalise ergonomically sound designs for informal 
workers through the state or through other mechanisms. Rather, it assumes that informal workers 
will bear the costs of this themselves. The “new” Global Social Floor promotes the idea of access to 
free primary health care, but does this on the basis of citizenship, with no mention of workers and 
the employment relationship other than to include informal workers alongside other vulnerable 
populations.  
 
This critique of the WHO and the ILO shows that there are possibilities for change – change that can 
happen without having to make dramatic changes to the system of global capitalism. The 
organisations of the UN system are facing a crisis of relevance, and if they are going to face this 
successfully, they need to provide a stronger critique of neo-liberal ideas, as well as providing 
stronger and more coherent policy alternatives to those being presented now. Here it is also 
important that space is made for worker organisations to contribute to the debate. The tripartite 
structure of the ILO was a revolutionary idea in its time. As Cox (1977) argues, this structure has 
been used to entrench the privilege of a few, is a twisting of the original idea behind tripartism, 




Spaces have opened up for informal workers to participate as for example with the Homeworkers 
Convention, the Domestic Workers Convention (C189), and SEWA’s acceptance at the ITUC after 
years of struggle. These spaces need to be protected and expanded where possible, because the 
exclusion of informal worker voices is not only questionable in terms of fairness, but it also means 
that the really innovative ideas that have been developed through long periods of struggle, that have 
emerged out of the everyday experiences of workers, and which are going to be a necessary part of 
any contest of ideas, are also excluded. Their exclusion also limits the possibilities for translating 
ideas into material realities. It is organisations of workers who will be the ones to push for reforms 
to be implemented at national and local levels: they will be the ones to challenge scientists to 
engage differently with the world of work, they will be the ones with an interest in a new universal 
“language of labour” that may one day, in a more conducive economic climate, be used to force a 
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1. Asamoah, Kofi, Secretary-General of the Ghana Trades Union Congress. Interview conducted 
by the author on the 9th of March 2009 in Accra, Ghana. 
 
2. Brown Afari, Juliana, International Coordinator, StreetNet Ghana Alliance. Interview 
conducted by the author on the 10th of March 2009 in Accra, Ghana. 
 
3. Chatterjee, Mirai, Director, SEWA Social Security. Interview conducted by the author in June 
2012, Bellagio, Italy. 
 
4. Horn, Pat, International Coordinator, StreeNet International. Interview conducted by the 
author on the 24th of September 2014 in Durban, South Africa. 
 
5. Patel, Jagdish, Executive Director, People’s Training and Research Centre. Interview 
conducted by the author on the 5th of April 2013. 
 
6. Seddoh, Anthony, World Bank Consultant seconded to the Ghana National Health Insurance 
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CCA   Cambridge Churchill Archives 
ILOA    International Labour Organisation Archives 
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MRU   Modern Records Unit, Warwick University 
NAG   National Archives of Ghana 
RH   Rhodes House, Oxford University 
TNA   The National Archives, London 
WHOA  World Health Organisation Archives 
WTA   Wellcome Trust Archives 
 
